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Abstract 
Under traditional International relations theory, diplomacy relates to relations between sovereign 
nations. There have been two broad schools of thought on the dynamics behind these relations: 
the ‘realist’ school, which tends to consider power and conflict as the major lens through which 
such should be viewed, and the ‘idealist’ school which tended to focus on cooperation rather than 
conflict. Between these two extreme views, a third school, the English School of International 
Relations, also known as the British Institutionalists, provides somewhat of a compromise view, 
acknowledging the merit of both realism and idealism, by accepting that power remains an 
important element but also advocating that acceptance of common norms and institutions plays a 
significant role in determining relations, or the International Society between states. 
In 1977 Hedley Bull offered the following definition of International Society when he stated that 
International Society … exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and 
common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a 
common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common 
institutions.1 
This thesis is not specifically related to International Relations theory, which deals with inter-
state relations. Whilst inter-state conflict and international relations remain important drivers of 
foreign and military policy, there is a growing recognition that it is intra-state conflict avoidance 
and post-conflict reconstruction which increasingly mitigate the risk to the safety, security, peace 
and prosperity of nations and regions. Much of this disquiet has its roots in maladministration, 
poor governance and a lack of justice. These are areas in which traditional approaches to foreign 
intervention via trade, aid and military force have limited effect, and in which effective consent-
based policing and justice can play a significant part in building sustainable and peaceful 
outcomes. 
This thesis discusses the role played by a non-traditional actor in the international arena, the 
police, specifically the Australian Federal Police (AFP), in addressing some of these intra-state 
justice and governance issues in a constantly changing, unstable and unpredictable global and 
regional environment. The thesis is intended to outline the diversity and versatility of AFP 
activities and to contextualise them in terms of non-traditional New Diplomacy. The aspects of 
diplomacy of most significance relate to diplomatic qualities or traits of the individual police 
officer, diplomatic behaviours of these members, and diplomatic outcomes of their activities.  As 
1 Bull, H. (2002). The Anarchical Society: A study of order in world politics. Basingstoke, U.K.: 
Palgrave, p. 13 in International Society: Oxford Research Encyclopaedia of International Studies: 
http://internationalstudies.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-
9780190846626-e-98 
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such the thesis does not relate directly to International Relations theory or to International Society, 
as espoused by Hedley Bull. 
There are, however, some interesting intersections which are worthy of note. There are some 
critics of the English School who argue that it is Eurocentric. Today’s International Relations 
originated in the 19th century when a number of European nations formed a club of ‘civilised’ 2 
states bound by international law, which expanded around the globe to involve all nations. This 
concept has been used to explain the lack of imperative for a supra-state or world government to 
maintain orderly inter-state relations, as the force which binds them is consent to agree to common 
interest and values within a global rules-based order. 
In terms of policing on an international scale, global government is simply too unwieldy. There 
are a number of global, consent-based institutions such as the United Nations and INTERPOL, 
which fulfil this requirement to a certain extent. The AFP has had long involvement with both of 
these global institutions, as well as several regional policing institutions.  In terms of conflict-
oriented ‘realism’ and cooperative ‘idealism’, policing walks both sides of the street. As this thesis 
will discuss, the whole posture of liberal-democratic policing is conflict prevention, and the 
means by which such police carry out their daily duties is by cooperation. This is the context in 
which replication or expansion of International Society should be considered in relation to the 
activities of the AFP internationally and regionally. 
This thesis is by definition Eurocentric, or more specifically Anglo-centric, due to the historical 
fact that the AFP draws all of its principles from Australia’s British antecedents and adheres to a 
largely ‘western’ or European notion of human rights values. 
This thesis explores the role of the AFP as an international actor. The thesis asserts that effective 
international policing has never been more important in linking the international with the 
domestic. The way the AFP operates in a landscape where traditional policing paradigms are 
rapidly changing, due to ever-changing, political, diplomatic, and transnational issues, is 
examined in the context of the ‘globalisation paradox’, of both needing and fearing, global 
governance simultaneously, as raised by Anne-Marie Slaughter in her book, A New World Order.3 
The way the organisation has evolved from its origins, based on Western liberal-democratic 
policing values, approaches and skills, to an organisation involved in international policing and 
diplomacy at the highest levels, while still retaining its liberal-democratic credentials is explained. 
It is argued that in the contemporary international and Australian context, the AFP is an effective 
2 Civilised in this context refers to post-Westphalian industrialised European nations with defined, 
although sometimes disputed, borders, common languages and accepted cultures, which were generally 
Christian. 
3 Slaughter, A. (2009). A New World Order. Princeton University Press. 
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and experienced agency. It is further argued that this is a distinctive form of new diplomacy, 
appropriate to an increasingly globalised world. 
The AFP has established an extensive international network in more than 30 countries, has been 
a consistent contributor to national security, has participated in numerous international 
deployments over half a century, and continues to play a meaningful role in Australian foreign 
policy efforts. The thesis provides evidence to show how AFP officers exhibit diplomatic qualities 
similar to those listed by Daryl Copeland in his book Guerrilla Diplomacy 4, as well as those 
mentioned by Christopher Meyer in his book Getting Our Way.5 
In all of its international endeavours, AFP members have demonstrated, in varying degrees, the 
three enduring elements of diplomacy as outlined by Jonsson and Hall in their book The Essence 
of Diplomacy. They have communicated and negotiated in some very challenging circumstances 
and they are representatives of the Australian Government and its humanitarian values. The AFP, 
as part of broader efforts with institutions such as the UN, have not so much sought a replication 
of international society, as mentioned by Jonsson and Hall, but have provided a supplement to 
international society, by effective networking, thereby addressing in large part, Slaughter’s 
‘globalisation paradox’. It is not so much universal police homogeneity which is sought by such 
endeavours, as a balance between it, and the heterogeneity which is inevitably associated with 
cultures transitioning from custom and tradition, to 21st century expectations of nationhood. The 
way the AFP’s transnational operations, activities, and deployments, not only serve perceived 
national interests, but result in more effective regional governance, is identified as ‘diplomacy by 
default’, because formal Track I diplomacy is not their primary objective. It will be demonstrated 
how international diplomacy, while generally conducted with perceived national interests as its 
primary goal, has a secondary benefit, good international citizenship, and that the AFP has a 
credible history of serving both. 
It is argued that the AFP is well positioned within government, law and intelligence and security 
circles, in the Australian and international contexts, through an extensive liaison officer network 
in South-East Asia, the South-West Pacific as well as more broadly. It will be demonstrated how 
the AFP has shown itself as capable and ready to respond effectively to extant and emerging 
challenges, and as such, has earned a place in foreign policy discussions and considerations at the 
highest diplomatic levels, including the UN. The AFP provides a distinctive and direct link 
between the global, the regional, and the domestic, which matches the rapidly globalised 
community it represents. The thesis confirms that international policing acts as a distinctive aspect 
of Australian ‘firm’ diplomacy, and supplements the more traditional elements of international 
4 Copeland, D. (2011). Guerrilla Diplomacy. Viva Books, New Delhi. 
5 Meyer, C. (2009). Getting Our Way: Getting Our Way: 500 Years of Adventure and Intrigue: the Inside 
Story of British Diplomacy. Weidenfeld and Nicholson. Orion Books, London. 
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engagement, between the ‘soft’ or traditional diplomacy, and the ‘hard’ form of military 
intervention. The evidence provided shows how it is by this form of whole-of-government 
activity, inclusive of policing, that stability and security are enhanced, and peace and prosperity 
are encouraged. Overall, the thesis affirms the AFP as a transnational agency, which is well placed 
to link the international with the domestic, the contextual with the aspirational, and the theoretical 
with the practical, in a period of strategic uncertainty in international affairs at the dawn of the 
Third Millennium. 
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Preface 
In September 2003, Professor Hugh White wrote an article in the Sydney Morning Herald 6 in 
which he mentioned ‘firm power’ in international affairs, which sits between traditional ‘hard 
power’ of military intervention and the ‘soft power’ of trade, aid and normal diplomatic links. 
This ‘firm power’, tougher than aid but softer than military intervention, is provided by justice 
sector actors such as police, prison officers, judges and governance actors such as auditors. 
This thesis is not about police ‘power’ per se, but is about a form of ‘firm diplomacy’ offered by 
international police deployments. The reason is that power implies strength and an imperative to 
use that strength to overcome an adversary. The principle behind the use of power is 
straightforward: to be more powerful, one must be bigger, stronger, faster and better equipped 
than your adversary. Whilst there are elements of this in policing, the use of power or force are 
last resorts for liberal-democratic police, whose general stance is a preference for other less 
confrontational forms of conflict resolution, such as negotiation and reconciliation, and of course, 
justice. These require empathy, understanding and a willingness to cooperate, collaborate and 
compromise, as well as an effective use of intelligence, which are characteristics very closely 
aligned to diplomacy. This thesis, therefore builds on Professor White’s notion of firmness, but 
instead of focussing on ‘firm power’, the thesis considers the actions of the Australian Federal 
Police in the international arena through the prism of ‘firm diplomacy’. This is discussed in the 
context of eight examples over a significant period spanning the millennium, where the AFP was 
deployed internationally, sometimes in lieu of the military. It will be argued that police at an 
individual level share many traits with diplomats, and institutionally, when deployed, have 
engaged in activities which have had positive outcomes for Australia’s national interests, 
including regional, and global security, peace and prosperity, as well as for the international 
‘good’ these bring. It is important to acknowledge that police do not act in isolation, but are an 
important component of a broader justice system. 
It is also important to acknowledge that the United Nations Declaration on the Principles of 
International Law decrees that: 
No state or group of states has the right to intervene directly or indirectly, for any 
reason whatsoever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, 
armed intervention and all other forms of interference or attempted threats against the 
6 White, H. 2003, ‘Not hard cop, not soft cop, but still firmly into PNG’, Sydney Morning Herald, 23 
September 2003, p.13] in Frame, T. (ed) The Long Road: Australia’s Train, Advise and Assist Missions, 
UNSW Press  Sydney 2017, p. 18. 
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personality of the State or against its political, economic or cultural elements are in 
violation of international law.7 
The Australian Government and its police respect national jurisdictional sovereignty and 
therefore do not deploy internationally without either an express invitation of the host 
government, or an international mandate from the United Nations. This is the context in which 
Australian police ‘firm diplomacy’ will be discussed. 
Diplomacy can mean many things simultaneously. For the purposes of this thesis, these 
diplomatic aspects fall into three categories: diplomatic qualities, diplomatic behaviours and 
activities, and diplomatic outcomes. This thesis will consider these in the context of eight 
individual circumstances and environments, over a span in excess of half a century, where the 
AFP has deployed its members, in the pursuit of peace, stability, security and justice, which in 
themselves are among the most worthy ideals of diplomacy. 
In chapter one of her book A New World Order, Anne-Marie Slaughter raises the use of networks 
of government officials as an alternative to the ‘globalisation paradox’, posed by the notion of 
global government. This paradox, she argues, sees global government in absolute terms between 
an outdated system of sovereign states, often in conflict or competition with each other, at one 
extreme, and an Orwellian notion of an undemocratic, autocratic, hyper-bureaucratic and coercive 
authority at the other. There is an increasing appetite for more government on a global and 
regional scale, but less inclination for centralised decision-making and global coercion. The scale 
and scope of such an entity, and the diversity of people it would encompass, are simply 
unmanageable. She argues that world government can be managed within existing parameters, by 
recognition and better use of extant and potential networks, using the soft power of persuasion, 
negotiation and information sharing, horizontally between governments, and vertically through 
international fora, or supra-national organisations. In this way, primary political authority remains 
with national governments, but ideas, concepts and common approaches, to the betterment of all, 
can be shared. She argues that these networks are at present, under-appreciated, under-supported, 
and under-used, and, describes those actors who do engage in such networking, as ‘new 
diplomats’. 
The Canadian author Daryl Copeland, in his book Guerrilla Diplomacy, and the British author, 
Christopher Meyer in his book Getting Our Way, have identified a number of individual qualities 
of diplomats, both traditional and new. It is asserted that most, if not all, of these individual 
qualities are shared and exhibited by police in their daily duties domestically, and that these 
7 United Nations Declaration on the Principles of International Law – Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations. A/RES/25/2625. 1883rd plenary meeting. 24 October 1970. 
[http://www.un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm] 
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diplomatic qualities travel with AFP members when they deploy internationally, as they bring 
well-established principles, approaches and values with them. 
Christer Jonsson and Martin Hall, in their book The Essence of Diplomacy, 8  identify three 
enduring behavioural aspects of diplomacy. The first is communication, which includes both 
negotiation and the collection and transmission of information; the second involves 
representation, not just of their principal, but also of ideas and ideals; the third is the replication 
of international society. The latter is a reflection of international norms and standards, which is 
not without its challenges in Australia’s immediate region, the Indo-Asia-Pacific, as well as 
further afield. 
This thesis will argue that the international activities of the AFP fit well within this concept of 
‘new diplomacy’, raised by Slaughter, and the behaviours identified by Jonsson and Hall, but that 
diplomacy is not their primary objective. Rather, it will be argued, the by-product of effective 
international policing activities such as peace-keeping, capacity development, crisis response, 
official liaison or engagement, in regional or international police fora by the AFP, constitute 
‘diplomacy by default’, because formal diplomatic outcomes are not their primary aim. The AFP 
acting internationally represents the ‘pale empire of ideas’, as mentioned by the Australian 
historian Geoffrey Blainey, where he states ‘[t]here were two categories of empire. One is 
physical, consisting, like the Roman and British empires, of colonies and dependencies. The other 
category is the pale empire of ideas. In the 19th century, Europe spread in influence even more 
through its empire of ideas than through the possession of new colonies.’9 It is argued, the values 
demonstrated by the AFP and its members whilst engaging internationally, are directly 
attributable to a colonial past, and are potentially transportable more broadly in the interests of 
security, peace and prosperity, and are thus an extension of this ‘pale empire of ideas’, and of  
ideals.  This is closely aligned with Hedley Bull’s notion of International Society. 
The ‘firm diplomacy’, as exhibited by the AFP, is a living example of this ‘pale empire of ideas’ 
and when applied in an international context, its’ influence is actually ‘diplomacy by default’. 
The structure, and values-base adopted by the AFP in its dealing internationally, may illuminate 
a way in which effective global policing can take place through active participation in global fora 
such as the UN and INTERPOL, and regional fora such as ASEANAPOL and PICP, without 
compromising the existing notion of state sovereignty, and thereby, at least in part, address 
Slaughter’s ‘globalisation paradox’. Instead of needing and fearing global government at the same 
time, we can have and embrace significant aspects of it through effective and accountable policing 
8 Jonsson, C. and Hall, M. (2005). The Essence of Diplomacy. Studies in Diplomacy and International 
Relations. Palgrave Macmillan. 
9 Blainey, G. (2013). A Very Short History of the World. London, UK: Penguin Books Australia, p. 385. 
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intervention and enhanced networks. This is a re-thinking of what diplomacy can be, and why it 
is increasingly important, in the era of globalisation.    
In their book Global Policing Ben Bowling and James Sheptycki introduce the notion of ‘global 
cops’ and outline the following sub-cultures of international policing: the technician, the 
entrepreneur, the public relations expert, the legal ace, the spy, the field-operator, the enforcer 
and the diplomat. These are not mutually exclusive as police are all of these things at once. The 
focus of this thesis is on the police diplomat. 
In relation to the international policing ‘diplomat’, they state that it:  
is a useful role in the complex architecture of policing but has not been the object of 
much scholarly attention. They state further …that this is the most difficult and 
demanding role and rarely found in the world of policing. It entails much more than a 
wide-ranging understanding of how to ‘get things done’, and smooth use of 
bureaucratic and legal rules. It also requires a sociological skill: the capacity to step 
outside one’s own narrow world-view and frame of reference in order to see things 
from another’s perspective.10  
The notion of policing and diplomacy are not necessarily natural partners. This is because policing 
is generally viewed through a domestic prism and diplomacy through an international one. These 
traditional paradigms are changing, due primarily to a rapidly changing policing and political 
environment, both domestically and internationally. Historically, the traditional modes of 
international engagement are by state to state diplomacy, and when required, by defence or 
military forces in furtherance of government objectives or the defence of national interests. There 
is now an increased impetus to add policing to this suite of options. 
In the Australian context, policing is well placed to link the international with the domestic, and 
the aspirational with the achievable. International diplomacy is generally conducted with the 
national interest as its primary goal, but there is a secondary beneficiary of effective diplomacy, 
which is good international citizenship. The use of military force is generally confined to serving 
the national interest, although there are some non-warlike aspects of military intervention, which 
serve international good citizenship: humanitarian aid and disaster relief are the two most obvious 
examples. Both are externally focussed with little or no domestic remit, although this is changing. 
As early as 1963, the UN Secretary General U Thant stated: 
I have no doubt that the world should eventually have an integrated police force which 
will be accepted as an integral and essential part of life in the same way as national 
police forces are accepted. Meanwhile, we must be sure that developments are in the 
right direction and we can also meet critical situations as and when they occur.11 
10 Bowling, B. and Sheptycki, J. (2012). Global Policing. London: SAGE, p. 88. 
11 U. Thant, UN Secretary General, June 13, 1963 
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A global police force is a distant vision for good reasons, including those related to Slaughter’s 
‘globalisation paradox’ of simultaneously needing and fearing such a global instrument.   Crime 
and criminals flourish in an environment of impunity, immunity and anonymity. This is becoming 
increasingly problematic in a globalised world of rapid mass communications. In addition, this is 
coupled with some major drivers of crime. Traditionally these have been seen as need and greed. 
These however have been joined by ideologies inimical to accepted societal values, such as 
religious, political or ideological extremism, which expose ordinary citizens to a significant level 
of criminal malevolence. To counteract this, the AFP provides the Australian community with a 
combination of western liberal-democratic policing values, approaches and skills, developed 
mostly in the British Isles over centuries, to detect, deter, disrupt and prevent crime offshore. 
Liberal-democratic policing is somewhat unique in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, which has faced 
serious stability and security challenges, as regional democracy has developed only recently in 
each individual nation. The AFP is a significant international participant operating in areas in 
which traditional defence capabilities or traditional diplomatic actors are not. In that sense, the 
AFP as an international police participant lies between traditional diplomacy and traditional 
defence and as such is very much a part of ‘new diplomacy’ as argued by Slaughter, and its 
activities, it is argued, constitute ‘diplomacy by default’. 
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Introduction 
In his book The Politics of the Police, Robert Reiner, an esteemed British expert on police and 
policing in the British context, quotes Frederick William Maitland the author of Justice and Police 
in 1885 stating that the group of words ‘police, policy, polity, politics, politic, political, politician 
is a good example of delicate distinctions.’12 This is as true and relevant in the contemporary 
environment as it was when it was written in 1885. 
Discussion related to daily politics is kept to a minimum in this thesis. Because, however, they 
are publicly funded, the police are inevitably connected to government policy, and as such could 
be said to be ‘political’. In British-based legal systems, however, police endeavour to remain aloof 
from the politics of the day, and maintain a posture of political impartiality and operational 
objectivity, by serving the law. This serves to underwrite their institutional legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public, and thereby the trust required in the consent-based policing model. It is public 
consent rather than coercion, or police prestige rather than police power, which underpins this 
model. Australia is a Constitutional Monarchy, and the mechanism by which political impartiality 
and operational objectivity is achieved, is by having the police, and in fact all participants in the 
criminal justice system, the legislature, the judiciary and corrections officers, swear an oath to the 
Crown, rather than to other entities such as the Constitution, the ‘people’, or the Government of 
the day. The Crown is an institution whose antecedents date from centuries of refinement, which 
underpins the legitimacy of those who represent it when dealing with fellow citizens, whose rights 
and liberties are protected under the laws enacted in the name of the Crown. This brings with it 
certain expectations and responsibilities relating to both police behaviours and misdeeds. The 
prominence of the Crown on police uniforms, is a constant reminder of this. It is a visible 
representation that rights will not be abused and freedoms will be protected by force of law, and 
that any abuses will be addressed through specifically designed accountability mechanisms. It is 
the police who actually carry out law enforcement in accordance with well-established values, 
principles and approaches, which will be further discussed. The Crown is as much a symbol of 
accountability as it is a symbol of authority. It is a visible representation of the liberal-democratic 
social contract. 13  There is also a difference between law enforcement and policing, which 
encompasses enforcement of the law as well as a host of other community-based engagements, 
often aimed at prevention. In many ways, the deployment of the AFP internationally is more 
related to the latter pursuit of policing than to law enforcement, because this sort of executive 
policing has been relatively rare in the AFP’s international engagement. 
12 Reiner, R. (2010). The Politics of the Police. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.1. 
13  Please see Appendix A: Symbolic representation of ideas and ideals worn by the AFP on international 
operations; see also Greenwood, N, (1999), For the Sovereignty of the People. 
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The notion of a liberal-democratic social contract also underwrites the common understanding of 
the ‘five-eyes’ community of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Britain and the United States. 
Ironically it is the overarching relationship with the latter, one of the most successful republics in 
world history, which underpins this community of the most trusted of international partners. The 
U.S., although a republic, shares British common law antecedents with the other members, as a 
legacy of its own British colonial heritage. 
In a paper written under the auspices of The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and 
Criminal Justice Policy, The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, 
The Centre for International Crime Prevention, The Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict 
Resolution Department of Justice of Canada, Duncan Chappell and John Evans state: 
…police derive and exercise their extensive powers and functions on behalf of the entire 
community. Consensus rather than conflict is the preferred mode and style of law 
enforcement. In contrast, non-democratic societies more frequently use police to 
impose the dictates of the ruling elite upon the masses. Their function is largely one of 
exercising control over the population rather than serving the needs of the broader 
community. These competing models of policing undoubtedly represent extremes…The 
police regulate the freedoms that are essential to democracy – immunity from arbitrary 
arrest, detention, and exile, the ability to speak, write, demonstrate, and form 
associations. 14 
This thesis concerns AFP engagement on a rapidly changing international stage. The distinction 
between law and policy therefore needs to be made early in this discussion. The AFP is essentially 
a domestic crime agency tasked with addressing nationally related criminal activity. This is done 
in accordance with legislation, as a sovereign police force operating within its own exclusive 
national jurisdiction, in partnership with its State and Territory counterparts. The AFP, however, 
has a number of international aspects related to its persona as Australia’s national police force. 
The AFP engages internationally in four broad ways: via ‘boots on the ground’ deployments 
related to peacekeeping, or police capacity-development; via crisis response in which Australia 
has an interest; via a highly effective international police liaison officer network, and via 
participation in various regional and international police fora. 
The AFP respects the notion of sovereign jurisdictions. When the AFP deploys internationally, 
particularly in ‘boots on the ground’ deployments, it does so in accordance with international law, 
as applied in Australian Government policy, to another nation’s sovereign jurisdiction. It should 
be further borne in mind that police never deploy without an international authority in the form 
of a United Nations Mandate, or an express invitation from the host government of the nation 
concerned. When, how and why these are negotiated is the preserve of official diplomats as part 
of traditional Track I diplomacy. This thesis outlines how the AFP has deployed under both UN 
14 Chappell, D. and Evans, J. (1997) The Role, Preparation and Performance of Civilian Police in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Sydney. 
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Mandates and host government invitation over the period of its existence and before. This respect 
for national sovereignty means that when the AFP does deploy to another national jurisdiction, 
certain legal requirements must be met. Prominent among these is the concept of diplomatic 
privileges and immunities.  
Diplomatic immunity 
Diplomatic Immunity is a principle of international law which provides immunity from host 
nation legal processes for certain foreign government officials. It has its origins in ancient culture 
where messengers were protected and were permitted to travel from tribe to tribe without fear of 
interference. In contemporary terms, this protects modern diplomatic communication channels, 
which allows certain foreign government representatives to conduct their duties with freedom, 
independence and security. Under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, and 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, this is a universal concept, thus all 
nominated diplomats, enjoy the same immunity from host nation legal processes.  The 
conventions provide immunity to persons according to their rank in a diplomatic mission or 
consular post and according to the need for immunity in performing their duties. 
Diplomatic privileges and immunities guarantee that diplomatic agents or members of their 
immediate family: 
• May not be arrested or detained 
• May not have their residences entered and searched 
• May not be subpoenaed as witnesses 
• May not be prosecuted 
Those of lower diplomatic status may not enjoy full immunity but may only be immune from 
legal action in relation to duties performed in an official capacity. Diplomatic Immunity can be 
waived by the diplomat’s own government, and action may be taken by that government for any 
abuses. 
It is also possible for the host country to declare any member of the diplomatic staff of a mission 
persona non grata (or unwanted person). This may occur at any time without explanation. The 
home country would normally recall the person or persons under these circumstances. 15 
In relation to immunity enjoyed by police when they engage internationally it is instructive to 
outline the circumstances in which they deploy. It is important to acknowledge that the AFP does 
not deploy its members without either an express invitation of the host government or under an 
international mandate, such as a United Nations Mandate. The AFP has four broad areas in which 
15 http://www.ediplomat.com/nd/diplomatic_immunity.htm 
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it engages internationally. The first is the international liaison network, whose members perform 
duties involving the exchange of criminal information with the countries to which the member is 
accredited. These members are generally resident in the Embassy or High Commission in a capital 
city and usually enjoy full diplomatic privileges and immunities. They travel on Diplomatic 
passports. 
The second involves members deployed on missions such as United Nations peacekeeping, or 
regional police capacity development missions. These members do not usually enjoy diplomatic 
privileges and immunities, but travel on green Official Passports, which provides a degree of 
limited protection for matters directly related to official duties. 
The third involves members who may deploy in response to emergency situations such as the 
bombings in Bali in 2002, the Boxing Day Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and the response to the 
downing of Malaysian Airlines MH17 in the eastern Ukraine in 2014. 
The fourth broad circumstance under which the AFP engages internationally is with global or 
regional police forums such as the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP), the Association of 
South East Asian Nations Police forum (ASEANAPOL), the European Union Police forum 
(EUROPOL) and the International Police forum (INTERPOL). Members of the International 
Liaison network who /are permanently stationed in these organisations normally enjoy full 
diplomatic privileges and immunities, as discussed above. Those participating in such forums 
from Australia, generally travel on green Official Passports. 
Diplomatic status generally has not been an issue of concern to AFP members deployed, as the 
AFP outlines some very strict behavioural guidelines expected of their members, including a 
number related to security, information protection, appropriate cultural behaviours, alcohol 
consumption and fraternisation, especially with host nation nationals. These are rigidly enforced 
and any breaches are usually met with immediate repatriation and internal disciplinary action. 
There have been circumstances where the AFP has been deployed in an active policing capacity, 
namely that AFP members, among others, have been required to enforce the domestic laws of the 
jurisdiction concerned, and that in order to do so they have been armed, as they would be when 
performing such duties in Australia. In such cases, the relevant use of force posture remains the 
same as that in Australia under AFP Commissioner’s Order 3. This is in accordance with Peelian 
policing notions of self-defence or defence of a third person and requires that any force used must 
be minimum, used as a last resort legal, reasonable, necessary and proportionate to the threat 
posed. Furthermore, the use of lethal force must only be in self-defence or defence of a third 
person at risk of death or serious injury. The AFP has only deployed in an Executive Policing 
capacity on rare occasions, including in Cyprus in the very early days, in East Timor with the 
UNTAET mission, in the early days of the RAMSI deployment to the Solomon Islands and in the 
Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) in Papua New Guinea in 2005. 
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The ECP in PNG encountered a number of challenges relating to immunity. In recognition of the 
highly litigious nature of the Papua New Guinea community, a number of immunities relating to 
prosecution were sought and granted with the approval of the PNG Government. This, however, 
was successfully challenged by the Governor of Morobe Province in the PNG Supreme Court and 
the ECP was withdrawn. This is further discussed in the chapter on Papua New Guinea.  
The police and the military 
The American scholars, David Bayley and Robert Perito, in their book The Police in War. 
Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism and Violent Crime point out the distinction between the different 
roles police play from their military counterparts, best summarised by the statement that police 
are not ‘little soldiers’. Bayley and Perito were making reference to non-permissive environments 
and advocated the development of core policing as an element of counter-insurgency, but indicate 
that it is easier for the military to consider police as part of a security force because it fits within 
a military set of parameters.  
Because the military, both foreign and local, is uncomfortable fighting unconventional 
wars, the great temptation is generally to substitute police for military units. 
Furthermore, it is easier to train local police as ‘little soldiers’ than as ‘professional, 
accountable, public-safety-oriented police’…Initial training for police is often as 
counterinsurgency, not as ‘serve and protect’ police….Core policing comes first, not 
last, in forging a new police force. If offensive counterforce is required, it should be 
done by the military...police contribute to counterinsurgency by winning the allegiance 
of the population; the military contributes to counterinsurgency by eliminating 
immediate threats of violence.16  
This is easier said than done, particularly in a contested environment, without resort to forceful 
and intrusive policing methods which are inimical to consent-based liberal-democratic policing, 
in which the consent of the community underpins police legitimacy. A comparison of two 
counter-insurgency operations conducted by the British in Ireland and Malaya at the end of 
Chapter 1 discusses this in detail. It will be argued in the section on Afghanistan, that although 
the basic premise of this is correct, police are not ‘little soldiers’, AFP experience in Afghanistan 
between 2007 and 2014, runs counter to the premise that ‘serve and protect’ police are effective 
in a highly contested, violent and non-permissive environment, such as an active insurgency. This 
is particularly important when the host nation police themselves are corrupt, partisan, 
factionalised or otherwise compromised, as was the case in large parts of southern Afghanistan 
in the period the AFP deployed there. 
A popular misconception, held by some military commentators, is that police are ‘little soldiers’, 
and are therefore ‘interoperable’ with their military counterparts. This may be the case in limited 
16 Bayley, D. and Perito, R. (2010). The Police in War. Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism and Violent 
Crime. Lynne Rienner Publishers, London, pp. 76–77. 
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circumstances, particularly in relation to public order management or even in violent extremist 
situations, where high-end policing mandates and capabilities meet low-end military mandates 
and capabilities. What is overlooked in such considerations, however, is that the suite of skills 
and approaches brought by police to an increasingly complex problem set, is more than just 
security-related, and involves values, principles and approaches more akin to their diplomatic, or 
justice sector colleagues than their to military ones. In terms of post-conflict transition, the police 
play a vital role in progressing from the disruption created by conflict, to a stable environment, 
from which a sustainable peace can have a reasonable chance of being maintained. The police 
span the ‘security-justice continuum’, between military ‘peace-making’ and police ‘peace-
keeping’. Broadly stated by Briton Paul Sieghart in a complaint about excessive use of force by 
the London Metropolitan Police in 1978, in a Commonwealth country like Australia, the job of a 
soldier is to kill the Queen’s enemies in wartime; that of a policeman to protect the Queen’s 
subjects in peacetime.17 Due to a number of circumstances the international has merged with the 
domestic. As a result the distinction between external and internal threat is no longer as clear as 
it once was, and exactly who is the ‘enemy’ and how they are impacting upon the ‘peace’, is no 
longer the exclusive preserve of with the military or the police. Militaries are becoming 
increasingly involved in domestic security, and policing is now a global pursuit. Policing is 
becoming more forceful and intrusive, and militaries are learning to conduct duties which are not 
directly related to warfare. 
The traditional broad divisions between police and military roles and responsibilities can be seen 
from the following table.  
  
17 Sieghart, P. (1978) Harmless weapons a threat to liberty? New Scientist, 30 March 1978, p. 841. 
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Roles of the military and the civilian police 18 
Comparison Police Military 
Activities   
Principal Purpose Law Enforcement/Crime Prevention Combat deterrence 
Objective Justice Victory/political aim 
Focus Law and Order-Internal Security-External 
Activity Constant Preparatory and Periodic 
Relevant Law Domestic Law Law of Armed Conflict 
Constitution Instrument of Law/No political influence Instrument of Policy/ Political Control 
Accountability Domestic Courts/Rule of Law Chain of Command/Executive Government 
Procedures Gather Evidence/Need for Proof Limited Information/Decisions under 
Uncertainty 
Use of Force Minimum Graduated 
 
Comparison Police Military 
Individual   
Responsibility Individual ‘Office of Constable’ Primarily a member of a Unit 
Duty To the law/judiciary To the State/Monarch 
Knowledge Law Lethal Force 
Unlawful Orders Uphold the Law Refuse Lawful Order 
Status Citizen with special powers Citizen with no special powers 
Service Voluntary Voluntary or Conscripted 
Career Starts ‘on the beat’ Soldier or Office entry 
 
 
  
18  From A.E. Hills The policing of fragmenting states’, Low Intensity Conflict and law Enforcement, Vol. 
5, No. 3, Winter 1996, pp. 334–354 at pp. 334–335 included in a chapter by McFarlane and Maley in a 
chapter titled Civilian Police in UN peace operations: Some lessons from recent Australian experience, in 
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement’ Ramesh Thakur 
and Albrecht Schnabel (eds), United Nations University Press, New York 2001, p. 187. 
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Comparison Police Military 
Organisation   
Control Local/Central Central 
Structure Hierarchical Strongly Hierarchical 
Personnel Uniformed/non-uniformed Uniformed 
Origins Emerged in 19th C 17th C and earlier 
Public Direct relationship 
Practical cooperation 
Desire for General Support 
Public esteem 
Mobility Limited Part of core function 
 
These traditional roles and responsibilities between police and military are becoming increasingly 
blurred, as law enforcement activities adopt more forceful and intrusive postures, and draw more 
on military-style techniques and equipment, in the face of a more challenging criminal 
environment.  
One area in which police and policing has become more prominent is in the international arena, 
where police activities take on a more diplomatic hue, which remains largely unrecognised, as 
raised by Bowling and Sheptycki. 
The essence of this thesis considers police and policing as acting between the ‘tracks’ laid down 
by conventional ideas of diplomacy. Track I diplomacy involves traditional diplomacy between 
official government representatives of nation states engaging in a formalised setting,  and Track 
II diplomacy involves relationships between non-government organisations, and individuals in 
furtherance of diplomatic objectives. Both Track I and Track II diplomacy are ultimately aimed 
at the restoration or preservation of sustainable peace, stability and ongoing prosperity. As relative 
newcomers to the international environment, the police fall somewhere between these two 
‘tracks’, but make significant contributions in the service of security, stability, peace and 
prosperity. 
Jonsson and Hall highlight three primary and enduring elements of diplomacy: communication; 
representation and reproduction of international society. Communication, they argue can be 
verbal or non-verbal, public or private, and in a diplomatic sense, involves negotiating as well as 
gathering and transmitting information. They note that the advent of new communications 
technology has diminished the role of diplomats, insofar as it has made direct communication 
between political leaders much easier at the same time as leaders often have to react 
instantaneously to international events, bypassing the diplomatic establishment. 19  In a 
19 Jonsson and Hall (2005), p. 96. 
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representational sense, they argue that diplomats represent their principal because they cannot ‘be 
present’ themselves or lack the required expertise and that accountability is a crucial aspect of 
this element of diplomacy, as a representative is someone who must eventually answer to whom 
he represents for what he does. 20 Furthermore they state diplomats act on behalf of principals, 
and also serve as symbols of their rulers and countries as well as certain ideas. 21   In relation to 
the ‘Reproduction of International Society’ they differentiate between inclusive and exclusive 
groupings and note that they can demonstrate homogeneous or heterogeneous characteristics. 
They note that when socialisation is strong, the international society tends toward homogeneity; 
and when socialisation is weak, toward heterogeneity. 22 Policing in fact seeks to enhance the 
social contract within culturally appropriate contexts, therefore homogeneity per se is not what is 
sought, but broad adherence to internationally accepted police behaviours. As discussed above, 
this is in accordance with Hedley Bull’s International Society conceptualization. 
It will be asserted through this thesis that the AFP in its international duties, demonstrates all 
three of these elements of diplomacy: communication, both negotiation and reporting, 
representation of the Australian Government and of broader ideals of adherence to common law 
rights, and humanitarian principles, as well as encouraging conformity with international societal 
norms and behaviours. This thesis explores the role played by the AFP as an ‘international’ actor 
largely in the service of peace. This is deliberately distinguished from the AFP acting as a 
‘diplomatic’ actor, which has connotations of the police acting in an official diplomatic capacity 
as agents of Australia’s foreign service, which is the preserve of traditional diplomats or Track I 
diplomacy. As a government agency, the AFP represents the Australian Government, but only in 
an official diplomatic sense through AFP Liaison Officers, who are accorded official diplomatic 
status, privileges and immunities. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 
maintains primacy at all times in Australia’s international engagement, and the police form 
another effective facet to that primacy. The AFP, however, is a Government agency, and as such, 
its advisers, trainers, peacekeepers and other responders such as search and rescue and disaster 
victim identification members, whose efforts cover the bulk of this thesis, are not afforded 
diplomatic status like their liaison officer counterparts, and fall outside the accepted notion of 
Track II diplomacy, which relates to non-government actors. Nonetheless, whilst not being 
officially regarded as ‘diplomatic’ actors in the narrow sense, the actions and outcomes of these 
AFP members when engaged internationally are increasingly diplomatic in nature, influence and 
impact. To that extent, traditional theory is perhaps anachronistic, and requires a review to 
encompass the increasingly globalised world, and the contemporary actors within it, including 
the police, and the malign non-state actors they pursue. There is no place for a major revision of 
20 Jonsson and Hall (2005) pp. 100–101. 
21 Jonsson and Hall (2005), p. 117. 
22 Jonsson and Hall (2005), p. 126. 
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diplomatic theory in this thesis, however the discussion in relation to ‘boots on the ground’, 
international crisis response and normal police peer to peer relationships on an international level 
by the AFP, provides a sound foundation upon which such a review could be based. 
Police and policing, on an international scale, falls between the notions of Tracks I and II 
diplomacy; it is rarely official diplomacy, nor is it non-government work. Between the traditional 
or ‘soft’ projection of state power and the ‘hard’ military projection of state power, there is an 
increasing requirement for ‘firm’ diplomacy in the form of the police. International circumstances 
are changing and they are no longer confined to government to government relationships in the 
form we have become accustomed to. Due to unprecedented globalisation of people and material 
and instantaneous communications, people to people relationships across the globe are now a 
reality. This phenomenon also includes non-traditional threats and challenges to peace, 
prosperity, public confidence, social cohesion and in some cases national sovereignty, which can 
only be addressed by the combined and co-ordinated efforts of all elements of the state, in ‘joined-
up Government’.   
In addition to increased demands on domestic police resources in the face of more widespread, 
complex and larger scale criminal activity, the demand for police internationally has increased 
exponentially in recent decades. In relation to the UN alone the growth in demand has been 
pronounced. As Caparini and Osland indicate: 
in 1988 some 35 civilian police were deployed in Cyprus, by 1994 there were 1667 UN 
civilian police deployed on international missions. This number had more than tripled 
to 5840 UN police deployed in 2000. The most recent UN figures indicate that over 
13000 international police from 187 countries were deployed in February 2014 on 15 
peacekeeping missions alone. 23  
The sorts of activities the police are involved in has grown from basic patrolling, monitoring, 
reporting and the provision of humanitarian assistance to interim law enforcement, training, 
advisory support, operational support largely in the form of para-military formed police units, 
police reform, capacity development and advisory roles in security sector reform and rule of law 
reform. The AFP has been active in all of these, with the exception of formed police units which 
are not a part of the Australian domestic police structures. The AFP has a Specialist Response 
Group (SRG), which provides a ‘high-end’ police capability for national and international 
response duties as required. 
The relationship between ‘firm’ police and ‘hard’ military diplomacy, is reasonably well 
understood, at least conceptually in Australian security circles, and deals primarily with inter-
agency ‘complementarity’ in an operational sense, and ‘transition and transfer’, in an intervention 
23 Caparini, M and Osland, K. As Police Roles Grow in UN Peace Operations, Clearer Guidelines 
Needed. March 19, 2014 https://theglobalobservatory.org/2014/03/as-un-police-become-part-of-
peacebuilding-clearer-guidelines-are-needed/ 
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sense. The former generally relies on guidelines and protocols, and the latter requires certain pre-
conditions re ‘permissiveness’. This will be discussed in the section on Afghanistan. The police-
military relationship is usually discussed in the context of the security aspect of policing, such as 
public order or the enforcement of the law by use or threat of force. The most important thing to 
bear in mind in this context, is the police and the military are not interchangeable but are 
complementary. They have well-established roles in society, however, given the emerging nature 
of some of the threats and challenges to be addressed, the traditionally distinct lines of 
demarcation between what was once traditional military, and traditional criminal lines of 
authority and effort, are also becoming increasingly blurred. This is well understood and 
adjustments are being made in this regard in all western liberal-democracies, including Australia, 
as police adopt a slightly more militarised posture and the military becomes more engaged in 
constabulary and response types of duties. Increasingly, police are calling upon military capacity 
or niche capabilities to supplement their limited resources and capabilities. Perception is 
important in this regard. The spectacle of joint police and military patrols on the streets of major 
European cities such as Paris and Brussels are designed as public reassurance measures as well 
as response and deterrence capabilities. In a different threat environment they may well be 
perceived as oppressive and intrusive. 
There has also been an observable trend in recent decades where the nature of conflict itself has 
changed, from predominantly inter-state conflict between sovereign states, to predominantly 
intra-state conflict, or conflict within established national boundaries. The dynamics underlying 
such asymmetric conflict are different and are related less to the interests of states themselves, 
than to the competing interests of those groups and individuals within these states. They include 
fissures emerging from culture, ethnicity, ideology, income or wealth disparity, resource 
competition, historically based animosities and crime. These are difficult to address by the use of 
‘hard’ or military power alone, and requires supplementation by other actors, including police 
and justice sector actors. This has become increasingly understood in Australia, in large part by 
virtue of contemporary involvement of the AFP in regional police interventions and community-
based police development efforts, particularly over the first fifteen years of the millennium. 
Less understood is the relationship between ‘firm’ and ‘soft’ or traditional diplomacy which in a 
policing sense, often relates to ‘international good citizenship’ engagements such as traditional 
peacekeeping, police capacity development and training and advising projects and humanitarian-
focused foreign aid projects, often funded by Official Development Assistance (ODA), in 
accordance with extant Australian foreign policy positions. In an international policing sense, this 
is a partially flawed funding model as there are both development and operational outcomes from 
police interventions, and the line between them is not easily discerned. In a similar vein to 
international relations and Tracks I and II diplomacy, the ODA formula, and its applicability to 
international police engagements needs to be re-visited. Again, there is no place in this thesis to 
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undertake or discuss such a review, but the thesis discussion itself will provide a clear foundation 
upon with such a review could be based. 
Globalisation 
The term globalisation has entered the lexicon over the past two decades and is used to explain 
the phenomenon of increased mobility and communicability of ideas, capital and people among 
other things. This has brought with it many positives including the ability to travel and 
communicate instantaneously on a global basis, increased cultural exposure and exchange, and a 
resultant understanding which has a tendency to minimise misunderstanding and thus conflict. 
Globalisation, however, is not universally accepted, and in fact is explicitly rejected by some 
significant sectors of the global community which has significant implications for police. 
Anarchists, whose disruption caused significant damage in western cities such as London in 2011 
and Hamburg in 2017, are two examples of anti-globalisation dispositions targeted specifically at 
the inequities attached to the global movement of capital. The rise of global Islamism is a rejection 
of the ‘western’ notion of globalisation and the advocacy of a global, or at least a regionally based 
Islamic caliphate in places like the Middle East, the Sahel and parts of South East Asia. The 
Chinese ‘one belt one road’ strategy challenges ‘western’ dominance of the globalised world and 
seeks to compete for hegemony in this sphere. There are other aspects to globalisation and its 
impact, such as some remote tribes in Papua New Guinea, who have lived in blissful ignorance 
of the rest of the human race, let alone the rapid globalisation of recent decades. Furthermore 
there are others, such as malign non-state actors including highly organised criminal syndicates, 
who utilise the mobility and communicability of globalisation to maintain the anonymity, 
impunity or immunity required to conduct their business.  Throughout its relatively brief history, 
the AFP has engaged internationally, regionally and domestically and has encountered aspects of 
all of these phenomena in the course of carrying out its duties. The phenomenon of globalisation 
will continue to shape the way in which policing conducts its duties. This includes the way in 
which the AFP interacts with its domestic partners, particularly its State and Territory 
counterparts. 
It should be acknowledged at this stage that in accordance with the way the former British 
colonies in Australia federated in 1901 to become the Commonwealth of Australia, the vast bulk 
of the day to day enforcement of the criminal law in Australia is done by the State and Territory 
police. The AFP enforces Commonwealth criminal law and deals with laws relating to narcotics 
importations, cyber-crime, major fraud against the Commonwealth, child exploitation including 
child sex tourism, as well as serious, transnational and organised crime. The AFP’s international 
liaison officer network is a direct extension of this. The ‘boots on the ground’ peacekeeping and 
capacity development, and crisis response are ancillary to it. The authority to enforce the law 
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derives from the law itself, whereas the authority for ‘boots on the ground’ deployment is derived 
from policy and ministerial direction. 
The AFP in its International Engagement Strategy 2020 and Beyond 24 estimates that up to 70 
per cent of serious crime in Australia has foreign origins or connections. As a national police 
agency, the AFP is the international representative of Australian policing when the Australian 
Government is called upon to provide police for international deployments such as UN missions. 
This is an aspect of the AFP’s international engagement which will be discussed in detail via a 
number of case studies in this thesis which will provide examples of the diplomatic effect of the 
AFP’s ‘boots on the ground’ and crisis response engagement. 
Historically, the traditional modes of international engagement by any country are by diplomacy, 
or soft power, and when required, by defence or military forces, hard power. When speaking of 
either diplomacy or defence, the following should be borne in mind: it is not what diplomacy is, 
but why it is done, which is important, and in relation to defence, it is important to ask the 
questions what is being defended, and from what is it being defended? Bearing these in mind 
enables the value of effective international policing to be reflected in light of historical, 
contemporary and anticipated future contexts, and in each, the AFP has shown itself to be a 
distinctive aspect of Australian diplomacy, with reach and relationships few other countries can 
match. International diplomacy is generally conducted with perceived national interests as its 
primary goal, but there is a secondary beneficiary of effective diplomacy, which is good 
international citizenship. 
Whilst traditional notions of ‘policing’ and ‘diplomacy’ may not automatically sit as natural 
partners, as has been previously discussed, international relationships, engagement and discourse 
are changing. We now talk of ping pong diplomacy, gunboat diplomacy, public diplomacy, 
cowboy diplomacy, dollar diplomacy, big Stick diplomacy, defence diplomacy, missionary 
diplomacy, science diplomacy, sport diplomacy. The obvious question is: why not police 
diplomacy? 
In order to understand the way in which police and policing via the AFP has had a diplomatic 
influence and effect, one needs to move away from the definition of what a diplomat is and ask 
why diplomacy is done. The primary role of diplomacy is the peaceful resolution of disputes or 
conflicts with the minimal use of force or preferably without it. There are two broad underlying 
motivations for diplomatic engagement for any state: the first is to serve its own interests, however 
that may be defined, and the second is to serve international good citizenship. Both of these are 
important, and it is timely to remember that as the police are publicly funded, so too are diplomats. 
24 Australian Federal Police International Engagement Strategy:  2020 and Beyond, Commonwealth of 
Australia AFP 2017. 
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That funding is allocated by the Government of the day in accordance with its own policy 
priorities, however, the basis of those policies and of the funding which underpins its 
implementation, is ultimately derived from the taxpayer, a fact which should always be borne in 
mind. Diplomacy does not serve its own ends and in a liberal-democracy, it is the electorate, and 
specifically the taxpayer, to whom the Government of the day and its agencies, including its 
diplomats, owe due consideration. The Government works in the interests of its people, not the 
other way around. In relation to the underlying motivations for diplomacy, namely interests and 
international good citizenship, the thesis argues that if done thoughtfully, effective policing can 
serve both by detecting, deterring, disrupting and thus preventing crime offshore. This is to the 
benefit of both the host community as well as the Australian community and the broader 
international community. This tends to undermine some of the precursors to conflict in fragile or 
disrupted states, and thus works towards long-term ‘peace and prosperity’, two of the ultimate 
aspirations of traditional diplomacy. Thus police, although not seeking to act officially as 
diplomats as their primary role, have a diplomatic influence as a by-product of their actions in the 
international environment. This is ‘diplomacy by default’. 
Daryl Copeland in his 2009 book Guerrilla Diplomacy lists a number of qualities of ‘new’ 
diplomats. They include: 
autonomy, agility, acuity, and resilience; the ability to generate and use intelligence; 
personal and situational sensitivity; local knowledge, cultural awareness and linguistic 
and communication skills; irregular representational capabilities and characteristics; 
an affinity for collaboration and teamwork; functionality in conflict situations; 
connectedness to the global political economy of knowledge; the capacity, enhanced 
by science & technology act with suppleness and a catalytic and transformational 
orientation.25 
Furthermore, it has been said that the qualities of a diplomat include a quick mind, a hard head, 
a strong stomach, a warm smile and a cold eye. 26 It is asserted that police, official diplomat or 
not, display all of the above characteristics as a normal part of their daily duties dealing with 
crises, crime, criminals, witnesses and victims, with humanity, compassion, impartiality and 
objectivity. Furthermore, it is asserted that because policing is a people-based endeavour, these 
qualities are shared by police both at the individual level and policing at the institutional level. 
This has been demonstrated by AFP in its international engagements over a fifty year period 
spanning the twilight of the Second Millennium and the dawn of the Third. These qualities are 
based on an agreed and mutually understood set of values, principles and approaches between 
liberal-democratic police, developed over centuries, in the British Isles, some dating from Roman 
times, transported to the Australian colonies where they were gradually adopted and adapted to 
suit the local environment and circumstances. These principles and values as discussed in this 
25 Copeland, D. (2011). Guerrilla Diplomacy. Viva Books, New Delhi, p. 207. 
26 Meyer, C. (2009). Getting Our Way: 500 Years of Adventure and Intrigue: the Inside Story of British 
Diplomacy. Weidenfeld and Nicholson. Orion Books, London. 
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thesis, as applicable to the AFP, are derived from three distinct, but mutually inter-related sources: 
common law principles, Sir Robert Peel’s Nine Principles of Policing and the AFP’s own values. 
These are the foundations upon which policing in Australia is based, and they form the basic 
framework of the notional ‘social contract’ between the Government and its people in Australia 
as a liberal-democracy. An understanding of this is integral to understanding the potential positive 
impact of effective, accountable, representative and responsible international policing. The terms 
of this ‘social contract’ have evolved over time, through legislation, enforced by the police and 
interpreted through the judiciary. The terms are not inflexible, but are subject to change within 
the basis foundational values, principles and approaches as outlined below. These can rightfully 
be considered inviolable. 
The common law principles are assumed but not often stated. They apply directly to police and 
the way policing is done in a liberal-democracy such as Australia. The police are the ultimate 
guarantors of these principles, but ironically breach them in pursuit of their daily duties, hence 
the vital importance of legitimacy which underpins the public consent for them to do so. The 
common law principles as listed below are an abridged version of those which form an 
introduction to basic AFP recruit training. They have been developed over the past two millennia 
in the British Isles, at the cost of much blood and treasure and were transported to the Australian 
colonies with the First Fleet in 1788 as part of the ‘pale empire of ideas’ associated with an 
industrialised Britain and an expansionist British Empire. This will be discussed more fully in the 
body of the thesis. These common law principles can be summarised as: the right to life; the right 
to liberty; the right to the use and enjoyment of private property; the presumption of innocence; 
the principle that he who accuses must prove; that in order to establish guilt proof must be beyond 
reasonable doubt; and the principle that all crimes are committed against the Sovereign. 
The significance of the latter principle relates to the fact that it is the Sovereign’s police, acting 
on the authority of the Crown, which enforces these principles, in doing so, are often required to 
breach them, sometimes by use of force. It is this police monopoly of the use of force which 
creates an environment of stability and security, which in turn provides the foundations of the 
concept known as ‘consent-based policing’, common to all British-based legal systems.  
The Peelian policing tradition 
As a federation of former British colonies, the police in colonial Australia gradually adopted the 
Peelian approach to policing throughout the 19th century, commencing with the Colony of South 
Australia in 1838. Although attributed to Sir Robert Peel, the Home Secretary of the time, the 
principles were in all likelihood, compiled by the two joint Commissioners of the London 
Metropolitan Police, Charles Rowan, a soldier, and Richard Mayne, a barrister. The sentiments 
expressed in the Nine Principles reflect those contained in the General Instructions, first 
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published in 1829, which were issued to every member of the Metropolitan Police. Noteworthy 
is the emphasis on prevention of crime, with minimal use of force, as the most important duty of 
the police. 
Peels Nine Principles were as follows: 
1. To prevent crime and disorder, as an alternative to their repression by military force 
and severity of legal punishment. 
2. To recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties is 
dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on their 
ability to secure and maintain public respect. 
3. To recognise always that to secure and maintain the respect and approval of the public 
means also the securing of the willing co-operation of the public in the task of secur-
ing observance of laws. 
4. To recognise always that the extent to which the co-operation of the public can be 
secured diminishes proportionately the necessity of the use of physical force and 
compulsion for achieving police objectives. 
5. To seek and preserve public favour, not by pandering to public opinion; but by con-
stantly demonstrating absolutely impartial service to law, in complete independence 
of policy, and without regard to the justice or injustice of the substance of individual 
laws, by ready offering of individual service and friendship to all members of the 
public without regard to their wealth or social standing, by ready exercise of courtesy 
and friendly good humour; and by ready offering of individual sacrifice in protecting 
and preserving life. 
6. To use physical force only when the exercise of persuasion, advice and warning is 
found to be insufficient to obtain public co-operation to an extent necessary to secure 
observance of law or to restore order, and to use only the minimum degree of physical 
force which is necessary on any particular occasion for achieving a police objective. 
7. To maintain at all times a relationship with the public that gives reality to the historic 
tradition that the police are the public and that the public are the police, the police 
being only members of the public who are paid to give full time attention to duties 
which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and ex-
istence. 
8. To recognise always the need for strict adherence to police-executive functions, and 
to refrain from even seeming to usurp the powers of the judiciary of avenging indi-
viduals or the State, and of authoritatively judging guilt and punishing the guilty. 
9. To recognise always that the test of police efficiency is the absence of crime and 
disorder, and not the visible evidence of police action in dealing with them.27 
27 The Principles of Good Policing. Civitas (The Institute for the Study of Civil Society) 
http://www.civitas.org.uk/pubs/policeNine.php. It is worth noting that these policing principles followed 
a decade of attempts to form an organised police body in London, and that they followed excessive use of 
military force causing multiple casualties in several public order situations, including the Gordon Riots in 
London in 1780 and the Peterloo Massacre near Manchester in 1819. The latter was condemned by 
Wellington who called for reform. Sir Robert Peel was Home Secretary and had some experience of 
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These policing principles were inculcated directly into the AFP in 1979, following a report in 
1978, by Sir Robert Mark a former Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police. This was 
a relatively straightforward process because policing in Australia via the State and Territory 
police had already adopted this approach via their colonial predecessors. Institutionally and 
individually, police consciously and unconsciously monitor, regulate and enforce the social 
contract between the community and its government which was summarised by Sir Robert Mark 
in his 1978 Report where he stated: 
We are very few in number and we are for the most part unarmed. We live among the 
communities we serve and our mobility is necessarily limited. Our authority under the 
law is strictly defined and we are personally liable for the consequences whenever we 
invoke it. We play no part in determining guilt or punishment and our accountability 
to the courts both criminal and civil, to local police authorities, to Parliament and to 
public opinion is unsurpassed anywhere else in the world…We do not act at the behest 
of a minister or any political party, not even the party in government. We act on behalf 
of the people as a whole and the powers we exercise cannot be restricted or widened 
by anyone, save Parliament alone. It is this which above all else determines our 
relationship with the public, especially in relation to the maintenance of public order, 
and allows us to operate reasonably effectively with minimal numbers, limited powers 
and by the avoidance of force, or at least the use of such force as will be approved by 
the courts and by public opinion. 28 
This is the essence of liberal-democratic, consent-based policing where, as an institutional 
representative of both the community and its government, the police represent government by 
consent rather than by coercion; prestige rather than power. The significance of this for police is 
the community generally resolves its own disputes and settles its own affairs freeing up scarce 
police resources to address more serious issues. 
The AFP itself has a number of values which it inculcates at both the individual and the 
institutional level. They reflect the way in which any member of the public would expect to be 
dealt with by police and are broadly reflective of both the common law and Peelian principles. 
They include the following: Fairness, Accountability, Commitment, Excellence, Integrity, Trust 
and Respect. The inclusion of ‘service’ is one recommendation which will emerge from the 
discussion in this thesis, based upon the past, present and future tasks and duties performed by 
the AFP. The rationale behind this should become evident from the case studies provided in this 
thesis. 
organised policing as Chief Secretary for Ireland. The London Metropolitan Police was based largely on 
the Dublin Metropolitan Police. There was a deliberate intent to avoid the continental models of policing 
which were seen as too forceful and intrusive.   
28 Mark, R. (1978). Report to the Minister for Administrative Services on the organisation of police 
resources in the Commonwealth area and other related matters. Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service. 
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The research question 
The specific question this thesis addresses is whether the efforts of police and policing, when 
engaging on an international basis, should be assessed for their ‘diplomatic’ influence and effect 
in addition to their ‘operational’ outcomes and impact. The argument this thesis presents in 
answering this question is that the combined diplomatic effect of effective international policing 
interventions or operations, is as important as, or in some cases, has greater far-reaching long-
term diplomatic implications, than the immediate operational effect of any individual intervention 
or mission. This is based on observations drawn from the experience of the AFP which has had 
continuous engagement in the international arena in various capacities, since 1964 when a small 
Commonwealth Police contingent was sent to the troubled island of Cyprus. The police were sent 
in lieu of an Australian military contingent, as part of a larger British-led, United Nations military 
intervention. The thesis covers the 53 year period 1964 to 2017 when they finally withdrew from 
Cyprus, and discusses the majority of the AFP’s international engagement in this period.  
This time-span of more than half a century is a significant period of time covering the end of the 
Second Millennium and the dawn of the Third, and can rightfully be called an era. This era covers 
the post 1945 events influenced by the global dynamics of the time, including the new 
internationalism and post-colonialism advanced by the newly-formed United Nations and the 
Cold War power plays amongst the global superpowers which emerged from the ashes of 1945: 
the communist and autocratic Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) and the democratic and capitalist United States of America (U.S.). On occasion 
new internationalism, post-colonialism and Cold War power plays were conflated in civil wars 
which became proxy wars of the great powers, or wars of national liberation. Once the victor was 
decided and the great powers or colonial administrations vacated the field, the resultant power 
vacuum was often filled by others of dubious credentials. This occurred in Cambodia, 
Mozambique, East Timor and Afghanistan, countries to which the AFP has deployed in various 
capacities. The consequent turmoil sometimes resulted in severe human rights abuses to which 
the ‘west’ reacted in varied ways. The AFP played a role in several of these responses, to restore, 
build and keep the peace. 
The AFP is well positioned within government law, intelligence and security circles in the 
Australian domestic environment, and internationally through an extensive liaison officer 
network and in regional policing forums both in South East Asia, the South West Pacific and 
elsewhere. Effective international policing has never been so important in linking the international 
with the domestic. In every sense of the word ‘diplomacy’, Australian policing through the AFP 
has shown itself capable and ready to respond effectively to extant and emerging criminal 
challenges, and as such has earned a rightful place in foreign policy discussions and 
considerations, as it provides a unique direct link between the global, the regional and the 
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domestic. Australian international policing efforts should therefore be viewed as ‘diplomacy by 
default’ and the police themselves as ‘inadvertent diplomats’. Diplomacy is not the primary 
objective of their activities but their influence and impact are diplomatic in nature. 
At the dawn of the Third Millennium global affairs are entering an age where effective policing 
has never been more important or in greater demand. This is applicable in domestic environments 
in all nations, but is also extremely important in the international environment, where the rapid 
transfer of information relating to criminal activity between trusted partners plays a significant 
role in the immediate prevention of potentially catastrophic events, but also underwrites 
community confidence in the institutions which exist solely to serve them. As a founding member 
of the UN, Australian foreign and defence policy should be aimed primarily at saving succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, in other words it should be aimed at sustainable peace. The 
17th century Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza, in a rejection of Hobbes definition of peace as 
the ‘absence of war’, is quoted as stating that peace is not an absence of war, it is a virtue, a state 
of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, justice.29 The eminent physicist and a leading 
thinker of his age, Albert Einstein is often quoted as stating, ‘peace is not merely the absence of 
war but the presence of justice, of law, of order-in short, of government’.30 George Washington 
stated that ‘the due administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good government’.31 
Effective policing within a legitimate justice system can play a significant part in such lofty 
endeavours both from a pro-active prevention perspective and also a re-active response 
perspective in post-conflict environments. Prevention and response are the two activities which 
British-based, liberal western policing has been involved in domestically for almost two centuries. 
It is a very stable model, which was spawned in the Industrial Revolution, developed during the 
expansion of Empire, tested during the decline of that same Empire and which has survived 
serious challenges both internal and external. This form of policing is in fact one of the hallmarks 
of democracy, but its perpetual continuation cannot be presumed. Demographic pressures alone 
pose a challenge to this presumption as social cohesion and trust become strained. To that extent 
it could be argued that it is preferable that liberal-democracies export their acceptable values 
rather than import the world’s unacceptable ones, and that effective and accountable policing on 
an international level is very much a part of that approach. 
29 Spinoza’s Political Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. First published April 2008, re-
published October 2013 https://plato.stanford.edu 
30 Einstein, A. cited in Vesilind, A. (2005) Peace Engineering: When Personal Values and Engineering 
Careers Converge. Lakeshore Press, p. 43. 
31 George Washington quoted in Sparks, J. (1853) The Life of George Washington  
Little, Brown and Company Boston, Massachusetts, p. 53. 
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One of the questions to be addressed in this analysis is, can this consent-based model of policing 
within a flexible social contract be replicated on an international scale? The answer is yes, but 
with some important qualifications. 
Most peace operations are conducted by international military forces, for two main reasons: most 
conflict has been traditionally inter-state in nature and military forces are oriented for such 
conflict. As such the military is generally the first option for any nation to send in response to 
international calls for assistance. However, as discussed, the nature of conflict has changed and 
the trend is now more people-centric than state-centric. This naturally involves elements 
supplementary to military force. Ideally, the aim of peace operations should be to transition from 
an international military-led guarantee of safety and security, to a democratic host nation-led 
society under the rule of law which can stand alone with little or no international assistance. It is 
only under the latter that economic development and community harmony, which are usually 
associated with such development, are made possible. Effective and accountable host nation 
police primacy and responsive policing have vital roles to play in this process, and are the 
hallmark of true state sovereignty. Interventions by international police can play a significant role 
in these sorts of transition and the AFP has a demonstrated history of successful sizeable 
interventions in East Timor and the Solomon Islands, both of which will be discussed in the thesis. 
International policing should therefore be considered as a form of ‘firm’ diplomacy, namely 
‘police diplomacy’ which includes aspects of international police activity designed to utilise 
‘police to police’ and ‘police to community’ linkages more broadly to build upon common ground 
when more traditional approaches may find barriers. Such common ground includes a mutual 
desire, and indeed a duty, to prevent and respond to crimes common to all societies such as violent 
extremism, organised criminal activities, child exploitation, narcotics and cyber-crime to name a 
few. It is this distinctive feature of police relationships which distinguish them from more 
traditional international relationships such as traditional diplomatic or even more so, military 
relationships, which at their very core often rely on seeking advantage over their international 
counterparts. It is in this aspect of ‘advantage’ that police differ from both traditional diplomats 
and military actors. Police perform better when they cooperate rather than compete with each 
other, to the mutual benefit of their respective citizens. In fact, police are at their most effective 
when that cooperation and collaboration is maximised and competition minimised. The AFP’s 
international experience demonstrates this. In that sense, operational policing support and police 
capacity development missions nest seamlessly with the strategy to protect the Australian 
community from crime by firstly addressing crime as close to its source as possible, and secondly 
by helping our neighbours develop their own capabilities, safety, security and eventual peace and 
prosperity. This inevitably involves police development defined by the AFP as: 
the support provided to police in post-conflict and developing nations to build their 
capacity to provide sustainable and quality policing to their citizens. This support 
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develops the operational capacity, enabling services and leadership that police 
services require to be accountable to their citizens and to build and maintain the 
legitimacy required to support the delivery of the rule of law. 32, 33 
One aspect which is often overlooked in discussions relating to police development and assistance 
is a return to a state of stability.  Such a state of normalcy enhances the ability for the rapid transfer 
of criminal information and intelligence between trusted policing partners, which in the 
contemporary criminal environment is of vital importance. This form of police to police 
relationship is the basis upon which the AFP has operated domestically with its whole of 
government counterparts, including with each State and Territory police agency, and also 
internationally as part of a global international police liaison officer network. This relates directly 
to the diplomatic element of communication as mentioned by Jonsson and Hall, as all aspects of 
police work involve negotiation as well as the collection and transmission of information, both of 
which are integral to effective policing. 
Overview of thesis 
The thesis follows a chronological explanation of the evolution of liberal-democratic policing and 
its underlying principles in the British Isles and their adoption and adaptation in colonial 
Australia, which laid the foundation for their adoption on a national level when the AFP was 
established in 1979. The timeline then advances to the second half of the 20th century when a 
combination of UN inspired post colonialism and Cold War dynamics in Australia’s near North, 
created a situation where Australian police were deployed in 1964 as a part of a United Nations 
peacekeeping mission in Cyprus in the eastern Mediterranean, known as the United Nations Force 
in Cyprus (UNFICYP), in lieu of the Australian military. This was the beginning of a continuous 
53-year presence with UNFICYP during which the AFP was established in 1979, and deployed 
members to other UN missions, including UNAMET to East Timor in 1999, once again in lieu of 
the Australian military. 
A series of events between 1999 and 2002 created a new security paradigm in which Australia, 
and the AFP became prominent in foreign policy considerations, particularly in the South West 
Pacific through the AFP’s International Deployment Group (IDG) and South East Asia through 
the AFP’s International Liaison Officer Network. The thesis contextualises decisions concerning 
international engagement by the AFP within global, regional and domestic environments and 
circumstances throughout the first two decades of the 21st century and Third Millennium, 
including those of Australia’s major security guarantor, the United States of America. This 
includes the resurgence of both China and the Russian Federation as global competitors to 
32 AFP International Deployment Group 2010 
33 Please see Appendix B: Police Capacity Development and the Rule of Law, for an explanation of the 
connection between police capacity development and the rule of law. 
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dominance by the U.S.-led ‘western alliance’. It also includes the rise of global ideologically 
inspired violent extremism, within the rapid and unprecedented global connectivity in both 
technological and demographic terms, both of which are enduring features of the contemporary 
international environment, with implications for police and policing, and by definition, social 
cohesion, the social contract and the community trust which underpins them. 
The sequence of chapters commences with a discussion of democracy and the role liberal-
democratic policing plays within it, and the way in which this evolved in Australia through its 
19th century colonial period and was consolidated at a national level in the 20th century. It then 
moves to a discussion on AFP involvement with the UN in Cyprus, Cambodia, Mozambique, the 
Thai-Cambodian border and briefly with Somalia, as well as some non-UN missions in Haiti and 
Bougainville. The overall observations made in relation to these missions is that they were 
primarily related to international good citizenship, with very little connection with regional or 
domestic considerations or the national interest. These missions did, however, consolidate the 
role of the AFP as an international actor, albeit for missions distant from Australia both in 
geographic and political terms. 
This changed in 1999, with an AFP-led deployment to East Timor with the UN, (UNAMET), 
which had considerable, and competing, domestic, regional and international implications. This 
mission, and the subsequent Australian-led military mission known as INTERFET, was of 
particular significance to the relationship between Australia and Indonesia. It should be borne in 
mind that Indonesia is the largest Muslim-populated nation in the world, and in the context of a 
growing level of violent Islamic-inspired extremism, particularly the attacks on the World Trade 
Centre and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the peer-to-peer police relationships between 
the AFP and its Indonesian counterparts played an extremely important role at a crucially sensitive 
time for both Australian and Indonesia. A bombing on the Indonesia island of Bali in 2002, 
discussed in detail in a section of the thesis, re-set the police to police relationship between the 
AFP and the Indonesian National Police, which continues to prosper. 
In 2003, the AFP led the security element of a multilateral regional intervention in the Solomon 
Islands in the Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) which also 
concluded in 2017 after 14 years. In a similar vein to the intervention in East Timor/Timor Leste, 
the Solomon Islands intervention provides an example of a successful transition from an 
international guarantee of safety and security to a guarantee provided by the host nation police: 
one of the hallmarks of national sovereignty. 
The successes in Timor and the Solomon Islands, and a number of political developments arising 
from a military coup in Fiji in 2006, including the rise of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) 
and its ‘Look North’ posture, resulted in the AFP enhancing its International Deployment Group 
(IDG) and developing a program known as the Pacific Police Development Program (PPDP) with 
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involvement in Papua New Guinea and in the Polynesian nations of Tonga and Samoa, as well as 
Vanuatu. The PPDP also has a regional extension known as the PPDP-Region (PPDP-R) which 
provides police advice to the vast, but sparsely-populated island nations of Micronesia. 
International Deployment Group 
The International Deployment Group (IDG) was formed in 2004 as a result of demands placed 
on the AFP by large police missions in Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands. The IDG was a 
separate portfolio within the AFP and was headed by a SES Band 2 (2-Star) National Manager 
(National Manager IDG-NMIDG). The IDG was based in Majura just north of Canberra Airport 
and had three broad components: the mission component, the A-based component and the 
Operational Response Group (ORG). It was given extra emphasis in 2006 following several 
outbreaks of violence in the Pacific, in Dili, Timor Leste, Honiara, Solomon Islands and Tonga. 
The mission component involved members actually deployed to missions from a general pool of 
suitable members trained through the IDG-designed-and-run Pre-Deployment Training (PDT), 
which was conducted in classrooms and a specific training village also located at Majura. These 
mission pool members were utilised in accordance with a ‘hubbing’ concept when not actually 
deployed or on leave. This involved working in areas in the AFP which did not involve 
operational work likely to result in a court appearance. This became slightly problematic as police 
members ‘hubbing’ could not be fully employed to their full capacity. It was a compromise 
solution with many such members working on the Mission Support Desks within the A-Based 
component. 
The A-Based component was the support mechanism for the training and administration of the 
mission component and included the IDG Executive, led by the National Manager IDG 
(NMIDG), the Mission Support Desks, a training component and a small logistics element. In 
addition to Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands, the IDG supported a number of other missions, 
including UN missions in Cyprus, Sudan and South Sudan, capacity development missions in 
Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu, the Enhanced Cooperation Mission in Papua New Guinea, operations 
Contego, Synergy and Illuminate in Afghanistan and the Pacific Police Development Program-
Regional, a fly-in, fly-out capability development mission in Micronesia. The IDG also managed 
the police response to the Northern Territory intervention and the responses to the Victorian 
bushfires and to the Wellington earthquake. 
The ORG was the specialist component which included tactical operators, negotiators, marine 
and aviation specialists as well as a number of other capabilities such as public order management. 
The IDG was amalgamated with the broader international liaison officer network in a newly 
named International Operations (IO) portfolio in 2015. IO is headed by a SES Band 3 level 
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National Manager International Operations (NMIO). The IO portfolio manages all of the 
international operations and missions conducted by the AFP. IO is based in the AFP HQ building 
in Canberra, known as the Edmund Barton Building. The logistics and ORG elements of the old 
IDG remain at Majura and became AFP-wide assets, as the ORG was amalgamated with its ACT 
Policing counterpart, the Special Operations Team (SOT), to become the Specialist Response 
Group (SRG). The SRG is available for response throughout Australia including Norfolk Island 
in the Pacific and Christmas and Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the Indian Ocean, as well as 
internationally to the region as required upon request and assessment by the Australian 
Government. 
Working with other international police 
Naturally liberal-democratic police agencies such as the AFP can occasionally encounter 
challenges when working with international police due to varying histories, cultures, roles, degree 
of politicisation, factionalism, training, competence and general benevolence. When the IDG was 
established in 2004, it was formed on the basis of increased involvement in RAMSI. The IDG 
trained all participating police from the 14 Participating Police Force nations, including Australia, 
but not New Zealand, and assessed all participants equally in scenario-based training prior to 
deployment. In this way the AFP IDG concept attempted to address some of the issues which 
sometimes bedevil United Nations missions involving large police components, including ‘hyper-
pluralism’, which as Brown, Stiernblad and Durch have identified, risks inadvertently 
undermining sound institution building, primarily related to differing policing approaches and 
environments from which they are drawn, which can sometimes confuse the host nation police.34  
This runs counter to the approach advocated by O’Rielly, former member of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police and Police Commissioner in the Former Yugoslavia who stated  
A thing that I am against, I would never agree on is having national contingents 
working one area. To be an international organization they have to be split up…[T]hat 
is the beauty of bringing police officers into a mission where you have 25 or 30 different 
nations working together. They all consider themselves as police officers, helpers of 
the people, problem solvers for the people… working together in stations, in the field, 
and divided up. Not working as a contingent, but 3 or 4 people in the station from each 
contingent… no more than 4, from these contingents in any station of 25 or 30 people 
because they learn from each other… they helped each other and they worked as police 
brothers.35 
34 Brown, M. Stiernbald, H. and Durch, W. (2014) Principles of International Police Command 
Background Paper for the SGF Thematic Meeting on Police Command.  2014. 
p.15.[http://trainingforpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/SGF-Principles-of-International-Police-
Command.pdf] 
35 Chappell, D. and Evans, J. (1997) The Role, Preparation and Performance of Civilian Police in United 
Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Sydney. Annex I: Personal Observations of a Police Commissioner in 
the Former Yugoslavia. p. 154. 
24 
                                                 
The national sector approach was adopted in a traditional peacekeeping mission such as 
UNFICYP, where sectors were allocated to national military components with corresponding 
nationally based civilian police components. For example, in one sector in 1996 the military 
component was from Argentina and the police from Australia, in another sector the military 
component was British and the police component from Australia, and in the third, the military 
was from Austria and the police from Ireland.  
The multi-national approach was certainly the case in the UNAMET deployment to East Timor 
in 1999 where Australian police worked alongside police from Britain, Ireland, the United States, 
Spain, Malaysia, the Philippines, Zimbabwe and many others. It should be noted, however, that 
the UN police were not enforcing the law in this particular mission, but were advising their 
Indonesian National Police counterparts in a highly-charged political environment. 
Between 2007 and 2013 the IDG was called upon to provide AFP members as part of the counter-
narcotics effort in Afghanistan and later as part of U.S. President Obama’s transition and transfer 
strategy in Afghanistan. This involved a changed strategic posture from a military Counter-
Terrorism strategy to a population-centric Counter-Insurgency strategy, involving training and 
mentoring large numbers of Afghan National Police. This involved liberal-democratic police such 
as the AFP in a highly contested and non-permissive security environment. The reticence by the 
AFP to engage in highly risky activities with questionable benefit, as part of ‘Team Australia’ 
under the discordant Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) construct, created a degree of 
reputational harm in the eyes of the government of the day, and undid much of the credibility the 
AFP had built up in the eyes of the previous government. It will be asserted that this was not 
really the fault of the AFP, rather it was due to a political imperative which saw the wrongful 
application of an instrument of government in an environment and for purposes for which it was 
not intended nor designed. 
This credibility was recovered in a significant way with an immediate and highly effective 
response to an unexpected but tragic incident involving the shooting down of a Malaysian Airlines 
plane over eastern Ukraine in 2014, in which evidence obtained by AFP members could 
contribute to international travel restrictions being placed upon representatives of an emergent 
super-power. 
There is an entire chapter devoted to the location of the AFP within the machinery of government 
domestically, which combined with its widely dispersed International Liaison Officer Network, 
plays a vital role in widening the thin blue line of domestic policing in every country to a wide 
blue network, when such a network has never been so important in a world of globalised serious, 
organised and occasionally violent criminal behaviours, which is explained in the final chapter. 
This chapter also discusses a number of future trends which will have implications for police and 
policing, especially the fine balance between maintaining observance of traditional individual 
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rights and freedoms, and heightened community expectations of safety, security and freedom 
from crime. 
The final observation from the thesis with an attendant suggestion is that the structure, 
interconnectivity and actions of the AFP, as one of several ‘thin blue lines’ of policing, 
domestically, regionally and globally, serve as a guideline for the way in which values-based 
policing could be considered more broadly. The proposition is that this extension of ‘thin blue 
lines’ into an effective network, a ‘wide blue net’, serves diplomatic ends by underwriting peace 
and prosperity, whilst simultaneously balancing individual rights and freedoms with broader 
community expectations of safety, security and freedom from interference by malign non-state 
actors such as organised criminals and violent extremists. As previously stated, it is preferable 
that Australia export its liberal-democratic values rather than import the illiberal values of violent 
extremists and organised criminal groups. It is this peer to peer networking between trusted 
partners, which goes some way to addressing Slaughter’s globalisation paradox. If conducted 
properly, globalised policing is not something to be feared, but is something to be embraced, 
respected and encouraged. The case studies provided in this thesis are demonstrations of how 
such globalised policing can be achieved, without compromising national sovereignty.  
The thesis concludes that although not officially acknowledged as a ‘diplomatic’ actor, the AFP 
is an ‘international’ actor whose activities, actions, responses, influences and effects are 
diplomatic in nature. The thesis furthermore will conclude that traditional theory which 
categorises diplomacy as official Government Track I diplomacy and non-government 
engagement as Track II diplomacy should be reviewed to account for the new actors in the 
globalised environment. In addition, as a result of this reconsideration of police activities as 
‘diplomatic’ in influence, the funding model under existing OECD DACC ODA guidelines under 
which many police programs are funded, should also be reviewed. At a more localised domestic 
level, a further recommendation relates to the status of police who have served in certain 
dangerous missions as ‘veterans’ who should be treated in exactly the same way as their military 
counterparts. This is an important aspect of harmonious, seamless and equitable Australian 
whole-of-government interventions. 
The final conclusion from the thesis is that the distinctive nature of AFP activities in the past, and 
likely future roles and activities, including responding to unexpected crises, are in fact, 
‘diplomacy by default’. 
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Chapter 1: Democracy, Peace, Prosperity and Progress Based 
on Values and Principles 
Overview 
In their 2012 book Global Policing, Bowling and Sheptycki, touch on the nexus between the 
social contract, colonialism and the use and abuse of state power. They quote Thomas Hobbes’ 
Leviathan of 1651, John Locke’s Second Treatise of Government of 1689 and Jean Jacques 
Rousseau’s 1762 treatise The Social Contract. 
Summarised, Hobbes argued that [l]aw is dependent upon the sanction of the sovereign and the 
government without sword are but words of no strength to secure a man at all. At the opposite 
end of the scale Rouseau argued that freedom happiness equality and liberty existed in primitive 
societies prior to social contract, but a new form of social organisation-the state was formed to 
assure and guarantee rights liberties freedom and equality.36 Between these two extremes John 
Locke the British philosopher argued that [t]he purpose of government and law is to uphold and 
protect the natural rights of men – when it ceases to fulfil it then the laws have no validity’. 37 All 
three influenced the American Declaration of Independence in 1766, which had an influence on 
both the reason the Australian colonies were settled and how the social contract evolved within 
these colonies throughout the 19th century. Noteworthy is that the period in which both Hobbes 
and Locke wrote preceded the Glorious Revolution and its Bill of Rights of 1688, as well as what 
became known as the Bloody Code, which sentenced so many to transportation to Australian 
colonies. 
The French philosopher, Francois Marie Arouet, Voltaire, in juxtaposing the absolute power of 
the French monarchy with the Constitutional Monarchy he observed in England, noted of English 
law that: 
The English system was the one that all of humanity would choose if they were given 
the choice to make laws…giving back to each man all his natural rights, which people 
have been stripped of in nearly all monarchies. These rights are: the complete liberty 
of the person and of his possessions; to speak to the nation through the instrument of 
the pen; to be tried in any criminal matters only by a jury made up of independent men; 
to not be judged in any matter except by the precise terms laid down by the laws; to 
follow in peace any religion one desires… I dare to say that if you assembled all of 
human kind to draw up laws, this is how they would frame them for their own safety.38 
36 https://www.britannica.com/topic/social-contract 
37 https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/locke/ 
38 Voltaire Philosophical Dictionary (1764) quoted in Adcock, M. The Enlightenment. Nelson Cengage 
Learning. South Melbourne, Australia 2014, p. 56. 
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These are the common law rights which underpin British-based liberal democracy, which are part 
of to social contract in Blainey’s pale empire of ideas which remain in Australia after the actual 
physical empire has ceased to exist.  In relation to colonialism, Bowling and Sheptycki argued 
that: 
[t]he social contract is the key to police legitimacy and forms the basis of the liberal 
idea of policing by consent … Policing was central to the colonial system and 
imperial domination. It was used to impose European standards of legality… 
European legal institutions of police and courts were used, along with other ideas, 
to impose modernity upon the globe. Policing was the lynchpin of the colonial 
project. Military authorities attended to ‘constabulary duties’ as well as being an 
‘army of occupation’ … Very often colonisers encountered organised resistance to 
the imposition of outside rule and in such circumstances this was responded to with 
what would nowadays be called counter-insurgency operations.39 
Australia also experienced this, particularly in relation to its indigenous inhabitants; however, 
despite some abuses of power by the colonial authorities, the Australian experience of 
transitioning from a military autocracy to a vibrant democracy was steady and was punctuated by 
a series of incidents, which if seen through a police prism, reveal a slightly different perspective 
from the widely accepted historical orthodoxy of the Australian colonial experience. 
The adoption of the Peelian policing tradition in 19th century colonial Australia, and at the 
national level when the AFP was established can best be understood through the role the Crown 
plays in ensuring both restraint on authority and accountability at the individual level. As 
Goldstein points out: 
democracy is heavily dependent upon its police, despite their anomalous position, to 
maintain the degree of order that makes a free society possible. It looks to its police to 
prevent people from preying on one another; to provide a sense of security; to facilitate 
movement; to resolve conflicts; and to protect the very processes and rights – such as 
free elections, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly – on which continuation of 
a free society depends. The strength of a democracy and the quality of life enjoyed by 
its citizens are determined in large measure by the ability of the police to discharge 
their duties.40  
This chapter will explore the notion of ‘consent-based legitimacy’. This is a vital concept in any 
discussion of the AFP and policing, particularly in a liberal-democratic sense. In many policing 
contexts, control is maintained more by force or the threat thereof, rather than by community self-
regulation with organised police support, as in liberal-democratic societies. The chapter considers 
the evolution of a distinct police identity and the development of the legitimacy of this identity, 
from its origins in the British Isles, its transportation to the Australian colonies and its adaptation 
to local circumstances including federation. The focus is on the formation of the AFP, and its 
evolution as international peacekeeper with the United Nations and its domestic crime duties.  
39 Bowling and Sheptycki (2012), Ch. 1. 
40 Goldstein, H., Policing a Free Society, Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1977, p. 1. 
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The significance of oaths 
In 1728 Voltaire visited England and later published Letters Concerning the English Nation in 
1733 in which he wrote: ‘The English are the only people on earth who have been able to 
prescribe limits to the power of kings by resisting them; and who, by a series of struggles, have 
at last established that wise form of government where the prince is all powerful to do good, and 
at the same time is constrained from doing evil.’41 This incurred the wrath of the French King, 
who was an absolute monarch and whose excesses resulted in the French Revolution. Britain did 
not suffer the same fate as France, because it balanced the power of the King with that of 
Parliament in a Constitutional Monarchy. 
One of the mechanisms which gives power to do good and constrain power to do evil, is to temper 
the natural impulse of the political class to pursue power, with an apolitical entity with 
benevolence and fairness as its core raison d’être. In British-based liberal-democracies, this entity 
is the Crown, which within a Constitutional Monarchy remains the sole enactor of laws. 
Kings, princes and politicians, may possess authority, and the ability to pass laws, but it is those 
in their service who exert that power by force of arms if necessary. These forces are the military 
and the police, which have traditionally been focused externally and domestically respectively. 
Military force is a familiar concept and requires no further explanation at this point. The 
relationship between the Crown and the police, as a significant component of the criminal justice 
system reflects a broader benevolence which is a feature of British-based common law systems. 
This benevolence is based upon strong adherence to objectivity and impartiality in the 
administration of the criminal law in favour of those accused of criminal activities. This is 
demonstrated by the oaths of office taken by police, whose wording they share with the judiciary, 
namely to carry out their duties ‘without fear, favour, affection or ill-will’. These words form an 
integral part of the oaths of both police and judges and oblige them to act impartially and 
objectively. They are oaths sworn by both police and judges, to the Monarch, Her Majesty Queen 
Elizabeth the Second and Her Heirs and Successors according to law. The pivotal role played by 
the Crown in Australia’s system of government is important to grasp, because it is the apolitical 
nature of this entity, the Crown, which plays a part in denying the potential for partiality, 
subjectivity or undue influence to play a role in public affairs. The institution of the Crown is a 
robust and elegant mechanism which effectively balances authority with accountability, both vital 
ingredients underwriting the element of trust which is so vital in the impartial and objective 
administration of justice, particularly criminal justice. The benevolence in this regards is further 
guaranteed by the Coronation Oath, sworn by Her Majesty when she took the Throne on 2 June 
1953, which is discussed further below. 
41 Adcock, M. The Enlightenment. Nelson Cengage Learning. South Melbourne, Australia 2014, p. 55. 
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Dating from the restoration in England following Cromwell’s failed administration and inherited 
in the Australian parliamentary system, the Crown plays a central role in the founding governance 
of the Australian Federation, as a third element in the passage of legislation through the Federal 
Parliament. Often overlooked in daily political discourse, the Crown is actually a part of the 
Parliament, by virtue of the role played by Royal Assent, usually performed by the Governor 
General. Refusal to grant Royal Assent is a significant, but rarely invoked feature of the 
Westminster system of government, but by its mere presence, it formally serves as a restraint on 
parliamentarians. This is embedded in Australia’s founding document, the Australian 
Constitution. 
The Australian Constitution 1901 42 states: 
Section 1. Legislative power 
The legislative power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Parliament, 
which shall consist of the Queen, a Senate, and a House of Representatives, and which 
is hereinafter called ‘The Parliament’, or ‘The Parliament of the Commonwealth.’ 
Section 2. Governor-General 
A Governor-General appointed by the Queen shall be Her Majesty's representative in 
the Commonwealth, and shall have and may exercise in the Commonwealth during the 
Queen's pleasure, but subject to this Constitution, such powers and functions of the 
Queen as Her Majesty may be pleased to assign to him. 43 
It can thus be seen that the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia consists of three distinct 
and independent components: a popularly elected House of Representatives; a Senate consisting 
of Senators elected on a State basis; and the Queen, represented by the Governor-General. The 
latter, often overlooked in day-to-day politics, is a largely silent but extremely important 
component of the legislative process, as proposed bills, passed by both houses of the Parliament, 
do not become law until they receive Royal Assent. This is a final check on political power, and 
its potential abuse, due to the fact that laws inconsistent with the ‘peace, order and good 
government’44 of Australia cannot become law if they do not receive Royal Assent. Politicians, 
42 Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900. 
43 Sawer, G. (1975) The Australian Constitution. Chapter 1 The Parliament. 
44 The phrase ‘peace, order and good government’ was originally used in the British North America Act, 
1867 (now known as the Constitution Act, 1867) enacted by the Imperial Parliament, and it defines the 
principles under which the Canadian Parliament should legislate. The drafters of the Australian 
Constitution borrowed heavily from other likeminded liberal-democratic countries including Canada. The 
Australian Constitution states that the legislative power of the Commonwealth of Australia is vested in 
the Queen, a Senate and a House of Representatives and, subject to the Constitution, the Parliament 
makes laws for the 'peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth'. 
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aware of this, are thus restrained from excess. This is what is meant by the Crown denying power 
to others.45 
Furthermore, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, in Her Coronation Oath swore to govern all of her 
subjects, including all Australians, ‘…according to their respective laws and customs’ and 
furthermore in doing so, ‘…cause Law and Justice, in Mercy, to be executed in all…judgements.’ 
The relevant detail from the Coronation Oath 46 is provided below: 
Archbishop. Will you solemnly promise and swear to govern the Peoples of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the 
Union of South Africa, Pakistan, and Ceylon, and of your Possessions and the other 
Territories to any of them belonging or pertaining, according to their respective laws 
and customs?47 
45 Royal Assent in Australia’s legislative process can trace its antecedents to the very foundations of 
parliamentary democracy in England in the Middle Ages, when all powerful monarchs, ruling with the 
Divine Right of Kings, gradually ceded power to representative institutions, the House of Lords, 
consisting of bishops, abbots, earls and barons and the House of Commons, consisting of shire and 
borough representatives. During the reign of Henry VI it became common practice for both houses to 
originate legislation as Bills which could not become law unless the Sovereign’s Assent had been 
obtained, because the Sovereign was, and remains the only enactor of laws. The Divine Right of Kings 
ended with the execution of King Charles in 1649, following a trial for treason. This was replaced by the 
Commonwealth or Protectorate, otherwise known as the English republic under Oliver Cromwell as the 
Lord Protector between 1649 and 1660, which abolished Royal Assent. This form of government 
subsequently failed and was replaced by the pro-Royalist Cavalier Parliament (1661-1679) which 
reinstated Royal Assent and repealed all laws passed during the period of Cromwell’s republic. Following 
parliaments retained Royal Assent as part of the legislative process. In terms of rights and freedoms in 
England in that period, a number of noteworthy developments ensued. These include: the English Bill of 
Rights, which dealt primarily with parliamentary matters such as regular sittings and parliamentary free 
speech; and the Act of Habeas Corpus in 1679 which required courts to examine the lawfulness of 
detention and which, based on Magna Carta 1215, was intended to prevent unlawful or arbitrary 
detention. This period also witnessed what was to become known as the ‘Bloody Code’, whereby an 
increased number of offences attracted capital punishment. These included murder, rape and assault as 
well as highway robbery, burglary, arson, house-breaking, high treason, coining, forging, uttering, 
personating, riot, stealing and sacrilege. The number of offences rose from 50 in 1688, to 160 in 1765 and 
225 in 1815, when, following the end of the Napoleonic wars, there were calls for reform. This was also a 
period in which those convicted for such crimes, often had their sentences commuted to transportation, 
originally to the American colonies, and upon loss of these, to Australia. When the Australian colonies 
developed responsible and representative government in the 19th century, they adopted the British 
bicameral structure, including Royal Assent, and when these colonies federated in 1901, the Federal 
Parliament adopted a similar structure, also including Royal Assent as part of the legislative process. 
Thus what had been designed to limit the arbitrary power of all-powerful monarchs, has been adapted to 
the benefit of the community, by placing a subtle, but important restraint on the potential for political 
excess in parliament. 
46 https://www.royal.uk/coronation-oath-2-june-1953 
47 Of interest is a comparison of ‘peace order and good government’ of the countries mentioned in the 
Coronation Oath, between those who remained constitutional monarchies (Britain, Canada, New Zealand 
and Australia) and those which became republics (South Africa, Pakistan and Ceylon). South Africa, 
Pakistan and Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, have all suffered violent post-colonial histories, whilst Britain, 
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Queen. I solemnly promise so to do. 
Archbishop. Will you to your power cause Law and Justice, in Mercy, to be executed 
in all your judgements? 
Queen. I will. 
The monarch, as represented by the Crown, serves as a symbol of the legitimacy of all courts of 
justice, and of their judicial authority, as well as those charged with applying and enforcing the 
law, the police. All participants of the criminal justice system, the legislators, the police and the 
judicial officers, are required to swear true allegiance to Her Majesty in oaths or affirmations. The 
wording of these oaths is also important, as judges and police, in particular swear oaths or 
affirmations which include the obligation to carry out their duties ‘without fear, favour, affection 
or ill-will.’ 
The actual wording of the oath sworn by members of the Australian Federal Police is provided 
below: 
Australian Federal Police Oath 
I………., do swear that I will be faithful and bear true allegiance to Her Majesty Queen 
Elizabeth the Second, Her Heirs and Successors according to law. That I will faithfully 
and diligently exercise and perform all my powers and duties as a person declared to 
be a member under section 40B of the Act of the Australian Federal Police without 
fear, favour, affection or ill-will, from this date until I cease to be a person declared to 
be a member under section 40B of the Act of the Australian Federal Police. That, 
whenever performing duty in the Australian Capital Territory, I will cause Her 
Majesty’s peace to be kept and preserved, and prevent to the best of my power, offences 
against that peace. And that, while I continue to be a person declared to be a member 
under section 40B of the Act of the Australian Federal Police, I will to the best of my 
skill and knowledge, faithfully discharge all my duties according to law: So help me 
God.48 
The combination of authority and accountability under The Crown, is shared by those components 
of the criminal justice system, the police and the courts as it is these institutions which actually 
deal impartially and objectively with people on a daily basis, and have the capacity to directly 
and meaningfully impact people’s lives, for better or worse, but they are always administered in 
accordance with law and justice in mercy in accordance with the sentiments of Her Majesty’s 
Coronation Oath. 
Canada, New Zealand and Australia have enjoyed relative peace and prosperity over a prolonged period. 
Whilst some doubt can be raised as to the direct influence of the Crown in this regard, it is certainly good 
governance and a relative absence of political excess, widespread corruption or large-scale ethno-
religious violence in the Constitutional Monarchies which is a point of differentiation with the republic 
mentioned. The indirect role the Crown has played in this cannot be overlooked. 
48 https://www.australianpolice.com.au/the-oath-of-office-police/ 
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Sometimes regarded as mere formalities, the wording and the sentiments underpinning them, are 
actually quite important. As the former Chief Justice of the High Court Sir Gerard Brennan, AC, 
KBE outlined in a speech upon being sworn in as Chief Justice of the High Court in April 1995: 
These ceremonies (and oaths and affirmations) ‘…are not empty rituals…[they are] not 
a matter of formal procedure…[but are a]…public witnessing of the making of two 
solemn promises for the performance of which the oath taker will be responsible…The 
first promise is a commitment of loyalty to Her Majesty the Queen her heirs and 
successors according to law. It is a commitment to the head of State under the 
Constitution…a promise of fidelity and service to the Australian people…[because] 
[a]llegiance to a young, free and confident nation governed by the rule of law is not a 
burden but a privilege. 
The second promise is to ‘do right to all manner of people according to law ‘without 
fear or favour, affection or ill-will’. In substantially that form, the oath or affirmation 
is taken by every judge. It is rich in meaning. It precludes partisanship for a cause, 
however worthy to the eyes of a protagonist that cause may be. It forbids any judge to 
regard himself or herself as a representative of a section of society. It forbids partiality 
and, most importantly, it commands independence from any influence that might 
improperly tilt the scales of justice.’49 
At the legislative level, Parliamentarians have been required to swear similar oaths or 
affirmations; however the wording has been altered over time, to remove or replace references to 
Her Majesty, depending upon the political persuasion of the government of the day, and to the 
degree of significance they place on oaths sworn to the Crown. Noteworthy is the fact that two of 
the major political parties, the Australian Labor Party and The Greens, have specific policies with 
the express objective of moving towards an Australian republic and favour the removal of 
references to the Crown, Her Majesty and Royal Assent from the parliamentary process. No detail 
as to what will replace them, should the move to an Australian republic be successful, has ever 
been agreed upon. Significantly, no wording such as ‘without fear, favour, affection or ill-will’ 
has ever been included in the Parliamentary Oath of Office. The conclusion to be drawn therefore 
is that it is only the policing and the judicial components of the criminal justice system which are 
duty bound to demonstrate accountability for their authority and for demonstrating the objectivity 
and impartiality to which their oaths and affirmations bind them. 
It can therefore be seen that both police and judges are duty bound to conduct themselves ‘without 
fear, favour, affection or ill-will’, because of the four components of the criminal justice system, 
it is these two which deal directly with life, liberty and the right of everyone to the use and 
enjoyment of private property. With such authority, there also needs to be a commensurate level 
of accountability. 
In the case of British-based liberal democratic police, this authority and accountability is devolved 
to the lowest ranking member, the Constable, who is directly, and individually responsible for his 
49 Speech on Swearing in as Chief Justice, 21 April 1995 
http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-justices/brennanj/brennanj_swearing.htm 
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or her own actions, and is held personally accountable for abuses of authority. The Office of 
Constable means that the individual police officer must form his or her own suspicions or belief 
before taking action such as making an arrest, using force or entering or seizing private property, 
and cannot be directed by superiors to do so. In fact this places an onus on the Constable to 
disobey any unlawful directions in this regard. 
Greenwood 50 in his book For the Sovereignty of the People makes this quite clear by quoting 
High Court Justice Windeyer ([1963] HCA 15; (1962) 110 CLR 74, 84 (Windeyer J) who stated 
in relation to government authorities under the Crown: 
They cannot justify any wrongdoing by alleging that they were acting in the execution 
of the orders of a superior. The constable who makes an unlawful arrest, is personally 
liable at the suit of the injured party, although he may have been acting upon 
instructions … Every civil servant should remember that, while it is the duty of the 
servants of the government to carry out all lawful orders, it is equally their duty to 
disobey unlawful orders. 
Furthermore, Greenwood argued: 
[T]he fact all government ministers, all the judges, barristers and other servants of our 
courts of law, all State and federal police, all members of our armed services have been 
required to swear an oath to Her Majesty … the symbol of the Crown is placed upon 
the badges and buttons of all the police, the armed services … that might need to wield 
extraordinary authority in a crisis or natural disaster … upon acquiring particular 
positions of power, officials are required to swear allegiance to the Queen because 
they’re given that authority formally as servants of the Queen, thus constrained in the 
manner set out by Windeyer … the conspicuous display of the Crown upon uniforms, 
as well as displaying the source of authority wielded by officials, also offers promise 
and warning – a promise that if he or she abuses that power by acting unlawfully, he 
or she is personally liable for the consequences… No special executive order, no excuse 
of ‘national security’ or secret agenda of high state can alter that.51 
In relation to the way police present themselves as institutionally and individually benign under 
the Crown in the Peelian preventative policing tradition, Greenwood’s watchdog provides an 
illustration: 
It may be said that the Crown actively defends the constitution in the same sense that 
a watchdog in a garden actively defends the grounds, even when he sleeps in his kennel. 
Most prospective burglars, aware of the danger, will prefer to let sleeping dogs lie and 
refrain from an attempt at burglary. For his own part the dog would prefer to sleep. 
Only the trespasses of those who still dare to violate the grounds will rouse him to the 
fury of his office.52 
The police in British-based liberal-democratic countries such as Australia are rarely roused to the 
fury of their office, primarily because there has rarely been any such requirement, and even when 
so roused, it is the exception rather than the rule. Society, however, is changing and serious 
50 Greenwood, N. 1999 For the Sovereignty of the People, p. 58. 
51 Greenwood p. 59. 
52 Greenwood p.117. 
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criminality, including ideologically-inspired violence within such liberal-democracies, and 
further afield, means that the watchdog can no longer afford to sleep in his kennel. The result is 
that policing is becoming more forceful and intrusive, as it balances respect for individual rights 
and freedoms with community expectations of safety and security, within a broader political and 
legal system which, a la Voltaire, continues to aspire to constrain the potential for both 
government and other actors to do harm and encourage the power to do good. In fact, even the 
most ardent of Australian republicans concede: 
Republican movements have generally been an expression of the desire for freedom 
and justice…We have no tyranny to oppose…In truth, in a world filling with tyrants, 
Queen Elizabeth 11 and her descendants represent a sort of anti-tyranny.53 
Section 1: Consent-based legitimacy 
The Australian social contract through the police prism 
Colonialism revisited: The Pale Empire of Ideas 
There has been a tendency amongst influencers in society, in academia, in large areas of politics, 
almost universally in the media and the arts, in short amongst those elites who are opinion-makers, 
to highlight the blemishes and deficiencies of imperialism and colonialism by focussing in detail 
on distasteful incidents while simultaneously ignoring the possibility that broader aspects of both 
imperialism and of colonialism had some beneficial aspects. 
Even the most disdainful critics of British imperialism and colonialism could not fail to recognise 
that those countries in Africa and Asia which were settled by the British also had a much more 
peaceful transition from colonialism to independence than their counterparts with French, Belgian 
or Portuguese colonial experiences. There are other countries, known as settler societies where 
the settlers eventually outnumbered the indigenous inhabitants such as Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada and arguably, the United States where those principles, practices and values imported by 
their British colonial settlers were not only adopted in their new lands but adapted to suit local 
circumstances. In one sense the British Empire was as much an extension of the ‘pale empire’ of 
ideas and ideals, as it was a geographically-based trading entity, or in Australia’s case, a penal 
colony. 
The first international arrest warrant: The Bounty Mutineers 
If the ability to enact, apply and enforce laws globally is a measure of ‘world government’ then 
it was an incident, commonly referred to as the Mutiny on the Bounty in 1789 in the Pacific, very 
close to the Australian continent, and with some close connections to the penal settlement of New 
53 Watson, D. (2018) Rethinking the Republic, The Monthly Magazine April 2018, p.11. 
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South Wales, which is arguably one of the first applications of British law internationally. 
Following the actual mutiny, then Lieutenant William Bligh RN made his way with seventeen of 
his loyal shipmates to Timor to alert the Governors of India and the new penal colony at Botany 
Bay, and thence to England to report the mutiny to the Admiralty. 
Bligh left a copy of the description of the mutineers on a list whilst in Batavia en route back to 
England and ‘subsequently forwarded copies-with a brief explanation of the mutiny-to the 
governor-general of India, Lord Cornwallis, and to Governor Phillip in New South Wales.’54  
These were the most obvious destinations for the Bounty mutineers to re-provision, had they 
decided to return to England. This was probably the first example of an international arrest 
warrant, and in fact it was acted upon by the Admiralty by dispatching a second ship the ill-fated 
HMS Pandora, of the infamous ‘Pandora’s Box’, to arrest the mutineers for return to England to 
face trial. 
Even an offence as serious as mutiny, which attracted the death penalty, entitled the suspects to a 
fair trial rather than face summary execution, and for its own reasons, the Admiralty was 
determined that justice would be done, and be seen to be done. This era is often portrayed as a 
cruel one, with some justification, however in comparison with its colonial peers, Britain at least 
had some sound notions of law, justice and government and the ability to deliver them on a global 
basis. 
Little wonder that Napoleon, after dominating Europe for over a decade, recognised the 
effectiveness, extent and reach of British law when he was taken into custody in 1815 and 
petitioned the Prince Regent for mercy: 
Your Royal Highness 
A victim to the factions which distress my country, and to the enmity of the greatest 
powers of Europe, I have terminated my political career, and I come, like Themistocles, 
to throw myself upon the hospitality of the British people. I put myself under the 
protection of their laws, which I claim from Your Royal Highness, as the most powerful, 
the most constant and the most generous of my enemies. 
Napoleon 
Rochefort 13 July 181555 
54 Mundle, R. (2016), Bligh Master Mariner. Pen and Sword Books Ltd. 
55 Napoleon's letter of surrender sent to George, Prince Regent, July 13 1815. Royal Archives / Her 
Majesty Queen Elizabeth II 2014. http://www.culture24.org.uk/history-and-heritage/military-history/pre-
20th-century-conflict/art512362-napoleon-letter-of-surrender-from-waterloo-to-go-on-public-view-at-
windsor-castle. The British demonstrated just how powerful, constant and generous they were by 
ultimately exiling him to the island of St Helena in the middle of the South Atlantic, and one of the 
world’s most barren and isolated outposts, where he remained until his death in 1821. 
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‘Powerful, constant and generous’, are words that, even in contemporary terms, are relevant to 
countries whose laws which derive their antecedents from Britain. Australia is one of these 
countries. In fact the Australian colonies commenced their journey to vibrant democracy 
ironically when the first Governor of New South Wales, Arthur Phillip was at the Admiralty in 
London whilst oversighting the provisioning of the First Fleet of convicts to New South Wales 
and was enlightened enough to envision a land without slaves. 
Philip, the First Governor – ‘… idealistic, humanitarian objectives …’ 
Australia is no stranger to justice and the rule of law, crime, punishment and its connection with 
economic development and international affairs. In fact it is very much part of Australia’s early 
genetic makeup as a convict settlement. With the loss of the American colonies in 1776, the 
British settlement of the Australia colonies was designed to solve a problem in Britain, primarily 
that of crimes against the person and property, caused mainly by the rapid urbanisation and 
subsequent poverty, created by the Industrial Revolution. In essence, the Bloody Code had created 
a crisis of overflowing prisons, and transportation was an alternative to hanging thieves or 
building prisons or prison ‘hulks’ to house them in Britain. 
These ‘idealistic, humanitarian’ principles in early Australia had an auspicious start. Even before 
leaving England, the first Governor, Captain Arthur Phillip RN had deliberated on the existence 
of slavery in the new colony and had rejected it. As Geoffrey Robertson QC states in the booklet 
published in 2015 to celebrate the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta in 121556 whilst waiting at 
the Admiralty for provisioning of the First Fleet, it was Phillip who drafted what he described as 
the first law for a land that only he envisaged might become a nation: 
Captain Arthur Phillip, by raising the Union Jack on the muddy foreshores of Port 
Jackson on 26 January 1788…imported into the country as much of British common 
law as was capable of application to its conditions. Not all the principles of Magna 
Carta, by then a feature of the common law, were applicable to a penal settlement-it 
would take many years and many disputes before trial by jury could be established. But 
its great promise that ‘to no man will we sell, to no man will we deny or delay justice 
or right’ was familiar to Phillip, who ensured that his Judge-Advocate protected 
convicts against theft by marines, and punished convicts and soldiers alike who 
assaulted Aborigines. Indeed it was Phillip, whilst waiting at the Admiralty until, at his 
humane insistence, the first fleet was properly provisioned, who drafted what he 
described as the first law for a land that only he envisaged might become a nation:’ 
There can be no slavery in a free land’, he decreed, ‘and consequently no slave’. 
Phillip’s first law…was imbued with the spirit of Magna Carta and its idea of the 
‘rights’ of freeborn citizens.57 
56 Australia Magna Carta 2nd ed (2015), Department of the Senate, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra. 
57 Australia Magna Carta 2nd ed (2015), Department of the Senate, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, p. 37. 
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Notably, this was forty years before slavery was abolished in Britain and it was the first of many 
matters of difference in legality and policy between Britain and its Australian colonies.58 
The arrival of the First Fleet at Botany Bay, and later Port Jackson in January 1788, however, 
brought with it more than a group of convicts from a harsh criminal code and their military 
overseers. It also brought with it the extant British governance and legal principles and practices 
dating from Rome in 212AD, affirmed in 1066, formalised in 1215, matured during the Middle 
Ages, refined in 1688 and expanded following British victories in 1759 in North America and the 
Sub-Continent and later further afield to places as far distant from Britain as the Australian 
continent. The pale empire of ideas and ideals had expanded into the southern hemisphere. 
There was an observable difference in judgements between sentencing a felon to transportation 
at the ‘Governor’s Pleasure’ and the Pain of Death.  Although often portrayed as a cruel and 
pernicious penal system, the transportation of convicts to the Australian colonies, could be 
interpreted in an entirely different light. In fact, conviction and transportation for relatively minor 
offences, often prevented the execution of the offender, thanks to the jury system. 
Trial by jury had one important consequence for the founding of Australia. The harsh 
laws of Georgian England decreed the death penalty for theft of goods worth more than 
40 shillings, but it was left to juries to do the valuing-and time and time again, they 
mercifully valued expensive goods at only 39 shillings, in order to save thieves from 
the gallows. This was one reason for the need to clear overcrowded prisons by 
transportation to Botany Bay after the American colonies had revolted. In the penal 
colony there was no immediate call for jury trial (convicts and soldiers alike faced 
court martial) but by Governor Macquarie’s time this featured as the very first demand 
of the emancipists. Their right to sit on juries was eventually granted, despite angry 
opposition from free settlers.59 
Even before trial by jury, the early military officers who formed Australia’s first judicial officers 
were able to demonstrate common sense and a degree of difference between strict adherence to 
English law, and its compassionate application in New South Wales, as demonstrated in the Kable 
case. 
The first civil case in New South Wales: Henry Kable (Cable) 
Under contemporary English law, condemned criminals became immediately dead in law and 
were thus unable to give evidence, or sue in court or sue. Their goods were forfeited to the Crown. 
58 In 1808, the British Parliament passed the Slave Trade Act 1807, which outlawed the slave trade, but 
not slavery itself. Slavery itself was abolished in the British Empire in 1833 by The Slavery Abolition Act 
1833. 
59 Australia Magna Carta 2nd ed (2015), Department of the Senate, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, p. 37. 
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The ‘felony attaint’ was not removed if their sentences were commuted to transportation. But the 
first civil case in NSW changed this.60 
This was the case of Henry Kable (Cable) who was convicted for burglary at Norfolk, England in 
February 1783, and sentenced to death, which was commuted to fourteen years transportation. As 
a convicted felon sentenced to death, he was subject to the law of ‘felony attaint’, whereby he 
was considered legally deal at law. He embarked on the transport ship Friendship as part of the 
First Fleet in 1787. Before he left England he married, and a number of people took up a collection 
of goods which he and his wife took with them when they sailed as convicts to Australia. 
A parcel of goods valued at £20 was sent out on Friendship to the Rev. Richard Johnson who was 
to give it to the couple on their arrival in the penal colony. The goods were plundered on the 
voyage, but Kable successfully sued and won damages of £15, for the theft of the property, against 
the ship's captain Duncan Sinclair the Master of Friendship upon which they had travelled to New 
South Wales.61 This was the first civil suit heard in New South Wales and was heard by David 
Collins, a marine officer and the first Judge-Advocate of the new colony.62  
Kable (Cable) v Sinclair showed that the penal colony of New South Wales would not be a closed 
prison. Convicts would be entitled to hold property and to enforce their rights in the courts. The 
personal autonomy of English law was transported to Australia, but in a new form.63 In Australia, 
the rights of the common man applied to those who were considered legally dead in England. Not 
only had the pale empire of ideas and ideals expanded into the southern hemisphere, it had been 
enhanced by the legitimacy of the equitable application of the law in stark difference to its 
application in England. 
The expiry of the sentence, or a pardon under the great seal of England, could remove the ‘felony 
attaint’. Cable was given the job of supervising other convicts and then became Chief Constable 
in 1796.64 In 1796, he also became head gaoler of Sydney Cove and, in 1797, was granted a 
licence to operate an inn in the Rocks area of Sydney. He was one of a syndicate of twelve which 
the governor authorised to build a boat for coastal trading. He was dismissed as head constable in 
1802, for trying illegally to import pigs from a visiting ship. 
This auspicious start, however, was to be compromised by a military autocracy, which developed 
into a monopoly on trade and de facto currency, rum. 
60 Kercher, B. (1995) An Unruly Child: A History of Law In Australia, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, Ch. 2. 
61 Hainsworth, D. (1967) Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 2, (MUP). 
http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/kable-henry-2285. 
62 Cable v. Sinclair [1788] NSWKR 7; [1788] NSW Sup C 7. 
63 Kercher (1995), Ch.2. 
64 Coupe, R. (2002). Australia's Convict Past. Sydney: New Holland Publishers, p. 25. 
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Four companies of Marines landed with the first Europeans to settle in Australia. They were 
replaced by the New South Wales Corps (102nd Regiment of Foot), also known as the Botany 
Bay Rangers65, which arrived on the Second Fleet in 1789. This regiment was specifically raised 
for service in New South Wales but was discredited by its monopoly of the de facto currency, 
rum, which brought it into direct conflict with successive Governors, including Governor Bligh, 
who the Rum Corps arrested in 1808.66 This was rectified by the arrival of Governor Lachlan 
Macquarie who commanded the 73 Regiment of Foot, a Scots Highland regiment which replaced 
the New South Wales Corps and restored law and order to the colony. In 1814 Governor 
Macquarie introduced a Second Charter of Justice for New South Wales which defined the 
structure of the civil court system. This introduced the Governors Court, the Lieutenant-
Governors Court and the Supreme Court. 
Successive regiments of the British Army rotated through service in the colony and developed 
infrastructure and ‘policed’ the settled areas of the colony, primarily on horseback. This was the 
predecessor of the New South Wales Mounted Police, which transitioned from military control 
to civilian control in 1838.67 
The year 1838 was a seminal year for the development of democratic ideals and the social contract 
in colonial Australia. It was the year the British Army withdrew from the ‘frontier’; it was the 
year the New South Wales Mounted Police transitioned from military to civilian control and it 
was the year the Colony of South Australia established a centralised police force based on Peelian 
principles from the London Metropolitan Police, which at that time was less a decade old. In fact, 
South Australia was ahead of much of the rest of Britain in adopting these principles. The police 
in South Australia were centrally organised and administered, and their authority expanded, as 
the settled areas of the colony itself expanded economically and geographically. The police were 
not just representatives of the Crown but were also agents of government, conducting a diverse 
range of activities.68 
65 Keneally, T. (2006) The Commonwealth of Thieves. North Sydney, N.S.W. Random House Australia, 
p. 21. 
66 Governor Bligh remained confined for over a year following his arrest in 1808. In February 1809, he 
boarded the ship Porpoise and in March sailed to the Derwent River in Van Diemen’s Land, seeking 
support from Governor Collins. This support was not forthcoming. Governor Bligh remained until the 
arrival of Governor Macquarie and eventually sailed for England in May 1810 where he arrived in 
October. 
67 For more detail relating to the British Army in colonial Australia please see Wright, C. (2011) 
Wellington's Men in Australia: Peninsular War Veterans and the Making of Empire c.1820-40. Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York and Stanley, P. (1986) The Remote Garrison: the British Army in Australia, 1788-
1870. Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst NSW Stanley. 
68 For a comprehensive discussion on how the South Australian Police applied and expanded throughout 
the Colony of South Australia, please see Hopkins, C. (1995) South Australia Police, 1838-1992: a 
history of the development and operations of the force from its establishment. Adelaide. 
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The roles played by the police in rural and remote colonial South Australia involved more 
community interaction via duties unrelated to the enforcement of the criminal law. The police in 
these areas were also Government agents and as such had cause to deal with the general public in 
many ways which were not as adversarial as enforcing the criminal law. This helped to underpin 
their legitimacy in the eyes of the community.69 
They were also highly mobile. ‘In carrying out these special duties, the Mounted Police alone 
have during the year, travelled 63,054 miles and have been absent from their stations for 2740 
days…’ 70 Hopkins further lists the varied duties assigned to the South Australian colonial police: 
…the extraneous duties were numerous and varied, included those of Fireman [City 
and of Port Adelaide 1838-1875], Postmen 1846-1849,Customs Officers 1838-1901, 
Telegraphic Operators 1865-1887, Ambulance Officers [City area] 1888-1954, Crown 
Land rangers, Inspector of Noxious Weeds, Collector of Annual Statistics from persons 
involved in Agriculture, Horticulture, Viniculture, and the Clerks and Bailiff of Local 
and police Courts.71  
The police, often as the only representative of government authority in remote areas also engaged 
and developed relationships with indigenous inhabitants, some of whom became actively engaged 
in assisting the police in expanding the rule of law into newly settled regions. ‘Police were also 
used to assist in the exploration and survey work of the country due to their intimate knowledge 
of particular areas, and their ability to liaise with Aboriginal Tribes…’ 72 
From the outset the South Australian Police applied both the common law principles and Peelian 
principles, particularly the presumption of innocence and the humane treatment of prisoners, 
which was in fact official Government policy.73 
69 In the 1893 Annual Report SA Police Commissioner Mr W.H. Peterswald stated: 
‘The following is a list showing the various offices held by members of the Police in addition to that of 
Constable: Assistant Inspector of Fisheries, Assistant Returning Officer, Bailiff, Clerk of Local Court, 
Customs Officer, Crown Lands Ranger, Collector of Agricultural Statistics, Crown Prosecutor under the 
Education Act, Commissioner for Taking Affidavits, Destroyer of Wild Dogs’ scalps, Harbour Master, 
Issuer of Miners Rights, Issuer of rations to Aborigines, Inspector of Stock, Inspector of Public Houses, 
Inspector under Vine, Fruit and Vegetable Act,  Inspector under Rabbit Suppression Act, Inspector of 
Hides, Inspector of foul brood in bees, Inspector of Slaughter Houses, Keeper of Life Saving rocket 
apparatus, Public vaccinator, Post Master, Registrar of Births, Deaths and Marriages, Registrar of 
Dogs, Sanitary Inspector.’ (Hopkins 1995, pp. 86–87). 
70 Hopkins 1995, p. 87. 
71 Hopkins 1995, p. 85. 
72 Hopkins 1995, p.86 
73 ‘It was Government policy from the time the Police Force was established, that prisoners were deemed 
to be innocent until convicted by a Court, and that when taken into custody, they were to be treated 
humanely, and no more force was to be used than that which was required to ensure their safety and 
security. In many instances, this included the use of handcuffs, neck chains and leg irons. However, these 
methods of restraint were mainly used after an assessment had been made of the temperament of the 
prisoner/s, nature of the offence, and if the number of prisoners exceeded the number of Police escorting 
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The salient point for the purposes of this thesis is that the South Australia police were organised 
as a centralised body, applied policing jurisdictionally rather than functionally, were highly 
mobile, inducted indigenous Australians into their ranks, performed duties other than enforcing 
the law thus creating situations, other than adversarial, where police interacted with the 
community, and applied Peelian policing principles of restraint and humane treatment. This was 
a model which was eventually adopted by all other Australian colonies as they separated from 
New South Wales and became viable and manageable sovereign jurisdictions in their own right. 
It was only then that centralised policing could develop, which under responsible and 
representative government in each colony, eventually adopted a liberal-democratic approach. 
Australian jurisdictions: A study in sovereignty 
It is important to understand that the legal notion of jurisdiction is directly related to another 
notion, that of sovereignty. These are extremely important for an understanding of police and 
policing. The contemporary Australian State and Territory jurisdictions developed between the 
1830s and 1860s as individual colonies, and provided a foundation for democratisation and 
eventual economic viability and thus prosperity in their own right. It was these colonies which 
agreed to federate in 1901 for certain defined reasons, primarily listed in s51 of the Australian 
Constitution. The story of the development of policing in Australia, since European settlement, is 
one which is intertwined with the evolution of modern notions of democracy and nationhood and 
is inextricably linked with notions of sovereignty, jurisdiction, legitimacy and authority. 
Law and order in colonial Australia, in the last part of the 18th Century, and the first half of the 
19th Century, was very much authoritarian and enforced by a mixture of military, para-military 
and ad hoc police bodies. It was not until well into the 19th century, when the Colony of New 
South Wales as sub-divided into smaller Colonies, that the jurisdictions thus created, were able 
to be better administered. This also coincided with the evolution and broad acceptance of more 
democratic principles, and improved organisation of policing, stemming from policing practices 
in the British Isles. It is of direct relevance to understand how these jurisdictions emerged in the 
Australian context, to gain an appreciation of how the social contract between the government, 
the police and the community developed. 
them etc. An interesting factor in regard to the use of handcuffs was, that due to the small hands and 
narrow wrists of the Aborigines, a separate smaller handcuff was necessary to restrain them. This was 
prior to the ratchet handcuff being introduced. Most prisoners were required to walk, if they were able to 
do so, either from the scene of the arrest to the Police Station, or from the Court to the Gaol. They were 
required to walk on the right hand side of the Trooper, level with his stirrup iron, as usually the Trooper 
was mounted on his horse. This enabled him to guide his horse with his left hand and to have his right 
hand available for use, or to draw his sword, pistol or baton in an emergency’. (Hopkins 1995, p. 22). 
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Prior to British settlement, the Australian continent was known as New Holland and was sub-
divided by British colonial authorities broadly as follows: 
Continental Australia was initially divided in approximate halves by then Lieutenant James Cook 
RN in 1770 originally at the 135th meridian which was then moved to the 129th meridian in 1825.  
Everything east of this line was named New South Wales, and incorporated all the land and 
islands from the Torres Strait to the bottom point of Tasmania, then known as Van Diemen’s 
Land. Everything west of this line was claimed by Captain Charles Fremantle RN in 1829 and 
was called Western Australia. This was in response to growing French interest in this region. The 
island colony of Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania) also separated administratively from New South 
Wales in 1825 and became an independent colony. The next sub-division was the formation of 
the colony of South Australia in 1836, proclaimed by Captain John Hindmarsh, a square shaped 
division carved out of New South Wales with a northern border set at the 26th parallel south and 
an eastern border set at the 141st meridian. The foundation of this colony in particular is of 
significance to the direction civilian policing took in this colony as well as in the other Australian 
colonies. The next division was that of Victoria in 1850 which separated along the Murray River 
to the South Australian border. This included all of the Murray River as part of New South Wales. 
Victoria was followed by Queensland in 1859 which separated from New South Wales with a 
southern border set at the 29th parallel and a western border originally set at the South Australian 
border at the 141st meridian. Part of this was then moved to the 139th meridian in 1862, except 
for that portion which was already proclaimed as South Australia. This explains the odd shape of 
the South Australia, Northern Territory, New South Wales and Queensland internal borders, 
known as ‘corner country’. The space between the western border of Queensland at the 139th 
meridian and the Western Australia border set at the 129th meridian was designated as the 
Northern Territory of South Australia. It was originally under the jurisdiction of New South 
Wales, then South Australia, then the Commonwealth and then itself following self-government 
in 1978. 
It is noteworthy that all of these boundaries, creating viable jurisdictions, were established by 
instruments of law, such as lawyers and surveyors, rather than by instruments of war, such as 
soldiers. 
Centralisation of policing in colonial Australia 
South Australia 1838 
The police in South Australia were centrally organised and administered and their authority 
expanded as the settled areas of the colony itself expanded economically and geographically. The 
police were not just representatives of the Crown, but were also agents of government, conducting 
a diverse range of activities. This was the first on the Australian continent and in fact in the 
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southern hemisphere and was established less than a decade after the formation of Peel’s ‘new’ 
Metropolitan Police in London in 1829. This set the stage for liberal-democratic policing in the 
remainder of the Australian colonies. 
Victoria 1850 
With the discovery of gold, the impact for the police and policing in Victoria was immediate and 
dramatic. Unlike the centralised model in the Colony of South Australia, policing in the new 
colony of Victoria was disparate. The colony was divided into police districts for the first time in 
1852 but this did little to coordinate the City Police, Goldfields Police, Water Police, Rural Bench 
Constabulary, Mounted Police, Country Police, Escort Police and Aboriginal Police, all of whom 
were operating within Victoria at the time. On 8 January 1853, the Victorian government passed 
an Act that established a single police force for the colony but it was not until 1856 that a Manual 
of Police Regulations was published. 
Between these events a momentous event in December 1854 occurred at the Eureka goldfield 
near Ballarat where miners assembled and drilled under arms. What had started as an objection 
to a licensing law, poorly enforced, became and armed rebellion, under a ‘certain standard’, the 
Southern Cross or Eureka flag, threatening to challenge the authority of the Crown, which was 
suppressed by military force with police assisting. In fact the charge sheet for the Eureka rebels, 
charged with treason charged that they fired upon Her Majesty’s forces and ‘other loyal subjects’. 
The police were not even considered as a distinct entity at that time. The events at Eureka were 
the crucible in which policing in Victoria was forged, but even though the police force had only 
just been established in Victoria, a full three years after actual separation, they were caught 
unawares by the decimation of their ranks by the lure of gold and the replacement of sub-standard 
and poorly paid members, many of whom were convicts from Van Diemen’s Land, early 
Victoria’s ‘traditional source of felonry’. Victoria was the second of the six original colonies to 
centralise its policing.74 
Western Australia 1853 
The next colony to centralise its policing, in 1853, was the Colony of Western Australia, formerly 
the Swan River Colony, founded by Captain Stirling RN in 1829, in an effort to prevent France 
seizing the other half of the Australian continent. Western Australia is the only Australian colony 
to never have been a part of New South Wales. A troop of Mounted Police was formed in 1834, 
but proved unpopular with the community on the grounds that it was not efficient and was being 
74 For a thorough history of the Victoria Police please see Haldane, R. (1995) The People's Force: A 
History of the Victoria Police. Melbourne University Press, Carlton. For a detailed account of the events 
at Ballarat in December 1854 please see Blake, G. (2009) To Pierce the Tyrant's Heart: A Military 
History of the Battle for the Eureka Stockade: 3 December 1854. Australian Military History 
Publications, Canberra. 
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financed by taxes for duties which the community thought the military should be performing. 
Other types of police such as the Water Police, formed in 1851, were added as the needs of the 
colony changed, particularly after the introduction of convicts. The colony's Legislative Council 
passed a Police Ordinance in 1849 which outlined police powers and responsibilities. The force 
was formally established in 1853, when a Chief of Police was appointed and a Code of Rules was 
published outlining an administrative structure. In 1861, a second and expanded Police Ordinance 
was passed to clarify the chain of command, the powers and responsibilities of members and the 
various offences with which they had to deal.  
New South Wales 1862 
The Colony of New South Wales, like the Colony of Victoria, had their respective police 
organised along functional lines, rather than centralised under one command as was the case in 
colonial South Australia. In the 1840s New South Wales was policed by the Sydney Police, the 
Mounted Police, the Sydney Water Police, a Rural Constabulary controlled by the rural 
magistracy, a Border Police responsible to the commissioners of crown lands and the Native 
Police, which operated primarily to the north and into Moreton Bay. In 1861 following riots on 
the goldfields at Lambing Flat goldfields police and the military were deployed to restore peace 
which led to a push for more effective policing in the colony. This prompted the New South Wales 
Premier to move quickly to address the evident incapacity of the goldfields police to act to protect 
the victims, in this case the Chinese miners. The inability of the police to suppress these riots 
caused the New South Wales Premier Sir Charles Cowper to introduce the Police Regulation Act 
5 Vict. No 16 of 1862, which was passed by the colonial Parliament on 1 March 1862, which 
amalgamated all exiting functional police to establish the New South Wales Police Force under a 
centralised command.75 
Queensland 1864 
On the January 1, 1864 the Queensland Police Force, began operating under its own legislation. 
The police had been operating as functional police since separation from New South Wales in 
1859 and were divided into Metropolitan Police, Rural Police, Water Police and Native Police. 
They came under a central command based in the colonial capital Brisbane in 1864. Like policing 
in Western Australia, centralised policing in Queensland was challenging due to the size of the 
colony, which extended from the New South Wales border to the Torres Strait. As a result, 
although still administered from Brisbane, a degree of independence and freedom of action 
existed in colonial Queensland in coastal towns such as Bundaberg, Rockhampton, Mackay, 
Townsville, Cairns, Cooktown and Thursday Island, as they were not directly connected to the 
75 NSW Police – History of the NSW Police Force – Significant Dates p. 2. 
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capital, other than by coastal steamers. As a result law and order was often not as refined as 
perhaps it was on the other colonies. 
Tasmania 1898 
The final colony to centralise its policing in 1898, was Tasmania, which ironically was the first 
colony to separate from New South Wales in 1825. Upon separation, policing was administered 
along municipal lines, with the hinterland being policed by the military. This decentralised model 
led to community dissatisfaction due to localised corruption, inconsistent application of laws, low 
wages and insecure tenure for police. In the 1870s serious riots broke out in Launceston as a result 
of a dispute with the colonial government in Hobart over a railway line connecting the two 
municipalities. The Police Regulation Act (1898) created a Tasmania-wide organisation under a 
police commissioner who reported to the Attorney-General, who answered to a democratically 
elected parliament.76 
 Despite some blemishes on its colonial past, Australia is one of the beneficiaries of the age of 
British imperialism and colonialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries in many ways, 
including the adoption and adaptation of the ‘pale empire of ideas associated with British 
colonialism. Several features worth mentioning include the hallmarks of what is often referred to 
as western liberal-democracy, such as responsible and representative government, justice and the 
rule of law, and freedom of action, assembly, expression and media. Among all of these aspects 
of Australia’s inherited legacy, are principles, practices and values which have influenced not 
only how laws are enacted, but also how they are implemented and applied in practice, in 
circumstances very different both in terms of geography and time, from when they were 
developed over centuries, literally on the other side of the globe. Liberal-democratic policing, 
developed in the British Isles, has played an instrumental role in both the development and the 
maintenance of Australian democracy for almost two centuries. 
The significance of the development of liberal-democratic policing in colonial Australia in 
relation to the AFP, is that when Australia federated in 1901, the common law principles and the 
Peelian policing approach had been adopted under responsible and representative government for 
over a century. Thus when the AFP was established in 1979, it was formed along the same 
principles. 
Australia has some impressive policing antecedents. It has two of the largest police jurisdictions 
by area in the world: Western Australia and Queensland. It has one of the oldest centrally 
administered police forces in the world: the South Australian Police. It has one of the world’s 
largest police forces by membership: the New South Wales Police Force, and it has arguably the 
76 http://www.utas.edu.au/library/companion_to_tasmanian_history/P/Police.htm 
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world’s largest single national police jurisdiction, albeit limited to federal matters, encompassing 
the entire Australian continent and outlying Commonwealth islands, namely Norfolk Island in the 
Pacific Ocean and Christmas and Cocos-Keeling Islands in the Indian Ocean respectively, 
administered by the Australian Federal Police. Despite the obvious logistical challenges, these 
are all policed with attention to world’s best practice, which is the community expectation. They 
are not perfect, but given the absence of wide scale violence and public disorder in Australia’s 
history, and the accountability of police through the courts, the media and through their own 
administrations, the overwhelming feature of policing in these jurisdictions is justice based rather 
than security based. 
The turn of the century and federation 
At the turn of the century, each of the Australian colonies had centralised police forces, policing 
in accordance with Peelian policing principles, and accountable administratively to responsible 
and representative governments, and operationally to mature and independent courts. The colonial 
police forces had engendered sufficient confidence by both government and the general public to 
play an administratively instrumental part in the federation. As Hirst wrote, [i]n societies where 
the police are feared they could not be used to collect census data. In Australia they could be 
used for everything. In some colonies they were used to create the electoral roll. 77 
The character of Australian police and a distinctively Australian approach to policing was 
developed in colonial Australia. These include those whose multi-faceted approach opened up the 
interior and brought the rule of law to remote areas, those who assisted in connecting Australia 
with the rest of the world, those whose poor practices led to violent confrontations, those who 
stood up to the violent crimes of outlaws and industrial thugs, those who negotiated in small 
localised ways with Aboriginals, those whose encounters were less peaceful as well as those who 
protected minorities such as the Chinese at Lambing Flat in the 1860s, which was the catalyst for 
the centralisation of policing in New South Wales, and the Afghans in western Queensland during 
the Shearers Strike in the 1890s.  
The principles they brought and applied in these circumstances were the common law principles 
based on the notion of justice: ‘to each his own’, and the Peelian principles of preventative 
policing and the minimum use of force. These are principles which endure to this day at a State 
and Territory level and also at a Federal level, which will be discussed in the following section. 
This character of fairness and impartiality, and a determination to get the job done, is best 
encapsulated in the following episode in western Queensland, as the federation polling papers 
were dispatched to enable everyone to have a vote on federation: 
77 Hirst, J. (2009) Building a Free Australia Australian Heritage Council, Canberra, A.C.T, p. 116. 
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In 1900 the Home Secretary ordered Acting Sergeant Cornelius Walsh to Bedourie in 
far west Queensland to take a poll for the Federal Elections. Walsh travelled from 
Brisbane to Charleville by train, and then by Cobb & Co. coach to the cliffs– 68 
kilometres east of Windorah– from where he continued on horseback. One night he 
began to cross the flooded King Creek, which was then 13 kilometres wide. Early in 
the morning he camped on an island amid flood-waste. In the morning, Walsh took off 
all his clothes 'save his hat' and after tying his possessions to his saddle, he wrapped 
the electoral papers in an oilcloth and fastened the bundle to the back of his neck. As 
he was swimming across King Creek his horse went under and was swept away. 
Walsh's bundle of clothes was also lost. He later recovered his mount and after 12 
hours in the water, reached the outskirts of Bedourie. All he was wearing were his hat 
and boots. After some thought, he fashioned a loincloth with the oilcloth and marched 
proudly up the street to the police station. Acting Sergeant Walsh held the poll the 
following day and then set out for Brisbane. On his return trip to Windorah, a distance 
of 433 kilometres, he set a record which could still hold good today. He rode the 
distance in 58 hours, 41 of which were spent in the saddle using a relay of horses 
borrowed from local graziers.78 
This is the sort of character who displays the values and attributes all Australian police should 
seek to emulate. The path to Australian nationhood was forged shortly after federation, when, as 
part of the British Empire, Australians were called upon for Imperial service in furtherance of 
British Imperial objectives, which were under direct threat by those of Imperial Germany. This 
had some very serious implications for diaspora communities and the way with which they were 
dealt by police and the justice system in Australia. In a newly globalising world, where British 
foreign policy and Australian military expeditions raised some issues with diaspora communities 
in Australia and forced Australians to ask the question: who is the enemy? 
The 1914–18 ‘war to end all wars’ and the establishment of the first Commonwealth Police 
Force 
Much of Australia’s character and 20th century security dialogue is derived from its considerable 
military exploits dating from the Boer War which spanned federation, the 1914-18 war in Turkey, 
the Middle East and Western Europe, as well as its military deeds in North Africa, South East 
Asia, the Pacific and northern Australia in 1939-45.These conflicts were inextricably intertwined 
with British foreign policy in relation to its position as a supreme imperial power. This hegemony 
came under threat from a unified and expansionist Germany in the latter stages of the 19th century. 
It is important to note, that at the time Australia was very much a part of the British Empire, and 
as a result Australians considered themselves as British Subjects, which in fact they were. 
In middle Europe, Germany, unified under its Iron Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in 1871, 
created some concerns for Britain. In 1884-5 Bismarck hosted a conference in Berlin which 
commenced the ‘scramble for Africa’. Ferguson, arguably with more accuracy, refers to this as 
the ‘scramble of Africa’. Colonial competition was rife in the last twenty years of the 19th 
78 From the Vault-A record ride, 1901 QPS Media on May 29, 2012 @ 11:00am. 
https://mypolice.qld.gov.au/museum/2012/05/29/from-the-vault-a-record-ride-1901/ 
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Century. Germany was already a powerful industrial nation, every bit the competitor to Britain 
and appeared to have global ambitions. It sought colonial possessions in Africa, the Pacific and 
Asia, along with France and Britain. When Bismarck was removed from office in 1890, Kaiser 
Wilhelm embarked on a policy of ‘Weltpolitik’-global politics-which confirmed Germany as a 
global competitor to British global hegemony. This was bound to end in conflict which finally 
broke out between these two military, economic and industrial titans in 1914. ‘Weltpolitik’ had 
become ‘Weltkreig’-global war. 
The causes of the ‘War to End All Wars’, fought in Turkey, the Middle East and Western Europe 
between 1914 and 1918, are many and varied, and are too complex to discuss in detail. The fact 
is that as a loyal member of the British Empire, when Britain went to war, so did Australia. This 
meant war with Germany, and its allies, including Turkey. The impact on ‘enemy’ Diaspora 
communities in Australia was profound, despite the fact that they were His Majesty’s subjects. 
Police were involved directly in many of these incidents, primarily to protect life and property, 
including those classified as ‘enemy aliens’. 
Three isolated incidents, in this tumultuous period of global affairs, are of direct relevance to 
demonstrate the nature of police and policing in Australia of that time, and the interconnectedness 
of global affairs to domestic sentiments, with which police have to deal. They all have 
contemporary relevance. These are in chronological order: the actions by police in a politically 
charged confrontation in Victoria September 1914; the firing of the first hostile shots against 
Australian civilians in rural New South Wales in January 1915; the reaction by police to a 
federally proposed policy of conscription in rural Queensland in November 1917. 
Australian domestic civilian policing in time of war: Who is the ‘enemy’? 
Port Melbourne, Broken Hill, Warwick 
Australian history has been dominated by the efforts of the Australian military since the Gallipoli 
landings on 25 April 1915. In fact, it is often said that this has shaped the national character, and 
entrenched the notion of ‘mateship’. Whilst this is undoubtedly true, there was another aspect of 
the Australian character developed in a domestic setting during the same period of hostilities: that 
of dealing with actual and potential hostility from diaspora communities opposed to Australian 
military action. This is highly relevant to contemporary Australia, and to the way the social 
contract applies, to whom, and under what circumstances. 
Germans 
War was declared between Germany and Britain on 5 August 1914. This had an immediate impact 
not just on combatants and their governments, but upon members of the diaspora communities 
associated with the belligerents. At just over 33000, by far the largest immigrant community with 
origins outside the British Isles at the time of the declaration of hostilities, was the German 
49 
population. The treatment of naturalised, and indeed Australian-born Germans was little different 
to actual German citizens, who could quite rightly be regarded as ‘enemy aliens’. ‘The process of 
naturalisation, even being born in Australia, made little difference to the perceptions of the 
dominant majority: German blood, however diluted, earned the pejorative title ‘German’.79  
The Germans were required to register as enemy aliens and swear an oath not to take 
up arms against the Empire. Their movements were controlled and it was made illegal 
to speak German over the telephone. They were not permitted to have a telephone 
without the written consent of the police, nor to own a camera or keep homing pigeons. 
They were forbidden to possess firearms.80 
An incident at Port Melbourne in which one of these German aliens was personally attacked, is a 
reflection that despite hostilities towards them, they were still afforded protection under law, as 
the actions of the police demonstrate. In September 1914, a month after the outbreak of war, a 
hostile mob cornered German-born labourer, Wilhelm Smock, and chased him onto the beach at 
Port Melbourne. Smock had applied for naturalisation, but this conferred no protection from the 
mob and police had to rescue him with batons drawn.  
This sort of protection did not last long as Lutheran Churches were attacked, German-Australians 
lost their jobs and their voting rights and many were interned without trial or right of appeal. Due 
to a change in the definition of ‘enemy subject’ in 1916 this included: 
any Australian natural-born subject whose father or grandfather was a subject of a 
country at war with the King. The effect was to include the vast majority of natural-
born Australians of German descent within the category of ‘enemy subject’. This gave 
Australian authorities complete power over almost all German-Australians.81  
This included a complete abrogation of their common law rights as they were interned, or subject 
to internment without trial. These internments were carried out by the military rather than the 
police. 
This animosity broke into actual hostilities in a most unexpected manner, not in a major city nor 
between combatants, and not even between German ‘aliens’ and loyal British subjects in 
Australia. This occurred in the western New South Wales city of Broken Hill on New Year’s Day 
1915, before the landings at Gallipoli in April of that same year. This became known as the little 
recognised Battle of Broken Hill. 
79 McKernan, M. (2014). Australians at Home: World War I: The Australian People and the Great War. 
The Five Mile Press. 
80 Challinger, M. (2001). Historic Court Houses of Victoria. Ringwood, Vic.: Palisade Press, p. 142. 
81 McKernan, M (2014), p. 156. 
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The Battle of Broken Hill – Turks or Afghans? 
The landings of Australian and New Zealand Army Corp (ANZAC) troops on the Gallipoli 
Peninsula on 25 April 1915 are commemorated annually on what is known as ANZAC Day. Less 
than four hours after the British Empire was plunged into war on August 5, 1914, the first shot 
fired by the British Empire in World War I was fired at Portsea on Victoria's Mornington 
Peninsula at the German cargo ship, SS Pfalz, as it attempted to leave Australian waters, as the 
captain knew war was about to be declared. Ten minutes before it reached open seas, the artillery 
headquarters at Queenscliff received the order to stop or sink the ship. The gunners at the Fort 
Nepean gun emplacement fired a warning shot across its bow, the captain of SS Pfalz surrendered, 
and the German seamen spent the rest of the war in an internment camp. 
Between the first shot from Point Nepean in August 1914 and the ANZAC landings in April 1915, 
the first Australian casualties of the war were civilians on Australian soil. This incident occurred, 
not in a far off land, not in proximity to any conflict zone, but in the regional city of Broken Hill 
in western New South Wales. Indeed, the first shots were fired not by soldiers, but by British 
subjects from the North West Frontier of British India. 
A number of ‘Afghans’ had come to Australia as cameleers in the mid-19th century, from what 
was then the North West Frontier of British India. They had played an important role in the 
opening up of the interior of the continent’s remote arid desert areas. The expansion of the 
railways, the advent of the internal combustion engine and regulation in relation to the pasturing 
of their camels resulted in many camels being turned loose to become a feral pest, as they were 
no longer of use to the economy. Many of the cameleers returned to their homelands but many 
also remained in the Australian colonies. The incident at Broken Hill involved two of the latter, 
although there had been some suspicions of them, as Australian historian Christine Stevens 82 
discusses:  
[i]n 1898 Probyn-Smith had warned the WA parliament that the Afghans in Australia 
were ‘traitorously disposed’, that they should be kept off the WA goldfields because 
they were in sympathy with those Afghans with whom the British were fighting in the 
Second Afghan War. Probyn-Smith warned that ‘if a Jehad or Holy War was 
proclaimed every nationality forgets the nationality to which he belongs’, and ‘only 
remembers the Sultan of Turkey who holds the holy places in Arabia, Mecca and 
Medina. He holds the flag of the Prophet Muhammad, first unfurled when he declared 
himself the prophet of God, and defender of things sacred.83 
In his 2010 book The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for 
World Power 84 U.S. historian Sean McMeekin  documented how Germany and Turkey came to 
82 Stevens, C. (2002). Tin Mosques and Ghantowns. Alice Springs: Paul Fitzsimmons. 
83 Stevens, C. (2002). Tin Mosques and Ghantowns. Alice Springs: Paul Fitzsimmons, pp. 161–164. 
84 McMeekin, S. (2010) The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for 
World Power. Bellknap Press, Harvard University. 
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an agreement to agitate for a global Islamic jihad to destabilise British controlled Egypt, India 
and Sudan in order to divert attention away from the main battlefields in Western Europe. This 
occurred before Turkey actually entered the war on the side of the Central Powers in November 
1914. This had an impact on New Year’s Day 1915, only weeks after Turkey’s entry, when two 
‘Turks’, who were actually Afghans flying the Turkish flag, opened fire on a train carrying 1200 
picnickers in open carriages from Broken Hill to Silverton for the Manchester Unity Order of 
Oddfellows New Year’s Day picnic, killing four and wounding seven. 
The incident has always been referred to as having been conducted by Turks, because the Afghans 
were flying the Turkish flag. But the two men were Afghans: Gool Mahomed was an Afridi from 
the Tirah region near Khyber Pass area in Afghanistan, and Mullah Abdullah was born either in 
India or Afghanistan.85  The Afghan origins of these men was not publicised because: 
[i]t suited the authorities of the time to perpetuate the rumour that the two men were 
Turks, for the country was at war with Turkey, even though from examination of the 
suicide letters and by talking to the Afghan community at Broken Hill, it was evident 
that they were both Afghans.86 
In all, 48 shots were fired by the Afghans, using a Martini-Henry breech loading rifle, a Snider 
Enfield carbine, a revolver and some handmade bandoliers.  The first casualty was a 17 year old 
girl, Alma Cowie. A gun battle ensued, which lasted until the mid-afternoon by which time 
Mullah Abdullah, born in 1855, was killed and Gool Mahomed, born in 1874, was badly 
wounded, with sixteen bullet wounds, and died soon afterwards in hospital. This was treated as 
an act of war and mob rule took over, until the combined efforts of the police and military could 
restore order: 
[a] crowd gathered in Argent Street that night. There was a heated debate as to whether 
the attackers were Turks or Afghans and whether the attack was instigated by the 
Germans of the town. A cry of ‘To the German Club’ went up, and the crowd surged 
towards Delamore Street. The German Club was empty, but stones were hurled through 
windows and the crowd began to sing patriotic songs. They screamed execration on 
Germans, Turks and Afghans. They forced entrance to the club and vandalized it before 
setting fire to the building.87 
A fire cart attended but the mob cut the fire hoses to pieces and the building was burned to the 
ground. Later that evening the mob then moved towards the camel camp and police and armed 
soldiers also made their way to the mosque. Two turbaned, robed figures appeared, seemingly 
‘calm, silent and unperturbed at the sudden invasion of the sacred precincts of their place of 
worship’. They denied the accusation that a constable was imprisoned in the mosque, but a search 
85 Stevens (2002), p. 161. 
86 Stevens (2002), p. 166. 
87 Stevens (2002), p. 164. 
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was made by soldiers and police, the police later confessing that the search was really born out of 
fears of a repetition of the day’s events.  Emotions were running high and:  
as the search party was leaving, the crowd of angry citizens came surging towards the 
Ghantown. The police and soldiers intercepted the mob, barring their entry past the 
camp fence until eventually the crowd gradually broke up and disappeared into the 
darkness. Police officers remained on guard at the camp all night.88 
Unlike the way in which Germans and their property were treated by the absolute removal of 
common law rights as they were interned simply for being German or having German parents or 
grandparents, the case of the Afghans was different. Even this act of hostility, on the part of 
belligerents flying an enemy flag, did not create an environment whereby common law 
protections by the authorities were removed, to allow mob violence to break out against the 
Afghans. In fact the Afghan camp was protected overnight by police and soldiers with bayonets 
fixed. Matters died down quickly and, despite a clear case of arson: 
[n]o action was taken against those who burned the German Club. The day after the 
funeral several ‘alien enemies resident in Broken Hill’, six Austrians, four Germans 
and one so-called Turk, were arrested by armed police and local militia and sent by 
train to the Adelaide detention camps.89 
They were sent to the Torrens Island Camp in Adelaide. The remaining Afghans assisted the 
police with their enquiries. It appeared the two assailants were acting in isolation from the rest of 
their community and: 
[s]everal Afghans from the North Broken Hill Ghantown were close to the scene of the 
attack on the terrorists and had helped police…The terrorists’ mission had been 
conceived and carried out between the Mullah and Gool Mahomed, and had been kept 
secret from the other Afghans.90 
On 7 January 1915, the Coroner C.F. Butler S.M., found that four Broken Hill residents had died 
of gunshot wounds, ‘feloniously and maliciously inflicted on them.’ In fact Gool Mahomed had 
enlisted as a member of the Turkish Army by letter, as evidence later located among his 
possessions confirmed. He had apparently enlisted in the Turkish Army shortly after federation 
but had returned to Australia to resume mining.91  
The newspapers of the day were loud in their condemnations. ‘The Fight with the Turks’ was the 
headline for the Sydney Morning Herald; ‘Turks Attack Train’ was the headline for the Melbourne 
Argus. This has echoes down the generations to contemporary Australian society, whereby 
authorities like the police, charged with community protection must balance that primary 
88 Stevens, (2002), p. 166. 
89 Stevens, (2002), p. 166. 
90 Stevens, (2002), p. 164. 
91 For a full text of this letter please see Stevens p.164. 
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responsibility with that of protection of individual rights, including the rights of violent offenders, 
who may at time require protection from vigilante style mob violence. 
The Irish Easter Rising and the Warwick incident 
The next incident relating to the 1914-18 war and its implications for national policing in 
Australia relates not to Germans, Turks or Afghans, but to British subjects from an island to the 
west of mainland Britain, Ireland, which was then still under British rule. The religious divide 
between Protestant Britain and Catholic Ireland had been a cause for British domestic security 
concerns for centuries. The 1914-18 Weltkrieg between Germany and Britain, provided a basis 
by which this domestic concern had implications for the British Empire, via an event in Ireland 
which has become known as the Easter Rising in 1916, the fallout from which remains un-
resolved, over a century later. 
At noon on Easter Monday 1916, a thousand or so extreme Irish nationalists led by the poet 
Patrick Pearse, and the socialist James Connolly, marched into Dublin and occupied selected 
public buildings, notably the General Post Office, where Pearse proclaimed an independent 
republic. After three days of fierce but futile fighting in which British artillery inflicted substantial 
damage on the city centre, the rebels surrendered. This was plainly an act of treason-the rebels 
had in fact asked for, and been sent, German guns-and the initial British response was harsh.92 
This had far reaching implications. 
[T]he brutal suppression by Britain of the Easter Uprising of 1916 turned Irish opinion 
away from the goal of self-government promised by the moderate Irish Party and 
towards the more radical independence policy of Sinn Fein (Ourselves Alone).93 
Amongst other things, this event set in motion the movement which ended British rule in India, 
and set the course for a divided Irish history, via the agencies of Sinn Fein and its military wing 
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) which continues. This coincided with massive losses on the 
battlefields of France and Belgium, which had to be replaced by means which normal recruiting 
wasn’t matching. The Catholic Church was opposed to conscription, so in Australia, with a 
sizeable Irish population, suspicion fell on the Irish Catholics to a similar extent, as it did upon 
the Germans, German Australians and Lutherans, especially when it involved the conscription 
referenda of 1916 and 1917 to replace the enormous losses in the Western Front. 
Who is the ‘enemy’? 
The link between Australian foreign policy or military activities and the reactions by diaspora 
communities in Australia is not a new one, but as has been discussed, is one in which police play 
92 Ferguson, N. (2004) Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, Penguin Books, London, p. 349. 
93 Kwan, E. (2014). Flag and Nation. Australians and Their National Flags Since 1901. Sydney: UNSW 
Press, pp. 65–66. 
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a vital role in the maintenance of social cohesion. When the police themselves question authority 
and fail to enforce the law, there is a risk of the social contract itself being torn up. This may be 
due to unjust laws, or to personal feelings held by individual police, based on ethnicity, religion 
or class, or to a perceived division of loyalties between tiers of government. The following 
episode at Warwick railway station in Queensland has elements of each, and led to the formation 
of the first Commonwealth Police. 
The Western Front and conscription 
The severe Australian Imperial Force (AIF) losses on the Somme in mid-1916 led Britain’s Army 
Council to call for large reinforcements to maintain five Australian divisions. In late August, the 
British Secretary of State for the Colonies cabled the Australian government notifying it of the 
heavy losses in France, and warning that as many as 69,500 reinforcements would be needed 
within the next three months to keep the AIF 3rd Division in service. Britain had introduced 
conscription in January 1916. New Zealand followed in August. Hughes felt he had no alternative 
but to do the same. Divided on the issue, his government called a referendum for October 1916. 
The Welsh-born Empire loyalist Australian Prime Minister William Morris Hughes was 
prominent in the conscription efforts in Australia, however this was complicated by the animosity 
between English Protestantism and Irish Catholicism. This was so acrimonious that when the 
1916 referendum on conscription was lost, Hughes blamed the Irish Catholics.94 This acrimony 
intensified in the second referendum on conscription in the following year. 
Hughes returned to the question of conscription late in 1917 when there were genuine 
fears that Germany might win the war. He called for a second referendum for 20 
December 1917, and reached for the race card as part of his campaign by publicly 
questioning the loyalty of Australia’s Irish community. More than a century of good 
relations between Protestant and Catholic in Australia was put at risk, and at a time of 
war.95 
Following the failure of the first conscription referendum on 28 October 1916, Hughes engaged 
in a tour by rail to promote the ‘Yes’ case for conscription, and an incident at Warwick, a town 
on the Darling Downs in southern Queensland, provided the catalyst for the creation of the first 
national police force. The political situation within Queensland however, was not conducive to a 
universal acceptance of this case for more cannon fodder for the quagmire which was the Western 
Front in France and Belgium. 
Warwick was a place where many Irish people settled when they arrived in Australia in the 19th 
and 20th centuries and contained a strong Irish-Catholic element which was not in favour of the 
94 Megalogenis, G. (2015). Australia's Second Chance: What Our History Tells Us about Our Future. 
Penguin Books, Australia, p. 170–171. 
95 Megalogenis (2015), pp. 170–171. 
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idea of conscription to fight in defence of a government based in London whose troops were 
occupying their homeland in Ireland. 
The Queensland State Government was not only a Labor Government, but the State Premier was 
of Irish Catholic extraction. The ALP of the time was dominated by Irish Catholics, many of 
whom had become disillusioned with the imperial nature of the conflict, and the obscene slaughter 
on the battle fields in France and Belgium. However, it is not unreasonable to also lay the blame 
in part on the violent reaction to the Easter Rising in Dublin in 1916 which aroused anti-British 
and therefore anti-conscription sentiments, among the Irish diaspora in Australia, although this 
has been attributed more to class distinction and state rights than ethnic and religious tension. 
The Queensland Labor government of Tom Ryan accused Hughes of being a class 
traitor. Deputy premier and treasurer Ted Theodore penned an incendiary pamphlet 
that was as vicious as any wartime propaganda that Australia had aimed at the Hun.96  
On 19 December Ryan made a speech in Brisbane from which passages were deleted 
by the Commonwealth censor. Ryan then arranged a debate in the state parliament and 
read the offending passages into Hansard, while Theodore, who took the opportunity 
to add two anti-conscription pamphlets that had been suppressed, ordered the 
Government Printer to publish 10,000 copies of this material as a special issue. Upon 
hearing this, Hughes ordered all copies be seized and while in Brisbane led a military 
contingent to the printing office. The Queensland government eventually retrieved its 
copies of Hansard and for good measure distributed 50,000 copies of a Government 
Gazette Extraordinary with an account of the events.97 
At the instigation of an erstwhile leader of democracy; ‘drunk with the lust of power and flattered 
to insanity by the patronage of the historic enemies of the common people, Australia stands 
threatened with that greatest of all industrial and social curses-Conscription.’ Theodore wrote.98 
Prime Minister Hughes arrived in Brisbane for a pro-conscription rally on November 26 and 
following an address he accompanied a military officer and soldiers along with the Queensland 
censor and seized 3300 copies of Hansard. Two days later on 28 November Mr Hughes departed 
Brisbane for Sydney aboard the Sydney mail train which at the time passed through Ipswich, 
Toowoomba, Warwick, Wallangarra and then across the border through New England to Sydney. 
Hughes addressed meetings at many of these places and while addressing a meeting at 
Toowoomba promoting the ‘Yes’ case, Premier Ryan was addressing a crowd in Albert Square 
96 Megalogenis, (2015), p.169 
97 Macintyre, S (1986), The Oxford History of Australia: Volume 4, 1901-1942, Oxford University Press 
Melbourne, Oxford University Press, p 173 
98Megalogenis (2015), p. 16. In this regard, the Irish Catholics in Australia, were in tune with general 
English thinking on the subject of conscription, James wrote:  
The roots of hostility to military conscription lay deep in British history, attitudes, and society. The case 
for conscription had been made before the war, but had made virtually no impact. Liberals in particular 
were instinctively opposed to the proposal; the Labour movement, fearing that it would be the first step 
towards industrial conscription, was adamantly hostile. But the hostility lay much deeper. The State, it 
was argued, was entitled to ask for the citizen’s services; it was not entitled to demand it.  (James, R. The 
British Revolution: British Politics 1880-1939, Methuen and Co. Ltd, London 1977, p. 329). 
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in Brisbane, advocating the ‘No’ case to conscription, repeating the claims he had made in 
Hansard. The next day, November 29, Hughes departed Toowoomba by mail train Warwick, 
where he was verbally abused by a large crowd which had gathered at the railway station. 
Two brothers of Irish descent, Paddy and Bart Brosnan were among the crowd and threw two 
eggs at Prime Minister Hughes. The first egg missed but the second one dislodged Mr Hughes’ 
hat. This created a fight between the Brosnans and a number of Mr Hughes’ supporters on the 
railway station platform. 
Megalogenis indicates that Mr Hughes attempted to address a meeting of local people at Warwick, 
which was reported to be a ‘howling mob’ on the railway platform, when two eggs were thrown 
by ‘Irish egg-hurling larrikins’, who were restrained by a returned serviceman, and were allegedly 
assaulted by Mr Hughes himself who emerged with a bleeding hand after he joined in throwing 
punches: 
As the prime minister stepped off the train, ‘he was surrounded by a howling mob’, 
according to an animated account in the Brisbane Courier. Eggs were thrown and the 
perpetrator was set upon by a returned serviceman, after which Hughes entered the 
fray, throwing punches at those who remonstrated with him. ‘Mr Hughes was hustled 
and jostled by men twice his size, but when he emerged it was his hand, and not his 
face that was bleeding. One of the men in the crowd carried a hammer, and another a 
heavy spanner, but the Prime Minister was daunted by nothing. 
According to Megalogenis: 
He demanded the arrest of the egg thrower but the officer at the scene, Senior Sergeant 
Kenny, declined, saying he recognised the laws of Queensland only. Hughes exploded, 
claiming the men who had attacked him were unworthy of retaining their liberty. “The 
law shall be obeyed by every man in this country, police or not. Here in this great crisis 
in the history of Australia and the Empire, when the citizens are asked to decide a 
question upon which the safety and liberty of Australia depends, the Prime Minister is 
assaulted and denied the opportunity of free speech.” 99 
Upon finishing his speech, Mr Hughes returned to the train where, he again instructed Kenny to 
‘proceed against the prime mover at the court the following morning, but Senior Sergeant Kenny 
again informed Mr Hughes that he was only prepared to recognise the laws of the state’. 
Mr Hughes re-boarded the train when the second whistle sounded and still angry the local 
policeman for refusing to carry out his instructions began drafting a telegram which appointed 
William Anderson, an inspector with the NSW Police, as head of a newly formed Commonwealth 
Police Force. Mr Hughes sent this telegram from the border town of Wallangarra and continued 
on his whistle-stop tour through New England and to Sydney, without incident, telling crowds at 
Stanthorpe, Glen Innes and Tamworth of the events at Warwick. 
99 Megalogenis (2015), pp. 173–174. 
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Hughes presented the referendum as a test of whether Australians were for or against Britain and 
its Empire: whether they were loyal or not. Describing the anti-conscriptionists as ‘every enemy 
of Britain open and secret in our midst’, he appealed to voters not to ‘dishonour’ Australia by 
voting no … Although a majority of voters supported Australian involvement in the war, they 
opposed conscription and Hughes narrowly lost the referendum, despite the support of most major 
newspapers, nearly all state governments, the federal opposition, and the professions. When the 
Labor Party split in 1916 over conscription, Hughes and his mostly Protestant followers joined 
former Liberals to form a Nationalist government, with Hughes still in control. 
The aggressive policies directed against ‘enemy aliens’ such as Germans and those of German 
extraction was one thing; the retaliation against hostile action by Islamic affiliates of Imperial 
Germany was understandable and manageable. The ‘passive resistance’ by members of a very 
large and disaffected Irish Diaspora community was quite another, particularly since the Irish 
were so heavily represented in the police in colonial, and later State police forces, in Australia. 
Haldane 100 estimates this proportion at 82% in the Victoria Police in 1870; in 1862 over 50% 
(479 of 803) New South Wales police officers were Irish-born. Actual figures for other colonial 
and early post-federation State police forces are difficult to estimate, but given the trends in 
Victoria and New South Wales, it is safe to assume that the proportion of Irish Catholics amongst 
their ranks was relatively high. This situation, particularly in Queensland, created the catalyst for 
the formation of the first iteration of an Australian National Police Force, the Commonwealth 
Police. 
Sydney academic Jeff Kildea in his 2002 book Tearing the Fabric: Sectarianism in Australia 
1910–1925 highlights some of the rationale behind the attitudes of Irish Catholics in Australia on 
conscription. The Catholic Press, an influential periodical of the time gradually opposed 
conscription, particularly following the military suppression of the rebellion in Ireland. The 
assistant editor, Mr Patrick Scott Cleary was an outspoken critic who ‘wrote that compulsory 
military service was incompatible with democracy and that conscription would have an adverse 
effect on many industries and that Australia would have to rely on foreign labour. Under the 
influence of Mr Cleary and others the Catholic Press drew on two aspects of the Irish crisis to 
support their advocacy of the ‘No’ case. The first argued that if the 90,000 British troops enforcing 
martial law in Ireland were removed to France there would be no need to conscript 
Australians…and the second argued that ‘Australia’s adoption of conscription would encourage 
England to introduce conscription in Ireland. 101 
100 Haldane, R. (p.82) 
101 Kildea, J. Tearing the Fabric: Sectarianism in Australia 1910–1925 Citadel Books Sydney 2002, p. 
139 
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This was reflective of many Catholic attitudes on conscription at the time as demonstrated by 
John Meagher MLC in NSW who told a representative of the Catholic Press 
‘I most strongly object to the conscription of Irishmen and the sons of Irishmen in 
Australia. Give Ireland the freedom that the people enjoy in other parts of the British 
dominions before you conscript Australians…I don’t see how any Irish-Australian can 
support it while their mother country is under martial law.’ [Catholic press 21 
September 1916 p 25] in Kildea.102 
  
102 Kildea, J. (2002) Tearing the Fabric: Sectarianism in Australia 1910–1925, Citadel Books Sydney, p. 
140. 
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Section 2: Liberal-democratic policing and democracy 
The first Commonwealth Police 
Out of that incident Hughes created the Commonwealth Police Force, to uphold law and order ‘in 
any State which refuses or does not enforce Commonwealth law’. ‘The Warwick incident has 
done much good,’ he told the Governor-General. ‘Everywhere I have had splendid meetings: 
there’s going to be a great fight. Glory be to God for that.’ He could not have been disappointed 
with his eve-of-poll meeting at the Melbourne Cricket Ground and five bands gathered round 
three platforms. At the platform erected before the members’ stand he obtained a hearing, but at 
the Richmond end the air was thick with eggs, stones and bottles, and the prime minister did not 
even attempt to speak.103 
On Sunday 2 December 1917, the Commonwealth Solicitor General, Sir Robert Garran, called an 
Executive Council meeting ‘to deal specifically with latent rebellion’ in Queensland... a ‘federal 
force, soon to be dubbed ‘the Commonwealth Fusiliers’ 104 ...was conceived. When Hughes 
announced the establishment of [the CPF]...in Sydney, [he] explained that the ‘Commonwealth 
proposes to carry out the law of the Commonwealth in the State of Queensland’ where ‘the law 
is not a thing to be kept but rather despised.105  
The Commonwealth Police Force was established on 12 December 1917, and was designed to 
ensure that the Australian government’s measures against the anti-conscriptionists, and against 
the IWW (International Workers of the World), would be enforced wholeheartedly in Queensland, 
where the Labor premier, Ryan, had proven hesitant to play ball with Hughes. 
The headquarters were established in Sydney. According to Cain this was done in an effort to 
disguise the fact that it was entirely an anti-Queensland organisation. 106 The new force operated 
primarily in Queensland to carry out the law of the Commonwealth in that state. Most of the 
recruiting was undertaken in Queensland-then Australia’s only Labor Government...It is of 
interest to note that there were no statutory functions defined for the police officers, and that as 
part of their duties, they conscientiously combed the streets and public gatherings for hard 
evidence of prevailing disloyalty to King and county particularly the perceived threat of 
Bolshevism.107 
103 Macintyre, S (1986), The Oxford History of Australia: Volume 4, 1901–1942, Oxford University Press 
Melbourne, Oxford University Press, pp. 173–174. 
104 Evans, R (1988) The Red Flag Riots: A Study of Intolerance. University of Queensland Press. 
105 Cain, F. (2007). The Origins of Political Surveillance in Australia, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, p. 
170. 
106 Cain, F. (2007), p. 174. 
107 Evans (1988), p. 24. 
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The first Commonwealth Police 1917–1919 
As discussed the first iteration of the Commonwealth Police came about as a result of an incident 
at Warwick Railway Station in Queensland, when Prime Minister William Morris Hughes was 
pelted with eggs, by Irish egg-throwing larrikins, while addressing a crowd amidst the highly 
divisive debate on conscription to replace troops depleted on the Western Front. When he 
demanded that the local police sergeant Kenny arrest the offenders, the latter refused stating that 
he only recognised the laws of Queensland. There is, however, good reason to suspect that 
Kenny’s motives were, at least in part, also related to affairs in Dublin during the Easter Rising 
the previous year, where the British army had bombarded the city centre with artillery. In this he 
would also have found support from the Queensland Labor Government of the day.  
Hughes attempting to drum up more recruits for the carnage of the battlefields of northern France 
on behalf of an Imperial power which had used that same military force on Irish soil, would not 
have been universally welcomed in all parts of Australia, particularly by those of Irish extraction. 
As a result, under the War Precautions Act, the Commonwealth Police Force was formed. They 
also became known as ‘The Commonwealth Fusiliers’, and perhaps more unkindly as 
‘HENZACs’108 a corruption of ‘ANZACs’, because they had been hatched from an egg. At its 
height it numbered about 50 and although it was based in Sydney it operated primarily in 
Queensland, then with the only Labor government. This iteration ceased to exist in 1919 shortly 
after the Armistice was signed in 1918. 
The formation of the Australian Federal Police 
In 1901 the former British colonies in Australia federated and became States, and one Territory 
(later to become two), but it was not until nearly 80 years later that a federal police agency was 
actually formed. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) was established on 19 October 1979. One 
of the ‘model’ police for policing in the Australian colonies, the ‘new’ London Metropolitan 
Police was formed 150 years earlier on 29 September 1829. The Peelian model of policing had 
been adopted by all Australian colonial police forces by federation and had been adapted to suit 
the local circumstances and environment. 
It was a former Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police, Sir Robert Mark, whose report, 
in response to a terrorist bombing in Sydney in 1978, provided the foundation document of the 
AFP. In his report, he re-iterated the Peelian notions of consent-based policing, and specifically 
mentioned that to give it legitimacy, it should have a metropolitan base.  
The foundation of Canberra as Australia’s national capital: Canberra a Metropolitan base 
108 AFP Hatched from an Egg, Andrew Kidd Fraser, The Australian, 22 November 2017. 
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In his report, Mark highlighted the need for a metropolitan territorial base. That metropolitan base 
was, and remains Australia’s national capital city, Canberra, in the Australian Capital Territory 
(ACT). Mark commented: 
[t]hose who framed the Constitution can hardly have foreseen the motor vehicle and 
the aeroplane. Arrangements for the governance of States which were adequate for 
trade, public order and the social requirements of the nineteenth century are not 
appropriate for dealing with serious wrongdoing which transcends State jurisdictions 
and affects the Commonwealth as a whole; terrorism, narcotics and organised crime 
being perhaps the most obvious examples. 
There is today and undoubted need for a federal agency to co-ordinate the efforts of 
all police forces against interstate crime and terrorism. But in my view it must have a 
metropolitan territorial base if it is to achieve the status and recognition necessary to 
its role.  
…at the best, I am being asked to cobble an ill-fitting 19th century boot.109 
The establishment of Canberra as the national capital came about shortly after federation in 1901. 
There were various discussions amongst the State Premiers about its’ location. The New South 
Wales Premier, George Reid, insisted that the national capital be located within the state borders 
of New South Wales. Other Premiers insisted that if that were to be the case, it should be at least 
100 miles (160 kilometres) from Sydney, to avoid undue influence from that city. The new 
national capital also had to be inland for fear of naval bombardment and disease, and according 
to prevailing attitudes, it also had to be in a cold climate as whites could only really thrive and 
lead by living in a cold climate. 110 
The district where Canberra is located, was settled by Europeans in the early 19th Century. In 
1815 a road was constructed across the Blue Mountains to the Bathurst Plains. In 1820 explorers 
Joseph Wild, James Vaughan and Charles Throsby Smith, discovered the Limestone Plains of the 
Canberra region, following the discovery of Lake George earlier that year. They crossed the range 
of hills beside Lake George and reached a point from which they saw what is now the site of 
Canberra. 
The first European settler in the district was Joshua John Moore, who established a stock station 
called 'Canberry'. It is thought the name Canberry is based on an Aboriginal name for the area 
'Kamberra' or 'Kambery'. The middle of Moore's property is approximately where Canberra's city 
109 Mark, R. (1978). Report to the Minister for Administrative Services on the organisation of police 
resources in the Commonwealth area and other related matters. Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service. 
110 Headon, D. quoted in Morris, L (2017) Why Canberra? Should we reconsider our capital city? Why 
was Canberra chosen in the first place? National Geographic. 
http://www.nationalgeographic.com.au/history/why-canberra.aspx 
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centre is currently sited. By 1820 a road from Sydney to the Goulburn Plains, which lie within 
100 kilometres of Canberra, was under construction. 
This opened up the vast interior of New South Wales to further exploration and development. The 
New South Wales Government commissioned a report suggesting possible locations for the seat 
of Government for the new Commonwealth of Australia, which as stated had to be within the 
State boundaries of New South Wales. The report suggested three places - Bombala, Yass-
Canberra, and Orange - which made it to a short list, and suggested others which were rejected, 
which included Albury, Tumut, Cooma and Armidale. Noteworthy is the fact that only Orange 
and Armidale are north of Sydney, the remaining candidates being located in the south east of 
New South Wales. 
Subsequent to Federation in 1901, the Commonwealth Parliament was formed. The opening 
ceremony was held on 9 May 1901 in Melbourne's Exhibition Building. The Commonwealth 
Parliament continued to sit temporarily in Melbourne as the site of the national capital had not 
yet been decided. The decision for the Yass-Canberra region was made in 1908 by the 
Commonwealth Parliament based on the NSW short list, and shortly afterwards, the 
Commonwealth surveyor, Charles Scrivener, was dispatched to choose a site. His instructions 
were to choose somewhere picturesque, distinctive, and with views. In 1913, Canberra became 
the official name for the area, and in 1927 the Commonwealth Parliament and many of its public 
service support departments moved from Melbourne to the new capital. 
Section 3: Australian federation and the AFP 
The formation of the Australian Federal police 
Federation: The Commonwealth 
Federation was not universally accepted in 1901. Many colonial citizens, including politicians 
were suspicious of federation. There were however, pressures, both internal and external which 
formed the catalyst for the colonies to come together and form a national government for certain 
purposes. These included the economic damage done by internal customs barriers at each colonial 
border, the need for an effective and common immigration policy and security fears arising from 
German activity in the Pacific, particularly in New Guinea in the 1880s. 
In the 1890s, the movement towards federation gained momentum, and a number of constitutional 
conventions were held in various locations throughout the colonies. The objective was to draft a 
form of constitution which would be suitable for submission to the Imperial Parliament in 
London, which retained the power to amend the constitutions of each colony, and to form a 
national government. Drafts were considered by the Parliaments of the Colonies, submitted to 
referenda and, in 1900, a form of draft constitution was approved by the electors in the six 
63 
Colonies. This became the subject of discussion between the representatives of the Colonies and 
the British Government. After slight amendments to the draft approved by the Colonial 
electorates, the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 was passed by the Imperial 
Parliament in London. The Australian Constitution is part of this Statute, under the terms of 
which, the Commonwealth came into being on 1 January 1901. 
The Australian Federation was, and remains, an agreement between the former colonies to unite 
for certain purposes which are contained in s51 (concurrent powers) and s52 (exclusive powers) 
of the Australian Constitution. Seven Commonwealth Departments of State were formed: three 
replacing existing Colonial departments: Trade and Customs, Post and Telegraph and Defence 
and four new departments: Prime Minister, Treasury, Home Affairs and Attorney-General. In 
relation to Federal or Commonwealth crime, of the four basic elements of the criminal justice 
system, only the federal legislature and aspects of a federal judiciary were established at 
federation. Policing and corrections were not. In terms of policing at a national level, there were 
a series of ad hoc reactions, primarily related to the reaction to the wars which were the scourge 
of the first half of the 20th century. These were broadly referred to as the Commonwealth Police.  
The second Commonwealth Police 1927-1960 
The second iteration of a national police force was in 1927, when eight New South Wales police 
officers became the first police to operate in the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), later the 
Australian Capital Territory (ACT). This national force, was supplemented by ten Peace Officers. 
They eventually assumed policing duties for the FCT from NSW, which had jurisdiction over the 
area until then, and became known as the Commonwealth Police (Federal Capital Territory). This 
coincided with the relocation of the Commonwealth Parliament from Melbourne to Canberra in 
1927. 
In the 1930s, the high level of civil unrest, necessitated the swearing in of Special Peace Officers 
at Commonwealth Departments. Strikes at strategic establishments, such as munitions factories, 
saw the creation of the Defence Establishment Guard which in 1940 merged with the Peace 
Officers to become the Peace Officer Guard. The plainclothes equivalent, the (Australian) 
Commonwealth Investigation Service (CIS) had also established offices in all states and existed 
between 1945 and 1960.  
The CIS had evolved from the (Australian) Commonwealth Investigations Branch (CIB) which 
had existed between 1919 and 1945. The major task of the CIB was the monitoring of all enemy 
aliens. In 1960 the Commonwealth Investigations Service (CIS) and the Peace Officer Guard 
amalgamated to form the third iteration of the Commonwealth Police, which continued 
investigations and surveillance duties, and eventually assumed guarding duties for diplomatic 
missions and international airports. 
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The Third Commonwealth Police 1960-1975 
The third iteration of the Commonwealth Police existed from 1960 until 1975, and was an 
amalgamation of the Commonwealth Investigation Branch and the Peace Officer Guard. It was 
this iteration of the Commonwealth Police, which became the international face of Australian 
policing, which included duties with the United Nations which commenced with service in the 
troubled island of Cyprus in 1964.  
Although the first thirteen contingents to Cyprus were actually a combination of State and 
Territory police, wearing Commonwealth Police uniforms, eventually all police contingents to 
Cyprus consisted entirely of Commonwealth Police. Following amalgamation in 1979, the AFP 
became the Australian government’s international police representative, primarily in UN 
missions, and assumed the role as Australian Civilian Police within a United Nations 
Peacekeeping mission-the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). It was also this iteration 
of the Commonwealth Police which became part of the proposed Australia Police in 1975. The 
AFP was formed in 1979 as an amalgamation of three distinct entities: (1) The Australian Capital 
Territory Police, (2) The Commonwealth Police and later the (3) Federal Narcotics Bureau.  
The Australian Capital Territory Police 1957–1979 
In 1883 the NSW Police Force established a police presence in the Canberra area and continued 
to undertake policing duties when the Federal Capital Territory was proclaimed in 1911, as the 
seat of the Australian Parliament, until the Commonwealth Police (FCT) was established in 1927. 
In 1926, the Commonwealth Attorney-General determined that policing in the Territory should 
be performed by a local force. In 1927, the Federal Capital Territory Police (FCT) was formed 
and staffed by 11 men, 10 former Commonwealth Peace Officers and the former NSW Police 
Sergeant, who had been in charge of the NSW Police contingent in Canberra. The force changed 
its name to the Commonwealth Police (Australian Capital Territory), until 1957 when it formally 
adopted the name, Australian Capital Territory Police Force. The ACT Police performed all of 
the community policing functions of the State police in other jurisdictions, and lent credence to 
Sir Robert Mark’s requirement for a metropolitan base for the AFP. 
Upon amalgamation in 1979, the AFP assumed responsibility for general community policing in 
the ACT, and various external territories controlled by the Federal Government, including the 
Jervis Bay Territory, on the News South Wales south coast, Norfolk Island, in the Pacific Ocean 
and Christmas Island and Coco (Keeling Islands) in the Indian Ocean. The AFP retains this role 
to this day, notable as the ACT attained self-government in 1989, but did not reinvigorate its own 
police force. The AFP performs this function in the ACT on a contractual basis with the ACT 
Government. It is now known as ‘ACT Policing’ rather than the ACT Police to reflect the fact 
that it is not a discrete entity but a sub-unit of the greater AFP. 
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The Federal Narcotics Bureau 
The Federal Narcotics Bureau, a division of the Australian Customs Service, was incorporated 
into the new AFP in November 1979, one month after its formation. The bureau was established, 
as a direct result of a review into Australia’s counter-terrorism capabilities, undertaken by Sir 
Robert Mark. The review followed the bombing of the Hilton Hotel in George St Sydney on 13 
February 1978. 
The Australian Federal Police 1979 
The AFP was formed on 19 October 1979 under the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 after the 
merging of the former Commonwealth Police and the Australian Capital Territory Police. In 
November 1979, the Federal Narcotics Bureau was transferred to the new agency. In 1984, the 
protective service component of the AFP, was separated forming the Australian Protective 
Service (APS) governed by the Attorney-General's Department. The APS was transferred back to 
the AFP twenty years later in 2004. 
The AFP enforces federal law and protects federal and national interests from crime in Australia 
and overseas. The AFP is Australia's international law enforcement and policing representative, 
and is the chief adviser on policing issues to the Australian government. Traditionally the types 
of crime addressed by the AFP revolved around narcotics importations, and fraud committed 
against the Commonwealth. These duties also involved the burgeoning emergence of organised 
crime, particularly with an international aspect. At this time, South East Asia was the major transit 
region for heroin coming from the ‘Golden Triangle’ in the border area between Laos, Thailand 
and Myanmar. 
As a result, the AFP established an International Liaison Officers Network, to act as an effective 
operational and criminal intelligence interface between Australian law enforcement and host 
nation police in nations, with the policy of addressing crime as close to its source as possible. 
Particular emphasis was placed on drug source and transhipment countries, especially in South 
East Asia. In addition to these duties, the AFP inherited the international aspect of Australian 
policing from its predecessor the Commonwealth Police, including UN service in Cyprus, dating 
from1964, which in 1979 had been operating for fifteen years. This was the vanguard of a proud 
history of Australian international ‘boots on the ground’ policing, primarily but not universally 
with the UN. The international aspect of the AFP continues and falls under the International 
Operations portfolio. In 2017 the Australian Government announced the proposed amalgamation 
of the AFP, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) and the Department of 
Immigration and Border Protection (DIBP) into a UK style Home Office, under one Minister. 
One of the influences the AFP can have in such a large department is the adherence to Peelian 
policing approaches which are more likely to protect rather than abuse power, due primarily to 
the community-based approach with its foundation in the metropolitan base, Australia’s national 
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capital city, Canberra. Interestingly, the Home Affairs department was one of the original new 
federal departments created at federation. 
Peelian policing principles 
Noteworthy is the fact that the Peelian approach to policing had been extant in the Australian 
colonial police forces which took some time before it was universally approached. In his Report, 
Sir Robert Mark provided direct encouragement for this approach, based on his own experiences 
in the London Met. The significance of the Mark Report as a foundation document for the AFP 
is manifold. Its primary significance, however is that the adoption of Peelian approaches to 
policing should be adopted at a national level, when alternative approaches involving more 
intrusive or forceful methods, could well have prevailed. The primary features are (1) separation 
from political control; (2) accountability; (3) public consent; and (3) the minimum use of force.  
The report also draws a distinction between administration and operations, which creates a 
situation where operations are impartial and free from political interference which is the antithesis 
of impartiality. The rationale for this, is that any community perception that operational police 
decisions have been subject to political influence, will have a tendency to result in an adverse 
view of the reputation and status of the force that underpins public confidence and trust. 
Institutionally and individually, police consciously and unconsciously monitor, regulate, and 
enforce, the social contract between the community and its government, and strict impartiality is 
an essential aspect of this.  
This is the essence of liberal-democratic, consent-based policing where, as an institutional 
representative of both the community and its government, the police represent government by 
consent rather than by coercion, relying on prestige rather than power to achieve its objectives. 
The significance of this for police, is that the community generally resolves its own disputes, and 
settles its own affairs, freeing up scarce police resources to address more serious issues.  
Summary and conclusion 
It is Peelian policing principles, developed in London in 1829, in response to the excessive use of 
military force, which were eventually adopted by all Australian colonial police in the 19th century 
and also adopted by Australia’s national policing agency, the AFP from the outset in 1979. It is 
these values-based principles and approaches that all members of the AFP carry with them in the 
execution of their duties both domestically and internationally. The AFP has developed a number 
of its own overtly stated values. They are Fairness, Accountability, Trust, Integrity, Commitment, 
Excellence and Respect. The issue at hand is whether these values and principles and approaches 
can be transferred to other police agencies with which the AFP deals as part of its international 
mandate. Another issue related to globalised policing is how these values, principles and 
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approaches can be sustained in the continual and moveable balance between the preservation of 
individual rights and freedoms and collective security domestically and internationally. These are 
not without their challenges as will be discussed in the following chapters. One particularly 
challenging area for police operating internationally is many of the areas requiring international 
intervention are undergoing such extreme civil disorder that a consent-based liberal-democratic 
policing posture is impossible and it is only by more forceful and intrusive means that order can 
be restored, laws enforced and justice done. Even being sworn to a benevolent institution like the 
Crown is no guarantee that authority will not be abused. A discussion of two counter-insurgency 
operations in which police took a lead role highlights this in the context of the prevailing security 
and criminal threat environment in which the police were operating.  
Authority and accountability: Systems and circumstances 
As previously discussed, the relationship between the Crown and the police, via their respective 
oaths of ‘law and justice in mercy’, and applied objectively and impartially ‘without fear, favour, 
affection or ill-will’, provides a solid foundation upon which to build a consent-based model of 
policing. This in turn is essential to the legitimacy which underpins sustainable peace and 
stability. It is a robust and elegant mechanism which balances both authority and accountability. 
Not all policing approaches adopt this finely tuned and flexible balance between respecting the 
rights of individual citizens and the expectations of the broader community in relation to safety 
and security. Authoritarian and totalitarian policing systems tend to serve the political elites at the 
expense of the rights and freedoms of ordinary citizens. They are very effective at meeting 
security criteria, but generally at the expense of individual rights, via both force and intrusion 
where authority is maximised, but accountability is minimised. The best examples of this sort of 
policing are those from the former Eastern Bloc communist countries and existing communist 
countries such as the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). 
The European policing model, the ‘gendarmerie’ model, adopted in most of continental Europe 
is forceful and intrusive, but not to the extremes of authoritarian or totalitarian policing 
approaches. In fact is was repugnance at the French para-military policing model during the 
French Revolution and Napoleonic periods which shaped British political attitudes in the early 
19th Century and led to the establishment of the London Metropolitan Police in 1829, as a specific 
non-military institution which relied almost exclusively upon cooperation from the public and 
adopted a posture of minimal use of force. This was the model which was eventually adopted in 
the Australian colonies as they centralised their administrative and judicial systems, including the 
police. Prior to this, policing in the Australian colonies had been ad hoc and was often based more 
on functional lines such as goldfields police, mounted police or water police, than territorial lines. 
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It was the centralisation of policing within identifiable sovereign jurisdictions within an 
accountable and well-functioning judicial system which formed the foundations upon which 
contemporary Australian liberal-democratic policing rests.  
Liberal-democratic policing in the context of this thesis has a number of distinctive features 
including police primacy, namely the principle that sworn police retain a monopoly on the use of 
force including armed force, within a given jurisdiction; the principle that the use of force is a last 
resort used in self-defence or in defence of a third party at risk of death or serious injury; that 
force is minimised and that it is legal, reasonable, necessary and proportionate to the threat posed; 
and that all actions by police are accountable at both the institutional and individual level through 
a functioning judicial system and an open and transparent media. These are essential elements in 
a functioning liberal democratic policing approach as they tend towards broad acceptance by the 
majority of the community being policed. 
The central role played by the Crown in this has been discussed in relation to oaths, but it also 
needs to be recognised as an institution which occupies space which could potentially become 
politicised, which has a high potential for adverse impacts on impartiality and objectivity as it 
risks compromising the apolitical nature of the administration of justice, thus undermining its 
legitimacy. Noteworthy is the fact mentioned earlier that even in British-based liberal 
democracies, parliamentarians do not swear an oath to act without fear, favour, affection or ill-
will, yet it is parliamentarians whose policies shape the way in which services, including police, 
direct and conduct their activities, particularly when involved in hostile environments. It is 
politicians who formulate the policy settings under which police deploy internationally. 
Counter insurgency policing 
Consent-based liberal-democratic policing can only really be effective if the overwhelming 
majority of the population actively supports, or is at least indifferent to the prevailing system of 
government. Should this level of consent change, a liberal-democratic posture, is difficult to 
maintain. Therefore in extreme circumstances, even police from liberal-democratic societies can 
adopt extreme measures more reminiscent of authoritarian or ad hoc systems. This is illustrated 
further by a comparison of policing models in two counter-insurgency operations conducted by 
the British Government in the 20th Century. The first, a counter-insurgency operation in Ireland 
in the 1920s was not well handled and resulted in further alienating the public and the loss of 
British sovereignty and an independent and divided Ireland, which has contemporary 
repercussions in relation to relationships with the European Union (EU). The second, a counter-
insurgency operation in Malaya between 1948 and 1960, masterfully orchestrated by the outgoing 
colonial British, resulted in a relatively peaceful transition to an independent Malaysia, within an 
expanded Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). Ironically both involved significant 
influence by Sir Winston Churchill. 
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There are a number of similarities in the way in which these two counter-insurgency operations 
were conducted, but there were also a number of significant differences, particularly in the way 
para-military police forces were used and the levels of control and accountability to which they 
were subjected. The injudicious and indiscriminate use of force in Ireland undermined the meagre 
amount of public consent, whereas the effective use of police intelligence in Malaya, to target 
force accurately against an increasingly isolated insurgent population, minimised exposure of the 
general population to hostilities, whilst retaining a functional government, and thereby maintained 
a relatively high level of community consent. 
At first blush it may seem to be a long stretch linking events in Ireland in the 1920s with events 
in Malaya in the 1950s. The link, however, is more apparent when the fact is recognized that both 
involved a combined effort of military and police and that both involved British forces, serving 
under the Crown, whose legitimacy, it has been argued, underpins good governance. Both 
counter-insurgency operations involved police using extreme methods which would be 
unacceptable in a liberal-democracy. In Ireland it was based on physical force, which lapsed into 
brutality, with little strategic thought, whereas in Malaya it was far more nuanced and was based 
on a well-considered strategy involving the effective use of a ‘carrot and stick’ approach to both 
‘win hearts and minds’ and isolate the insurgents to prevent the spread of hostile influence. 
Information relating to these two counter-insurgency operations has been sourced from Irish and 
Australian historians in relation to the Irish matter and from British and American sources in 
relation to the Malayan Emergency. A paper published in 2001 by the Queensland historian John 
Ainsworth provided some very useful information relating to the Royal Irish Constabulary and 
their Black and Tan and Auxiliary components. This was supplemented by some detail provided 
by Irish commentators on the original Bloody Sunday in Dublin in 1921.111 
The detail relating to the Malayan Emergency was sourced from two very informative documents. 
The first is Noel Barber’s 1971 book The War of the Running Dogs which provides a personal 
account in addition to a well-documented account of this seminal moment in the fighting 
111 Ainsworth, J. (2001) The Black and Tans and Auxiliaries in Ireland 1920-1921: Their Origins, Roles 
and Legacy, School of Humanities & Social Science, Queensland University of Technology. 
[https://eprints.qut.edu.au/9/1/Ainsworth_Black_conf.PDF] 
Bloody Sunday:  Today in Irish History (2011), 21 November 1920. 
[http://www.theirishstory.com/2011/11/21/today-in-irish-history-bloody-sunday-november-21-
1920/#.Wph1XTYUncs] 
Lawlor D, (2015) The Black and Tan War: Nine Fascinating Facts About the Bloody Fight for Irish 
Independence.  [http://militaryhistorynow.com/2015/11/09/the-black-and-tan-war-nine-fascinating-facts-
about-the-bloody-fight-for-irish-independence/] 
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withdrawal of the British Empire. The second, written by Robert Komer for the RAND 
Corporation in 1972 when the United States had spent so much blood and treasure in Vietnam.112 
Ireland 1919–1921 
What has become known as the Irish War of Independence took place between January 1919 and 
July 1921. It was an undeclared war which involved approximately 15000 Irish guerrillas fighting 
against a British military and police force of about 42,000. Lawlor states there were nearly 2000 
casualties including 750 civilians. 
In the Irish situation the extant police body, the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), was located in 
poorly fortified housing throughout the rural areas and as such became increasingly subject to 
hostile activities by the Irish Republican Army (IRA). This violence and intimidation caused 
increased casualties among the RIC, causing it to withdraw to more defensible locations from 
which they conducted their patrols. They were supplemented by two groups of para-military 
police members: the infamous Black and Tans, many of whom were former soldiers and veterans 
of the 1914-18 war, and the Auxiliary Division of the RIC (ADRIC), who were officers with 
similar backgrounds. The British Government established recruiting centres in the major cities in 
mainland Britain, including London, Liverpool, Birmingham and Glasgow, specifically to recruit 
military veterans for service in Ireland. Many of these men had been subjected to and perhaps 
brutalised by the horrors of trench warfare and constant bombardment during their service and 
many no doubt were suffering from what is now known as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 
(PTSD), whereby their moral compasses were adversely affected. Their actions whilst in ‘police’ 
service in Ireland certainly reflected this. This was a political decision against best advice from 
quarters best placed to provide that advice. 
As Ainsworth points out: 
…London and the Secretary of State for War…Winston Churchill…were clearly 
responsible for …the process of militarizing the RIC, namely the creation of the 
Auxiliary Division. Churchill planted the seed of an idea in this regard at a conference 
of ministers in London on 11 May 1920 when, in proposing an alternative to substantial 
reinforcements for the Army in Ireland, he suggested raising a special force of 8,000 
ex-soldiers to reinforce the RIC instead. Furthermore, he persisted with his proposal 
for ‘the prompt raising of a special Corps of Gendarmerie ... in aid of the Royal Irish 
Constabulary during the emergency period’ despite the clear opposition of a military 
112 Komer R. (1972) The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organisation of a Successful 
Counterinsurgency Effort. Advanced Research Projects Agency RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 
California. 
Barber, N. (1971) The War of the Running Dogs, How Malaya Defeated the Communists 1948-60.   
Collins London 1971. 
Hack, K. (2009) The Malayan Emergency a Counterinsurgency Paradigm, Journal of Strategic Studies, 
32:3, 383-414, DOI: 10.1080/01402390902928180 
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committee of review appointed by Cabinet and chaired by the new GOC in Ireland, 
General Sir Nevil Macready, which rejected the idea as ‘not feasible.113 
Both the Black and Tans and the Auxies displayed a ‘…tendency to engage in wanton destruction 
of property, indiscriminate shooting and violence and, on occasions, even deliberate murder, in 
their apparent quest to administer random terror.’114 
As one IRA members is quoted as saying: 
They had a special technique. Fast lorries of them would come roaring into a village, 
the occupants would jump out, firing shots and ordering all the inhabitants out of 
doors. No exceptions were allowed. Men and women, old and young, the sick and 
decrepit were lined up against the walls with their hands up, questioned and searched. 
No raid was ever carried out by these ex-officers without their beating up with the butt 
ends of their revolvers, at least a half-dozen people. They were no respecters of persons 
and seemed to particularly dislike the Catholic priests.115 
This sort of brutality captured the attention of the press in Ireland, England and significantly in 
the United States with its large Irish diaspora. This invited Britain’s critics to accuse the British 
Government of ‘…conniving in a systematic program of barbaric reprisals against the Irish 
people.’116 
It should not be forgotten however, that the brutality was not one-sided. The term ‘Bloody 
Sunday’ in contemporary terms is usually associated with the indiscriminate shooting by British 
Army paratroopers at a civil rights demonstration in Derry/ Londonderry in January 1972 which 
killed thirteen civilians. The original term in Ireland’s troubled history however, relates to an 
incident on 21 November 1920. On that date Michael Collins, the IRA Chief of Intelligence, led 
an armed gang known as ‘The Squad’ to murder all identified British intelligence agents in 
Dublin. Collins had an original list of 50 names, but this was shortened to 35 following objections 
raised by Cathal Brugha, the IRA’s Minister for Defence.  Brugha had been the Chief of Staff of 
the IRA and had argued against ambushes of British forces unless there had been first a call to 
surrender. This had been rejected by the IRA brigade commander as impractical. The IRA under 
Collins preferred assassination. 
Collins and his gang murdered 14 British officers on 21 November 1920. This included two 
‘Auxies’ who had stumbled across one of the shootings. As news of these murders spread the RIC 
drove to a football stadium at Croke Park where a Gaelic football match was scheduled, ostensibly 
to search for the offenders. Upon arrival, Black and Tan members of the RIC dismounted from 
their vehicles and without provocation began firing indiscriminately into the crowd, 
113 Ainsworth (2001), p. 2. 
114 Ainsworth (2001), p. 3. 
115 Ainsworth (2001), p. 6. 
116 Ainsworth (2001), p. 4. 
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coincidentally also killing fourteen. In all 228 rounds were fired including 50 rounds fired from 
a machine gun mounted on an armoured car, over the heads of the fleeing spectators.117 
This precipitous action further exacerbated an already dire situation, as the majority Catholic 
population lent more support to the IRA and eventuated in a complete rout of the RIC, to the six 
counties in the province of Ulster in the north-east of Ireland, and its disbandment and re-naming 
as the Royal Ulster Constabulary, later to become the Police Service of Northern Ireland. British 
sovereignty was lost. The policing vacuum in the Irish republic was filled by the Garda Siochana, 
the Guardian of the Peace, in 1923.118 
This sort of ad hoc and violent policing was anything but conducive to the restoration of law and 
order in Ireland, and in fact made the situation worse. These sorts of reprisals by a clearly 
uncontrolled and non-accountable para-military police, provided Sinn Fein with a propaganda 
gift and turned British and United States opinion further against British Government policy in 
Ireland. Those who disapproved included King George V. As a result, Britain not only lost its 
sovereignty over Ireland; it attracted significant opprobrium for the poor handling of a situation, 
which lingers to this day. 
The implications for Australian policing arising from this unfortunate escalation of hostilities in 
Ireland are not immediately apparent. Indiscriminate and violent actions by forces representing 
the Crown and terrorist campaigns by the IRA have soured relations both in Ireland and in Britain. 
In Australia, Catholic-Protestant sectarian troubles which were once widespread are no longer 
apparent. There is a residual effect which may impact upon police in the form of a resurgent 
Australian republicanism, partially based on lingering bitterness among some descendants of Irish 
diaspora communities in Australia, actively working to remove the role of the Crown in the 
Australian Constitutional arrangements. The significance of this may not seem readily apparent, 
unless it is considered in the light of the oath police and judges swear when they promise to 
conduct their duties ‘without fear, favour, affection or ill-will’, under the direct link to the 
Coronation Oath of ‘law and justice in mercy’. 
There was clearly an absence of ‘law and justice in mercy’ and an overt presence of ‘fear, favour 
affection and ill-will’ on the part of both the IRA and the RIC and its supplements. The poor 
117 Bloody Sunday:  Today in Irish History (2011), 21 November 1920. 
[http://www.theirishstory.com/2011/11/21/today-in-irish-history-bloody-sunday-november-21-
1920/#.Wph1XTYUncs] 
118 Noteworthy is the fact that the AFP and Garda Siochana members developed a very strong working 
relationship whilst both organisations were deployed as UN Civilian Police in Cyprus. One example of 
this is long-standing mutual agreement on the assumption of duties in each other’s sector on days of 
national significance: St Patrick’s Day on 17 March and ANZAC Day on 25 April. 
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handling of the Irish situation by the British Government in the 1920s can be contrasted with the 
adept handling of the situation in Malaya in the 1950s. 
Malaya 1947–1960 
The Malayan Emergency was a British-led operation conducted on the Malayan Peninsula 
between 1947 and 1960. It involved 40000 British and Commonwealth troops, including 
Australians and 67000 police, predominantly Malayan, including Special Constables, fighting an 
insurgency involving about 8000 mainly ethnic Chinese guerrillas located mainly in camps deep 
in the jungle. 119  The casualty figures were 6710 insurgents killed, 1287 captured, 2707 
surrendered and 2810 wounded. Police casualties at 2947 were significantly higher than the 1878 
military casualties. Civilian population casualties were 2473 killed, 1385 wounded and 810 
missing.120 
The insurgency was split into two groups, the first a small deadly strike force operating from 
covert jungle bases, and the second a large dispersed group in the main population centres 
supplying money, food and information. Many ‘…worked as waiters in British clubs, as clerks in 
government offices, as school teachers, newspaper reporters. Others operated among the 
squatters in the jungle fringe, tappers on the estates, in the rabbit warrens of big cities…’121  
With long, sometimes bitter, experience in population-based conflict, the British recognised that 
pouring more troops into the jungle was not the solution but, taking a leaf from the American 
revolutionary John Adams about the hearts and minds of the people’, formulated a carrot and 
stick approach to population control, both physically and psychologically.  
From the very start of operations, the British recognised that this was a war of political ideologies 
and that what was required was ‘armed support for a political war, not political support for an 
army war.’122 They worked with their Malayan counterparts to reform government services and 
placed the military in support of a police-led security operation, with police Special Branch 
playing a vital role in intelligence collection and effective targeting operations, both in physical 
terms and as a vital part of an information operation or psywar. Initially the military had enjoyed 
free reign ‘with virtually no interference, particularly as at first the police had been ineffectual. 
119 Hack, K. (2009) The Malayan Emergency a Counterinsurgency Paradigm, Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 32:3, 383-414, DOI: 10.1080/01402390902928180 
120 Komer R. (1972) The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organisation of a Successful 
Counterinsurgency Effort. Advanced Research Projects Agency RAND Corporation, Santa Monica 
California. 
121 Barber, N. (1971) The War of the Running Dogs How Malaya Defeated the Communists 1948-60 
Collins London 1971, p. 29. 
122 Barber (1971), p. 57. 
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To the military mind this was ‘just the job for an army’ and it was unthinkable…that ‘a bunch of 
coppers would start telling the generals what to do.’ 
The British High Commissioner Sir Henry Gurney disagreed and based his position on the belief 
that if: 
the army were given its head…it would…lead to a pattern of escalation, a need to 
impress with military might, the inevitable bombing of innocent civilians, resulting in 
hatred of authority…In this kind of war, one stray bomb that killed one innocent child 
could make a thousand enemies…it was better to police the villages than destroy them.  
Gurney believed that arms alone could never win a guerrilla war and that political stability was 
the major determinant. Normal daily government had to function and be seen to function to avoid 
the millions of ‘bemused, bewildered bystanders caught up in the turmoil of war and terror’ 
turning to communism.123 
Gurney was assassinated by insurgents in a deliberate ambush on a remote country road in 
October 1951. Unfortunate as this was, it was catalyst for more robust action under the 
government led by the returning Prime Minister Winston Churchill. As Barber states: 
For the British, the murder of Gurney would pave the way to victory. It had needed his 
death to galvanise the British government in Whitehall into serious action, to make 
them realise that without a supremo to run a real war, there could be no victory. By 
chance, Gurney’s death coincided with the last breaths of the Socialist government in 
Britain, so that within a few weeks one dynamic man would at last see the threat in 
Malaya for what it really was.124 
The supremo was a former Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Gerald Templer, who 
was appointed following a visit to Malaya by Churchill’s Colonial Secretary the Rt Hon. Oliver 
Lyttelton, who recommended a unified civil-military command under one man. In February 1952 
Templer combined the positions of High Commissioner and Director of Operations, thus 
ameliorating the problem of divided command at the top and the problem of having the police tell 
the generals what to do, because he was a general himself.125 
Templer also set about full participation by Malayan Government officials in a committee-based 
decision-making process, where policy was determined centrally but implemented at the state and 
local levels, with full and equal participation by Malayan Government officials. This set the 
framework for the remainder of the conflict where … ‘the highest direction and operational 
conduct of counter-insurgency throughout the 1948-1960 Malayan Emergency were on both a 
joint civil-military and a combined British-Malayan basis.’ 126 
123 Barber (1971), p.p. 58–60. 
124 Barber (1971), p. 123. 
125 Komer (1972), p. 30. 
126 Komer (1972), p. 33. 
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Road to conflict 
The stakes were high. In the post-1945 world, two broad camps emerged: the market-based pro-
western alliance, led by the United States and the international communist world, led by the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in Europe and the communist People’s Republic of China 
(PRC), following the communist victory in China in 1949. Peninsula Malaya, a British colonial 
possession, was surrounded by the strategic waterways of the Malacca Strait to the west, the 
Johore Strait and Singapore to the south, and the South China Sea to the east. These waterways 
linked the oilfields in the Middle East with the industrial nations in the Far East- Taiwan, Japan 
and Korea-whose stability and economic development was vital to the U.S. strategy of 
containment of Chinese expansionism. The peninsula was mostly covered by thick jungle. The 
major economic activity involved tin mining and rubber production, both vital for the industrial 
economies of the world. The population of Malaya consisted of Muslim Malays who accounted 
who for about 50 per cent of the population and ethnic Chinese from various parts of China 
accounted for about 37 per cent of the population, with the remainder being significantly 
represented by ethnic Indians. Very few of the ethnic Chinese were Malayan citizens and as a 
result were under-represented in Malayan Government employment. 
The Malayan communist movement emerged from ethnic Chinese who, supported by the British 
during the 1939-45 war against the Japanese, fought a very effective guerrilla war against the 
Imperial Japanese forces. Their motives appear to be related to the invasion of China by the 
Japanese in this period. With the end of hostilities in 1945, these guerrillas began agitating for an 
independent Malaya, along with many others in South East Asia and Indo-China. The conflation 
of these nascent national liberation movements with expansionist communism in this region 
created a concern in the ‘west’ that the strategic waterways and the resource bases could be 
compromised. Nation-wide guerrilla warfare which became a new and terrible force in Asian 
countries such as Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos was also a possibility in Malaya unless the 
situation was handled carefully. 
Some commentators are unconvinced that the Domino Theory, as it became known, was based on 
sound analysis; however the words of Malaysia’s first Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman in 
1957 on this subject, after eventual independence, are worthy of repetition: 
The Tunku was not…pleased when thirty-five Socialist MPs in London demanded that 
after Merdeka [independence] British troops should be withdrawn as ‘their presence 
was incompatible with Malayan Independence’. This attitude, the Tunku felt, was part 
of a Communist strategy to encourage a similar ‘End the War’ demand in Malaya. 
It is as much the duty of the British people as of the Malayans themselves to meet and 
crush the Communist challenge,’ he said. ‘It is accepted by all the free world that the 
fight against the Communists in Malaya is not Malaya’s concern alone. The Reds are 
trying to establish Communist dictatorships in South-East Asia-if they succeed, the 
whole of South-East Asia will be lost. Malaya is engaged not only in a life and death 
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struggle, but also in a struggle to free this part of Asia from the Communist menace. If 
the British and other Commonwealth countries were to withdraw their support and 
leave Malaya to shoulder the burden alone, it would be necessary for this country to 
double her security forces and expenses in order to end the war.127 
This was said in 1957, however the sentiments held by the Tunku prevailed in 1947, when anti-
British hostilities commenced. To complicate matters further, both the United States and the 
newly formed United Nations opposed colonisation, and actively advocated de-colonisation. For 
the British in Malaya, time was up and independence was inevitable, but the British were on their 
own.  
By acknowledging and accommodating this in negotiations with Malay representatives like 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, and the land-owning Sultans, the British not only gained favour with this 
significant group, it also deprived the Malayan Chinese communist guerrillas of their main source 
of inspiration-Malayan independence. 
As a result …‘the Malays firmly supported the government and enlisted heavily in the security 
forces…[as]… much anti-Chinese sentiment existed among them.128 
The move towards independence came from a directive in London in February 1952 which 
directed that Malaya become both ‘a fully self-governing nation and a united one.’ Templer 
consequently emphasised both the development of the electoral process and enfranchising of both 
Chinese and Indian minority communities via a law passed in September 1952 which extended 
citizenship to 50-60 percent of these communities.129  
With half of the population already working in accordance with British and Malayan Government 
policy, and significant proportions of the other two major ethnic minorities also enfranchised, and 
thus with an incentive to work towards a peaceful transition to independence, the groundwork for 
an effective counter-insurgency operation was prepared. 
The strategy 
The strategy, known as the Briggs Plan, named after the British General Sir Harold Briggs, 
Director of Operations in Malaya, involved four phases: 
1. dominate the populated areas with effective security 
2. disrupt civilian support for the insurgents 
3. isolate insurgents from food and information sources 
127 Tunku Abdul Rahman in Barber (1971), p. 234. 
128 Komer (1972), p. 13. 
129 Komer (1972), p. 65. 
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4. force the insurgents to attack Government forces on grounds or terms favourable to 
the security forces. 
The implementation of this plan involved population control via a universal ID card system 
containing thumbprints and photographs; food controls via this ID card system and eventual food 
denial programs administered by the Emergency Food Denial Organisation (EFDO). It involved 
the resettlement of half a million ‘at risk’ ethnic Chinese into ‘New Villages’, with dispensaries, 
schools, markets, fresh water and electricity, as well as allotment with full title to those who 
farmed their plots. The plan also involved curfews, road blocks, arrest on suspicion, and the 
involvement of police ‘jungle patrols’ including para-military activities such as patrolling and 
ambushing. The plan also involved banishment to mainland China via Hong Kong, until the 
Chinese communist government put a stop to this in 1949. This was all supported by a very 
effective information operations campaign involving Radio Malaya broadcasting daily in twelve 
languages or dialects, ‘voice aircraft’ flying low over the jungle broadcasting and dropping 
leaflets supported by ‘voice trucks’ capable of being heard up to six miles distant. The messaging 
was heavily influenced by intelligence provided by police Special Branch which advised on 
specific targeting. 
Police special branch intelligence and psychological messaging 
Reliable, accurate and timely human intelligence was a vital component in this campaign. The: 
respective intelligence functions of the military and ‘the police Special Branch was 
given primary responsibility for intelligence on the insurgents. All military-generated 
raw intelligence such as captured documents, and any prisoners or defectors, were sent 
to Special Branch for exploitation.130  
From this intelligence, carefully directed messaging via ‘voice aircraft’, voice vehicles’ and 
leaflet drops could be specifically targeted. 
The success of the leaflets, promising rewards for information, surrender or capture, as well as 
‘safe-conduct’ passes, combined with voice techniques can best be assessed by the fact that 
anyone found picking up a dropped leaflet faced instant execution by insurgent commanders 131 
and that, as Barber argues, not even the toughest insurgent commander could be sure his men 
weren’t listening.132 
Isolation and food denial 
Isolating the insurgents from their food, money and information sources was a very effective 
strategy because the insurgents could not sustain themselves in any numbers in the jungles without 
external food supplies. Food sales could not be made to anyone without an ID card, and strict 
130 Komer (1972), p. 43. 
131 Komer (1972), p. 72. 
132 Barber (1971), p. 189. 
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records were kept for inspection in food-restricted areas.  Food stocks over a certain amount were 
confiscated and food rationing was implemented. This was supervised by the Emergency Food 
Denial Organisation (EFDO) created under the Ministry of Defence and Internal Security. 
Population movement was controlled by curfews by military and police and operated on the 
assumption ‘that anyone or anything moving after curfew was to be shot on sight.133  
Over time, this complex of food and resource controls together with food denial operations seem 
to have done a great deal to sap insurgent strength. It forced the guerrillas to expose themselves 
to patrols and ambushes, and eventually to surrender in increasing numbers under the pressure of 
hunger.134 
The importance of justice 
The combined British-Malayan efforts in Malaya took twelve years and involved unified civilian 
control over military forces, and police-led intelligence operations, using extreme methodology 
and an effective Psychological Operation (psyops) campaign targeting the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
the population. The central role played by the police, particularly the Police Special Branch, 
stands out as an enduring feature of the way in which this potentially volatile situation was 
resolved relatively peacefully. 
As British Maj. Gen. Richard Clutterbuck stated in Guerrillas and Terrorists  
The decisive element in doing all these things in Malaya was the police force; counter-
insurgency is a matter of restoring law and order, and law and order is a matter for 
policemen with the training and the lawful means for the task…Security and 
intelligence were provided by the police, for whom the army was a support not a 
substitute.’ 135 
As Komer indicates, the British reputation for fair-minded justice and impartial 
administration was of significant value to the counter-insurgency effort. 136 Barber further 
states ‘the finest weapons against Communism is the let the world see that justice is being 
done.’137 This combined effort was so successful that by 1960 guerrilla strength and activity 
had declined to such an extent that in July the Emergency was declared officially over.  
133 Komer (1972), p. 58–60. 
134 Komer (1972), p. 61. 
135 Maj. Gen. Richard Clutterbuck in Guerrillas and Terrorists (1977), Faber, London quoted in Barber 
(1971), p. 177. 
136 Komer (1972), p. 34. 
137 Barber (1971), p. 75. 
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Contemporary concerns 
There is no question that many of the operational tactics employed by the British and Malayan 
Government security forces in Malaya would stand in contravention of contemporary 
international human rights instruments. Nonetheless they were effective in securing a relatively 
peaceful transition from colony to self-government in a region which was engulfed in wide-spread 
and devastating violence undergoing similar transitions. It could be argued therefore that these 
stern methods adopted judiciously prevented more widespread violence and misery, which 
unfortunately occurred in other parts of the region in the 1960 and 1970s. The ultimate arbiter 
should be the people of Malaysia, which after independence in 1957 became a founding member 
of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) when it was formed a decade later in 
1967, and which later admitted those communist nations in Indo-China, Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos, as full members. 
The way in which the British handled their departure from Malaya stands as a blueprint not just 
of effective counter-insurgency, but as a textbook example of how de-colonisation should have 
taken place elsewhere, by winning the hearts and minds of the people by maintaining fair and 
impartial justice. ‘Law and justice in mercy’ were evident in Malaya and the security forces 
showed no ‘fear, favour, affection or ill-will’ except when confronted with circumstances which 
warranted extraordinary actions in which case they showed no quarter. Independence did not 
bring a complete withdrawal of the British, many of whom remained as Malayan Government 
workers to usher in nationhood. This involved a significant effort in nation-building. 
 In the words of Tunku Abdul Rahman: 
During the last three years of the war, more roads were built, more jungle cleared, 
bridges and water systems constructed, schools and hospitals started, than had been 
done in the last three generations. We were not fighting the communist terrorist with 
arms alone. We went a long way to win the hearts and minds of our people. We gave 
the people more than the communists could ever hope to give.138 
The implications for Australia from this period of turmoil in South East Asia were significant. 
The strategic waterways in the region are vital trade routes for Australia, and the instability which 
arose in the 1960s and 1970s drew Australian military forces into the region. The direct 
implications for Australian international policing arise because when inter-communal violence 
broke out on the Mediterranean island of Cyprus, a British request for Australian military forces 
was denied by the Australian Government and a contingent of Commonwealth Police was sent in 
its stead. This police peacekeeping legacy was inherited by the AFP upon its formation in 1979. 
  
138 Barber (1971), p. 247. 
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Chapter 2: The AFP in International Peacekeeping 
Overview 
The way in which the AFP was initially positioned as a contributor in international policing and 
diplomacy through peacekeeping deployments is discussed in this chapter. It will be demonstrated 
how the AFP has shown itself as capable and ready to respond effectively to extant and emerging 
challenges at the request of the Australian Government. The way in which, in 1964, the 
Commonwealth Police as it was then known, responded to the international community call to 
deal with the hostilities in Cyprus as a civilian police contribution to the United Nations 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) is examined. This mission provided the foundation 
upon which further AFP deployments in 1992 to Cambodia (UNTAC), in 1994 to Haiti, and 
Mozambique (ONUMOZ) were based. 
Section 1: United Nations Force in Cyprus: Police – the ‘accidental peacekeeper’ 
Sometimes even in heavily ‘militarised’ environments, an effective civilian police presence can 
offer an alternative to an exclusively military solution, to what are often community-based 
problems. This is particularly important in situations where ingrained ethnic hatreds, a belief in 
the justification of their own belligerence and sheer stubbornness, combine to create highly 
volatile situations, where accidental or deliberate misunderstandings, can escalate quickly. The 
situation in Cyprus is one of those situations. 
An involvement, spanning more than fifty years of international Australian policing, began in 
1964 when police were deployed in lieu of Australian troops, due to more pressing regional 
priorities in the post-colonial era, when wars of ‘national liberation’, were conflated with 
aggressive and expansionist Cold War international communism in South East Asia. The strategic 
genesis of this lies almost a decade earlier in the 1950s, arising from what became known as the 
Suez Crisis, caused by the nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Egypt, and precipitous military 
action by Britain and France in conjunction with Israel, which failed and resulted in Egypt taking 
full control of the canal. The ability for Britain to maintain its military commitments in the Persian 
Gulf and South East Asia was diminished. The Suez Crisis also created a major rift between the 
foreign policies of Britain and its major ally, the United States and ultimately resulted in Britain’s 
‘East of Suez’ policy in the 1970s, whereby British military forces east of the Suez Canal would 
be withdrawn.  
As one of Australia’s security guarantors in the South East Asian region, this created a serious re-
think of Australian foreign and defence policy in the region, which had taken a battering with the 
fall of Singapore to Imperial Japanese Forces in February 1942 and Indian independence in 1947.  
81 
The nascent nationalist, post-colonial independence movements, often conflated with 
expansionist communist aggression in Indo-China and South East Asia, resulted in Australian 
military forces becoming involved in conflict alongside British military forces in Malaya and 
North Borneo in the 1960s, resulting in the creation of the sovereign nation of Malaysia, and later 
Singapore, and later alongside United States military forces in Indo-China, specifically Vietnam. 
This re-focussed Australia in its interaction with the South East Asian region, as it sought trading 
partners to replace Britain as a destination for Australian agricultural and mineral exports, as 
stated by Kwan: 
As Britain gained entry to the European Economic Community and withdrew from most 
of its defence commitments east of Suez, trade, investment and defence ties with the 
United States and Japan became more important to Australia. Its citizens found their 
traditional easy access to Britain increasingly difficult after restrictive British laws in 
1962 and 1968.139 
Britain’s courtship of the European Common Market, later the European Union, caused a re-
prioritisation of Australian trade efforts into East Asia and South East Asia. Japan became a major 
trading partner in lieu of Britain, however, this was potentially compromised by communist 
threats to the sea lanes north and south, between Australia and Japan, and west to east from the 
Straits of Malacca to Japan, threatening Japan’s oil supply from the Middle East. This required 
military involvement by Australia in support of U.S. support for Japan. As a result, when asked 
for a military contribution to Cyprus in 1964, the Australian Government was unwilling to provide 
it, citing regional priorities as outlined by Sue Thompson from ASPI: 
at Britain’s request, the UN Security Council took a look at the situation in Cyprus, 
which had steadily deteriorated since the outbreak of violence between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots in December 1963. After the UN Secretary General had failed to 
reach an agreement with the parties, and following Turkish naval manoeuvres off the 
Cypriot coast, the Security Council adopted on 4 March a resolution authorising the 
Secretary General to create, with the consent of the Government of Cyprus, a 
peacekeeping force for the island. Australia chose not to contribute soldiers to the 
peacekeeping force, despite British attempts to convince Canberra otherwise. 
Australia’s position was that, because of other commitments and the onset of the 
Confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia just as America increased its 
involvement in Vietnam, Australia would be unable to consider a contribution to 
Cyprus.140 
The situation on Cyprus was, and remains, classic peacekeeping. There is a ceasefire, and thus a 
‘peace to keep’; there are two identifiable belligerents, who choose to use conventional military 
forces, and there is a combination of ethnic and religious tensions, as well as a territorial dispute. 
Unlike many other missions in which the AFP eventually became involved, the nature of the 
dispute is between governments, which ironically are both members of a larger alliance, the North 
139 Kwan, E. (2006), p.154 
140 Thompson, S. (2014). Fifty years of Australian civilian police involvement in international 
peacekeeping. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra. 
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Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). It was, and remains a ‘wicked problem’, but one which 
involved community sentiments as much as military actors. 
In the case of Australian involvement in Indo-China and South East Asia, one lesson learned from 
this regional military involvement, in places such as Malaya and Vietnam, is that most post 1945 
conflict is ‘intra-state’ rather than ‘inter-state’. The worlds militaries are still structured for inter-
state conflict thus an exclusively military solution to these conflicts is rarely achievable and very 
expensive. Militaries are geared to win wars rather than keep the peace. They are not generally 
structured, equipped or trained to deal with community issues as they are peace-makers rather 
than peace-keepers. 
It is better to build upon an existing diplomatic relationship including a healthy proactive and pre-
conflict ‘police’ relationship or, in the absence of such a relationship, to have the ability to restore 
‘peace, order and good governance’, by an effective transition process in a ‘post-conflict’ 
environment. A comparison between the Malayan Emergency 141 and the Vietnam War illustrates 
this especially in relation to what was coined as winning ‘hearts and minds’, and the involvement, 
or lack of involvement of police, and civilian leadership. 
It is worth noting however, that neither the tactics used by the British in Malaya, via police Special 
Branch, nor the Americans in Vietnam by maximum use of military force, would pass 
contemporary human rights muster, due to the involvement of ‘civilians’ both as non-state 
belligerents and as victims of conflict. Australian military involvement in the Vietnam War was 
controversial and its ignominious end, involving acrimonious domestic political implications, 
heralded the start of what some Australian military commentators have coined ‘The Great Peace’. 
It was during this ‘Great Peace’ between the end of Australian military involvement in Vietnam 
in 1972, and the entry of the Australian military in East Timor with INTERFET, in 1999, that the 
AFP continued a ‘firm’ international presence, including with UNFICYP in Cyprus. 
The United Nations Force in Cyprus 1964–2017 
Australian police became involved in contemporary UNCIVPOL duties in Cyprus in 1964, when 
a number of state and Territory police, and later Commonwealth Police (one of the founding 
forces which made up the AFP), were asked to form part of the United Nations Force in Cyprus, 
UNFICYP. The inter-communal violence between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which broke out 
in late 1963, following independence from Britain in 1960, in the wake of the Suez Crisis, caused 
the mainland nations of Greece and Turkey to both become involved in the situation. The UN 
became involved during the inter-communal violence, and UNFICYP was established in 1964 to 
‘prevent a recurrence of the fighting, help maintain law and order, and promote a return to 
141 Please see Barber, N. (1971) The War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya defeated the Communist 
Guerrillas, 1948-60, Collins, London. 
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normal conditions’. This is a classic peace-making, peace-building and peace-keeping approach. 
As Chappell and Evans point out, the involvement of a Civilian Police component derives its 
origins from an earlier mission (ONUC) in the Congo. One of its former military commanders, 
Brigadier Sean McEown, the Chief of the Irish Army, considered police to be a better alternative 
to the UN military to encourage meaningful negotiation and liaison between the communities and 
their representative police agencies. In this regard  ‘…the role and function of CIVPOL must be 
seen as part of a continuum from preventative diplomacy to post conflict peacebuilding. That 
continuum may be divided into three stages, beginning with CIVPOL’s participation in conflict 
resolution through helping to build confidence between former combatants.’142 
This can often be a lengthy process. A coup d’état in Cyprus in July 1974 by Greek and Greek 
Cypriot elements, favouring ‘enosis’ (unification) with mainland Greece, caused consternation in 
mainland Turkey. The Turks then ‘intervened’ militarily from the north and pushed the retreating 
Greeks and Greek Cypriots back towards the south. The UN Security Council immediately called 
for a cease-fire, and a conference was arranged between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, 
the erstwhile colonial power, in Geneva in August 1974. 
These talks subsequently broke down, and the Turkish forces pressed on with their ‘intervention’. 
They eventually ceased their southward thrust on 16 August 1974, having gained ground to the 
middle of the capital Nicosia, and to the northern outskirts of Nicosia International airport, which 
also happened to be a Royal Air Force base. Anecdotal information suggests that the British 
commander alerted the Turkish commander to the existence of the RAF base and of two British 
Sovereign bases on the south coast, a Royal Navy Base at Akrotiri, and a Royal Air Force Base 
at Dhekalia.  In addition, the proximity and readiness of the British Army in Germany, a mere 
four hours away, may well have also been a highly persuasive factor in the decision by the Turkish 
military to halt its advance. 
The cease-fire lines were drawn in August 1974 to form the northern and southern perimeters of 
what became the United Nations Buffer Zone (UNBZ), which runs east-west along almost their 
entire length of the island. The UNBZ is still in existence, and divides the Turkish held northern 
third from the Greek Cypriot held southern two thirds. The UNBZ passes through the middle of 
Nicosia where in parts it is a mere two metres wide. On the northern, or Turkish side of the cease-
fire lines, there are troops dug in fortifications, fully armed and ready to mobilise at a moment’s 
notice. After many years of very limited and restricted connectivity between the Turkish Cypriot 
north and the Greek Cypriot south, there are now a number of crossing points between the north 
and the south, including in Nicosia itself. 
 
142 Chappell and Evans (1997), Chapter 1. 
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 Figure 1. Map of Cyprus 
Source: cyprusmap.fact.co 
There are fortifications on the southern or Greek side; however they are rarely fully manned. 
Basically, both sides merely agreed to apply their safety catches and take their fingers off their 
triggers, but all else remain as it was in 1974.The areas between the two cease-fire lines is 
patrolled by the United Nations, both military and police (UNCIVPOL), who for all intents and 
purposes are the actual civilian authority in the UNBZ. UN Civilian Police in Cyprus are unarmed, 
a deliberate policy to encourage community engagement, and a feature which was to have 
resonance in a later mission in East Timor in 1999. The UN Civilian Police, however, are unable 
to enforce the law as they would in a domestic sense, primarily because of a reluctance to charge 
offenders criminally to appear before a court in either the north or the south of the island.  
With the inter-communal violence and the Turkish ‘intervention’ in 1974, a major refugee 
problem ensued, with in excess of 200,000 people requiring assistance as a result of dislocation. 
Members from each community were permitted under UNCIVPOL supervision and escort, to 
cross the UNBZ to be re-united with their families. In February 1975 the Turkish Cypriot 
leadership unilaterally announced the formation of the ‘Turkish Federated State of Cyprus’ which 
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was renamed by the same authorities in November 1983 as the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus’. 
The UN has never recognised Turkish sovereignty in this northern part of Cyprus, however the 
reality is that the Turkish military is well entrenched there. In pragmatic terms, the Turks believe 
they have a right to the entire island, due primarily to geographic proximity, a notion which 
conflicts with the Greek claim of sovereignty, which amongst other things includes the assertion 
that the Ancient Greek goddess Aphrodite was born on the island of Cyprus. 
 
Figure 2. Map of Cyprus showing UNBZ and British sovereign bases 
Source: walterdorn.net 
The British have two sovereign bases in the southern part of the island, negotiated with the 
Cypriots, before partition, when Britain ceded independence in 1960. These bases, one Royal Air 
Force (Dhekalia) base and one Royal Navy base (Akrotiri), form an integral part of British 
strategy in the Mediterranean along with similar installations in Malta and Gibraltar. From this 
combination of bases, the British can respond to issues arising in the Mediterranean, Middle East, 
Suez Canal, a vital sea lane for fuel supplies to Europe and the Black Sea, the egress point for 
Russia into the Mediterranean. The United States has bases within mainland Turkey itself, which 
form a forward ‘foothold’ for any intelligence or military activity involving the former USSR and 
the more hostile nations within the Middle Eastern region. 
86 
This has created a situation whereby neither the U.S. nor the UK has been inclined to apply 
military force, or the threat of such, to force Turkey off the island of Cyprus. This situation is 
complicated further by the fact that both Greece and Turkey are members of NATO. Greece and 
Cyprus are both members of the European Union (EU) and Turkey is actively seeking 
membership of the EU. Cyprus therefore remains a stalemate whilst each of the parties remains 
intractable. 
When Turkey ‘intervened’ in 1974, many Cypriots from both communities left Cyprus and sought 
more tranquil lives elsewhere, including Australia. Both communities formed lobby groups, 
which had influence in both major political parties. The Cyprus issue thus became loosely linked 
with Australian domestic politics and whenever the withdrawal of Australian police was raised, 
the Greek Cypriot lobby group would oppose it and the matter would drop from the agenda. This 
changed however, in 2007 with the election of the Rudd/Gillard/Rudd Government, and the 
Abbott/Turnbull Government in 2013 which put financial pressure on the AFP which 
consequently sought to cease its contribution to UNFICYP, and which subsequently withdrew in 
mid-2017 after 53 years of continuous service. 
The AFP was in Cyprus for over fifty years and had built up a level of trust amongst members of 
both communities. Australian police have traditionally been seen as ‘honest brokers’ in this 
difficult situation as Australia, unlike the former colonial power, Britain, has no agenda in relation 
to the future of Cyprus. This had many positive by-products, not the least of which was the 
willingness of members of both communities to approach unarmed Australian police to provide 
information they would often be unwilling to provide to members of other UN contingents. 
Cypriots from both communities who have lived outside Cyprus and have returned, are far less 
intractable than those who have remained on the island.  It is an enduring contact between these 
people and trusted UN members which assists in diffusing potentially volatile situations, and 
which may eventually break down the intractability that persists on both sides of the UNBZ. 
Noteworthy is the open invitation made by the Cypriot community of Darwin, to the Federal and 
Northern Territory governments, for the use of their club facilities in Darwin to assist in the post-
evacuation procedure for the refugees from East Timor in September 1999 following an outbreak 
of violence following a UN sponsored ballot. 
The AFP was also heavily invested in that mission, and much of the posture adopted by the AFP 
in East Timor in 1999 was informed by experiences in Cyprus, and elsewhere, including 
Bougainville, Mozambique, Haiti and Cambodia. When it deployed to Cyprus in 1964, the 
Commonwealth Police (later the AFP) was amongst one of the first civilian police forces to 
deploy into a disrupted state. As such, it set a precedent for a number of other UN missions, 
including some which involved the AFP. This was a major shift in thinking away from military 
dominance of this sort of intervention, towards a more civilianised approach, involving civilian 
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police as well as military forces. This has taken some time to be recognised by military forces, 
including in Australia, however it was recognised early by the British military, or at least by one 
of its more senior and experienced officers. As a former senior member of the AFP, Adrian 
Whiddett wrote of a former British Chief of Staff to UNFICYP, Brigadier Michael Harbottle: 
the decision to raise a small multinational civilian police component to form part of 
the UN Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was a novel and experimental 
departure from usual practice, acknowledging that, as useful as the military are, they 
are limited in dealing with a usually resentful citizenry. Harbottle, a former Brigadier 
and Chief of Staff of UNFICYP from June 1966 to August 1968, came to realise that 
the insinuation of impartial civilian police into what now is a largely civil situation was 
indeed one of the ‘unqualified successes’ of the UN action in Cyprus.143 
The UN is still there, patrolling the UN Buffer Zone which separates the two communities. 
Turkish soldiers are still dug in on the northern perimeter of the Buffer Zone. Britain still 
maintains its sovereign bases. The AFP after 53 years patrolling the UN Buffer Zone, engaging 
with the communities on both sides and conducting humanitarian patrols lowered the Australian 
National Flag in Nicosia and concluded its involvement in UNFICYP, but the experience-based 
lessons formed the basis for future ‘boots on the ground’ missions for half a century. 
  
143 Harbottle, M. (1970) The Impartial Soldier, London Oxford University Press,  p. 176 cited by 
Whiddett, A. in Maley, W, Sampford, C. and Thakur, R.(eds) (2003). From Civil Strife to Civil Society: 
Civil and Military Responsibilities in Disrupted States Tokyo: United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 
pp. 332–333. 
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Section 2: United Nations – Cambodia 
 
Figure 3. Map of Cambodia 
Source: lib.utexas.edu 
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Closer to home, the involvement of Australians in the post Pol Pot era in Cambodia, under the 
leadership of the United Nations, known as the United Nations Transitional Authority Cambodia 
(UNTAC), had some Australian domestic political implications, due to the intimate involvement 
of the then Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, and the leadership of UNTAC by the 
Australian military commander, General John Sanderson. UNTAC involved a combination of 
Australian government elements, including the Australian Defence Force and two contingents of 
the AFP. It was a largely successful transition, from the turmoil and trauma of Pol Pot, to what is 
now a peaceful, if not fully-democratic country, and was a feather in the caps of both Gareth 
Evans and General Sanderson. 
U.S. bombing and the Khmer Rouge 
The genesis of the situation in Cambodia, lay in the conflation of its French post-colonial past 
and its proximity to Vietnam, which during the 1960s and 1970s, became engaged in a war with 
the United States, as part of the Cold War. Cambodia had been plunged into the U.S. war in Indo-
China in 1969 when US President Nixon began a secret bombing campaign, codenamed 
Operation Menu, to attempt to destroy a Vietnamese communist headquarters, which the U.S. 
claimed had been operating inside Cambodia along the border with Vietnam since 1964, in 
violation of Cambodian neutrality. The North Vietnamese were operating with the approval of 
Cambodia’s leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Sihanouk tied to maintain neutrality however, [in] 
return for a North Vietnamese pledge to respect Cambodia’s frontiers, he allowed Vietnamese 
communists to operate covertly from bases inside eastern Cambodia.144 
Over 200 nights, between March 1969 and May 1970, American B-52 bombers dropped more 
than 500,000 tonnes of explosives on Cambodia’s countryside. The pilots flew at such great 
heights they were incapable of discriminating between a Cambodian village and their targets, 
North Vietnamese supply lines – nicknamed the ‘Ho Chi Minh trail’, which ran inside Cambodian 
territory down the Vietnam border, to supply Viet Cong fighters guerrillas conducting a guerrilla 
campaign in the southern Republic of Vietnam. 
Up to 500,000 Cambodians were killed, many of them children. The bombings drove hundreds 
of thousands of ordinary Cambodians into the arms of the Khmer Rouge, an ultra-Marxist 
organisation, led by Pol Pot, which seized power in 1975, and over the next four years, presided 
over the deaths of millions of people through starvation, disease and executions. The Cambodian 
Monarch, Prince Sihanouk, had courted both Moscow and China in an anti-U.S. stance. Despite 
courting both Beijing and Moscow he was ousted by his former Deputy Prime Minister, General 
144 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Norodom-Sihanouk. For a detailed explanation of this bombing 
campaign please see Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon, and the Destruction of Cambodia, Shawcross, W. 
Simon and Schuster, 1978. 
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Lon Nol, who took control of the Government.  Between 1970 and 1975, Lon Nol and his army, 
the Forces Armees Nationale Khmer (FANK), with U.S. support and military aid, battled the 
Khmer Rouge communists for control of Cambodia. Lon Nol was later persuaded to leave 
Cambodia. 
In 1973, the U.S. Congress succeeded in forcing a halt to the bombing of Cambodia, which left 
FANK without ground or air support. FANK held against the Khmer Rouge until 1975, when the 
Khmer Rouge took control of Phnom Penh, following daily rocket attacks, which created an 
estimated two million refugees. Once in control, the Khmer Rouge forced the bulk of the 
population into the rural areas, and forced them to work for their plan to re-mould Cambodia into 
a communist rural utopia. They succeeded in killing in excess of one million people by starvation, 
malnutrition, torture and execution over a four year period. 
Vietnam invades Cambodia 1978 
Across the border in what was the former Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam), in April 1975, 
the capital city of Saigon, fell and the communist Republic of Vietnam was declared. The Khmer 
Rouge and Vietnamese forces almost immediately became engaged in conflict over a disputed 
border, as well as Cold War competition for hegemony between China and the Soviet Union. The 
Khmer Rouge was backed by China, and Vietnam had moved closer to the Soviet Union 145. This 
fighting intensified in 1976 and 1977, but by that time, Australian troops had left South 
Vietnam.146 
In December 1978, a Kampuchean National Salvation Front was established with Vietnamese 
sponsorship, and, three weeks later, a Vietnamese force, along with some dissident Cambodian 
allies, invaded the country. These pro-Vietnam forces occupied Phnom on 7 January 1979 causing 
the remnants of the Khmer Rouge regime flee to sanctuary across the border in Thailand. This 
was the end of the Khmer Rouge as a government. Large numbers of non-aligned Cambodians 
also fled to the border camps clustered around the Thai town of Aranyaprathet. This had a 
significant impact on the newly created Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
particularly Thailand, whose proximity to Cambodia via a shared border, made it a ‘frontline 
state’ in the Cold War, which was still a very real concern in the region. The Vietnamese invasion 
of Cambodia was also seen by ASEAN as a violation of the principle of territorial sovereignty. 
The Cambodian refugees found themselves pawns in a geopolitical struggle which pitted Thailand 
145 Frost, F. (2016). Engaging the Neighbours. Australia and ASEAN since 1974. ANU Press, p. 56. 
146 Australian troops commenced their withdrawal from South Vietnam in December 1969, under the 
Prime Ministership of Sir John Gorton, following the withdrawal of 25,000 U.S. troops and a plan to 
withdraw a further 50,000 U.S. troops. Australia’s military commitment to South Vietnam ended in 
December 1972. 
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and other ASEAN states, backed by the U.S. against communist Vietnam, which was developing 
a closer relationship with Soviet Union.147 
For over a decade from 1979, the conflict over Cambodia became the dominant political and 
security problem in South East Asia. Within Cambodia, the Vietnamese-sponsored regime, the 
People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), whose dominant leader was Hun Sen, attempted to 
promote economic reconstruction and its own political consolidation. Vietnam and the PRK 
regime faced armed opposition from three Cambodian resistance movements, operating on and 
near the Thai border: the ousted Khmer Rouge (referred to widely as the ‘Pol Pot regime’ after 
its leading figure); the royalist FUNCINPEC (the National United Front for an Independent, 
Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia) led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk; and the 
republican KPNLF (Khmer People’s National Liberation Front) led by Son Sann. 
Vietnam and the PRK also faced opposition from ASEAN, which refused to accept the PRK 
regime’s legitimacy, and worked to deny acceptance of the regime internationally, and to mobilise 
support for Vietnam’s withdrawal. A key avenue for ASEAN’s diplomacy was sponsorship of a 
resolution in the UN General Assembly calling for an immediate ceasefire and the withdrawal of 
Vietnam’s forces. The first such resolution was adopted on 14 November 1979, and ASEAN 
continued to gain large majorities in support of similar resolutions for the next decade. 
This created a significant dilemma for Australian foreign policy. Loathsome as it was, the Khmer 
Rouge was seen as the internationally recognised government of Cambodia and Vietnam as an 
‘invader’. Responding to domestic concerns in relation to the excesses of the Khmer Rouge, the 
then Fraser government, via its Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock, announced on 14 October 
1980 ‘that Australia had decided on a policy of ‘de-recognition’; he stated that ‘Australia cannot 
prolong its recognition of such a loathsome regime as that of Pol Pot’.148   
This resulted in de facto recognition of the Vietnamese ‘invaders’ by Australia, which created a 
divergence of views between Australia and its ASEAN allies in South East Asia, which had as its 
central pillar, non-interference in the affairs of other nations, under the ASEAN doctrine of the 
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The unfortunate outcome was that ASEAN 
was providing de facto support to a genocidal regime under the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, a 
situation by which an increasingly human rights aware Australian public could not abide. 
147 The communist victory in Vietnam saw many former members of the South Vietnamese government 
and armed forces sent to ‘re-education camps’, where they were held for up to a decade. At the geo-
political level China denounced Vietnam’s invasion, and in February-March 1979, launched a limited 
invasion of northern Vietnam which failed to dissuade Vietnam from continuing its presence in 
Cambodia, but which caused substantial economic and social dislocation in Vietnam (Frost 2016, p. 56). 
148 Frost, F. (2016), p. 68. 
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The Australian Government’s change of policy on recognition had responded to domestic opinion 
but produced some critical reactions from ASEAN, and from China and the US, especially after 
the May 1981 announcement on recognition policy at international forums. In late May, the policy 
change was criticised by Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Sinnatamby Rajaratnam, as one that 
‘will certainly damage the foreign-policy interests of Australia, seriously question its credentials 
as a reliable ally of those who have taken up the Soviet challenge in South-East Asia and bring 
comfort to the Vietnamese’149 
At the time of the ASEAN foreign minister’s meeting in June 1981 in Manila, the Philippines 
foreign minister described Australia as being ‘recalcitrant’ on the issue, and reservations were 
also reported to have been expressed by U.S. and Chinese officials. The Australian conservative 
government of Malcolm Fraser had been replaced in 1983, by the ALP, under Prime Minister Bob 
Hawke, which in Opposition, had welcomed the Fraser Government’s withdrawal of diplomatic 
recognition of the Khmer Rouge Democratic Kampuchea. In Government, Prime Minister Hawke 
and Foreign Minister Hayden decided to explore some options to resolve the Cambodian situation. 
Prime Minister Hawke wrote in his memoir: 
[O]ne of the most important initiatives of my entire prime ministership was our 
diplomatic effort to help bring about a lasting peace in the tragic, conflict-ridden 
country of Cambodia…Both Hayden and I were acutely aware of the obstacles ahead. 
ASEAN had arisen from the instability in Indo-China and the intrusion of the Soviet 
Union and China into the affairs of the region; its members remained suspicious of 
Vietnam and the two communist giants. The antagonism between China and Vietnam 
stretched back a thousand years. Cambodia itself remained sunk in conflict, with an 
uneasy alliance of forces arranged against the puppet Hun Sen regime. Our knowledge 
of and closeness to the regional players had its advantages, but understanding the 
range of their conflicting interests meant that Australia’s diplomacy would have to be 
deft in the extreme.150  
Hayden, as Foreign Minister from March 1983-August 1988, observed: 
[t]he aim was to facilitate a process of dialogue leading to a peaceful settlement of the 
warring inside and near the borders of Kampuchea. I regarded the proposal with some 
caution. There were a great number of differences between many of these parties and 
some had large political interests at stake. Australia strolling into this particular pastry 
shop and upsetting the wares so carefully if unsteadily arranged could well be 
disastrous.151 
On the ground, there was a new form of stalemate. ASEAN had the strength and unity to stand 
behind Thailand and the Cambodian coalition in their resistance to Vietnam; while on the other 
hand, Vietnam took comfort from the fact that the situation on the ground in Cambodia was 
largely in its favour despite resistance to its occupation, especially in the border areas.  
149 Frost, F. (2016), p. 61. 
150 Hawke, R. quoted in Frost, F. (2016), p. 69. 
151 Haydon, W. quoted in Frost, F. (2016), p. 380. 
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The Australian approach sought a comprehensive solution based on Vietnamese acceptance of a 
phased troop withdrawal, and an arrangement to facilitate the return of displaced Cambodians 
which prevented the return of the Khmer Rouge, as well as an act of self-determination in 
Cambodia itself, all predicated on the universal acceptance that Cambodia should be neutral, 
independent and non-aligned; and the restoration of normal relations on the part of Vietnam with 
China, ASEAN and the West.152 
By 1988, after five years of diplomatic activity, the efforts to promote dialogue over Cambodia, 
had raised Australia’s profile as a concerned regional participant, but had produced little result, 
as the major power blocs maintained their intransigence: the Soviets backing Vietnam, the 
Chinese backing the Khmer Rouge and the U.S. backing ASEAN. Australia was politically 
isolated, as it had de-recognised the Khmer Rouge, was neutral on Vietnam and was an active 
supporter of ASEAN. Frost points out that this isolation stood it in good stead when putting 
forward its peace initiative in 1989, since the country was clearly not aligned to any of the major 
powers in their client Cambodian factions.153 
In strategic geo-political terms, the stalemate was broken only when European communism 
collapsed in 1991. The end of the Cold War in Europe, following a ten year Soviet occupation 
and humiliating withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and the fall of the Berlin Wall in the same 
year, brought about some profound changes globally, regionally and domestically in Australia 
and its region. A key catalyst internationally was the impact of President Mikhail Gorbachev’s 
policies in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev’s speech in Vladivostok in July 1986 introduced a new 
era of flexibility in foreign relations as the Soviet Union sought to curtail costly foreign 
involvements.  This included the withdrawal of support provided by the Soviet Union to countries 
such as Vietnam. 
This provided the catalyst for some more assertive action by ASEAN to resolve a long-standing 
regional issue. In July 1988, further negotiations occurred when ASEAN’s largest member, 
Indonesia, hosted formal multilateral talks among the Cambodian parties, along with the other 
ASEAN members and Vietnam and Laos. 
In July 1989…the Paris International Conference on Cambodia…met for one month 
and was attended by the four Cambodian factions, the six ASEAN members, the 
‘Permanent Five’ members of the UN Security Council (China, France, the Soviet 
Union, the United Kingdom and the United States), Vietnam, Laos, Australia, Canada, 
India, Zimbabwe (representing the Non-Aligned Movement) and a representative of the 
UN Secretary-General.154 
152 Frost, F. (2016), pp. 70–71. 
153 Frost, F. (2016), p. 72. 
154 Frost, F. (2016), p. 73. 
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Contemporaneously, the surrounding nations in the region including Thailand, Malaysia, 
Singapore and even China were in the midst of an economic boom. This gave added incentive for 
Cambodians to solve their differences. 
The global strategic situation was also changing. The dissolving Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact 
ended aid, to both their long-standing ally Vietnam, and the PRK, while Thailand and other 
members of ASEAN concluded that Indo-China was more lucrative as a market-place than as a 
battle-field. Several attempts were made to negotiate a peace settlement for Cambodia in the 
1980s; the most successful were meetings in Jakarta brokered by India and Indonesia. 
Called the Jakarta Informal Meetings, (JIMs) they were attended by all four factions, Laos, 
Vietnam and the ASEAN member states. This was followed by a Sino-Soviet meeting in 1988 
which resulted in a thaw in relations between Vietnam and China. Further talks involving 
Thailand in 1989 produced a key breakthrough in the shape of Vietnam’s offer to withdraw its 
troops…and agreement to an international peace-monitoring force. 
Vietnam, facing a decline in economic and military assistance from the Soviet Union and anxious 
to extricate itself from Cambodia, announced its withdrawal of combat forces from Cambodia, 
and in September 1989 declared this process completed. Building on initial suggestions by Prince 
Sihanouk and U.S. Congressman Stephen Solarz, Australia suggested an enhanced role for the 
UN in the transitional process which had been initially proposed in November 1989. To avoid: 
the power-sharing issue that had confounded the Paris conference, and to constrain 
the role of the Khmer Rouge, Australia proposed that the UN be directly involved in 
the civil administration of Cambodia during the transitional period. A UN military 
presence to monitor the ceasefire, cessation of external military assistance, a UN role 
in organising and conducting election, and UN involvement in the transitional 
administrative arrangements would, it was hoped, ensure a neutral political 
environment conducive to free and fair general elections.155 
A departmental task force, under the direction of Evans, drew up a detailed set of scenarios and 
plans for a UN role in Cambodia, and these papers were presented to a meeting of the ASEAN 
members, the Cambodian parties, Vietnam and Laos in February 1990. These were then published 
and became known-because of the colour of the cover-the ‘Red Book’. The issue of Cambodia 
was a substantial instance where Australia and ASEAN cooperated on a major issue of security 
and regional concern and achieved a significant outcome. 
United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC) Cambodia 1992–1993 
The Australian Foreign Minister Senator Gareth Evans engaged in a re-formulation of a concept 
originally proposed by Prince Sihanouk and enunciated by US Congressman Stephen Solarz. The 
155 Frost, F. (2016), p. 75. 
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‘proposal envisaged that, instead of a quadripartite power-sharing arrangement, the UN itself 
would temporarily take over the administration of Cambodia, canton and demobilise the armed 
forces of the various parties and conduct the election, after which it would transfer power to a 
new Cambodian government. This was to become the UN Transitional Authority Cambodia 
(UNTAC). 
Overshadowing the entire peace process was the question of the atrocities committed by the 
Khmer Rouge. The term ‘auto genocide’ was diluted to the un-recognisable ‘no-return to the 
policies and practices of the past’. The compromise to restore peace to Cambodia was the 
withdrawal of the charges of mass murder, as no provision would be made for war crimes trials 
or other means of achieving justice. In 1991, the Paris Peace Accords were formally adopted by 
the UN in New York. 
AFP in Cambodia 
Thus, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, UNTAC, was created by accord 
and in May 1992, 10 members of the Australian Federal Police were dispatched to Cambodia. 
They were stationed at Thmar Puok, and had a patrol area of 2500 square kilometres which was 
home to approximately 78000 Cambodians in a state of post-conflict shock. The infrastructure 
was poor and the police along with their international counterparts had to construct many of their 
own places of accommodation and work from available materials. 
The overall role of the contingent was to assist the UN in bringing peace and democratic elections, 
which they implemented by supervising training and controlling local police and investigating 
allegations of human rights abuse which were reported to the UN command. This created a more 
stable environment in which elections could be held. Part of their role was to-assist in bringing 
an environment of calm and confidence conducive to the holding of free elections 
A second AFP contingent replaced the first in early 1993. During the deployments of both 
contingents more than 200 suspected human rights violations were investigated and over 400 
local police were trained. These local Khmer police came from all political factions. Khmer police 
instructors went on to maintain a Khmer police training programme. The command and control 
of UNCIVPOL in UNTAC was under a system where police were deployed to districts where the 
contingent commander was also tasked as the police district commander for the area of operations. 
Police in this situation acted in concert with the military force in the district but were 
independently controlled. The mechanism for this was via a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Police/Military co-operation, which formalised a clear de-lineation of responsibilities to prevent 
duplication of effort and resource allocation. 
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Australian police were fortunate to have Australian commanders in both contingents. Working in 
conjunction with Australian UNCIVPOL, were five German and five Tunisian police with six 
Indian and five French police in nearby locations. A situation where Australian police were being 
led by Australian police commanders, created an environment conducive to success through 
initiative and co-operation. Anecdotal information from AFP participants from both Cambodian 
contingents highlights the positive aspect of Australian police being led by commanders from 
Australia. 156  The contingents were very small but very effective because they were under 
Australian command, they were empowered to take the initiative to do the right thing and most 
importantly they knew what the right thing was. 
A former senior AFP member, Adrian Whiddett states of the good work the AFP did in Cambodia 
that its successes were laudable and quite disproportionate to its size 157. However the most 
appropriate praise comes from the overall military Commander of UNTAC, Australian General 
John Sanderson who stated: 
[T]he very small AFP contingent did a remarkable job in Cambodia. Its members 
numbered 10 out of a total civil police force of 36000. If there had been 360 groups of 
that potency, I think we would have had a much more significant impact on the 
outcomes in Cambodia because the law is the key issue in this. While we were not the 
sovereign authority in Cambodia, the process of taking the law down to the grassroots 
and getting it implemented there …. was the key process and the AFP contingent did 
that….[T]he contingent  actually wrote the body of law, established the school and the 
police station and supervised the activity.158 
It was experience on the ground by members in places such as Cambodia and other missions 
which built up a corporate knowledge of how such deployments should be planned, equipped, 
staffed and deployed. This was to play an extremely important role in the near future in equally 
challenging circumstances in East Timor in 1999. 
Section 3: Other AFP Missions 1989–2003 
A credible international police peacekeeping experience by the AFP in Cyprus and Cambodia 
provided a basis for further deployments, particularly in a United Nations context. The transition 
from ‘post-colonial civil conflict’ to self-determination, as illustrated in the previous chapter is 
seldom a peaceful process and in the context of Cold War dynamics and the post-Cold War ‘peace 
dividend’, these transitions were very complex. Two examples involving firstly the former 
156 It is now UN policy that all civilian police detachments will be multinational. No national detachments 
with designated sectors will be employed in future. Apparently this is an attempt to balance the quality of 
the available civilian police officers. See McFarlane and Maley United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement Ramesh Thakur and Albrecht Schnabel (eds). 
United Nations University Press, New York 2001. 
157 Whiddett cited in Maley Sampford, C and Thakur, R Civil Strife to Civil Society p. 333. 
158 Sanderson in Thakur, R. and Maley, W. (2015). Theorising the Responsibility to Protect. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press p. 334. 
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Portuguese colony of Mozambique on the South East coast of Africa and secondly the Caribbean 
island of Haiti, a former French colony, provide illustrations of the sort of challenges such post-
conflict transitions can pose. In the former, Mozambique a number of AFP deployed with United 
Nations to a mission known as ONUMOZ. In the latter, Haiti, a number of AFP were deployed 
with a United States-led intervention known as ‘Operation Restore Hope’. 
One feature of both of these missions is that they were distant from Australia and thus relatively 
free from Australian domestic political considerations. One was a United Nations led mission and 
the other was a United States led mission. Both missions fulfilled Australian international 
obligations, especially with the UN during the ‘Great Peace’. 
In addition, the AFP deployed small numbers to three other locations: The Thai-Cambodian 
border in between 1989 and 1993; Somalia in 1993 and Bougainville between 1997 and 2003. In 
all of these deployments, AFP members brought with them a strong sense of trust-based values 
and principles which were applied in societies where such trust had broken down. Although small 
in number the impact was generally positive. The situation in Somalia was highly contested and 
non-permissive, reinforcing the precept that such trust based approaches can really only be 
effective if the environment is permissive and there is a peace to keep. This is a ‘lesson not 
learned’, in 2008 when the AFP was asked to contribute to police training in a highly contested 
environment in southern Afghanistan, where there was no peace to keep. 
United Nations Border Relief Organisation (UNBRO) 1989 
As a result of the post-conflict turmoil created by the war in Indo-China, and the devastation 
visited on the long-suffering people of Cambodia, there was a mass exodus of approximately 
300,000 displaced persons and refugees fleeing westward to the border area with Thailand. The 
United Nations established the United Nations Border Relief Organisation (UNBRO) in 1989. 
Shortly after UNBRO was established, two AFP Superintendents deployed to Aranyaprathet in 
North East Thailand. 
Their mission was to assist UNBRO and the Government of Thailand to improve security and 
protection within the camps located along the border between Cambodia and Thailand. These 
camps were subject to hostile action including guerrilla attacks and artillery fire, further eroding 
peace, law and order. During the period the AFP Superintendents were working with UNBRO 
they encountered a high level of lawlessness inside the refugee camps, a tendency which they 
assisted in alleviating. 
The AFP members assisted the newly formed Khmer Police with training and equipment, the 
establishment of justice committees along the lines of traditional Cambodian justice as well as a 
central prison. A key outcome for the AFP members was the development of the criminal code 
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and regulations for the police, judiciary and prison services. Members of UNBRO later deployed 
to Somalia in response to increasing lawlessness in Somalia on the Horn of Africa. 
Mozambique: ONUMOZ: 1994 
In the post-war anti-colonial wave, the Portuguese government remained obdurate in its desire to 
retain its colonial possessions. In Mozambique various independence movements merged in June 
1962 to form the Frente da Liberacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO) (Mozambique Liberation 
Front . FRELIMO commenced military activities against the Portuguese, conducting their 
activities from bases inside Tanzania. A 1974 coup in Portugal, known as the Carnation 
Revolution, led to the signing of an agreement between the Marxist-oriented Portuguese 
government and their appointed government in Mozambique which was dominated by the pro-
Marxist FRELIMO movement. Mr Joaquim Chissano became Prime Minister and independence 
was declared on 25 June 1975. 
Mozambique borders several countries, including Tanzania, Malawi, Zimbabwe (formerly 
Rhodesia), South Africa and Swaziland. The prospect of a Marxist government on one of its 
northern borders caused a great deal of concern in South Africa, which was then under the 
administration of the pro-apartheid Botha government. This was also the period before the 
independence of Zimbabwe, which was then known as Rhodesia under the Smith government. 
 
Figure 4. Map of Mozambique 
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Source: lib.utexas.edu 
In 1977 FRELIMO declared its Marxist-Leninist leanings and signed aid agreements with the 
Soviet Union and Cuba. FRELIMO was also assisting the Zimbabwean National Liberation Front 
(ZNLF) struggle in Rhodesia, and the African National Congress(ANC) in South Africa. The 
Rhodesian and South African governments commenced providing assistance to a group formed 
to oppose FRELIMO; initially called the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR) it was 
renamed RENAMO-Resistencia Nacional Mocambiquana. Eventually Mr Marceta Dhlakama 
became president of RENAMO which pursued a guerrilla war aimed at destroying the social and 
economic infrastructure of the country. Between 1981 and 1983 South Africa itself launched 
commando and air force raids inside Mozambique. 
The Mozambique government, via its armed forces, the FAM, closed the land transport routes, 
vital for Zimbabwe, which responded by sending their own troops into Mozambique to protect 
the transport routes. RENAMO activities created a refugee problem in neighbouring states and a 
major drought between 1982 and 1984 combined with the disruption caused by the war caused a 
major shortage of food. 
In 1985, the Mozambique armed forces, (FAM) were stretched and had to rely on the support of 
neighbouring states, including Tanzania and Zimbabwe which had gained its independence and 
ousted the Smith government in March 1980. The new Zimbabwe government of Robert Mugabe 
was a pro-Marxist government, well disposed to the incumbent government in Mozambique. The 
new Zimbabwe armed forces were trained by North Koreans. 
RENAMO and the Mozambique government continued fighting. Following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, in 1990 the Mozambique government altered 
its Marxist-orientation towards a more market-oriented, multi-party system. This attracted more 
favourable treatment from the ‘west’ and helped to isolate RENAMO politically, as well as the 
White minority South African government. Both the Mozambique government and RENAMO 
faced exhaustion, with neither capable of ultimate victory, thus creating a political impasse, 
precursor to a political solution. 
Peace negotiations took place between July 1991 and October 1992 with an agreement between 
President Chissano and Mr Dklakama in Rome in a General Peace Agreement. This included a 
joint political declaration, which committed the parties to accepting the role of the international 
community, and especially that of the United Nations, in monitoring and guaranteeing the 
implementation of the General Peace Agreement, in particular the cease-fire and the electoral 
process. In December 1992 ONUMOZ was approved by the UN Security Council with a mandate 
which included four distinct sets of objectives: political, military, electoral and humanitarian, with 
a one year timetable, later revised and extended. ONUMOZ needed to build trust and confidence 
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in both parties, and in the general Mozambican population as a whole, and convince them that the 
process could succeed. 
The collapse of Soviet Communism in 1991 and the resultant reduced internationalist posture by 
the Soviet Union had made the 1992 elections possible. The UN-sponsored elections in 1992 were 
possible because RENAMO was losing support from South Africa and FRELIMO has dropped 
its Marxist policies, thus making peace talks possible. 
In early 1994 the AFP dispatched a contingent of sixteen to Mozambique to aid the civil 
authorities in restoring law and order to a shattered infrastructure. This contingent was replaced 
later in 1994 on a rotation basis, as the posting was for six months. The Australian police were 
under the operational command of a Chief Police Observer, or UNCIVPOL Commissioner, an 
Egyptian national, who reported directly to the Special Representative. The Australians were 
posted to various districts in Beira, Lichinga, Gurue, Tete, Nampula, Xai Xai, Inhambane and 
Matola. 
The situation which the first contingent encountered, was a serious deterioration of infrastructure, 
which had improved little despite the presence of the UN for several months in country. Australian 
police were instructed by the UNCIVPOL Commissioner to ‘get out and get things moving’. The 
original concept was for the Australians to be split totally, however negotiations between the 
Australian Contingent Commander and the UNCIVPOL Commissioner resulted in Australians 
working in pairs in the districts. They largely assumed command positions and supervisory roles. 
The Australians worked along-side police from Scandinavia, Malaysia, Guinea-Bissau, India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Egypt. Upon the arrival of the Australian police, they immediately set 
about restoring a command structure and establishing investigations teams. Numerous reports of 
multiple murders, rapes and other general criminal activity had been evident. This established an 
environment in which the electoral component of the mission could proceed. A general election 
was held and the entire process passed peacefully. The second contingent of Australian police 
returned home in late 1994. 
Three years later in 1995, Mozambique, by supporting the Commonwealth of Nations in its call 
for an end to apartheid in South Africa was in turn supported by the Commonwealth to join it; the 
first and to date the only non-British colony to do so. This provided several non-tangible, but 
important diplomatic benefits for Mozambique. It allowed access to larger and more wealthy 
members; it provided for direct diplomacy at the ministerial and head of government level, a 
facility available to all Commonwealth members, and it assisted in reducing Mozambique’s post-
conflict reliance on foreign donations, by gaining access to Commonwealth related NGO’s and 
their expertise and goodwill. Meanwhile further north along the eastern coast of Africa, the UN 
was engaged in another mission in Somalia. 
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Somalia 1993 
In May 1993, one Superintendent, released from duties with UNBRO, was seconded to UNOSOM 
II in Somalia to the post of senior police advisor to the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General. His task was to assess the need for police monitors and if possible to organise and 
develop a training programme for a civilian police authority in Somalia. In November 1993, a 
second Superintendent was appointed as the director of police services and deputy director of 
justice in Somalia. His task was to control and direct UNCIVPOL in their task to assist in re-
establishing a local Somali police force with a view to eventually restoring peace, stability and 
law and order. Insufficient staff and indecision by the UN administration in the early stages of 
this mission, resulted in the AFP members struggling to achieve their mission. The withdrawal of 
the United States in March 1994 resulted in the withdrawal and closure of the mission. 
The sight, in the lounge-rooms of middle-America, of the corpse of a US serviceman being 
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, captured graphically in the 2001 movie Black Hawk 
Down, recalled images portrayed similar during the Vietnam War. It was probably this incident 
which resulted in the withdrawal of US troops from Somalia in March 1994. This caused a 
fundamental shift in US policy opinion relating to UN peacekeeping duties. 
The Clinton administration issued stringent new guidelines for American participation 
or even support of UN peacekeeping. If these guidelines were followed strictly, the 
United States would never support another peacekeeping operation again. The 
Americans, in fact had to close their eyes to their own guidelines in 1994 when they 
persuaded the Security Council to vote for a new peacekeeping venture in Haiti.159 
Haiti: Operation Uphold Democracy 1994–1995 
In 1990, the UN observed the first democratic elections in the Caribbean island nation of Haiti 
since a military coup had forced the President Aristide into exile. Haiti’s self-appointed military 
leader Colonel Cedres did not comply with a UN Agreement for the return of democracy, which 
resulted in the UN Security Council authorising the formation of a multi-national force to 
facilitate Cedres’ departure and the return of Aristide. The United States led force in Operation 
Uphold Democracy facilitated the return of the exiled President in 1994. 
Part of the multi-national force included thirty Australian Civilian Police, primarily from the AFP, 
with three Victoria Police and two Queensland Police members. This contingent served in Haiti 
from October 1994 until March 1995 and was posted as a contingent, under Australian police 
command, to police a district surrounding the town of Jeremie. The Australian police worked 
alongside United States Special Forces. 
159 Meisler, S. (1995) United Nations:The First Fifty Years. Atlantic Monthly Press, p. 309. 
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The mission in Haiti is unique in three aspects: firstly it was the first mission in which state police 
members had participated in an international police mission since the very early days in Cyprus; 
secondly it was, up to that time, the only mission in which Australian police had been armed, at 
the insistence of the United States, and thirdly it was not a United Nations Mission, but a chapter 
VII engagement. The United States led mission was later taken over by a United Nations mission, 
however by this time the Australian police had returned to Australia. Experience gained in 
Mozambique, Haiti and Cambodia as well as Cyprus saw the AFP deployed in small numbers to 
the troubled island of Bougainville in 1997. 
Bougainville 1997–2003 
The island of Bougainville suffered seven years of conflict before a peace settlement was reached. 
In October 1997 peace talks were held in Burnham New Zealand which resulted in the formation 
of a Truce Monitoring Group (TMG) which included four AFP members deployed to 
Bougainville. They were later supplemented by additional AFP members. Their role involved 
observation and monitoring the progress of the truce and liaison between the various factions 
involved in the conflict, and reporting and investigating breaches of the truce. 
The TMG ceased on 30 April 1998, and was replaced by the Peace Monitoring Group (PMG). 
AFP members of the PMG monitored and reported on compliance of the parties, and worked to 
rebuild trust and confidence amongst the communities concerned. This involved assessing and 
reporting on other aspects of community resilience and development including fresh water, health 
and schooling. They were also involved in the location, recording and disposal of weapons, 
ammunition and explosives. The PMG finished in mid-2003. 
The New Zealand Police continued to engage in Bougainville with a community policing 
program. Bougainville remains as a province of Papua New Guinea and is due to conduct a 
referendum in relation to its political future in 2020, along the lines of the Matignon Accords 
which related to French possessions in the Pacific. There is little doubt that the AFP will be once 
again called upon to contribute to an Australian Whole-of-Government engagement in relation to 
Bougainville. Unless carefully managed, it may well result in a similar outcome to East Timor in 
1999. 
Is this diplomacy by default? 
The role the AFP performed in the bulk of these deployments between commencement with 
UNFICYP in 1964 and Bougainville in 1998, was primarily monitoring and representative. There 
were aspects of communication, including negotiation and reporting, but these were generally at 
the local level, especially with UN missions, as reporting to national capitals outside the UN chain 
was not required, as most missions were distant from direct Australian interests, and such 
communication was discouraged by the UN. 
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The contrast between the operational indentations of these missions, and their diplomatic impact 
can be demonstrated by the trust developed by the long-term presence of Australian police, 
identifiable by the prominent display of the Australian National Flag in their uniforms, with 
members of the Greek and Turkish communities on both sides of the UN Buffer Zone, many of 
whom had relatives in Australia. The long-term diplomatic impact of UN efforts in Mozambique 
moved that country to transition from a Marxist past, to willingly joining the Commonwealth of 
Nations. As indicated above, the issues in Bougainville continue, and have the potential to flare 
up again if the situation is not managed carefully, and have the potential to adversely impact on 
the relationship between Australia and Papua New Guinea. 
Summary and conclusion 
The AFP is the international representative of Australian policing and commenced a long, proud 
and highly credible history of international police engagement primarily with the United Nations. 
During the ‘Great Peace’ experienced by the Australian military in the post-Vietnam era, the AFP 
was active in international ‘boots on the ground’ missions in Cyprus, Cambodia, Mozambique, 
Haiti and in a number of other places including Bougainville. This resulted in increased 
recognition by government that, if used judiciously, police and policing, particularly the AFP, 
could be an effective alternative to the traditional means of projecting national values and 
protecting national interests, via traditional diplomacy and military deployment. As Whiddett 
stated of a 1991 Senate report on UN peacekeeping. 
[i]n passing reference to the role of police…the report asserted that it was ‘useful in 
the UN context to preserve the distinction between police serving in a non-military 
capacity and the more usual military police units...Depending on the tasks to be 
performed, the United Nations may have a `need for civilian police personnel in the 
future, as operations become less exclusively military…[I]t may also be that some of 
the tasks that have traditionally been carried out by military personnel would be 
performed by UN civilian police.160 
This concept was to be fully tested in 1999 in the 27th Province of the Republic of Indonesia as a 
UN-sponsored ballot was conducted to ascertain the political destiny of the population of that 
province. The AFP played a lead role in this mission in lieu of the Australian military. This will 
be fully discussed in the following chapter. The UNAMET deployment to East Timor in 1999 
was a major turning point in the way the AFP was perceived by the Australian Government of the 
time led by Prime Minister John Howard. The confidence held by Prime Minister Howard in the 
AFP, underpinned much of the activities of the AFP in the following decade and a half. It was 
during this period, that the credentials of the AFP as an international actor came to the fore, and 
consolidated a foundation upon which the claim of ‘diplomacy by default’ could be based. 
160 Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Australia’s involvement in peacekeeping 
operations. The Senate. Commonwealth of Australia. August 2008. 
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Chapter 3: Repercussions and the New Security Paradigm: 
Closer to Home 
Overview 
In this chapter, the repercussions of AFP involvement in the United Nations Mission in East 
Timor in 1999 (UNAMET), and the implications this had for a new Australian security paradigm 
are explored. It will be demonstrated that the involvement of the AFP in UNAMET and the 
subsequent Australian-led military intervention known as INTERFET, as well as the international 
reactions to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, changed Australian 
government policy, and resulted in a new foreign policy focus, in which the AFP played a key 
role. This had implications for regional relationships, and diplomatic sensitivities with Indonesia, 
the Pacific, and further afield, in what was known as the ‘Arc of Instability’.161 
 
Figure 5. Map of Timor Leste 
Source: geographicguide.com 
161 In 1999 Paul Dibb used the concept ‘arc of instability‘ to describe the security challenges facing the 
Pacific. Wallis, J. (2012) The Pacific: from ‘arc of instability’ to ‘arc of opportunity’? The Strategist 
ASPI, Canberra. 
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Section 1: East Timor 1999 
The AFP commenced involvement in the 27th Province of the Republic of Indonesia in June 1999, 
and has remained engaged in one capacity or another in the years since. This involvement has its 
genesis in the mid-1970s, from events in Europe, and a desire by the new socialist government of 
Portugal, to divest itself of its former colonial possessions, including what was then referred to as 
Portuguese Timor. The challenges facing peace, order and good governance in this area of land 
are myriad, and involved both Cold War, and post-Cold War dynamics, as well as a post-colonial 
power vacuum, which created some serious governance issues, following an Indonesian invasion 
in 1975. It is also inextricably interconnected with the emergence of democracy in the Republic 
of Indonesia following the fall of the Suharto Government in 1998. 
Carnation Revolution – Lisbon, Portugal 1974 
When Suharto came to power in an anti-communist coup in 1965, it provided a sense of relief in 
the west, including Australia. He was pro-west, and the Cold War in Asia, especially in Vietnam 
was heating up. The Portuguese colony of East Timor was seen as an insignificant problem, 
especially as Portugal was the colonial power which administered its possessions directly from 
Lisbon. Australia generally welcomed European powers in South East Asia, for the added stability 
they provided to a volatile region, as other colonial powers withdrew. The French had been 
unceremoniously thrown out of Indo-China, leaving behind a raging insurgency in Vietnam, 
which was taken up by the United States, with support from others including Australia. 
In accordance with their East of Suez policy, the British had departed from their colonial 
possessions in Peninsula Malaya and Northern Borneo, following some military engagements 
with Malayan communists, and Indonesian military respectively, in which the Australian military 
had also played its part.  Activists such as FRETILIN, inspired in part by FRELIMO in 
Mozambique, and its military arm FALINTIL, in Portuguese Timor, were leftist-leaning, anti-
colonialists, and seen by Australian policy makers as more akin to Viet Cong guerrillas, or 
Malayan communists than as freedom fighters. In the Cold War environment, this was important, 
but not important enough to gain any traction in Australia, whose primary defence and foreign 
policy posture, was anti-communist, and maintained a strong desire to keep any such threats as 
far away from Australian territory as possible. 
In 1974, Portugal had a change of government in Lisbon, to a leftist-socialist leaning government, 
known as the Carnation Revolution. In accordance with the prevailing global sentiment, this 
government sought to decolonise its possessions as quickly as possible. The problem was that the 
Portuguese were not very benevolent colonists, and ran their possessions directly from Lisbon 
rather than gradually transitioning to self-government or self-sufficiency. They thus left problems 
in their former possession Mozambique in Africa, as has been discussed, and in their small 
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province on the island of Timor, East Timor, which shared a border with Indonesian West Timor. 
When they left East Timor in 1975, they left no legacy of governance. Even worse they also left 
10000 brand new NATO rifles behind as their administration including their military, fled to 
Atuoro Island in Dili harbour, prior to eventually departing altogether back to Europe. 
The Carnation Revolution ended Portugal’s colonial empire, which led to the right to self-
determination. This precipitated a unilateral declaration of independence in November 1975 
which prompted the Indonesian military to invade in December 1975. The Portuguese withdrawal 
created a serious security deterioration on the ground between rival political factions wishing to 
fill the void, which of course gave the Indonesians a reason to invade in 1975. Prior to this, five 
Australian journalists had been reported missing in Balibo, on 16 October. It was not until 12 
November, that their deaths were confirmed, when their remains and belongings were handed to 
the Australian Embassy in Jakarta by Indonesian officials. The journalists were in East Timor in 
advance of the Indonesian invasion and it was believed that they had been murdered by 
Indonesian Special Forces. This is significant, as the wives and families of these journalists, 
joined with other activists in Australia, including some 1939-45 war veterans, who fought with 
the support of the Timorese against the Imperial Japanese in the 1940s, and some student leftists, 
as well as the Catholic Church. One legacy the Portuguese left was Catholicism, which was also 
clearly an irritant to predominantly Islamic Indonesia. This was an important factor in the activism 
which was to emerge later, particularly following the Santa Cruz Massacre in 1991. 
The only power with the capacity to challenge the Indonesian action, the United States, was at 
best, ambivalent for a number of reasons, including an aversion to antagonising an anti-
communist, oil-producing nation, with control of significant sea-lanes between the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans, particularly as the global focus was on Cold War dynamics. There was even talk 
of an independent, leftist-leaning, East Timor, being recognised by China or the Soviet Union and 
perhaps even becoming a South East Asian Cuba with the potential as a missile base aimed at 
Jakarta. 
The Indonesian invasion in 1975, was ‘unofficially’ sanctioned by Australia and the United 
States, due to Cold War dynamics. Indonesia, as a majority-Muslim nation, was anti-communist 
and largely pro-west. The sea-lanes which transit the Indonesian archipelago are vital for 
Australian trade and security. In particular, the deep waters of the Straits of Ombai and Wetar, 
which run north of the island of Timor, were important as sea transit lanes for U.S. submarines, 
traveling from the Pacific to the Indian Oceans. 
Domestically, at the political level, this invasion was treated with a bi-partisan ‘blind-eye’, 
although there was some agitation among student activists. The two major domestic influencers 
in Australia were the so-called Jakarta Lobby, an informal group of academics and senior defence 
and foreign affairs officials, who were pragmatically pro-Indonesian, and domestic political 
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activists, who were pro-East Timorese independence. There is also a line of thought that despite 
assurances given by President Suharto to the then Prime Minister Whitlam, that Indonesia would 
refrain from taking military action in East Timor, in the eyes of the Indonesian President, that 
promise was no longer an obligation after Whitlam was dismissed on 11 November 1975.  
The significance of an Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor in late 1975, from an 
Australian perspective, needs to be put into context. The capital of South Vietnam, Saigon, had 
fallen to communist forces from the north in April of that year. The Americans had largely 
withdrawn from active military involvement in South East Asia, and Australia had also changed 
its posture from ‘forward defence’ to ‘defence of Australia’. 
United Nations Resolutions 384 and 389: 1975 
On 12 December 1975, the United Nations General Assembly confirmed resolutions (384 and 
389), passed by the Fourth Committee, which deplored Indonesia’s intervention in East Timor, 
and called for the withdrawal of its troops without delay. The resolution was carried 69 to 11, 
with 38 abstentions. Australia and New Guinea voted in favour of the resolution, as did Singapore. 
The remainder of the ASEAN nations voted against it, probably related to the non-interventionist 
foundations of ASEAN as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). The U.S., Britain 
and other ‘western’ powers abstained, arguably for more strategic reasons related to the Cold 
War, which was at high risk of turning into expansionism through South East Asia, following the 
fall of Saigon to North Vietnamese communist forces in April. 
Human rights abuses 
Upon invasion and occupation of East Timor, Indonesian forces almost immediately became 
engaged in a full-scale counter-insurgency, which they met with military force, which as 
Braithwaite states was ruthlessly brutal with those who openly resisted it, while seeking to respect 
human rights, and enrol and win the hearts and minds of those who collaborated with it.162 
Kingsbury wrote how this brutal counter-insurgency resulted in up to 200000 deaths from human 
rights abuses including starvation caused by compulsory re-location, preventable diseases caused 
by a lack of otherwise available medicines, and the killing of combatants and more commonly 
civilians often on a scale of wholesale massacres by Indonesian soldiers.163 
This was matched on the Indonesian side by a high cost in blood and treasure as highlighted by 
Braithwaite:  
162 Braithwaite, J., Charlesworth, H. and Soares, A. (2012). Networked Governance of Freedom and 
Tyranny: Peace in Timor-Leste. ANU E Press, Canberra, p. 65. 
163 Kingsbury, D. (1998) The Politics of Indonesia. Oxford University Press. Melbourne, p. 181. 
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Estimates of total Indonesian lives lost in fighting range from 4000 to 20,000 and of its 
cost from US$1 million to $3 million per day…This cost burden foreclosed 
opportunities for development projects and also sapped the morale of the Indonesian 
elite.164  
Fence of legs 
In June 1981, the Indonesian military deployed at least 15 territorial battalions, from outside East 
Timor and as many as 145,000 conscripted civilians in an operation known as Operasi Keamanan 
(Operation Security). The operation is also known as Operasi Kikis or Pagar Betis (Fence of 
Legs). It involved the formation of a human chain which would march across large areas of land 
with the military behind it in order to flush out guerrillas from their hiding places. The Fence of 
Legs targeted the eastern part of the territory, because the military's view was that that this was 
the area in which the resistance was the strongest. 
The Australian Government still turned a blind eye. It wasn’t until the release of a video taken by 
photo journalist Max Stahl (2017) of a massacre at the Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili in 1991, that 
international activism began to take on a more influential role. Even so, the Australian 
Government under Prime Minister Keating continued to turn a blind eye. 
Santa Cruz massacre 1991 
In October 1991, a protest march organised by the East Timorese resistance movement, marched 
to the Santa Cruz cemetery, in the capital Dili. During this march a protester was killed, and two 
Indonesian soldiers were allegedly stabbed. 
The reason for the march was that a pro-independence youth, Sebastiao Gomes, was 
hunted by a government agent and killed with a shot in the stomach while he was 
seeking sanctuary with other young people in the Motael Church in Dili. During the 
encounter, an Indonesian intelligence agent also suffered fatal injuries inflicted with a 
sharp instrument.165  
Gomes was buried in the Santa Cruz Cemetery in Dili. A protest march was organised by Xanana 
Gusmao, then leading the East Timorese resistance movement, to demonstrate in front of a 
visiting Portuguese delegation. Furthermore, Braithwaite observed, how on 28 October, 1991: 
The plan of Xanana Gusmao and the Executive Committee of the Resistance (CAVR 
2006: Ch.7, p.28) for the clandestine youth to organise a huge demonstration in front 
of the Portuguese delegation was then switched to a march after mass from the Motael 
Church to Sebastiao’s grave in the Santa Cruz Cemetery…Indonesian spokesmen 
claimed two Indonesian soldiers were stabbed during the march that swelled to 3000 
or more.  
164 Braithwaite, J. et al. (2012), p. 65. 
165 Braithwaite et al. (2012), pp. 79–80. 
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Braithwaite continued: 
Acting on orders and without warning the crowd to disperse, troops opened fire on the 
crowd, driving them into the walled cemetery. They then moved about the cemetery 
shooting and bayoneting protestors inside. Bodies piled up at the gate to the cemetery 
as marchers sought to flee back out… Shooting continued for about 15 minutes on many 
accounts before there were orders to cease firing and pile the wounded and dead into 
trucks. On the highest systematic counts of the time, 271 East Timorese were killed, 
382 wounded and 250 were missing afterwards.166 
The entire incident was filmed by journalist Max Stahl (2017). When this graphic footage was 
released, and widely distributed by journalists, including John Pilger, it proved a turning point in 
galvanising international support for the East Timorese, as well as providing a degree of 
momentum behind Indonesia’s pro-democracy movement. Copies of Stahl’s video were 
circulated among the aforementioned groups, and critically amongst human rights and advocates 
of democracy within Indonesia itself. The video also resulted in renewed interest in the situation 
in East Timor among the world’s media, which was fed by a clandestine activist movement in 
East Timor. One graphic photo was of the naked body of a young girl in a cell: 
[c]overed in cuts and horrific wounds. Various profanities written in Bahasa Indonesia 
are written on her body, and a crucifix … been drawn on her stomach. Stuck to the wall 
just above her head … a picture of Jesus Christ, and at her feet… a sign in Bahasa, 
paralleling the death of Christ on the Cross, which translates as ‘If you really are God, 
come down and bring her back to life’.167 
Being a member of the Catholic Church had become a form of resistance. It was well organised 
and reached into rural areas, as well as providing access to an international network. As 
Braithwaite observed, Joining the Church…became a private gesture of resistance to perceived 
Muslim invaders and an affirmation of Timorese identity.168 
The impact among the Australian polity was continued political ambivalence, possibly due to the 
bi-partisan influence of the so-called Jakarta Lobby in government circles. 
Prime Minister Paul Keating…even cast doubt on the original massacre, saying ‘it 
isn’t clear what happened. Pilger and the solidarity movement won this contest for 
Western public opinion resoundingly, and Australian leaders were again seen as 
apologists for a crime against humanity.169 
Activism 
A disparate East Timorese solidarity network, expatriate East Timorese, elements of the Catholic 
Church, and Australian ex-servicemen, who had served in East Timor during the Pacific War and 
journalists. The latter group was significant due to the five Australian journalists murdered at 
166 Braithwaite et al (2012), pp. 79–80. 
167 Wise (2006) pp. 110-11 cited in Braithwaite (2012), p. 83. 
168 Braithwaite et al (2012), p. 64. 
169 Pilger (1994), p.314 cited in Braithwaite (2012), p. 84. 
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Balibo by Indonesian troops around the invasion in 1975. This disparate but vocal group 
continued to apply pressure upon successive governments in Australia. 
The issue of East Timor was also kept alive in the ‘western’ media, particularly in Australia, and 
remained a significant area of disagreement between Indonesia and Australia, in particular 
because of reports such as those above. It was a ‘pebble in the shoe’ 170  in the Australian-
Indonesian relationship. Successive Australian governments continued to turn a blind eye to the 
situation in East Timor, despite the increased reporting of obvious human rights abuses by the 
Indonesian military. 
Blind eye: Influence of Jakarta lobby 
The Australian position, based on pure pragmatism, was de juré recognition of Indonesian 
sovereignty in East Timor. This position was maintained by the so-called ‘Jakarta Lobby’, a group 
of academics, defence and foreign affairs officials who maintained an active interest in pursuing 
strong diplomatic relations with Indonesia. The existence of this group as a formal entity, is very 
difficult to establish with any fidelity, however the pragmatic attitude adopted by successive 
Australian Governments of either political stripe, certainly reflected advice from a: 
group of scholars and diplomats [which] included most of the big guns of their 
professions who specialised in Indonesian affairs [who] throughout the 1970s, 1980s 
and most of the 1990s…utterly outgunned the mostly more marginal intellectuals who 
were active in the East Timor solidarity movement. Political leaders of both major 
political parties in Australia liked the hard-headed political pragmatism of the pro-
Indonesia network.171  
As Cotton stated to ABC Report Mark Colvin in 2004: 
whichever way you look at it, Indonesia is the key country. It’s the key country 
strategically in geographic terms. It’s the core country of the South-East Asian regional 
organisation, ASEAN. For two generations, managing the relationship with Indonesia 
has been a key concern of governments of both persuasions in Canberra.172 
The two primary nodes of this group were: 
in Canberra at the Department of Foreign Affairs (its most important player being 
Richard Woolcott, former Ambassador to Indonesia) … at the Australian National 
170 This came from a remark Indonesian Foreign Minister Alatas once made to a Portuguese journalist 
who had asked him how he felt about the international stigma over East Timor. He had responded by 
saying that it was a problem for Indonesia ‘but only as bothersome as a pebble in a shoe…’ He later 
wrote a book with the same title: Alatas, A. (2006). The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for 
East Timor. Aksara Karunia. Jakarta. 
171 Braithwaite et al (2012), p. 72. 
172 Cotton, J. interviewed in PM, A look behind the 'Jakarta Lobby', Australian Broadcasting Corporation 
15 April 2004. 
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University (its most senior players being the distinguished political scientist Jamie 
Mackie and the renowned economist Heinz Arndt).173 
They were unified by the idea…that Australian diplomacy and scholarship were far too oriented 
to other Western nations and insufficiently to the largest Muslim population of any nation in the 
world.174 
The implications for members of the AFP who deployed to East Timor in the second half of 1999 
were potentially fatal. Brian Toohey, a leading Australian investigative journalist, wrote in 1999 
that a high-level Canberra official was spying for Indonesia when the Australian military was 
about to deploy to East Timor.175 Presumably this person was also in office prior to, during and 
immediately following the deployment of unarmed Australian police with UNAMET. This is not 
a comforting thought. Whether the executive of the AFP was aware of these machinations is 
uncertain. What is certain is that none of this was known to members deployed. 
Fall of Suharto: Move towards Indonesian democracy – Window of opportunity 
Kingsbury (1998), described how, when Indonesian President Suharto was in Egypt, his son-in-
law General Prabowo Subianto took a heavy-handed approach to student pro-democracy protests 
in Jakarta, with several killed and wounded. This resulted in Major General Yudhoyono 
personally delivering a message from a number of retired Generals to the Commander of the 
Indonesian military General Wiranto, requesting that President Suharto resign. 
General Wiranto initially resisted but it was becoming increasingly apparent that Wiranto had 
done a deal with Suharto: ‘agree to retire quietly and there will be no more violence’.176 President 
Suharto resigned on live television, on 19 May 1998, and announced the formation of a ‘reform 
committee’ and a new ‘reform cabinet’. He also announced that there would be new presidential 
elections and that he would not stand as a candidate.177 
The election of President Habibie 
The election was conducted relatively peacefully and President Habibie was elected. The collapse 
of the Suharto government in 1998, and the emergent forces of democracy in Indonesia, brought 
the issue of East Timor once again to the international table. There had been a change of 
government in Canberra in 1996, and the conservative Liberal Prime Minister John Howard, 
173 Braithwaite et al (2012), p. 72. 
174 Braithwaite et al (2012), p. 72. 
175 Toohey, B. (1999) ‘Hunt on for Indonesian Spy’, Australian Financial Review, 18 Sep 1999 in Collins, 
L. and Reed, W. (2005). Plunging Point: Intelligence Failures, Cover-ups and Consequences, 4th 
Estate/Harper Collins, Sydney, p. 50. 
176 Kingsbury, D. (1998), p. 251. 
177  Kingsbury, D. (1998), p. 252. 
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having witnessed the success of the Cambodian mission in 1993, under the ALP Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans, and the enlightened involvement of the Indonesian Government with the Jakarta 
Informal Meetings (JIMs), to facilitate the Cambodian solution, perhaps glimpsed a window of 
opportunity for East Timor, which was open for a fraction of a political second. Prime Minister 
Howard made an approach, by letter, to President Habibie, the caretaker President of Indonesia, 
and raised the issue of East Timor. After some hesitation, and deliberation, President Habibie 
acquiesced and arrangements were made to conduct a ballot through the United Nations, to 
ascertain the intentions of the East Timorese public. 
This was not appreciated by powerful elements within the Indonesian military as Habibie’s 
presidency was regarded as transitional. At the time of the announcement of the ballot, several 
pro-Indonesian militia groups became active within East Timor. Each was assigned to a particular 
area or regency and were raised, trained, armed and supported by the Indonesian military, TNI 
(Tentara Nasional Indonesia). 
Letter from Prime Minister Howard to President Habibie 1998 – Offer of special 
autonomy 
It was President Habibie’s reaction to the contents of Prime Minister Howard’s letter of 19 
December 1998, which created a momentum over which the Australian Government and Prime 
Minister Howard lost control. The letter purportedly drafted by Michael Thawley (International 
Advisor to Prime Minister John Howard, between 1996 and 1999) , Peter Varghese (First 
Assistant Secretary of the International Division, Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet 
1998 to 1999) and John Dauth178 (Deputy Secretary of DFAT) , and discussed by Ashton Calvert 
(Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade 1998-2005) and John McCarthy 
(Ambassador to Indonesia 1997-2001), was hand delivered by the Australian Ambassador to 
Indonesia. It was a letter relating to President Habibie’s mention of offering a status of special 
autonomy to East Timor. It was a letter that would have profound consequences. It states inter 
alia: 
My dear President 
Your offer of autonomy for East Timor was a bold and clear-sighted step that has 
opened a window of opportunity both to achieve a peaceful settlement in East Timor 
and to resolve an issue that has long caused Indonesia difficulties in the international 
community. A settlement would enable you to put the issue behind you. It would make 
a substantial difference to Indonesia’s standing in the world, with the benefits that 
could bring. 
178  John Dauth was the Australian Consul-General in New Caledonia from 1986-1987 before being 
declared persona non grata by the French government after Paris complained that he was too close to the 
Kanak pro-independence movement. 
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I want to emphasise that Australia’s support for Indonesia’s sovereignty is unchanged. 
It has been a long-standing Australian position that the interests of Australia, Indonesia 
and East Timor are best served by East Timor remaining part of Indonesia…It might 
be worth considering… a means of addressing the East Timorese desire for an act of 
self-determination in a manner that avoids an early and final decision on the future 
status of the province. One way of doing this would be to build into the autonomy 
package a review mechanism along the lines of the Matignon Accords in New 
Caledonia. The Matignon Accords179 have enabled a compromise political solution to 
be implemented while deferring a referendum on the final status of New Caledonia for 
many years …[This] would allow time to convince the East Timorese of the benefits of 
autonomy within the Indonesian republic.180 
Importantly, the letter contained support for Habibie’s decision to offer autonomy to East Timor, 
and reaffirmed Australia’s support for East Timor remaining a part of Indonesia. This was 
contrary to the popular narrative amongst the Indonesian military and their militia proxies that 
Australia was actively supporting the pro-independence movement. The perceived lack of 
impartiality of Australia and Australians, posed a serious risk to AFP members, who deployed as 
part of the UNAMET Mission as they wore the Australian National Flag prominently on their 
uniforms in accordance with UN uniform requirements, and were specifically targeted by the pro-
Indonesian militia, both before, and particularly after the UN ballot in 1999. 
Indonesian response 
Habibie’s reaction to the letter provoked an unexpected and unwelcome reaction from President 
Habibie. The letter was carefully drafted and delivered discreetly, and was intended to open the 
East Timor issue tactfully, to address what Indonesian Foreign Minister referred to as, the ‘pebble 
in the shoe’, in the Indonesian-Australian relationship. However, the letter’s contents, particularly 
the reference it contained to the Matignon Accords, angered Habibie and were misconstrued by 
him, as a suggestion that Indonesia was acting like a colonial power. This inference was 
unwelcome, and probably spurred his desire to address the East Timor issue once and for all. 
Loss of control over the process 
In late December 1998, the existence of the letter was leaked, and was published in the media. 
The situation then became difficult to control. On 27 January 1999, following a media release by 
the Australian Government on 12 January1999, President Habibie consulted with his cabinet and 
decided to offer East Timor ‘regional autonomy plus’. If the offer of autonomy was rejected, his 
179 The Matignon Agreements (1988) were agreements signed in June 1988 between loyalists who wanted 
to keep New Caledonia as a part of the French Fifth Republic, and separatists, who did not. They allowed 
for a delayed period between a decision to hold a referendum and the actual referendum itself. 
180 Mules, N., Merrifield, S., Bull, C., Chan, M. and Hooper, S. (2001). East Timor in Transition, 1998–
2000: An Australian Policy Challenge. Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, pp. 181–182. 
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government would recommend that the Indonesian parliament ‘release East Timor from 
Indonesia’. 
The events and decisions of January 1999, created some serious concerns for the Australian 
national security policy community. The meeting of the Strategic Policy Coordination Group 
(SPCG) on 15 January, highlighted Defence’s disappointment with the lack of internal 
consultation, and provided a negative prognosis for what might happen next. Rear Admiral Peter 
Briggs, a participant at that meeting, recalled: 
Hugh White [Deputy Secretary for Strategy, Australian Department of Defence] was 
very forthright, and questioned the DFAT representatives on the process and intentions 
of the letter. Hugh said something like ‘Do you know what the f … is going to happen?’ 
– they were taken aback at Hugh’s language and expression – ‘Habibie is going to 
accept the offer, there will be a process of self-determination which the Indonesian 
military will resist, and the local militias will be the tool they will resist it with, and we 
will end up with the ADF [Australian Defence Force] on the ground between the 
Indonesians and the East Timorese. We could well end up with body bags coming back 
to Australia.’ It was an extremely strong event.181 
This was prophetic, but it wasn’t the ADF who stood between the pro-Indonesian militia and the 
rest of the East Timorese community, but unarmed AFP members, who formed the bulk of the 
UN Civilian Police component. There were no body bags returning to Australia, but that was 
more due to good luck than good management, as there were many situations in which body bags 
were a definite possibility. 
Australian response 
There was a significant divergence of opinion, between DFAT and Defence, about any Australian 
response to this rapidly emerging situation. DFAT believed that Indonesia, specifically the 
Indonesian Police, were responsible for security in East Timor and advocated the use of 
diplomacy to avoid the need to deploy a peacekeeping force. They did not want to convey a 
perception that Australia was preparing to intervene in East Timor, as it could create tension with 
Indonesia, or allow others to assume that Australia would take the lead and ‘bankroll’ the process. 
Australian officials also feared this perception could have discouraged the Indonesians and 
Timorese from coming to their own compromises about the process. 
Militia warnings – Pre-ballot 
The political choices for the East Timorese were becoming clearer: special autonomy and 
continued integration within the Indonesian republic, or a formalised UN-sponsored path towards 
full independence. This aroused deep passions on both sides of this question, and serious 
181 Blaxland, J. (ed) (2015). East Timor intervention: A Retrospective on INTERFET. Carlton, Victoria, 
Australia: Melbourne University Press, p. 32. 
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breakdowns in civil order occurred, with the formation of para-military militia groups supporting 
the pro-Indonesian position. 
The need for some form of international intervention was underlined by the precarious 
state of civil order. The appearance of armed ‘militias’ in the territory, including 
Halalinitar led by Joao Tavares (former Bupati of Bobonaro), Mahidi led by Cancio 
Lopes de Carvalho, as well as Besih Merah Putih and Pana led to a sharp deterioration 
in the security of the territory. The use of militias, raised by the Interior Ministry but 
attached to the territorial or combat military groups, has been a long-standing practice 
in East Timor. Now these and other groups declared themselves in favour of 
integration, and were provided with additional arms so that they might terrorise the 
populations in their areas. Through February, attacks on civilians continued while 
villages emptied, and roadblocks staged by armed gangs led to beatings and 
murders.182 
The militia groups were organised along Portuguese colonial regency lines, which also coincided 
with UN Electoral Districts. They were raised by Major-General Zacky Anwar Makarim, the 
former head of military intelligence. Their predilection for violence was known in some 
Australian quarters as early as February 1999, where at a meeting at the Australian National 
University, discussions ensued about forward momentum concerning East Timor. 
At the end of the meeting (on 25 February 1999), FPDK spokesman Basilio Araujo 
handed Downer a letter, which he opened after the group had departed. It was 
addressed to him and signed by Eurico Guterres, head of the Aitarak militia group, and 
Cancio Carvalho, head of the Mahidi militia, on behalf of the ‘Commander of the Pro-
Integration Paramilitary’. The letter declared integration as ‘final’, claimed that the 
pro-integration forces fought for those who were politically immature and vulnerable 
to manipulation, and contained threats to the safety of Australian diplomats and 
journalists in East Timor. ‘It is better to sacrifice an Australian diplomat or journalist 
to save the lives of the 850,000 East Timorese…the pro-integration paramilitary group 
is…looking forward to meeting and facing any Australian hypocrites, deceivers and 
political mercenaries (including the East Timor pro-independence Australian 
peacekeeping force) on the soil of East Timor-day or night.183   
In the meantime, the militia-led violence continued under the military operational name Operation 
Global Clean Sweep. This was organised by the Indonesian military. 
Operation Global Clean Sweep – Pre-ballot 
The deteriorating circumstances on the ground in East Timor were becoming evident to the 
Defence establishment. According to Kingsbury: 
Aitarak and the other militias were supported and armed by the regional Udayana IX 
Military Command, based in Bali, and occasionally led in the field by (sometimes 
former) military intelligence officers, associated with the Satuan Tugas Intelijen 
(Intelligence Duty Unit-SGI) and Kopassus (Special Forces). Through what it called 
Operasi Sapu Jagad (Operation Global Clean Sweep), these gangs were responsible 
for hundreds of deaths in East Timor between January and July 1999 and caused more 
182 Mules, et al. (2001), p. 15. 
183 Mules et al. (2001), p. 50. 
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than 600,000 people to flee their villages, creating a serious refugee problem. Officials 
from the key independence organization, the Timorese National Resistance Council 
(CNRT) were killed, while its offices in the western part of East Timor were effectively 
kept closed.184 
In May 2004, an ABC Background Briefing program journalist Peter Cronau interviewed a 
number of defence, intelligence and DFAT officials and stated, There were shootings and 
massacres, and Indonesia continued to fend off calls for UN peacekeepers in East Timor. And a 
steady trickle of leaked secret documents from Defence Intelligence Organisation, with details of 
the TNI backing for the violent militias flowed to journalists.185 It was clear something needed to 
be done, and the expectation was that Australia was best placed to do it. 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1246: 1999 
The UN, which had never recognised Indonesian sovereignty, and was committed to de-
colonisation generally, successfully negotiated an agreement between the governments of 
Portugal, the former colonial power, and Indonesia, the actual occupiers of East Timor in March 
1999, to move forward politically on the question. This set in motion a series of meetings 
concerning the deteriorating security which was clearly an issue in such a volatile environment. 
[O]n 12 March, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan was able to announce that all 
parties had agreed that a ‘method of direct ballot will be used to ask the people of East 
Timor whether they accept or reject a proposal for autonomy, the details of which were 
soon to be provided by the Indonesian Government. Though it was clear that there were 
still some obstacles in Jakarta to be overcome….this was nevertheless a significant 
breakthrough. The conditions necessary for the conduct of such a vote would require 
a UN presence, including a role for armed forces, and the Secretary General suggested 
that UN personnel would be in place by June 1999…The Government’s position was 
that in advance of any possible settlement, the use of Australian military forces as 
‘peacekeepers’ was likely to have disastrous consequences … The oppositions view 
was that without a third force to prevent the violence and intimidation which was 
becoming commonplace in parts of the island, no ballot could hope to produce a fair 
and accurate result. It followed that such a force was necessary ahead of the ballot.186 
In terms of Australian foreign policy, Australia was now in an unenviable position. Having 
initiated a process towards a long-term, peaceful political solution in good faith, it had now lost 
control of the process by which this could possibly be achieved. It was the reference to the 
Matignon formula which appeared to tip the balance in the mind of President Habibie. The official 
Australian position, recognising Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor was in direct 
184 Kingsbury, D. (ed) (2000) Guns and Ballot Boxes: East Timor’s Vote for Independence. Monash Asia 
Institute. Melbourne, p. 72. 
185 Cronau, P. (2004) Intelligence Wars:Behind the Lance Collins Affair, ABC Background Briefing, 
[http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/backgroundbriefing/intelligence-wars-behind-the-lance-
collins-affair/3418864] 
186 Cotton, J. (1999). East Timor and Australia. AIIH Contributions to the Policy Debate. Australian 
Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, pp. 15–16. 
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contravention to that of the United Nations, which still recognised Portugal as the legitimate 
power. Portugal had divested itself of its colonies in 1974. It was a tense and complex situation. 
To complicate matters further, Australia was best placed to provide the military force which was 
clearly required in the circumstances. The difficulty was that the Australian military, which in 
practical terms, was the most appropriate instrument to provide a peacekeeping force, was not 
considered suitable for political reasons, primarily related to the active opposition from the 
Indonesian military to have a foreign force, particularly Australian forces, on what it considered 
to be sovereign Indonesian territory. It was a complex situation. Clearly a ‘Third Force’ was 
required. The prospect of such a ‘Third Force’ however, was raised by Max Moore-Wilton, the 
head of the Prime Minister’s Department. This took the form of the Australian Federal Police. 
Security agreement civilian Police: The Third Force 
Max Moore-Wilton floated the suggestion of the Australian Federal Police, and as a result at a 
meeting with the Indonesian President in Bali in May 1999: 
Prime Minister Howard asked whether Indonesia would accept a contingent of several 
hundred police officers. Habibie said this would be difficult given the small number of 
officers (250) in the Indonesian police force in East Timor. Habibie said that it was 
intended that the number of Indonesian police would be increased, but even without 
increased numbers the security situation in East Timor presented no problems: there 
was no international crisis occurring in East Timor…It was agreed that the UN would 
determine how many police would be adequate for the task. In a separate discussion 
with Defence Minister John Moore, Wiranto agreed that Indonesia would accept 200-
300 international civilian police in East Timor.187 
The dynamics of this meeting are instructive. Hugh White, a senior Australian Defence official 
present, later stated that, when the prospect of Australian troops was raised, the Chief of the 
Indonesian military, General Wiranto, emphatically opposed it. So much so that he physically 
waved his arm repeatedly in front of his own President and said loudly, ‘No, no, no!’. This 
exchange speaks volumes about where real power resided in the embryonic Indonesian 
democracy.  
UNAMET is established: June 1999 
The result of all of these meetings was the creation of the United Nations Mission East Timor 
(UNAMET) on 11 June 1999, in which the newly formed Indonesian Police would be responsible 
for security, with a number of unarmed international police advisors, assisting. Prominent among 
the number of international police, was a group of Australian Federal Police which eventually 
numbered 52. 
187 Mules et al. (2001), pp. 79–80. 
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The UN Resolution 1246 of 11 June 1999 was the instrument under which the AFP members 
deployed to UNAMET. It state inter alia: 188 
Authorises until 31 August 1999 the deployment within UNAMET of up to 280 civilian police 
officers to act as advisers to the Indonesian Police in the discharge of their duties, and at 
the time of consultation, to supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from the 
polling sites. 
By virtue of UN Resolution 1246, 11 June 1999, UNAMET was mandated to include 
political, electoral, civilian police, information, military liaison officers and 
administrative components…The 5 May Agreements mandated the Indonesian police 
with the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, with CivPol acting as 
advisors. CivPol were to be unarmed. CivPol were also mandated to supervise the 
escort of ballot materials to and from polling sites. To carry out these tasks the United 
Nations deployed 271 civilian police, with the first team deployed by mid-June.189  
Armed police 
The question as to whether the police should have been armed or not, was raised at the time, and 
continues to raise eyebrows in certain circles. East Timor in 1999 was a province of a sovereign 
nation recognised by Australia, but not the UN. As such the armed security was entrusted with 
the sovereign power, Indonesia. This was an asymmetric security situation as UN Civilian Police 
including members of the AFP were unarmed. This was a controversial subject at the time and 
still remains so. Most of those who were part of the first contingent, including the author, maintain 
that had they been armed they would have provoked a more hostile reaction from an already 
affronted Indonesian police and military structure. They would have been outgunned as they 
would only have been carrying police issue handguns, and they would have presented themselves 
as targets by militia groups, who would see the police side-arms as desirable items, and would 
have attempted to obtain them by any means available including murder. Paradoxically in this 
case being unarmed worked to the advantage of member safety. 
The question of whether CivPol would be armed was the subject of considerable 
discussion within the Australian Government. After extensive deliberation, the 
Government accepted advice from the AFP that Australian CivPol should be unarmed, 
in line with conventional UN practice.190 
Commissioner Alan Mills who was the UN CivPol Commissioner in East Timor in a later address 
to an International Policing Conference stated: 
The issuance of sidearms to CivPol should only be taken as a last and extreme measure. 
That issuance must be consistent with the mandate criteria and preferably in agreement 
188 UN Security Council Resolution 1246 (1999) Established the United Nations Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET) to organise and conduct the East Timor Special Autonomy Referendum on the future status of 
East Timor. [S/RES/1246/ (1999)] 
189 Mules et al. (2001), pp. 91–92. 
190 Mules et al. (2001), p. 92. 
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with the parties to the conflict…the issuance of a sidearm for CivPol raises the bar in 
terms of visual acceptance as a peacekeeper, and increases the likelihood of the 
member becoming a target. In any case, when compared against the array of military 
type weapons usually carried by the parties to the conflict, the presence and capacity 
of a sidearm is totally disproportionate…The absence of weapons assists in clearly 
projecting a more positive image to the parties to the conflict and the community 
generally. In most cases it engenders respect that paves the way for a more positive 
communication process.191 
Impartiality is a trait of liberal-democratic policing and played a significant part in maintaining a 
semblance of order during the UNAMET Mission. It is a highly desirable requirement for United 
Nations service. This was sorely tested in East Timor during the UNAMET Mission, and despite 
the challenging security circumstances, and the volatile political situation, it was the correct 
decision.  
Indonesian perception of Australian partisanship 
The Indonesian military, and their militia proxies, believed that the UN, and all of its constituent 
parts, including Australian police working with the UN, supported the pro-independence 
movement. Had the AFP members assumed the policy of the Australian Government, rather than 
that of the UN, they would have actually been justified in being actively pro-autonomy. The fact 
is, in accordance with their own training and apolitical posture in Australia, the AFP members 
were impartial, which was something which came naturally to them. This can be a difficult 
concept to grasp for people whose political experience and exposure has been entirely partisan, 
which was the case with the militia groups or even politicised entities such as the military and 
police in East Timor. Nonetheless, the impartial posture and the fact that they were unarmed, 
allowed international police to negotiate, rather than use force, or the threat thereof, to resolve 
potential conflict, in partnership with their Indonesian Police colleagues, who themselves had just 
split from their military. In fact, impartiality played a significant role in de-escalating some very 
volatile situations between armed militia groups and UN volunteers, as well as normal East 
Timorese community members. 
In accordance with an instruction from the UN Civilian Police Commissioner, the senior AFP 
member Alan Mills, the UN police were: to apply the rule of strict neutrality, monitor the 
neutrality and observe the performance of the Indonesian Police, by creating a professional and 
sound working relationship with them. To provide advice, assess threats and escort the ballot 
boxes to and from the polling sites. The objective was to encourage the preservation of law and 
order, and inspire confidence among the community to allow them to register their vote in a ‘free, 
fair and stress free environment.’ The process of the ballot itself was very thorough and 
progressed through organised phases. 
191 Mills, A. (2001) Civilian Police as Peacekeepers, International Policing Conference, 2001, p. 10. 
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Operation Global Clean Sweep – ballot 
The overt nature of Operation Global Clean Sweep went covert upon the arrival of UNAMET in 
June 1999, however: 
[i]n late June and early July, incidents of intimidation and violence directed at 
UNAMET served not only to highlight the larger problem with militia activities posed 
to a free consultation process, but also the question of whether UNAMET would be 
able to carry out the process at all. Throughout June, anonymous phone callers made 
repeated threats against UNAMET personnel, including, to lob grenades into 
UNAMET’s Dili compound and eateries favoured by international staff. Threats were 
also made to shoot down the helicopter transporting the Secretary-General’s two 
representatives…A letter was received threatening ‘rivers of blood’ in East Timor, and 
the UNAMET VHF frequency was broken into with a message that all UNAMET 
personnel would be killed.192 
This was the uncertain security environment which confronted AFP members who formed the 
largest contingent within the CIVPOL element of UNAMET. The helicopter report was made by 
AFP members in the Suai region after sightings of militia carrying long arms, and what appeared 
to be shoulder-launched rocket launchers in the vicinity of the proposed landing zone. These 
reports were dismissed by Commissioner Mills as ‘alarmist and overstated’, and the reporting 
police were chastised. This did nothing to engender trust in Commissioner Mills amongst the 
Australian police. The helicopter situation was eventually resolved after the incident was brought 
to the attention of the Indonesian Police, who then dealt with the suspects, not by arresting them, 
but by ordering them to leave …with their weapons. 
AFP role, UN CIVPOL and the relationship with the Indonesian Police 
The role of the UN CIVPOL as outlined in UN Resolution 1246 in which CIVPOL was directed 
to monitor the neutrality and observe the performance of the Indonesian Police: (1) Provide advice 
to the Indonesian Police; (2) Assess threats to the public order and advise the local authorities on 
it; (3) Supervise the escort of ballot papers and boxes to and from polling sites; and (4) Assist 
efforts on UN agencies and other Civil Components of the UN Mission. All of this assumed a 
benign security environment: The agreement on security stated that an environment devoid of 
violence or other forms of intimidation was a prerequisite for holding a free and fair ballot.193 
This was the sole responsibility of the Indonesian Police however, they had only separated from 
the military in April 1999 and given the difficult circumstances in which they found themselves, 
generally the police to police relationships between AFP and POLRI were positive as McFarlane 
wrote: 
192 Mules et al. (2001), p. 102. 
193 Mules et al. (2001), p. 83. 
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[g]enerally, the POLRI officers tried to do ‘the right thing’. Most POLRI members 
never felt at ease with the role they were required to perform and there was a fair bit 
of ‘manoeuvring’ about the way they performed their duties. Overall relations between 
Civilian Police and POLRI were very good, and on many occasions, POLRI officers 
went out of their way to help or look after the Civilian Police members. POLRI was 
quite a professional organization, but during the UNAMET period they were 
sandwiched between the TNI/militia and the United Nations-a difficult place to be. 
Relations with the Police Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB) were also good and on at least 
one occasion, BRIMOB intervened to save Civilian Police from militia violence. In 
Maubisse, Civilian Police and BRIMOB played volleyball regularly and a good spirit 
prevailed. Unlike the TNI, POLRI was not well-equipped and, in particular lacked 
transport, which severely limited their role to protect Civilian Police.194 
The ballot 
Upon arrival in East Timor, police were split into small groups and attached to electoral teams, 
as determined by the Chief Electoral Officer, which were then dispatched throughout the province 
to some very remote and inaccessible areas, often without supplies, communications or maps. It 
was in these areas, as well as in Dili, that much of the militia inspired violence and intimidation 
took place. Increasingly, reports of these militia groups being supplied with alcohol and 
amphetamines, by the TNI, to increase aggression became apparent. This violence continued 
throughout the entire period UNAMET was running, and escalated dramatically when the actual 
ballot result was announced. 
Each electoral team, consisted of two UN Volunteers, drawn from all parts of the globe, a local 
Timorese driver and a Timorese interpreter. The role of each team was to establish a registration 
and polling-place, provide voter education, register voters, and ultimately to conduct the ballot. 
The role of UNCIVPOL was to liaise with POLRI to ensure that this process could proceed 
without disruption or interference. This was generally successful, however in some areas, 
intimidation and coercion occurred to such an extent that voter registration and campaigning had 
to be suspended. 
The most important role of UNCIVPOL was to secure the ballot boxes once the polling had 
ceased, the administration reconciled and the ballot boxes sealed. The ballot boxes were conveyed 
to secure locations overnight and collected the following morning and conveyed to the central 
tally office in Dili. At all times these ballot boxes were to remain in the custody of the UN Police. 
This included overnight security, where in some cases UN Civilian Police slept with the ballot 
boxes to ensure an unbroken chain of custody. This was a concept with which police were 
familiar, as it is exactly the same concept used for the handling of evidentiary material. 
194 McFarlane, J, and Maley, W. (2001) Civilian Police in United Nations Peace Operations: Some 
Lessons from Recent Australian Experience, in Thakur, R and Schnabel, A (eds). United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement (Tokyo: United Nations University 
Press) pp.182–211. 
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Ballot result 
Despite intimidation and coercion by militia groups, and claims made by pro-Indonesian 
elements, of bias and procedural irregularities by UNAMET, the people of East Timor registered 
to vote almost in their entirety, and in excess of 98 per cent of eligible voters actually voted on 
30 August 1999. The ballot result was announced by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in the 
mid-morning of 4 September 1999.  
The result was an overwhelming rejection of Indonesia’s autonomy proposal: 21.5 per 
cent (94388) said yes to the offer; 78.5 per cent (344580)) rejected it and, in doing so, 
indicated a preference to separate from Indonesia.195 
The impact on the ground was immediate, widespread and extreme. Most of the UN electoral 
volunteers had left East Timor immediately following the actual ballot, and before the 
announcement of the result. The only remaining, and highly visible UN presence, were UN Police, 
with AFP members prominent among them. There is a UN requirement that police members wear 
their national flag prominently on their shirts. As a result, Australians attracted the specific 
attention of militia violence. This was a very dangerous situation for CIVPOL, but specifically 
for AFP members, who were the most numerous, and also highly identifiable to militia groups. 
The Indonesian Police could no longer guarantee their safety. 
One Australian Civilian Police (UNPOL) officer told us how his local POLRI 
(Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia: Indonesian National Police) commander 
tipped him off after the referendum result was announced in 1999: ‘Tomorrow I’ve 
been ordered to remove your security at midday and not see what happens.’ The 
Australian added that the local militia had a list of priority targets for assassination 
that he himself was on, but the POLRI commander was number one on that list.196 
Over reaction by TNI/Militias: Operation Global Clean Sweep – Post-ballot 
The overt phase of Operation Global Clean Sweep was implemented, as TNI and POLRI were 
dispatched throughout the province. Some members of POLRI donned their old military 
uniforms. Shortly after these dispatches, smoke from burning villages was sighted, large groups 
of internally displaced persons commandeered transport, or were loaded aboard military 
transports and the province generally descended into chaos and violence. The Indonesian police 
evaporated and the UN Civilian Police were left isolated in many areas of the province. There 
was thus no control at all over the violence, and little restraint was being demonstrated by the 
perpetrators. This created a deliberate humanitarian crisis on the ground. 
A further element of Operation Clean Sweep was to disrupt the UN process in East 
Timor. This problem escalated into August and had reached radical proportions by 
195 Mules et al. (2001), p. 124. 
196 Braithwaite (2012), p. 61. 
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early September, with more than 350,000 forced into homelessness and hundreds, 
probably thousands, tortured and killed.197 
The Indonesian military action bore similar hallmarks to those of 1975, where military action was 
justified to suppress insurrection, and to remove international witnesses, particularly UN police. 
Major Clinton Fernandes, an Australian Intelligence Officer with INTERFET, deployed after 
UNAMET withdrew stated: 
The Indonesian military terror campaign was carefully calibrated in intent, timing and 
location. For all its visceral, punitive aspects, the aim was to reverse the result of the 
ballot. It would have to be discredited as rigged, by suggesting that a majority of 
Timorese were voting with their feet. The Indonesian military needed to remove all 
foreigners in order to execute its plan without the impediment of outside attention. 
Therefore, for all its sensationalism and violent imagery, the execution of the terror 
campaign was carefully controlled. 
The military campaign would work sequentially as follows: 1. Use the militia proxies 
to confine and remove foreign observers. 2. With foreigners gone, attack the local 
population and use logistics assets to move them across the border. 3. Provoke a 
desperate retaliation from Falintil…thereby drawing it into a conventional war. 4. 
Announce that the TNI was forced to intervene between the ‘factions’ and then, freed 
from restraints, attack and destroy Falintil in conventional warfare. 5. Create new 
demographic facts on the ground, ensuring that the results of the ballot were 
irreversibly overturned.198 
Prominent among the Indonesian military units perpetrating the violence was Battalion 745, an 
East Timorese military unit, whose nickname was ‘The Brave Ones’. 
The Battalion’s nickname was strictly and bitterly ironic. ‘The Brave Ones’. A fighting 
unit with a proud history of child murder, rape, plunder and riot. You could tell when 
Battalion 745 had passed through because of their signature legacy of shallow graves, 
burnt buildings and drinking wells crammed with the mutilated remains of the dead 
peasants they were pledged to protect.199 
The UN compound, Dili 4–10 September 1999 
Eventually through a great deal of negotiation and by sheer luck, the UN Civilian Police were 
able to make their various ways to the UN Headquarters compound in Dili from all of the remote 
197 Kingsbury (2000), p. 72. 
198 ABC Background Briefing, 30 May 2004 Intelligence Wars: Behind the Lance Collins Affair p.10) 
[http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22media%2Fradioprm%2
F2YQC6%22;src1=sm1] 
Australian Intelligence Corps’ former principal analyst for East Timor, Major Clinton Fernandes declined 
to comment on the report, but Background Briefing extracted the above comment from his contribution to 
a university discussion list.  
[http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/backgroundbriefing/intelligence-wars-behind-the-lance-
collins-affair/3418864] 
199 Birmingham, (2001), The Brave Ones: East Timor 1999. Black Inc. Collingwood, Victoria, p. 1. 
125 
                                                 
areas of the province. There the situation was little better. This is illustrated by the following 
extract from a 2001 DFAT publication: 
Despite a visit to Dili on 5 September by General Wiranto and Foreign Affairs Minister 
Alatas, that afternoon the security situation in Dili deteriorated further. Harassment of 
the international presence increased significantly. UNAMET staff were increasingly 
confined to headquarters as UN vehicles were shot at in the streets, as was the 
Australian Consulate vehicle…That evening, machine gun fire in the close vicinity of 
UNAMET headquarters drove several hundred more terrified East Timorese to seek 
refuge in the UNAMET compound. Gunfire and grenade blasts continued throughout 
the night.200 
A latrine was dug behind the auditorium and gunfire and grenade explosions persisted throughout 
the day and night. Indiscriminate tracer fire was visible being directed up the hill behind the 
compound in the direction of fleeing internally displaced persons (IDP). Whilst machine gun fire 
and other military weapons, including grenades were being discharged around the UN compound 
in Dili, the UN Police Commissioner was holding a briefing to an auditorium of assembled police 
who had been withdrawn from regional areas and concentrated in the compound. During the 
briefing a burst of automatic fire was heard very close to the front gate. 
This incident was dismissed by the Commissioner as some sort of over exuberant behaviour by 
some disappointed East Timorese using ‘toy pop guns’. This was met with incredulous 
expressions by the assembled police, many of whom had seen active military service, until a 
number of U.S. police officers, got up and walked out, voicing their opinions of his assessment 
of the situation and seeking ways to contact their government. At this point the credibility of the 
police leader, with his own police members, reached a point of no recovery. 
Later that evening, more automatic fire which caused the flight of the IDP’s into the UN 
compound, gave lie to the Commissioner’s assessment, as it was machine-gun fire containing 
tracer rounds, fired up the hill behind the compound, directly at fleeing IDP’s who had clearly 
lost faith in the protective capacity of the UN, and were going to take their chances in the 
hinterland around Dili. That burst also gave lie to the assessment that the Indonesian military was 
remaining neutral, as it was a TNI machine gun post near the front gate of the UN compound 
which fired up the hill. 
The post-announcement violence in East Timor created a volatile situation, which could have 
been anticipated, but which placed the security of civilians and UN civilian police, at the mercy 
of the newly-formed, and heavily out-gunned POLRI. The UN Headquarters in Dili was in a 
former teacher training college. Next to this facility was an actual school where thousands of East 
Timorese displaced persons had taken refuge. During the militia rampage, automatic small-arms 
fire was directed in the vicinity of this group of people, who naturally panicked and scaled the 
200 Mules et al. (2001), p. 127–128. 
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wall into the UN compound. In the ensuing panic, terrified East Timorese climbed over the 
masonry wall separating the UN compound from the former teacher’s college. 
The wall was topped with razor wire, and many of the fleeing people became caught up in the 
wire, some hanging by their clothes and many hanging by their limbs and hair. An AFP member 
organised for the heavy steel gate separating the areas to be opened, and a large number of East 
Timorese flowed into the UN compound. This put an enormous strain upon the limited water, 
food and sanitation facilities inside the compound, thus causing the UN to ‘tactically re-locate’ 
the bulk of its staff to Darwin. Whilst this was occurring, the TNI and militia continued their 
destruction. Images of this were being transmitted by news crews to an increasingly enraged 
public in Australia and elsewhere. 
Withdrawal of UN to Darwin 
Once the extent and severity of violence became known, the plan to evacuate UNAMET 
personnel from East Timor (Operation Spitfire) commenced and contingency planning for a 
peace-making operation began. Lobbying was conducted to muster support for an international 
military coalition. It was clear that UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan did not believe that the 
Indonesian military could maintain control of the situation. This concern resulted in a phone call 
to Prime Minister Howard on 6 September, where the UN Secretary General asked whether 
Australia would contribute to an international force for East Timor if this was authorised by the 
Indonesians and the UN Security Council. According to Prime Minister Howard, he told him that 
Australia would make a significant contribution and insisted that Australia be asked to lead. 
Between UNAMET and INTERFET – A fortnight of chaos 
The period between the withdrawal of UNAMET, between 6-10 September and the arrival of 
INTERFET on 20 September was characterised by multiple casualties and atrocities. Battalion 
745 wasn’t the only offending group. TNI General Syahnakri the military commander recorded: 
As we predicted, on 4 September 1999, after the announcement of the referendum won 
by those in favour of independence, riots occurred in almost all regions of East Timor, 
especially in Dili. For no apparent reason, the results were announced earlier than the 
original schedule of 7 September 1999. Horizontal conflict was unavoidable, and 
chaos, burning, looting and even murder, occurred in some areas. 
On 7 September, I suggested the Commander in Chief of the TNI should send two 
brigades to East Timor and on the afternoon of 8 September we landed in Dili. In the 
evening, and through most of the night, we heard sporadic rounds of gunfire. From 
intelligence gathered from Damiri, we ascertained that these shots were fired by TNI 
soldiers who were not satisfied with the results of the poll. The majority of these 
disgruntled soldiers were native-born to East Timor, including soldiers from the 744 
Battalion and the local military district command. I was disturbed by this situation and 
I was thinking hard to find the best way to curb their emotional outburst. I strongly 
condemned their anarchic actions, but I understood their anger. These were soldiers 
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who had risked everything they had and when they were defeated they felt their 
sacrifice had been made in vain by the ‘shortcut’ policy of President Habibie; they had 
to leave their houses, livestock and other painstakingly obtained belongings, setting 
aside their small salaries. Disappointment and emotional shocks were unavoidable and 
should be understood as human.201 
Robinson detailed some of the atrocities in detail district by district. 
The principal crimes committed in East Timor in 1999 included extra-judicial killing, 
torture and ill-treatment, sexual violence, forcible transfer of population, and 
destruction of property. These acts infringed a wide range of fundamental human rights 
recognized in international law, including the right to life, the right to personal 
security, the right to physical integrity, freedom of thought, freedom of association, and 
the right to own or hold property.202 
Section 2: The pebble creates ripples 
On 6 September, Australian Prime Minister Howard sought a U.S. military commitment to an 
international peacekeeping force. This was declined by President Clinton, citing existing military 
commitments in the Balkans. Henry quotes Howard as saying: it really brought home to me how 
much of a peace dividend they had taken out of the end of the Cold War…we all felt a bit sort of 
alone on it … it was a surprise when he said no to boots on the ground.203 
On 7 September Foreign Minister Downer was criticised by U.S. Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright when he publicly berated the U.S. for not supporting peace efforts in East Timor. This 
was further compounded by a comparison made by U.S. National Security Adviser Sandy Berger 
between the situation facing Australia in relation to East Timor, and his daughter’s messy 
bedroom. On 8 September President Clinton rang Prime Minister Howard and committed the 
symbolic support to the international peacekeeping force, which would be called the International 
Force for East Timor (INTERFET). This was announced at the APEC Meeting being held in 
Auckland New Zealand. The dynamics of this are a demonstration of real politik. 
APEC meeting and the United States 
The security situation broke down in the post-ballot period, due to a foreseeable flaw in the 
security agreement. Placing POLRI in charge of security, working against what the TNI clearly 
saw as the national interest of Indonesia, was a miscalculation by the framers of the Agreement 
201 Syanahkri in Blaxland, J. (ed) (2015). East Timor intervention: A Retrospective on INTERFET. 
Carlton, Victoria, Australia: Melbourne University Press, pp. 185–186. 
202 Robinson extensively documented the extent of the carnage and the damage: Please see Robinson, G, 
(2003) East Timor 1999: Crimes against Humanity: A Report Commissioned by the United Nations 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR): University of California Los Angeles, 
July 2003, Chapter 3. 
203 Henry, I (2013) Playing Second Fiddle on the Road to INTERFET: Australia’s East Timor Policy 
Throughout 1999.  https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/SC9-1Henry.pdf. p. 22. 
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under which the UN was deployed. At an APEC meeting in New Zealand, by 10 September 1999, 
the Australian government was able to convince regional powers, including the United States that 
some intervention was required.  International pressure, led by the U.S. was brought to bear upon 
the government of Indonesia to halt the violence and to acquiesce to calls for a peacekeeping 
force. 
The Indonesian government was reluctant to grant consent to what some prominent 
figures saw as an unwarranted interference in its domestic affairs. To break the 
deadlock, the U.S. threatened to veto the extension of World Bank loans to Indonesia 
unless it relented. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis (1997), the denial would 
have crippled the Indonesian economy. The Indonesian government yielded and 
consented to the deployment of the Australian-led INTERFET force.204 
As Maley stated in 2000: 
It is notable that the decision of the Indonesian Government, on 12 September 1999 to 
accept the deployment of INTERFET came immediately after the postponement of the 
visit to Indonesia of an International Monetary Fund (IMF) delegation. Had the 
deployment not been accepted, the rupiah would almost certainly have ‘melted down’ 
in the foreign exchanges when next they opened for trading.205 
 On 9 September, U.S. President Bill Clinton said: 
The Indonesian government and military are responsible for the safety of the East 
Timorese and of the UN mission there. If Indonesia does not end the violence, it must 
invite, it must invite the international community to assist in restoring security. It must 
allow international relief agencies to help people on the ground. It must move forward 
with a transition to independence. Having allowed the vote and gotten such a clear, 
unambiguous answer, we cannot have a reversal of course here. 
It would be a pity if the Indonesian recovery were crashed by this but, one way or the 
other, it will be crashed by this if they don't fix it. Because there will be overwhelming 
public sentiment to stop the international economic co-operation. But quite to the side 
of that, nobody is going to want to continue to invest there if they're allowing this sort 
of travesty to go on.206 
INTERFET 
This was an about turn by the United States, which had previously indicated lukewarm enthusiasm 
for involvement in East Timor. The Indonesian Government was faced with an unattractive 
proposition of an economic meltdown. Thus preparations began in earnest for the military 
deployment of INTERFET, which was to be Australian-led. As a result the deployment of 
204 Bellamy, A. (2009) Responsibility to Protect: The Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities. Polity Press 
Cambridge, p. 148. 
205 Maley, W. (2000) Australia and the East Timor Crisis: Some Critical Comments, Australian Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 54, No. 2, 2000, Footnote 4, p. 58. 
206 Clinton tells Indonesia: stop the killing or become pariah. Independent 9 September 
1999.http://www.independent.co.uk/news/clinton-tells-indonesia-stop-the-killing-or-become-pariah-
1117450.html 
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INTERFET was unopposed. In fact an amicable agreement between the commanders of the 
Australian and Indonesian forces was reached, which minimised any prospect of violence 
breaking out. On 16 September 1999 the Indonesian government formally requested the 
Australian-led, multinational force INTERFET to take over responsibility for security in East 
Timor. Indonesian General Syanahkri stated: 
On 19 September Major General Peter Cosgrove, INTERFET Commander, arrived in 
Dili, accompanied by his deputy, Major General Sogkiti Jaggabatara from Thailand, 
as well as some of his staff. I greeted him at the airport and from there we toured the 
city of Dili, and then travelled to the Korem’s headquarters which was used also as the 
martial law headquarters. We discussed the situation in East Timor, as well as the 
technical plans of the INTERFET landing. In the afternoon, General Cosgrove and his 
entourage flew back to Darwin. I thought the day of his arrival was intended to assure 
the smooth landing process of INTERFET.207 
The Australian military commander of INTERFET, General Sir Peter Cosgrove, states: 
There was significant disenchantment between Australia and Indonesia in September 
1999, and no matter the reason or the validity of that disenchantment, it was very 
important for the future of our relationship that we worked very hard and keenly to 
focus on avoiding friction and exhibiting goodwill. The best place to do this was 
literally ‘from the ground up’-our Australian attaches started this during the 
evacuation operations out of East Timor earlier in September. 
‘General Kiki and I embarked on this process when we met in Dili for the first time. 
We met there virtually daily thereafter when I was being burnt in effigy in Jakarta, in 
Dili he and I would be discussing issues of local security and military de-confliction 
over coffee in a professional and amiable way.208 
Syanahkri continued in defence of Indonesian actions or inaction in the post ballot violence:  
Unfortunately, allegations of human rights violations against the TNI during the 
assignment in East Timor, particularly following the ballot of September 1999, have 
continued to this today. In our view, these allegations are very tendentious and unfair. 
It was true that during the process of public polling, especially after the results were 
announced on 4 September, there was widespread violence, but the reported number 
of casualties was exaggerated. We admit that there was a failure of security handling 
after the public polling, but this was due to unfair implementation conducted by 
UNAMET. So it was not fair if Indonesia should be said to be solely responsible for the 
violence that occurred in the post public polling. UNAMET must also carry some of 
the responsibility.209 
There are some commentators who regard UNAMET as a failure which required military 
intervention. While there is some merit in this if viewed through an exclusively military security 
lens, there are other more tangible and longer-term results for the ballot, as Hess (2015) observed: 
207 Syanahkri, in Blaxland, J. (ed) 2015, p. 188. 
208  Cosgrove quoted in Blaxland. (ed) 2015, p. 108. 
209  Syanahkri, in Blaxland, J (ed) (2015), p.189. 
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The cost for the East Timorese people was very high, in terms of post-ballot casualties, 
and it is they who should be the ultimate arbiters of whether the sacrifice involved in 
conducting the ballot was worth it or not.210 
Xanana Gusmao, who was such an instrumental influence in the political destiny of East Timor 
wrote: 
Our independence referendum was an uplifting event for our people that brought the 
promise of self-determination after many years of struggle. While we knew the wishes 
in the hearts of our people, we also knew best the situation on the ground in our country 
and the risks of a vote for independence. On 30 August the Timorese people came out 
to vote in a collective act of courage and determination. The referendum had a turnout 
rate of 98.6 per cent and 78.5 per cent voted for independence. The Timorese people 
had achieved what so many had told us was no more than a dream. 
Today, the referendum stands and testament to the bravery and dignity of our people. 
We knew that a vote for independence would provoke vengeance and retaliation. After 
the result was announced on 4 September, widespread violence broke out, spreading 
across our country. People were killed as a scorched-earth campaign of destruction 
was carried out, leaving most of our country in ruins. This was a bittersweet moment 
for our people as out joy turned to despair. Just as our dreams of freedom were 
becoming a reality we faced further brutality and fear. Our people were desperate. We 
were not certain if the international community would intervene with peacekeeping 
force, so desperately needed.211 
Australia blamed for rebellion in East Timor 
Despite the miscalculation by their own President, many Indonesians, including the 
TNI and their proxy groups, the militia, blamed Australia generally, and Prime 
Minister Howard specifically, for fomenting what they saw as rebellion in East Timor. 
One need only consider the initial approach by letter from Mr Howard to President 
Habibie, to realise that this is an erroneous viewpoint. Officially there appeared to be 
a difference of opinion between defence officials and foreign affairs officials. Defence 
appeared to be ambivalent about the East Timor issue, and Foreign Affairs appeared 
to hold an opinion which some commentators have attributed to the ‘pro-Jakarta 
Lobby’. 
It is important to stress here that, as Howard wrote to Habibie, East Timor’s continued 
incorporation into Indonesia was clearly Australia’s firm preference in late 1998 and early 
1999. Canberra remained convinced by the arguments that had shaped policy since 1975, 
reinforced by a growing concern that an independent East Timor would be economically 
unviable and politically unstable, and thus a liability to regional security for which Australia 
would have to take prime responsibility.212 
Whether this difference of opinion between the two major departments responsible for the 
Australia/Indonesia relationship on the one hand, and the security implications on the other, was 
known to AFP executives upon deployment is a moot point. The fact is that militia groups, under 
210  Hess, M, in Blaxland, J (ed) (2015), p. 67. 
211 Gusmao, in Blaxland (ed) 2015 pp. 258–259. 
212 White, H. (2008) The Road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian Strategic Decisions Concerning 
East Timor, December 1998-September 1999, p. 73. 
https://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol4no1White.pdf 
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the auspices of the Indonesian military were becoming increasingly active in the province, and 
that some in the Australian intelligence community knew of this fact. 
The AFP was deployed in lieu of an international military force because the Australian military 
was an unacceptable option to the Indonesians. An overwhelming percentage of the East Timorese 
population were registered to vote and they passed an emphatic expression of their own political 
will. This was an electoral success, and a powerful expression of a political will which many in 
the west take for granted. However, it was a security and diplomatic failure. According to White: 
Australia had four key policy objectives in relation to East Timor: 
• East Timor should remain part of Indonesia; 
• The relationship with Indonesia was more important to Australia than the future of 
East Timor, so that we should avoid outcomes which damaged or jeopardised that 
relationship; 
• The relationship with TNI was especially important, because of its expected role in 
Indonesia’s political future, so special care should be taken to protect that 
relationship. 
• We should avoid having to deploy a large Australian Defence Force (ADF) 
contingent to East Timor if at all possible.213 
White concluded: 
On the one hand, the Howard Government and its supporters see Australia having 
taken a morally principled decision to liberate East Timor, and managed a strategically 
adroit campaign to bring that about, so entitling Australia to claim a large share of the 
credit for East Timor’s independence. The Government’s detractors on the other hand 
argue that Canberra wilfully ignored the clear and growing threat of militia and TNI 
violence against the East Timorese in order to placate or appease Jakarta, and thus 
bears a heavy responsibility for the tragedies of September 1999. 214 
These assessments appear fair if viewed solely through an Australian Government policy prism. 
There are however, other aspects and perspectives that must be considered. Chief among them 
are the opinions of the East Timorese themselves, who resoundingly expressed their will in 
relation to their own political destiny in the second half of 1999. 
Peacekeeping and elections 
Elections have been at the centre of many peacekeeping operations. They can represent new 
beginnings for conflict-ridden countries, as they decide their political destinies, but in the process 
they can also create disruption and danger for the voting public. This was certainly the case in 
East Timor in 1999.  Peacekeepers can help to create an environment in which fair elections can 
213 White, H. (2008), pp. 74–75. 
214  White, H. (2008), p. 85. 
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take place, but elections by themselves will not solve all a country’s problems. They are the 
beginning of a process where societal consensus, rather than political direction, set the agenda. 
This is not always perfect but even an imperfect democracy is better than a future in which power 
comes through force. 
A group of 280 unarmed UN Civilian Police, which included 52 members of the AFP, played a 
significant role in creating the environment in which the East Timorese could make their own 
choice in their political destiny.215 
According to Xanana Gusmao: 
Freedom is not won easily … In 1999, 280 civilian police and 50 military liaison 
officers came to East Timor as the uniformed contingent of UNAMET (the United 
Nations Mission in East Timor) and provided the infrastructure support for the historic 
30 August poll to take place. The poll was organised and administered by the United 
Nations, supported by hundreds of UN volunteers from all corners of the globe… The 
important role of these UN staff has been largely overlooked, their presence being 
replaced by INTERFET military troops, brought in to restore civil order after the 
devastation caused by the militias. The violence, deaths and absolute destruction that 
followed the poll were tragic for a small nation, but without the presence of the 
UNAMET police and military advisers the poll may never have occurred… Unarmed 
and against great odds, they stood up to the militias, who used threats and physical 
attacks, to try and force them to leave East Timor and therefore prevent the poll 
happening. That the UN men and women stayed until the poll is an indication of their 
individual courage and commitment to the cause for freedom they were supporting.216 
The UNAMET Mission commenced what was to be an engagement with East Timor, later to be 
the independent nation of Timor Leste which lasted two decades. Commencing in 1999 with 
UNAMET, with an executive policing role under the auspices of the UN, with the UN 
Transitional Authority East Timor (UNTAET), the UN Mission in Support of East Timor 
(UNMISET), the UN Office in East Timor (UNOTIL), the UN Mission in East Timor (UNMIT), 
as well as with Operation Serene in 2006 and Operation Comity in 2008, plus the bilateral police 
training mission known as Timor Leste Police Development Program (TLTDP), AFP engagement 
with East Timor is scheduled to finish in mid-2018. 
Section 3: Transition – Past to present 
One of the primary drivers of policing and diplomacy is political prioritisation. This is dependent 
on political will. Despite the strict adherence to the separation of powers between government 
policy and police best practice, and the determination on the part of police to maintain this 
215 The 52 AFP members who deployed to UNAMET were awarded a Group Bravery Citation by the 
Governor General in 2001. A copy of this Citation is provided at Appendix C. Noteworthy is the mention 
of the ‘protection of the civilian population’ well before this was formally adopted by the UN as a 
thematic. 
216 Gusmao, X. (2001) quoted in Savage, D (2001) pp. i–ii. 
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separation, there are occasions where policy rather than law determines police actions. This was 
the case with East Timor, both with the initial AFP involvement as part of UNAMET and the 
resultant Australian-led international military engagement known as INTERFET. 
Both of these combined, created some serious foreign policy difficulties for Australian-
Indonesian relations, among them the raising of Australia as a ‘legitimate’ target in the eyes of al 
Qaeda, with Osama bin Laden stating that East Timor, as a part of the predominately Islamic 
nation of Indonesia, had been illegitimately excised via western and UN machinations, and was 
thus an attack on Islam. This despite the fact that as a legacy of its Portuguese colonial 
antecedents, East Timor was, and remains an overwhelmingly Catholic population, which was 
one of the factors underlying the problems between the Indonesian administration and the local 
people. There was truly a clash of cultures. 
Indonesia: Counter terrorism and the AFP liaison network 
This period coincided with the rise of militant Islam in the Middle East, Afghanistan and Iraq, 
and in other parts of the world including South East Asia, as former Mujahedeen fighters returned 
to their home countries from Jihad in Afghanistan, after defeating the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s. They regrouped in their home countries, including Indonesia, and became a threat both 
internally and externally, to the fledgling democracy, following the demise of the Suharto 
Government in 1998. 
The work undertaken by the AFP Liaison Officers based in Jakarta, in developing sound, 
productive and congenial relationships with members of the Indonesian National Police in the 
period following UNAMET and INTERFET in late 1999, was extraordinary, and serves as a 
demonstration of effective diplomacy par excellence. One influential commentator stated that this 
was ‘a police-led recovery’ of the relationship between Canberra and Jakarta. The police to police 
relationship between the AFP and INP endures, and has survived the political ebb and flow which 
occurs regularly at the political level over a number of contentious issues, ranging from asylum 
seekers, to live cattle exports and the execution of convicted drug dealers. 
Underwriting the effectiveness of this work was the recognition amongst police that their mutual 
interests were best served by cooperation and even collaboration in serving the law and 
community safety, despite adverse political discourse. It has been stated previously that unlike 
other foreign policy actors, foreign affairs officials or military institutions and individuals, police 
perform best when they cooperate rather than compete with their foreign counterparts. This will 
be discussed more fully in the following chapter. 
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The 911 attacks, Prime Minister Howard and the AFP close protection team 
The rise of militant political Islam manifested itself in its most dramatic way, with the attacks on 
the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon by hijacked civilian aircraft on 11 September 2001. 
The Australian Prime Minister was on an official visit to the United States at the time and was in 
Washington DC at the time of the attacks. In fact, he was giving a press briefing at the Willard 
Hotel, next to the White House when a plume of smoke became visible from the site where a 
plane flew into the Pentagon. 
Initial advice had been that an aircraft had collided with the World Trade Centre in New York 
City. News emerged that it was a hijacked commercial aircraft and a deliberate attack. As always 
Prime Minister Howard was accompanied by an AFP Close Personal Protection (CPP) team 
which, although it did not have any ability to perform actual security itself, was in close contact 
with the US Secret Service, which had primary jurisdiction for the protection of visiting 
dignitaries, including heads of government such as Prime Minister Howard. 
Alarm rose among the U.S. Secret Service and the AFP CPP Team when news of the second 
commercial aircraft which was deliberately flown into the World Trade Centre in New York City. 
Further information was received that another plane was still in the air and was headed for the 
White House. This was United Airlines flight 93, which was downed in a field in Pennsylvania, 
thanks to the brave efforts of the passengers aboard, who fought the hijackers, foiling their attempt 
to reach Washington DC, by forcing the aircraft down into a field. Upon hearing of the potential 
targeting of the White House, the close proximity of the Willard Hotel to the White House caused 
an immediate evacuation and relocation to an agreed location at the Australian Embassy where 
the party remained. 
The long flight home 
It should be noted that PM Howard was accompanied on this visit by his wife Jeanette and one of 
his sons, but that they were located in another part of Washington. Being reunited with his family 
was a priority for PM Howard and this was accomplished by both U.S. Secret Service and AFP 
CPP, much to the PM’s relief. Despite an option to depart immediately for Australia, PM Howard 
was determined to remain in Washington. The Australian government was offered the use of the 
Vice President’s Boeing 747 (Air Force Two), but Prime Minister Howard declined the offer, 
preferring to focus on the western coalition and any role Australia could play in supporting this 
coalition. 
The day following the attacks, on 12 September, PM Howard attended a church service and then 
attended a Joint Sitting of Congress, where he had originally been scheduled to provide an 
address. His attendance was acknowledged by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and 
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he received a standing ovation which lasted a full five minutes. Eventually, late on 12 September, 
PM Howard decided it was time to depart the United States for Australia. The offer of Air Force 
Two still stood and was accepted. Aside from US Air Force military aircraft, this flight direct 
from Washington DC to Hickham Air Force Base in Hawaii, was the only other aircraft flying 
across US air space. 
The Australian party aboard this aircraft consisted of about 14 people, including the AFP CPP 
Team and Team Leader. During the flight, unsurprisingly, several people had some difficulty 
sleeping and thus began wandering about the aircraft. Among these were the AFP CPP Team 
Leader and the Prime Minister. Naturally they fell into a conversation, where PM Howard 
foreshadowed some of the challenges faced by Australia within the western alliance, and sought 
advice from the AFP CPP Team Leader about what role the AFP could play in this, and what 
resources it would require.   
Prime Minister Howard and the 911 attacks 
This experience gave PM Howard an early and graphic first-hand perspective of the new security 
threats which faced the social cohesion and prosperity western world. This included the value of 
a well-resourced and supported intelligence and policing framework and the role it can play as a 
major part in countering and mitigating these threats. The following year, on 12 June 2002, Prime 
Minister Howard returned to the United States, and addressed a Joint Sitting of the U.S. Congress. 
In this address, he stated: 
The ANZUS Treaty of 1951 pledged each country to come to the aid of the other if it 
were under attack. And so it was that in a US Airforce plane made available for my 
return to Australia on 12 September and high above the Pacific that I informed the US 
Ambassador Tom Schieffer travelling with me our intention was that, for the first time 
in its fifty year history, Australia would invoke the ANZUS Treaty. America was under 
attack. Australia was immediately there to help.217 
Hence Australia’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. He also spoke of Australian involvement 
in East Timor by stating: ‘Australia is proud of its leadership role in East Timor in gaining for a 
people so long oppressed the freedom and democracy available to our own citizens’, which as has 
been mentioned, caused a significant degree of political difficulty between Canberra and Jakarta. 
East Timor and global jihad 
The AFP was instrumental in the East Timor situation in 1999 and onwards in various capacities 
for almost two decades. The AFP became involved in assisting with the Iraq effort by providing 
217 Transcript of the Prime Minister the Hon. John Howard MP Address to Joint Meeting of the U.S. 
Congress 12 June 2002. https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-12906 
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police trainers to a U.S.-led facility in Jordan. The AFP also became involved in the troubled 
nation in Afghanistan between 2007 and 2014. 
The 911 attacks changed the world and in particular, the demeanour of the United States, and 
resulted in military interventions in other parts of the world, including Afghanistan, which also 
resulted in Australian Defence Force and later AFP members being deployed to that country 
between 2007 and 2013. As will be discussed in the next chapter, Australia was to experience 
Islamic terrorism very close to its shores in 2002 when several bombs were detonated on the 
Indonesian island of Bali. It was this situation that built upon the police to police relationship 
between the AFP and the Indonesian National Police. This was to prove to be extremely 
significant for later regional police engagement. This was the environment in which Australia, 
and the AFP entered the Third Millennium which will be discussed in the following chapter. 
Is this diplomacy by default? 
The period spanning the millennium from the UNAMET and INTERFET deployments, involving 
Australia, Indonesia and the people of East Timor, to the September 11attacks which caused 
Prime Minister Howard to invoke the ANZUS Treaty, was a watershed period for the AFP, and 
created a seismic shift in the way in which it was perceived by the Australian Government of the 
day. All of Meyers’ diplomatic qualities of ‘a quick mind, a hard head, a strong stomach, a 
warm smile and a cold eye’, were applied to various degree by the AFP and its members 
throughout this period. With the best of intentions, AFP regional engagement in a UN mission, 
ignited a situation which involved regional and global dynamics, which sparked the deployment 
of AFP members in response to a mass casualty event, killing over 200 people including 88 
Australians. Coupled with the U.S., Australia, and the AFP was thrust into the world of global 
violent extremism. A silver lining to arise from this, was the enhanced relationship between the 
AFP and the Indonesian National Police, in common endeavours such as narcotics trafficking, 
people smuggling and counter-terrorism efforts. This provided the impetus for further expansion 
of AFP networks throughout the South East Asian region, in furtherance of addressing 
transnational criminal activity, which in itself, supports the assertion that the AFP, as an 
international actor, is achieving practical ‘diplomacy by default’. 
This is further reinforced when one considers the fact that it was the efforts of 52 unarmed AFP 
members alongside their international police counterparts, which created a security presence, of 
such sufficiency, to provide the people of East Timor the opportunity to register and vote in large 
numbers, and in such a way as to pave the way for their ultimate independence from Indonesia. 
This involved all of the qualities listed by Copeland and Meyer, all of the activities, 
communication and negotiation, as well as representation and the replication of international 
society listed by Jonsson and Hall, and was a form of vertical and horizontal relationships on the 
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ground in accordance with the views advanced by Slaughter. There is arguably no higher claim 
to international diplomacy than active participation in the creation of a new nation. It is submitted 
that the East Timor deployments alone justifies the assertion that the AFP and its members are 
‘Diplomats by Default’. 
Summary and conclusion 
When Prime Minister Howard sent his letter to Indonesian President Habibie in December 1998, 
it set in motion a series of decisions and events over which Australia had no control. The result 
was a hastily created UN-sponsored ballot process, with a severely flawed security agreement. 
The AFP was called upon in lieu of the ADF, which was deemed as unacceptable by the 
Indonesian Government. The UNAMET mission has been viewed as a failure due to the post-
ballot violence which erupted as a consequence of the ballot result. This resulted in an emphatic 
statement by U.S. President Clinton, which in no uncertain terms, informed the Indonesian 
Government that the consequences of a failure to halt the violence would be severe. This allowed 
a relatively permissive, non-contested environment for the Australian-led military intervention, 
known as INTERFET, to deploy and restore stability. The impact of both UNAMET and 
INTERFET emboldened Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda to regard Australia as a ‘crusader’ nation, 
and its citizens and interests to therefore be legitimate targets for violent action. This was not to 
manifest itself until 2002, when bombs exploded in Bali killing over 200 people including 88 
Australians. Between the East Timor interventions in 1999, and the Bali bombings in 2002, al 
Qaeda attacked New York and Washington killing over 3000 people. This resulted in U.S. 
President Bush, putting all nations on notice, that unless they were with the United States, they 
were against it and with the terrorists. Coming so close on the heels of President Clinton’s warning 
to Indonesia, the Indonesian Government had a decision to make. Fortunately it decided to side 
with the U.S. which paved the way for an enhancement of the AFP-INP relationship. This 
relationship was to be given further impetus in the immediate aftermath of the Bali bombing in 
2002 and the response to the 2004 Boxing Day Tsunami. It is a relationship which endures to this 
day and in fact it was Indonesian sponsorship which allowed Australia to be a dialogue partner in 
ASEANAPOL in 2007. 
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Chapter 4: The ‘Arc of Instability’ in the Face of Global 
Challenges 
Overview 
The concept of an ‘Arc of Instability’ to Australia’s north, has its roots in the perspective that 
Australia’s main strategic priorities lie in its immediate neighbourhood. The way in which 
disrupted, unstable, or fragile Pacific states, pose a risk to Australia, particularly if they fall under 
influences inimical to Australia’s interests, or those of the broader western alliance is discussed. 
Such threats need not necessarily be foreign powers, using military force, but can take the form 
of malign-non-state actors such as organised crime groups, or violent extremists, unduly or 
unlawfully imposing their will, to the detriment and peace of the communities concerned. 
The underlying challenges need not be external, or visible but can often be internal and largely 
unseen, in the form of political corruption and social breakdown, creating an erosion of host-
nation institutional trust, to the extent that international intervention is required. A number of 
these nations in Australia’s neighbourhood are recipients of Australian foreign aid funding. 
History shows that the expectation in this region, is that it is Australia which will shoulder the 
burden of such interventions. There is an economic cost associated with such interventions, and 
the Australian taxpayer should quite justifiably expect that Australian taxes, so allocated, are 
being spent wisely and appropriately. 
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Figure 6. Map of South East Asia 
Source: Mapsworld.com 
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Section 1: Indonesia 
On 20 September 2001, nine days after the attacks on New York and Washington, on 11 
September 2001, US President Bush delivered an address to a Joint Session of Congress, and the 
American People, at the United States Capitol in Washington. He stated that the U.S. was: 
…a country awakened to danger and called to defend freedom.  Our grief has turned 
to anger, and anger to resolution.  Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring 
justice to our enemies, justice will be done. 
Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  It will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated…We will 
direct every resource at our command-every means of diplomacy, every tool of 
intelligence, every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence, and every 
necessary weapon of war- to the disruption and to the defeat of the global terror 
network. 
Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or 
you are with the terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor 
or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime.218 
Following so briefly after US President Clinton threatened to melt down the Indonesian economy, 
if the Indonesian Government failed to allow an international peacekeeping force into East Timor 
in late September 1999, the intent behind President Bush’s words, and the ability to deliver on 
them, would not have been lost on the Indonesian Government. This softened the ground for 
improved AFP-INP relationships. 
As discussed earlier, Australian governance evolved from an entirely different historical and 
cultural base from the majority of its neighbours in the region. It is difficult to think of an example, 
where such differences exist between neighbours, than those which exist between the 
Commonwealth of Australia and the Republic of Indonesia. There is no common language, 
culture, history, or ethnicity. There has been on occasion, a fractious diplomatic relationship, 
influenced largely by politics, and a degree of mutual distrust and misunderstanding. A series of 
events in which police to police relationships, based on mutual respect, and a shared responsibility 
to cooperate, in the face of a growing Islamist threat in the region, played a significant role in 
improving the government to government relationship, through the police. 
Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim majority country, with an island chain extending from 
Aceh, which has a sea border with the Indian Nicobar and Andaman Islands, to Papua New 
Guinea, with which it shares a land border. Indonesia also has a land border with the Malaysian 
states of Sabah and Sarawak on the island of Borneo, and common archipelagic concerns with 
the southern Philippines. It is the most populous country in South East Asia, and controls the sea-
218 President George, W. Bush, 2001, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 
September 20, 2001. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-
8.html 
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lanes, through which the bulk of Australian trade and commerce transits, to markets deeper into 
Asia, and through which much of Australia’s imports, including oil, travel. Indonesia is a 
founding member of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), formed in 1967, as 
a bulwark to the southern expansion of communism at the height of the Cold War. It is a highly 
influential, and strategically placed nation, which links Asia to the Pacific. 
The health of the Australian-Indonesian relationship is of very high significance to Australian 
interests. As discussed in the section relating to East Timor, there has been strong bi-partisan 
political support for this relationship, as well as support by those in academic and senior levels of 
the public sector, referred to colloquially as the ‘Jakarta Lobby’. Despite some political 
differences both permanent and short-term, the AFP has managed to establish, nurture, and 
maintain, a close and effective working relationship, with its Indonesian counterpart organisation, 
the Indonesian National Police (INP). The result has been to the betterment of each other’s 
respective communities, and to the broader improvement of government to government relations 
generally. This relationship is a good example of cooperation in the face of common threats. 
The relationship between the AFP and INP 
The Indonesian National Police (INP) is sometimes referred to as the Police of the Republic of 
Indonesia (POLRI). The AFP and INP have a formal relationship which pre-dates the events in 
East Timor in 1999. On 5 August 1997, the AFP and INP, signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding, concerning law enforcement issues of mutual concern. At this signing an address 
by INP National Police Chief General Dibyo Widodo stated prophetically: ‘…we have to be 
prepared to anticipate the type of crime that is likely to happen or else we’ll be left behind to do 
too little too late.’219 
At that time, Indonesian President Suharto, was still in power, and the police were still part of the 
Indonesian military. Although the police had operated as an autonomous agency in the immediate 
post-independence period in 1945, they were integrated into the military during the 1960s. As a 
result, the capacity of the national police suffered as a result of its militarisation, where its 
responsibilities were limited to lower level crime and providing support to military-led internal 
security operations.220 
The Suharto years featured an authoritarian approach, and when he stepped down in 1998, there 
were calls for democratisation and security sector reform, including reform of the police, by 
219 AFP (1997). Platypus Magazine No. 57, 1997, p. 5. 
220 Connery, D. Sambhi, N. and McKenzie, M. (2014) A return on investment: The future of police 
cooperation between Australia and Indonesia. Australian Strategic Policy Institute, p. 2. 
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/return-investment-future-police-cooperation-between-australia-and-
indonesia 
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separating it from its military structure. POLRI was formally separated from the military in April 
1999, just before UNAMET deployed, which goes some way to explain some of the security 
issues experienced by the UNAMET mission in East Timor in 1999. The Indonesian Police lacked 
capacity and experience, and were simply outgunned by the Indonesian military and their militia 
proxies. The 2002 bombings in Bali, created an environment in which close cooperation between 
police, from all over the world, including Australia, despite their different cultural backgrounds, 
worked effectively in the pursuit of justice. This was a glimpse into the future potential for 
international police cooperation, where there is more which unites police than divides them. 
UNAMET, INTERFET and the connection with global Jihad: 1999–2002 
The previous chapter outlined the relationship difficulties created by the involvement of the UN 
in East Timor in 1999 in which significant numbers of AFP were engaged. One of the resulting 
global aspects of this intervention, particularly the Australian-led military intervention 
INTERFET, was the listing of Australia by Osama bin Laden, the leader of the emerging Islamic 
jihadist organisation al Qaeda, as a legitimate target. On 3 November 2001 the Qatar-based media 
network Al-Jazeera, broadcast a statement by bin Laden, which specifically identified Australians 
as ‘crusaders’. The British Broadcasting Corporation quoted him as follows: 
Let us examine the stand of the West and the United Nations in the developments in 
Indonesia when they moved to divide the largest country in the Islamic world in terms 
of population. This criminal, Kofi Annan, was speaking publicly and putting pressure 
on the Indonesian government, telling it: You have 24 hours to divide and separate 
East Timor from Indonesia. 
Otherwise, we will be forced to send in military forces to separate it by force. The 
crusader Australian forces were on Indonesian shores, and in fact they landed to 
separate East Timor, which is part of the Islamic world. Therefore, we should view 
events not as separate links, but as links in a long series of conspiracies, a war of 
annihilation in the true sense of the word.221 
The fact that he was factually incorrect, mattered little to those in Indonesia, who were eager to 
hear his message. He was incorrect in stating that East Timor was Islamic, when in fact, as has 
been discussed, it was a predominantly Catholic province, which was one of primary drivers 
behind its desire for independence from Muslim dominated Indonesia. He was also incorrect in 
stating that it was the UN Secretary General who directed Indonesia to separate itself from East 
Timor. In fact the dynamics were far more complex than this simple statement, but this was the 
message received by those in Indonesia, who were radicalising and who were not interested in 
the polemics of nuanced arguments. In October 2002, a network of these radicalised individuals 
221 BBC (2001) Bin Laden rails against Crusaders and UN (3 November 2001) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media_reports/1636782.stm 
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set large bombs on the largely Hindu island of Bali, where western tourists, including Australians, 
holiday in large numbers. 
Three explosions occurred on 12 October 2002, detonated by Islamic extremists known as Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI). The bombs killed 202 people including 88 Australians. The response from 
Australia was immediate, and included significant numbers of AFP members. This was aided by 
the fact that a relationship had already developed between AFP Commissioner Mick Keelty and 
General Dai Bachtiar, the Chief of the Indonesian National Police Chief from 2001 to 2005. This 
relationship had been developed by effective liaison work by the AFP Liaison Officer in Jakarta 
immediately following the East Timor intervention. In this capacity, he managed to overcome 
some of the political static, and natural reluctance to engage, and arranged a meeting between the 
two police chiefs, which developed into an enduring friendship. 
The personal relationship between Commissioner Keelty and Indonesian National Police 
representatives was long-standing, in particular the relationship with the INP commander in 
charge of the Bali bombing investigation, who had attended an AFP Management of Serious 
Crime (MOSC) course in Canberra in 1993. As McFarlane stated: 
The benefit of solid professional and personal friendships formed during the MOSC 
programs was clearly demonstrated in the aftermath of the first Bali bombing in 2002. 
The Indonesian police commander in charge of that investigation, Inspector General 
Drs I Madi Pastika, was a graduate of MOSC-5 in 1993, at which time one of his closest 
colleagues was Mick Keelty.222 
This is an example of effective police diplomacy at the senior level, which originated at the middle 
management level. In a reflection of the true nature of the combined efforts of AFP, INP and 
many others, the response to the Bali bombing in 2002 was named Operation Alliance. The AFP 
deployed specialist teams of investigators, intelligence analysts, bomb experts, post-blast 
analysts, search and rescue, forensic specialists, Disaster Victim Identification specialists, crime 
scene analysts and many others within a very short timeframe. They developed their own 
relationships, both professional and personal. 
Islamic extremism in Indonesia 
Due to its enormous diversity, both geographic and cultural, the Republic of Indonesia has 
experienced a number of separatist insurgencies, seeking greater autonomy, or even complete 
separation from the Jakarta-centred government, East Timor being arguably the most prominent 
example. Others include, Aceh and Irian Jaya at opposite ends of the Indonesian archipelago, with 
entirely different dynamics. These have been predominantly geographic in nature, as remote and 
discrete areas sought to move away from central control from Jakarta. Although not unknown in 
222 McFarlane, J. (2007). The Thin Blue Line: The Strategic Role of the Australian Federal Police. 
Security Challenges Volume 3 Number 3 (August 2007). 
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the post-1945 period, internal terrorism, based on ideology or religion, was not widely 
experienced. The post-Suharto era, where the authoritarian approach to internal security was 
effectively used to suppressed such activity, was relaxed, witnessed an increase in internal, 
ideologically-based, primarily Islamic, violence, as  attacks and bombings against shopping 
centres and churches were perpetrated as expressions of anti-Christian and, later anti-Western 
sentiment.223 
The Australian Government National Security website states that the most notorious Islamic 
jihadist group in Indonesia is a Salafist group known as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which is inspired 
by the same ideology as al Qaeda. JI was formed in Malaysia on 1 January 1993, by radical 
Islamist clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, and regards regional governments as 
illegitimate, including the Indonesian Government. It seeks to revive and install a ‘pure’ form of 
Islam, in an Islamic Caliphate, governed by the tenets of Sharia (Islamic law), across the region 
by force. This region includes Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, southern Thailand and the 
southern Philippines, namely the original members of ASEAN. 
It was members of JI who perpetrated the bombings in Bali in 2002 and 2005, as well as a 
campaign in Jakarta, with two bombings of the J.W. Marriot Hotel in 2003 and 2009, the 
Australian Embassy in 2004, and the Ritz-Carlton in 2009. JI has a network of about 50 religiously 
affiliated boarding schools (pesantren) which continually works to inculcate future generations 
of Indonesian youths in this extreme form of Islam ... The current membership is estimated to 
range between 900 and several thousand active members. Incarceration of JI members does not 
disincentive them, rather prisons … provide a further avenue for recruitment, as some JI members 
proselytise to fellow prisoners and visitors in efforts to recruit members. 224 
JI remains connected to other radical Islamist organisations in the region, including Abu Sayef 
and the Moro Liberation front (MILF) in the southern Philippines, as well as radical organisations 
in the Middle East including al Qaeda. A number of JI members have travelled to Syria and Iraq 
under the auspices of Hilal Ahmar Society Indonesia (HASI), where they have formed affiliations 
with other extremist networks in the region. The seizure and siege in Malawi on Mindanao in the 
southern Philippines in 2017, and the resultant violence inspired by Islamic extremism, is an 
example of how potent this regional threat is. 
The Australian Government first proscribed JI as a terrorist organisation on 27 October 2002, 
relisted on 1 September 2004, 26 August 2006, 9 August 2008, 22 July 2010 and 12 July 2013. It 
remains a proscribed organisation by the Governments of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, 
Britain and the United States. JI co-founder Abu Bakar Bashir, the Indonesian Islamic cleric who 
223 Connery and Sambhi (2014), p. 4. 
224 Australian National Security website. 
https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/JemaahIslamiyahJI.aspx 
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was charged and imprisoned for orchestrating the Bali bombings, as well as other bombings in 
Indonesia, directed against the Indonesian Government of Megawati Sukarnoputri. Six days after 
the bombings in Bali, he preached anti-western sentiments to the assembled media for the benefit 
of his followers in the mosque at Solo in Central Java: 
We reject all of your beliefs, we reject all of your ideologies, we reject all of your 
teachings on social issues, economics or beliefs. Between you and us there will forever 
be a ravine of hate and we will be enemies until you follow God's law.225 
The Bali bombing – 2002 
This vitriolic hatred manifested itself with three explosions on 12 October 2002, deliberately 
targeting western holiday makers. The first bomb exploded at a bar called Paddy’s Bar and was 
estimated to have involved between 500g and 1kg of TNT, and was placed in the bar by a 
suspected suicide bomber. Later crime scene examination revealed pieces of metal intended as 
shrapnel.  Shortly after the explosion at Paddy’s Bar, a much larger device was detonated in a van 
parked outside another bar, the Sari Club. It was estimated that there were more than 350 people 
in that location when the bomb went off. 
The force of the blast was strong enough to register on Indonesian seismic instruments. 
It is estimated that this was a lower velocity, high explosive bomb with an effective 
weight of between 50 and 150kg. It consisted of potassium chlorate, sulphur and 
aluminium, was placed in a van outside the club, and was possibly remote detonated 
by mobile phone.226 
A third bomb, estimated to involve between 500g and 1 kg of TNT, was detonated approximately 
45 seconds later, close to the U.S. Consulate, about 10 km from the Sari Club and Paddy’s Bar. 
It was believed to have been detonated remotely by mobile phone. 
The bombings were reported by Federal Agent Paul McEwan, who was in Bali at the time, and immediately 
contacted the AFP in Canberra and reported as follows: 
He described seeing burning buildings, burning motor vehicles with occupants still 
inside and a relatively large crater in the street outside the Sari Club. He reported 
chaos, with people running from the scene and emergency services attempting to 
extinguish fires. He also advised that Paddy’s Bar and the Sari Club were known to be 
frequented by Australian and other foreign tourists and that, because of the extent of 
the damage he could see, Australian casualties were likely to be significant.227 
The AFP had renewed its focus on terrorism in the post-911 period, and was therefore in a position 
to provide specialist and technical assistance very rapidly upon the request from Indonesia. This 
225 Neighbour, S. (2005). In the Shadow of Swords: On the Trail of Terrorism from Afghanistan to 
Australia. Harper Collins Publishers, Australia, p. 2. 
226 Australian Federal Police (2002) Paradise Lost-Terror on our Doorstep,  Commissioner Keelty. AFP 
Platypus Magazine No 77 December 2002. 
227 Australian Federal Police (2002) Paradise Lost-Terror on our Doorstep Commissioner Keelty. AFP 
Platypus Magazine No 77 December 2002, p. 4. 
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included investigative, administrative and forensic staff to assist the Indonesian National Police. 
The AFP contribution was part of a DFAT–led response which also involved members from other 
agencies and departments such as ASIO and the Australian Protective Service. 
Eventually the range of Commonwealth Government agencies and departments was to involve: 
Prime Minister and Cabinet, Defence, the Australian Defence Force, Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
Australian Federal Police, Australian Protective Service, Immigration, Customs, Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation, Health, Family and Community Services, Centrelink, 
Parliament House, Transport and regional Services, Emergency Management Australia, Treasury, 
Finance and AusAID. The speed of the Australian response is an example of what can be achieved 
if consideration has been given to contingency planning and preparation. 
Within 24 hours: 20 government officials, nine DFAT and 14 AFP staff from Canberra 
and Jakarta on the ground in Bali. Operation headed by the Australian Embassy’s 
Deputy Head of Mission from Jakarta. Staff placed at Denpasar International Airport 
to facilitate departure of Australians and arrival of victim’s relatives.228 
By the fourth day, 80 staff comprising pathologists, odontologists, radiologists, 
forensic experts and police were working on the case.229 
These members enmeshed with the Indonesian National Police and other international police, and 
pursued a joint investigation to identify the perpetrators and bring them to justice. This was made 
much easier by the fact that for many years, the AFP and INP had been conducting joint 
investigations and had shared intelligence in relation to criminal activities, such as drug 
trafficking, money laundering, fraud, child sex tourism and people smuggling. It is through this 
sort of collaboration that personal and professional relationships, based on trust and mutual 
respect developed, and which formed the basis for Operation Alliance. 
This cooperation and collaboration was not confined to AFP and INP as each Australian State 
and Territory provided personnel and resources. International investigators and specialists from 
the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, the German Federal Police, the London Metropolitan 
Police Anti-Terrorist Branch, the New Zealand Police, and police from Japan, France, South 
Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Sweden, also provided part of this international response. All of 
this took place in the sovereign nation of Indonesia, where international police, including the AFP 
had no legal sovereignty. A Background Paper by ASPI in 2014 provides an explanation of how 
this was short-circuited by the Indonesian Government. A joint operations agreement was 
formalised between both governments on 18 October which outlined the command arrangements 
and formalised the basis upon which Australian and later international participation was based 
228 Australian Federal Police (2002) Paradise Lost-Terror on our Doorstep Commissioner Keelty. AFP 
Platypus Magazine No 77 December 2002, p. 4. 
229 Australian Federal Police (2003) Building Success of Professionalism Commissioner Mick Keelty 
Platypus Magazine No 78 March 2003, Operation Alliance, Bali, p. 14. 
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under Operation Alliance. This streamlined much of the administrative and bureaucratic 
requirements to enable a whole of government and inter-agency approach to this incident. 
While the Indonesian police, led by Brigadier General (Police) I Made Mangku Pastika, took the 
lead in the investigation, POLRI gave AFP unprecedented access to the crime scene and witnesses 
from the very beginning, and shared the task of analysing evidence in an open way. General 
Pastika worked closely with the lead AFP officer, Assistant Commissioner Graham Ashton, who 
said at the time: 
The dimension of the incident was such that a lot of the normal red tape-visa, 
quarantine clearances-were waived for us and that was an immediate sign from the 
Indonesian Government of their view of the importance of this issue. Since then, things 
have been fast-tracked-and continue to be fast-tracked. There is a whole-of-
government approach to this and officials are co-operating elsewhere at a very high 
level.230 
Arrest of Amrozi 
Examination of the chassis of the van used to bomb the Sari Club, revealed a chassis number. The 
original had been filed off, but in Bali a second number was required. It was this number which 
revealed that the van had been purchased by an individual named Amrozi, who was identified and 
arrested by INP. Upon questioning, Amrozi admitted that he had purchased the van and chemicals 
used to make the explosives, and had attended meetings where the bombings were discussed and 
planned. He also identified his accomplices as Samudra, Idris and Dulmatin. 
Disaster victim identification 
While the identification, arrest and interview of Amrozi was taking place, an extensive and 
painstaking Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) process was also occurring. DVI processes must 
comply with internationally recognised protocols, and a high degree of certainty is required before 
the remains of victims can be released to their relatives. The DVI process aims to accurately 
identify each victim by comparing and matching data available prior to death with post-mortem 
remains. This is done via a phased approach: 
The first phase involves collecting ante-mortem information such as physical 
descriptions, photographs of possible clothing and jewellery, fingerprints and DNA 
samples. The second, or post-mortem information collection phase, involves detailed 
examination by pathologists, odontologists, radiologists, forensic experts and police of 
the victim’s remains. The third and final phase is the reconciliation of the collected 
information. 
230 Ashton quoted in Connery and Sambhi (2014). 
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It is only through this process that certainty of identification can be guaranteed. This 
certainty is needed not only for the victim’s families’ peace of mind but also for other 
legal processes and procedures that follow death.231 
Domestic response – Immediate 
The AFP has had a presence at designated Australian international airports, and in each mainland 
capital city since 1979. At each state and territory headquarters, Darwin, Brisbane, Sydney, 
Melbourne, Adelaide and Perth, the AFP established Major Incident Rooms (MIRs), with direct 
connectivity to the National Incident Co-ordination Centre in Canberra. The MIR’s and the 
existence of AFP members at Australian international airports was a vital link between an 
international mass casualty event, and its domestic implications, and sped up the flow of 
information and evidence. 
Thus, arrangements were already in place for the reception and evidence collection from returning 
victims. As the then General Manager Counter Terrorism, Assistant Commissioner Ben 
McDevitt, stated: ‘We needed to be able to capture whatever information those people had. We 
also needed to gather any forensic evidence they might actually be wearing, including residue 
from the explosives. 232 The efficacy of a national policing body, with representation in all 
mainland capitals and all international airports was a major factor in securing information and 
evidence, as by 0230 on 13 October, the first commercial charter flights began arriving at 
Australian airports, where passengers were interviewed, statements taken and physical evidence 
was collected. This resulted in statements being taken from passengers from 19 flights, over a 
two week period, and the collation of information from 7340 passenger questionnaires, which led 
to 450 relevant leads.233 
Why police? 
This response involved a great deal of contemporaneous activity, including the immediate 
response, forensic analysis, DVI, and follow up investigation. The incident involved a large 
number of victims from a wide range of countries.  
Of the 202 people who died there were 88 Australians; two Brazilians; 22 British; two 
Canadians; three Danes; four Dutch; one Ecuadorian; four French; six Germans; one 
Greek; 38 Indonesians; four French; two Japanese; three New Zealanders; one Pole; 
231 Australian Federal Police (2003) Building Success of Professionalism Commissioner Mick Keelty 
Platypus Magazine No 78 March 2003, Operation Alliance, Bali, p. 14. 
232 McDevitt in Australian Federal Police (2003) Building Success of Professionalism Platypus Magazine 
No 78 March 2003, Operation Alliance, Bali, p. 6. 
233 Australian Federal Police (2003) Building Success of Professionalism Platypus Magazine No 78 
March 2003, Operation Alliance, Bali, p. 6. 
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one Portuguese; two South Africans; two South Koreans; five Swedes; three Swiss; one 
Taiwanese; seven Americans and…three unidentified bodies.234 
The investigation was conducted in accordance with internationally accepted standards, at the 
actual crime scene and the follow-up co-ordination at Australian international airports, was 
greatly enhanced by the fact that the AFP was positioned nationally, and was thus prepared for 
such a contingency. 
The existing relationship with INP and the coordination with a range of other police agencies, 
both on the ground at the crime scenes in Bali and in Australia, with all State and Territory police, 
as well as other stakeholders, provides an example of professional operational policing as an 
effective form of international diplomacy, with a direct link to the lives of ordinary citizens. It is 
this aspect of linking into the community, at the individual level, which is prominent among the 
features that distinguishes professional policing in terms of effective diplomacy. This is not an 
aspect of normal duties shared by other traditional international actors. 
Police worldwide share certain features, which make them uniquely placed in terms of linking 
many aspects of contemporary affairs. They include, well-established relationships with the 
communities they serve, the authority to question, search, arrest suspects and seize material, well-
established accountability measures, and the legal authority to use force if required, to enforce 
the extant law. There is thus an implicit understanding shared by all police officers worldwide, 
and an ability to cooperate, communicate and collaborate, particularly in times of crisis. 
International policing 
The bombing in Bali in October 2002, and the resultant Operation Alliance, were significant 
milestones in the evolution of the AFP as an international police agency. The credibility gained 
from such a rapid and comprehensive response, and the enhanced relationship with the Indonesian 
National Police, provided a foundation upon which a solid relationship continues to prosper. The 
respect for the 88 Australians killed in Bali on that night, is reflected in the fact that the INP 
named their special operations police unit, responsible for counter-terrorism activities, 
‘Detachment 88’. The AFP responded along three primary lines of effort. The first was the 
immediate response to the incident. 
The first priority was to deal with the incident, which as discussed, was made much easier by the 
existence of personal relationships and mutual respect based on professionalism. The heightened 
sense of security resulting from the 911 attacks in the United States, and the Bali bombing in 
2002, plus others which were to follow uncovered a number of home grown plots in Australia. 
The second was to further nurture the important relationship between the INP and the AFP, which 
234 Australian Federal Police (2003) Building Success of Professionalism Platypus Magazine No 78 
March 2003, Operation Alliance, Bali, p. 14. 
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despite the sometimes acrimonious political relationship, steers a steady course between mutually 
respected professional organisations. As AFP Commissioner Colvin stated in an address to the 
National Press Club in Canberra on 31 May 2017: 
Our relationship with the Indonesian National Police has for many years delivered 
outcomes that benefit both Australia and Indonesia’s interests. This has been a resilient 
and continuous relationship despite the sometimes rocky diplomatic tensions between 
the Governments. Even more importantly, it has often been the catalyst for the broader 
bi-lateral relationship to come back on track.235 
The third was to acknowledge that Australia indeed existed in a highly volatile region, and that 
in its national policing body, the AFP, it had an asset which was multi-faceted and highly 
professional. As a direct result, in 2004, two significant developments occurred. The first was the 
creation of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation, discussed immediately below, 
and the second was the International Deployment Group, discussed in another section of the 
thesis. This approach emphasises the significance of the combined effect of cooperative police to 
police relationships, and all that can derive from them, as well as a recognition that police 
interventions, can provide an effective mechanism, by which social cohesion in societies where 
there is a breakdown in trust, can be restored, thereby addressing one of the precursors to violence. 
Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC) 2004 
The AFP maintains an International Liaison Officer network in many locations of interest to 
Australian law enforcement. The largest of these posts is in Indonesia with approximately 30 AFP 
personnel located in the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, in Bali and at the Jakarta Centre for Law 
Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC), which is located within the Indonesian National Police 
Academy (AKPOL) in Semarang. It was established in November 2004 and is an initiative of both 
the Australian and Indonesian Governments, arising as a direct result of the Bali bombings. 
The trusted relationship between the AFP and INP has also provided entre into regional police 
fora such as the Association of South East Asian Nations police conferences (ASEANAPOL). 
This has provided direct access to a highly diverse group of policing agencies, in a region which 
is vital to Australia’s interests. This is one aspect of police diplomacy, involving close cooperation 
at the strategic and operational level, based on issues of mutual interest. 
Government and academic partners 
The long-term development goal of the JCLEC is to contribute to the enhancement of regional 
law enforcement capacity in managing multi-jurisdictional investigations. It is primarily an 
education and training institution, focussing on a cooperative relationship between Australian and 
235 Colvin, A. (2017). Address to the National Press Club 31 May 2017. https://www.afp.gov.au/news-
media/media-releases/commissioner-colvin%E2%80%99s-national-press-club-address 
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Indonesian police, as well as other regional police representatives, and is aimed at disrupting 
transnational crime and violent extremism is the Asia Pacific region. This includes: (1) 
professional law enforcement education; (2) exchange of information and intelligence; (3) 
international law enforcement education standards; (4) supremacy of the law. 
JCLEC maintains relationships with the governments of Indonesia, Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Denmark, US Dept State Diplomatic Security Service, UNODC, INTERPOL, and the 
Centre for International Legal Cooperation (CILC). Over 15,000 students from 69 countries have 
participated in over 600 training experiences at JCLEC since it opened its doors. The bulk of these 
students are from POLRI, but around 20% of places are reserved for participants from other 
countries. The Centre also engages with non-police law enforcement agencies, including those 
with border security, anticorruption and judicial responsibilities. 236 
The establishment of JCLEC also maintains close affiliations with universities and other training 
centres in Australia and Indonesia, including the Australian Institute of Police Management 
(AIPM), Charles Sturt University and Griffith University in Australia. It also includes Indonesia’s 
own police colleges, and Indonesian universities, including the University of Indonesia, Gajah 
Mada University and University of Diponegero. 
Another region in which Australia has had a long-term interest is the South West Pacific. 
However, the approach made by the AFP in this region, was totally different to that with Indonesia 
and South East Asia. The approach in this region was along the lines of police capacity 
development, commencing with a regional engagement in the troubled country to Australia’s 
north east, the Solomon Islands. This is another aspect of police diplomacy based on ‘boots on 
the ground’ involvement which will be discussed in the following section. 
  
236 Connery, D. Sambhi, N. and McKenzie, M. (2014) A return on investment: The future of police 
cooperation between Australia and Indonesia. Australian Strategic Policy Institute. 
https://www.aspi.org.au/report/return-investment-future-police-cooperation-between-australia-and-
indonesia, p. 8. 
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Section 2: The regional assistance mission to the Solomon Islands  
The intervention in East Timor, to Australia’s north-west, from 1999 has been discussed in the 
context of mixed success, due to circumstances at the very inception in late 1998 and early 1999, 
which were largely out of the hands of the Australian Government. The next major ‘boots on the 
ground’ policing intervention involving the AFP, was in the Solomon Islands, to Australia’s north 
east, commencing in 2003. It involved many lessons learned from the East Timor intervention in 
the preceding years. This was especially so in relation to a strong security posture, and maximum 
Australian Government control over the planning and implementation of the intervention. 
It was recognised by the Australian Government, that a preventive strategy in the greater Pacific 
was an approach which would benefit both the local communities by better policing, and Australia 
as a donor, by better relationships with more capable local police. According to Byrnes ‘Law and 
justice assistance became a foreign policy and development priority during the first decade of the 
2000s, against a strategic backdrop of state fragility in our region.237 
The result has been better police to police relationships between the AFP and host nation police 
in the Pacific, thus contributing to the AFP mandate of fighting, or at least deterring, crime off 
shore or at its source. From an operational policing perspective, the ultimate aim of such police 
interventions, should be for a strong, reliable trust based police to police relationship. This is 
different to the relationship police have with their own communities, which is their own form of 
social contract. From a community and host government perspective, the relationships between 
the host government and the community should ideally be trust-based and culturally appropriate. 
Hence, the Australian government made some considered decisions when deploying police in the 
troubled South West Pacific nation of the Solomon Islands. 
The first and largest police mission in the Pacific, was the Regional Assistance Mission in the 
Solomon Islands (RAMSI) which was established in 2003, despite some reticence by senior 
politicians and their departmental advisers. It was Prime Minister John Howard who was the 
driving force behind the establishment of the RAMSI intervention, based on a renewed 
assertiveness, and well-founded confidence in the two primary arms of international intervention, 
the diplomats and the military, as well as in the ‘third force’, the police, in the person of the AFP, 
whose members had acquitted themselves well in East Timor. 
  
237 Byrnes, J. quoted in Frame, T (ed). (2017). The Long Road: Australia's Train, Advise and Assist 
Missions Sydney: University of New South Wales Press. 
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Figure 7. Map of Solomon Islands 
Source: Australian National University CartoGIS 11–157 
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The United Nations not involved 
RAMSI had a number of unique features which contributed to its success. One of the most 
important is that it was Australian-led, and was deployed at the specific request of the Solomon 
Islands Government of Prime Minister Kemakeza. However, as Braithwaite et al (2010) pointed 
out, this was only after two approaches to the United Nations in 2002, which was not in a capacity 
to respond, due to the fact that the effect of Solomon’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan would 
be that China would veto any Security Council resolution to step up assistance… the United 
Nations played a more marginal role than is normally the case with an international peace 
operation.238 While according to Breen, it was the opinion of the Australian Government that a 
United Nations force would not be able to solve the problems facing the Solomon Islands, and 
that any such intervention by the UN would risk displacing the Solomon Islands Police and risked 
initiating a prolonged occupation by international military and police forces.239 
Australian government change of mind 
The problems faced by the Kemakeza Government in Honiara were significant, and included 
extortion and political corruption, to the extent that the Solomon Islands was on the verge of state 
failure, as it was running out of funds to pay for essential services. In February 2003, Elsina 
Wainwright of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) drafted a paper on the Solomon 
Islands, Our Failing Neighbour240 which was distributed by Hugh White, then the head of ASPI. 
The paper proposed an Australian led, multinational mission to assist in restoring law and order 
in the Solomon Islands. 
The paper prompted the Solomon Islands Prime Minister Kemakeza, to write to Australian Prime 
Minister Howard, requesting intervention by Australia. The request was not welcomed by the 
Australian High Commissioner to the Solomon Islands, who advised Canberra that it was most 
unfortunate that ASPI had stimulated unrealistic expectations. Kemakeza was now tenaciously 
committed to an armed regional peacekeeping force. In Kemakeza’s opinion, the Solomon Islands 
people would welcome such a force, provided that it could improve the law and order situation.241  
Officials from PM&C, Defence and DFAT prepared a paper in response to Kemakeza’s letter 
which emphasised the intractability of Solomon Islands problems and stressed the risks and high 
costs of intervention. According to Breen, the Report indicated that: 
238 Braithwaite, J, Dinnen, S., Allen, M., Braithwaite, V and Charlesworth, H. (2010) Pillars and 
Shadows: Statebuilding as Peacebuilding in Solomon Islands, ANU  E Press Canberra, pp. 49–50. 
239 Breen, B. (2016). The Good Neighbour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.361 
240 Wainwright, E. (2003) Our Failing Neighbour: Australia and the Future of Solomon Islands, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra. 
241 More, (2005), in Breen (2016), p. 363. 
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[n]o intervention force could reshape the political culture of Solomon Islands. At best, 
it would give the Solomon Islands Government breathing space by securing Honiara 
and allowing the government to operate without the threat of violence, and to begin to 
purge the Solomon Islands Police and regain control of public finances. 
This outcome was precisely what Howard and Downer had in mind-a circuit breaker 
to create a secure environment for recovery, not a panacea for all the problems facing 
Solomon Islands.242 
The major Australian departments, Prime Minister and Cabinet, Foreign Affairs and Trade and 
Defence, were of a like mind that the Solomon Islands had not hit rock bottom’, and that the 
endemic lawlessness and corruption was ‘not sufficiently threatening to Australia’s interests to 
warrant the cost of intervention on the scale required. The decision rested on whether the 
Australian Government was willing to ‘pay the price and take the risk of deploying Australian 
police and soldiers to deter, disarm and bring to justice those in Solomon Islands who were 
destroying its polity.243 
As a result, the ASPI paper created reconsideration at many levels. Prime Minister Kemakeza 
read it and was supportive. He was in a perilous situation and had been rebuffed by the UN. 
Australian officials from both DFAT and Defence were against any intervention, as was Foreign 
Minister Downer initially, as Stephanie Koorey states: 
In January 2003, then Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer emphatically 
stated that Australia would not be sending troops to Solomon Islands. Downer 
contended that not only would such an intervention ‘fail to solve the problem’ but he 
was particularly acute to potential allegations of ‘recolonisation’, and decried the idea 
as ‘folly in the extreme’.244 
The Foreign Minister, and the Defence Minister however changed their minds after consulting 
with Prime Minister Howard, who had read the Departmental Report himself and had been 
reminded of Australia’s responsibilities in its own region by U.S. President Bush when he visited 
the U.S. 
Howard disagreed with the departmental paper arguing against intervention in 
Solomon Islands, which he read on the plane after speaking with Bush. He decided then 
and there to confer with Downer and Hill on his return to Australia and to have them 
direct their departments to examine options for intervention.245 
242 Breen, B. (2016), p. 364. 
243 Breen (2016), p. 365. 
244 Downer, A. (2003) ‘Neighbours cannot be recolonised’, The Australian, 8 January 2003 in Koorey, S. 
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Whole-of-government and whole-of-region 
At the insistence of Prime Minister Howard and Foreign Minister Downer, there were a number 
of criteria which underpinned any possible deployment. Firstly, it had to be at the express 
invitation of the Government of the Solomon Islands; secondly it had to be endorsed by the Pacific 
Islands Forum and thirdly, it had to involve police and military contributions from the Pacific 
Islands Forum member states. This was a watershed decision … Howard and Downer moved 
Australia from a ‘whole-of-government’ approach to Solomon Islands to a ‘whole-of-region’ 
approach.246 
The ASPI paper overturned the prevailing attitude in Canberra policy circles, which was based 
on a reluctance to intervene, for fear of being perceived as ‘neo-colonial’. This failed to recognise 
that the international community, via the UN and other organisations, was intervening in failing 
and failed states around the globe. This included East Timor, or as it was known post-
independence in 2002, Timor Leste, in Australia’s own region, whose extant status was due in 
large part to Australian intervention. 247 Both Breen and Braithwaite, J (2010) further argued that 
the attacks in September 2001, and the bombing in Bali in October 2002, influenced Prime 
Minister Howard’s perspective on the region, towards a more robust posture. 
The 2003 ASPI paper also mentioned the reluctance to intervene based on a lack of contemporary 
relevance. This appeared to be the opinion of the strategic advisers from the traditional diplomatic 
or the military fields, and arguably not from the AFP, whose concerns about transnational crime 
and other malign actors, did not appear to register with the traditional policy advisers, whose 
emphasis remain steeped in inter-state, and defence oriented, relations. Breen however points out 
that the possibility of transnational organised crime or other malign activity was acknowledged 
and that occupation of Solomon Islands by a military power was unlikely, if Solomon Islands 
became a so-called failed state, there was potential for it to become a source or transit point for 
criminal and terrorist activities, that might affect Australia, as well as other countries in the 
region.248 
Part of this thinking incorporated the non-military threats mentioned above, although as 
Braithwaite points out the prospect of transnational criminals or terrorists gaining a foothold in 
the Solomon Islands was not a high risk: 
When Prime Minister Howard announced the intervention, he referred to the risk of 
the Solomons becoming a safe haven for ‘transnational criminals and even terrorists’. 
246 Breen (2016), p. 366. 
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It seemed implausible to people who knew the Solomons well that it could be a 
hospitable safe haven for transnational criminals or terrorists.249 
Nonetheless, the Howard Government pursued this policy of an Australian-led, multilateral 
intervention of state-building until the job was done. This was based on Prime Minister Howard 
and Foreign Minister Downer concluding that failing states in Australia’s region were a threat to 
Australian national security, as well as to regional stability. In this thinking they were encouraged 
by the success of the Australian-led intervention in East Timor in 1999. As a result, they 
advocated for an armed Australian-led regional peace support force to act as a circuit breaker 
on violence in Solomon Islands, to coerce weapons disposal and to facilitate the rebuilding of its 
polity.250 The AFP led the security aspect of this mission, with military support. 
Diplomats, police and soldiers – In that order 
Planning then began in earnest by the AFP. AFP members Rod Walker and Don Whinfield drafted 
a basic four-phased plan in May 2003 called at that stage the Solomon Island Law Enforcement 
Mission (SILEM). This involved four contemporaneous phases: (1) ‘separation’-arrest and detain 
16 major militia commanders and criminals; (2) ‘top down’-retrench senior RSIP and Field Force 
Special Constables, search homes with a view to arrest and prosecution;  (3) ‘recovery’-locate 
and impound all high-powered weapons; and (4) ‘enclaved lockdown’-cordon and search of 
Honiara-establish quarantine perimeter-checkpoints.251 
The casual observer may ask, why the police and not the military? The answer is that the Solomon 
Islands situation was unique in many ways, which meant that police, as part of a broader law and 
justice mission were a more appropriate instrument than the military. There are many reasons for 
this. The first is that the Solomon Islands does not have its own military. Security and public 
safety were the exclusive responsibility of the Royal Solomon Islands Police, and they had failed 
in this most basic of duties. The second is that the deterioration of the security situation was 
essentially a law and order problem, and thus best addressed by a law and order agency, namely 
the police. 
This was recognised by the first Australian Special Coordinator from Australia’ Department of 
Foreign Affairs, which had overall authority for RAMSI, Nick Warner who stated: 
Because of the purely criminal nature of most of their activities, it was decided that we 
would approach the former militants as a policing issue. After we arrived, teams of 
RAMSI police investigators were formed to investigate the many crimes that had been 
249 Braithwaite (2012), p. 50. 
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committed in recent years, mostly by former militants. These investigations were 
conducted quickly, but without fanfare.252 
While Braithwaite (2010) stated: 
[t]he size of the intervention was much more than was needed. RAMSI Special 
Coordinator Nick Warner has said this was an explicit policy of ‘shock and awe’… 
helicopters dropping troops in visible locations, landing barges crashing onto the 
beach loaded with troops…It worked in immediately transforming the climate of 
security … RAMSI replaced the rule of the gun with the rule of law very quickly.253 
In this very visible sense, the military was extremely important.  Learning a lesson from the 
precarious and flawed security arrangement in UNAMET in East Timor in 1999, where unarmed 
UN Civilian Police and electoral volunteers were exposed to a high level of risk at the hands of 
extremely violent Indonesian –backed militia groups, a large Australian military show of force 
was deployed in support of RAMSI, to persuade anyone who may have been considering an armed 
challenge to RAMSI, to re-consider. As stated by the first Special Coordinator of RAMSI upon 
arrival in Honiara in 2003 ‘Our immediate purpose is to restore law and order… should criminals 
seek to sabotage our assistance efforts, endanger public safety, or prevent the police from doing 
their duty, the military will not hesitate to act. 254 
This was reflective of posturing to ‘speak softly and carry a big stick.’ A full scale military 
intervention into an island nation of approximately 500,000 islanders by a first world nation such 
as Australia, could have had disastrous consequences in terms of Australia’s international 
standing, and allegations of neo-colonialism may well have been justified. The police, on the 
other hand, although uniformed, armed and responsive, provided a much lower profile, more 
appropriate to the circumstances. This was ‘firm’ power and as much about governance as it was 
about conflict. Some background on this ‘road to crisis’ in 2003 is required to explain why 
Australia generally and the AFP specifically intervened. The troubles in the Solomon Islands date 
back to independence from Britain in 1978, and the power vacuum which was filled by corrupt, 
tribalised, and criminal actors, with the inevitable downward spiral towards state failure. 
Independence 
As has been discussed, the decade of the 1970s saw a well-intentioned global move towards self-
determination and independence of former colonial possessions, encouraged by the UN and 
exploited by Cold War power blocs. This brought with it several challenges in relation to peace 
and stability, as colonial administration withdrew. Australia’s immediate region has had its fair 
252 Warner, N. (2004) Operation Helpem Fren: Rebuilding the Nation of Solomon Islands: Speech to 
National Security Conference Special Coordinator Nick Warner, Canberra, Australia 23 March 2004. 
253 Braithwaite (2010), pp. 51–52. 
254 Warner, N. (2003) Message to the people of Solomon Islands.  Special Coordinator Nick Warner 
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share of this experience, and Australia has responded accordingly, but not always immediately. 
Following the independence of Papua New Guinea from Australia in 1975, the Solomon Islands, 
a former British Protectorate, gained self-government in 1976, and full independence from Britain 
in 1978. It was not of strategic significance, in a Cold War context, so it was basically abandoned 
by Britain and left to its own devices. 
The first Solomon Islands Constitution was created in 1970, but was challenged and a new 
Constitution was created in 1974. Unfortunately, the post-colonial era left a leadership vacuum, 
which was filled by poor governance and foreign exploitation, which led to rampant corruption. 
With no effective political leadership, the society descended into tribal based violence. Many of 
the issues faced by the Solomon Islands were the same as those faced by many other nations 
emerging from a colonial past. Such features include corruption, foreign-based resource 
exploitation, urban drift, high youth unemployment and the resultant crimes against the person 
and property. A tribalised or factionalised overlay, complicated matters further. 
Decades of deterioration in the social cohesion culminated in a period known as the ‘tensions’ in 
the late 1990s, where resentment based on which island group one belonged, to developed into 
violent clashes. The two main ethnic groups were the Malaitans and the Guadalcanal people 
(Guales), each of which formed their own armed elements, known as the Isatabu Freedom 
Movement (IFM), the Malaitan Eagle Force, also known respectively as the Maurau Eagle Force 
(MEF) and the Guadalcanal Revolutionary Army (GRA). Violent clashes between these groups 
further destabilised the peace, order and good governance of what was already a fragile 
environment. AFP RAMSI Commander Ben McDevitt explains that the first aggressors appeared 
to be Guadalcanal people who resented the concentration of Malaitans in Honiara: 
At the height of this conflict some 20000 Malaitans were forced, through fear and 
intimidation, to flee their homes in Guadalcanal and return to Malaita. Young, 
dispossessed and aggrieved youth took up arms and clashes between rival groups 
became commonplace.255 
The societal cohesions had descended to such an extent that its primary features were: …guns, 
ethnic tensions, rogue police, corrupt politicians and business people, and armed criminals.’ 256 
The Government of the Solomon Islands recognised that it was facing a set of problems which 
were beyond its own capabilities of resolving, and sought assistance from is larger neighbour, 
Australia, but these were rebuffed for various reasons including a fear of a neo-colonialist label 
on the part of Australian policy makers, and so things deteriorated further. 
255 McDevitt, B. in Australian Federal Police (2013) On the Road to Transition, AFP Platypus Magazine, 
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Request for help 
The AFP, for many years placed its representation in the South West Pacific region in the South 
Pacific International Liaison Officer (SPILO), one of whom was John Murray, whose book, The 
Minnows of Triton, provides a comprehensive background to circumstances in the region in the 
1980s and 1990s. Murray wrote: 
A number of requests made by the Solomon Islands Government to the governments of 
Australia and New Zealand for stability assistance were rejected. Anecdotal 
information suggests that an overriding fear of criticism based on ‘neo colonialism’ 
prevailed in many influential circles. 
Actual reasons cited for this rejection included that any intervention would not be 
supported by the Pacific region; that Australian taxpayers would not support any 
intervention; that intervention would require a long-term strategy with an ill-defined 
exit point, and it was believed that foreigners would lack a solution to what was 
perceived as a local cultural problem.  Also among the reasons was an apparent 
reluctance for an Australian police Commissioner to use armed force.257 
There were some compelling reasons, linked to Australia’s national interests, by virtue of malign 
non-state actors gaining a foothold in such fragile nations, with anaemic or corrupted policing, so 
close to Australia, because: 
a dysfunctional Solomon Islands held long term dangers for Australia and the region. 
A country beholden to armed thugs is a recipe for chronic instability…[s]uch instability 
is an open invitation to transnational crime. Experience elsewhere shows that weak 
states are also attractive as havens for money laundering, people smuggling, drug 
smuggling and terrorism. And while there was no evidence that transnational criminals 
were targeting Solomon Islands, there was no point waiting for this to happen.258 
There was a recognition by some that action was required, but a breakthrough did not arise until 
the year 2000, with the signing of the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA). 
The road to peace 
Murray provides a snapshot of the situation in the Solomon Islands. As many as 1100 armed 
Malaitan ‘special’ members of the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP): 
remained on the police payroll while engaging in torture, rape and the burning of 
‘enemy’ villages. Murder and banditry went unabated elsewhere with former police 
employee Harold Keke and his gang held responsible for multiple abductions and 
massacres in the Weathercoast region of Guadalcanal including the killing of cabinet 
minister/Catholic priest Father Augustine Geve … many ranking officers became 
complicit in supplying MEF militants with weapons from the police armoury.259 
257 Murray, J. (2005). The Minnows of Triton: policing, politics, crime and corruption in the South Pacific 
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In June 2000, MEF militants with rogue Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) members formed 
para-military unit, known as the Joint Operations Force which seized control of key installations, 
and took Prime Minister Ulufa’alu hostage. He resigned in exchange for his release. He was 
replaced as Prime Minister in late June 2000 by Manassah Sogovare, who had previously been 
Finance Minister. He was replaced in December 2001 by Allen Kemekeza. According to Murray 
during this six month period, Sogovare had entered into arrangements with what was effectively 
a mercenary group to counter any opposition to the outcomes of the MEF cadres.260 This was the 
Solomon Islands Peace Monitoring Organisation (SIPMO). 
SIPMO was formed in Melbourne, and was codenamed Operation Unity. Its stratagem was to 
overcome by force ‘those recalcitrant elements identified as a threat to the MEF’s total assumption 
of control.’  This plan was kept well out of the public domain, and was later abandoned. Its initial 
planning used terminology such as ‘neutralise the opposition’, ‘robust arrangements’, ‘rapid 
deployment’, and ‘enforce compliance’. It was intended that SIPMO operatives would possess 
sophisticated weaponry, explosives, marine resources and a BK 117 twin –engine multi-mission 
helicopter – a ‘force multiplier’ with the ability to fly ‘hot and high’, with the purpose of 
deploying armed personnel throughout the islands.261 This was partisan politics writ large, with 
the real risk of ethnic cleansing. 
Clearly this was a situation Canberra could ill-afford to allow to continue in a Commonwealth 
country so close to its shores. This reinvigorated efforts for Australian and New Zealand 
assistance to bring militant to the negotiating table, which took place aboard HMAS Tobruk in 
July 2000, which concluded a ceasefire agreement on 3 August 2000. This led to the momentum 
for further peace talks which became known as the Townsville Peace Agreement (TPA) which 
took place in Townsville North Queensland in October 2000. 
The TPA was signed by MEF and elements of IFM and the Solomon Islands Government and 
was followed by the Marau Peace Agreement in February 2001, signed by MEF, IFM, 
Guadalcanal Provincial Government and the Solomon Islands Government. However, it was not 
signed by Harold Keke, Guadalcanal militant leader, who was to become instrumental in eventual 
restoration of order in the region. The indigenous Peace Monitoring Organisation (SIPMO) was 
charged with the responsibility for implementing the peace agreement with the assistance of the 
International Peace Monitoring Team, which had been established under the TPA. The IPMT was 
largely ineffectual and withdrew in June 2002. 
Lawlessness continued, although Australia continued with assistance with a Law and Justice 
Sector Program, aimed at strengthening the police, prison and legal services, assisting the work 
260 Murray (2005), p. 93. 
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of the National Peace Council, financial support for the UNDP project for the Demobilisation of 
Special Constables, and communications and logistics support for the police. In February 2003 
shortly after the British police Commissioner William Morrell arrived to replace Morton Sirheti, 
former police Commissioner, Fred Soaki, was shot dead while dining at a hotel. Soaki was a 
member of the National Peace Council, and was due to chair a Commission of Inquiry into the 
causes of civil unrest, which created misgivings amongst many people in positions of influence. 
A police sergeant, Edmund Sae was arrested for the crime, but escaped custody with relative ease. 
Civil unrest continued, with the Department of Finance, for instance, being surrounded by armed 
men when cash was due to arrive. There was a prevailing atmosphere of lawlessness, violence 
and extortion, with an inadequate police response, which prompted Prime Minister Kemekeza to 
seek formal assistance from Australian Prime Minister Howard in April 2003, but only, as 
discussed earlier, after an approach for United Nations intervention was deemed impossible, due 
to a Chinese veto in the UN Security Council, over diplomatic recognition of Taiwan by the 
Solomon Islands Government. 
Following consultations between the governments of the Solomon Islands, Australia and New 
Zealand, a package of strengthened assistance was proposed and endorsed unanimously at a 
meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF). It was debated and endorsed 
by the Solomon Islands Parliament through the Facilitation of International Assistance Act 2003, 
commended by the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and supported by the Commonwealth’s 
Ministerial Action Group and Secretary-General. This level of regional and international 
endorsement underwrote RAMSI’s legitimacy. 
Op ‘Helpem Fren’: Engaging armed offenders by negotiation, not enemies by armed force 
The AFP Commander of the RAMSI Participating Police Force (PPF), Ben McDevitt, adopted 
strategy of targeting Keke because he was seen by Solomon Islanders as ‘almost like a demon’. 
The significance of this, was that Keke was treated not as an enemy in a military sense, but as an 
armed offender, in a police sense. There is a major difference, and this approach proved to be 
successful. Braithwaite (2010) records that RAMSI police commander Ben McDevitt wrote to 
Keke on 25 July 2003, offering to guarantee Keke’s safety in custody in return for surrendering 
weapons and submitting to justice. 
Keke replied in writing, that he wanted peace, and was willing to surrender ‘as long as the first 
priority is to disarm the militants in Honiara and get rid of corrupt politicians’ 262 
262 Keke quoted by Fraenkel, J. (2004) The Manipulation of Custom. From Uprising to Intervention in the 
Solomon Islands, Australian National University, Pandanus Books, Canberra,  p. 168, in Braithwaite, J 
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Keke’s Guadalcanal Liberation Front had declared a unilateral cease-fire three weeks before 
McDevitt’s letter, on 5 July 2003.263 A direct message was sent in a letter to all militants from 
Warner and McDevitt: 
In our talks with militia leaders, we have made it very clear that we are not here to 
negotiate or make deals…It is in your interest to hand in all guns. Anyone found with 
a gun after midnight 21 August will be breaking the law and will face up to 10 years in 
prison and a S$25,000 fine…We are able to deal with any situation and track down 
illegal weapons. We will not be stopped by threats or intimidation.264 
This approach eventually allowed McDevitt to negotiate the peaceful surrender and arrest of 
Keke, on 13 August, to face criminal charges. Two weeks after the arrival of RAMSI, Special 
Coordinator Nick Warner and PPF Commander Ben McDevitt met with Harold Keke in his own 
village. They told him it was time to end the conflict, and it was best to pursue matters through 
legal processes, where he would have an opportunity to tell his side of the story. He was informed 
that he had an outstanding arrest warrant and that he would have to give himself up at some stage. 
Negotiations took place over three meetings, after which Keke and some of his key commanders 
surrendered. Breen (2017: 388-389) states that Keke was originally arrested for aggravated 
burglary, and the theft of an outboard motor in order to get him to agree to accompany police to 
RAMSI Headquarters in Honiara for further questioning. He was accompanied by his family, in 
special accommodation at the Guadalcanal Beach resort, which was the RAMSI Headquarters. 
He was also accompanied by his Chief of Operations Ronnie Cawa, who had ordered most of the 
murders, executions and other atrocities on the Weather Coast. He apparently boarded the 
helicopter because he had never been in one before. 
Harold’s day in court 
Upon the departure of Keke and Cawa it is reported that around 50 members of Keke’s GLF 
militia held a formal parade after Keke and his entourage had left and handed in their weapons. 
One man raised his arm and loudly declared, ‘The war is over!’ and others joined the chant: ‘The 
war is over! The war is over!’ As indicated by McDevitt, Keke ultimately surrendered to have his 
day in court. ‘He wanted to tell his side of the story about what had happened to him and I think 
263 Plunkett, M. (2003) Stress-Testing Solomon Islands Peace Operations Scenarios, Griffith University, 
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that was a pretty powerful incentive for him-one of several. He wanted to say how he had been 
wronged.’265 
On 18 March 2005, Keke and Cawa were sentenced to life in prison for the murder of former 
Cabinet Minister and clergyman Father Augustine Geve at Mbiti in 2002. 266  According to 
Braithwaite, Keke was a mentally unstable man who had convinced others of his mystical 
indestructibility.267  This was confirmed by Special Coordinator Warner. 
Keke’s behaviour was erratic and unpredictable. Just before our arrival seven 
Anglican brothers from the order of Melanesian Brothers who had been taken hostage 
by Keke’s followers in May, were killed. Keke’s surrender was a key milestone in 
RAMSI’s operations. Other militants and police had used his belligerency as a 
justification for holding onto weapons. After his arrest, there were no more excuses. 
Keke’s arrest was another major confidence boost for the whole country, especially on 
Guadalcanal where many had lived in fear of his raids.268 
This was the catalyst for the seizure and public destruction of weapons, which in itself had a 
positive profound and visible influence. A 21-day amnesty, between 31 July and 21 August 2003, 
was announced by the Prime Minister. Anyone found in possession of a firearm after that date 
would be subject to a ten year term of imprisonment. This had an immediate effect and firearms 
were handed in in large numbers.269 
The participating police force and disarmament 
As the Royal Solomon Islands Police (RSIP) had been disarmed, the management of crime was 
left to the Participating Police Force (PPF), which was under the command of RAMSI. The PPF 
consisted of police representatives from 14 Pacific Island nations, which gave a ‘Pacific face’ to 
this intervention. These PPF members were recruited locally in their own countries, and trained 
in Australia by the AFP at the IDG facility at Majura. In a similar fashion to the UN Police in 
East Timor during the UNTAET mission, the international police in RAMSI performed an 
executive policing function, and actually enforced the criminal laws of the Solomon Islands. 
The PPF set about disarming the militants and ‘[m]ore than 3730 weapons and more than 30000 
rounds of ammunition were removed from the militia. About 700 of those were high-powered 
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military style weapons’.270 These were destroyed publicly before large crowds of onlookers ‘in a 
potent display of our commitment to ridding the nation of firearms.’ 271 
Justice being done and being seen to be done 
In addition to the arrest of Keke, the disarming of the police and the militants, the PPF, led by the 
AFP commenced investigating and prosecuting the offenders, who had been the cause of so much 
of the political instability. 
Dozens of senior police…along with politicians and bureaucrats were put before the 
courts and imprisoned for rapes, murders, abductions, thefts and falsification of 
accounts. Andrew Nori was charged with corruptly receiving SI$5 million and 
Alexander Bartlett for illegally importing firearms, demanding money with menaces, 
arson, lodging false compensation claims and inciting to commit offences. Justice 
Minister Michael Maina had to explain a theft of SI$15000, while former ministers 
Kemakeza, Benjamin Una and Francis Zama faced a spectrum of corruption and office-
based abuse claims. Ex backbencher John Maetia was arrested on 10 charges for 
obtaining over SI$198000 and attempting to solicit a further SI$14000 for supplying 
naturalisation certificates for Chinese nationals.272 
By July 2004, 3316 people had been arrested on 4788 charges. This success was made 
possible through evidence collected and secreted by Royal Solomon Islands Police 
(RSIP) who remained loyal during the tensions. Similarly the security situation in the 
Solomon Islands had stabilised to such a degree that military personnel were drawn 
down in the second half of 2004 … Eventually 25 percent of the RSIP was either 
arrested and charged with corruption offences or discharged from the force. More 
widely, an ombudsman, a magistrate, numerous lawyers, multiple public servants, 
corrections officers and four government ministers were arrested in a very public and 
transparent cleansing of corruption.273 
This was not only justice being done, but was justice being seen to be done, which had its positive 
impact on restoring public confidence and societal trust. The PPF in which the AFP was 
significantly represented, was instrumental in this effort. RAMSI continued in this way for the 
next decade, during which the PPF gradually stepped back from front line policing roles and 
allowed the newly re-constituted, and re-named, but still unarmed, Royal Solomon Islands Police 
Force (RSIPF), to assume more general policing duties. 
On the path to sovereignty: Re-arming the police 
This set in train a gradual re-armament of the RSIPF, beginning with PPF trained Close Personal 
Protection (CPP) members responsible for the armed protection of High Office Holders and 
visiting foreign dignitaries, and Airport Police which is in accordance with international 
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requirements. Both of these sections were trained by AFP trainers and mentors. The re-arming of 
the police created some disquiet in some sections of the Solomon Islands community, whose trust 
in the police remained at low levels. RSIPF Commissioner Matthew Varley, himself on 
secondment from the AFP, acknowledged these concerns but pointed out that: 
More than two thirds of the RSIPF has been recruited since the tension period. We've 
had heavy investment in training by RAMSI and development over that time. The 
officers that are involved in this limited rearmament program have been trained to the 
highest standards and I'm pretty confident that those officers are well disciplined and 
ready to take on that extra responsibility.274 
RAMSI finally withdrew on 30 June 2017, after 14 years leaving behind 45 AFP members with 
the Solomon Islands Police Development Program (SIPDP), to continue to advise the RSIPF. The 
RAMSI mission is broadly lauded as a success and allowed one commentator to state in 2009: 
From the beginning, the AFP/IDG contribution to RAMSI has been marked by a 
number of achievements. The first of these was the ability of the Mission to rapidly 
deploy to the Solomon Islands and diffuse the turmoil that was spreading across the 
country. By achieving this tasking through regional consensus and collaboration 
rather than using direct assistance from the United Nations, a model has been 
established for Pacific intervention that is both more responsive and less cumbersome 
than traditional peace-keeping models. This success is what prompted the 
establishment of the IDG in 2004 and has led the Australian Government to adopt a 
policy preference toward law and order as the lynchpin of stability in the Oceanic 
region. Furthermore, the emphasis on achieving law and order as a means toward 
nation-building has put the AFP at the forefront of Australia’s regional security 
program.275 
The People’s Survey 
One feature of RAMSI which helped maintain direction and connection with the Solomon Islands 
community, was the People’s Survey. A selection of statistics and comments is provided below 
from which some conclusions can be drawn about the popularity of RAMSI, the issues which 
have been addressed, and the issues which remain. 
In 2006, 92% of respondents considered youth unemployment as a threat to security. In 2008 
many respondents considered gang-based violence among unemployed youth to be a response to 
disempowerment in an unforgiving urban environment. Nepotism and ‘wantokism’ were 
consistently seen as problems, particularly within the political and police circles. Some 
understood that this was a ‘cultural expectation. In 2009 ‘[w]eak policing and a poorly disciplined 
police force were frequently mentioned as contributing to law and order problems, especially by 
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the Men and Young Men groups. There were many negative comments and examples of bad police 
behaviour and police providing poor role models.’276 
In relation to conflict resolution, in 2006, 41% of respondents indicated a preference for 
customary law rather than modern law to resolve disputes. In 2007, 93% of respondents indicated 
that they would resolve their disputes entirely within their own community, either through 
customary law, the church or ‘working it out themselves. Only 4.2% would involve RSIPF or 
RAMSI. The following year, in 2008, 84% of respondents expressed a preference for customary 
law and 5% and 7% would involve RSIPF or RAMSI respectively. By 2011, 60% of respondents 
indicated they would seek help from a chief to resolve a dispute and 15% indicated they would 
seek help from RSIPF.277 
In 2010, the main suggestion on improving the dispute resolution processes were: ‘more respect 
for chiefs’ (46%), ‘kastom’ (26%), ‘elders’ (19%) and ‘church’ (19%). ‘More community 
policing’ was mentioned by 15% and ‘more access to RSIPF’ by 10%. Less than 10% mentioned 
courts and other modern sources of justice and dispute resolution. Support for RAMSI in 2008 
was 89% of respondents which had dropped to 86% in 2013. In that same year, 48% said RAMSI’s 
biggest achievement in Solomon Islands was bringing peace to the country and 40% said it was 
restoring law and order.278 Recalling Einstein’s statement that peace is not merely the absence of 
conflict, but the presence of justice and government, in terms of policing, the bringing of peace 
and the restoration of law and order are one and the same. 
The success of RAMSI 
There is little doubt that, despite early misgivings about the prospect for success for such an 
intervention, RAMSI has been one of the most successful international interventions ever, 
regionally or globally. This is due to a range of factors, including the fact that it was a regional 
agreement by the Pacific Islands Forum; that it was Australian-led, but whole-of-region; that it 
was ‘whole-of-government; that the political support from Australia was not influenced by the 
political cycle, but by intervening as long as it took to get the job done; that the security aspect 
was police-led; that the police were not confined to ‘western’ interventionists from Australia, but 
that the police instead adopted a regional ‘Pacific face’, via the PPF and that the PPF was prepared 
to perform all executive powers of a police force, not just general duties and public order, and 
was able to address some of the underlying issues of corruption and poor governance, through 
justice mechanisms. This was not achieved by the police acting alone; it required a viable and 
legitimate court system. 
276 http://www.ramsi.org/media/peoples-survey/ 
277 http://www.ramsi.org/media/peoples-survey/ 
278 http://www.ramsi.org/media/peoples-survey/ 
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Many lessons came from the Australian experience in RAMSI. Among them are: that the 
invitation of the host government is essential for cooperation. This is not always straightforward, 
as simple pride often prevents sovereign governments asking for help. Nefarious activities by 
government actors, including corruption exacerbates the problem. Regional consultation and a 
genuine long-term partnership with the host government are essential. The inclusion of all agency 
perspectives, including those of the police, during the planning process tends to minimise 
coordination problems on the ground. 
The adoption of a ‘Pacific’ style, under the PPF allowed for a much more credible voice on behalf 
of the intervening force. This Pacific voice was on occasion able to deliver harder messages in a 
softer way than more unfamiliar or unwelcome ‘western’ voices. The leadership provided by a 
senior diplomat, who was capable of seeing the ‘big picture’, and coordinating efforts accordingly 
was no doubt part of the success of RAMSI. The ‘optics’ of a police-led security posture rather 
than a military one, was a much softer, yet effective form of ‘firm’ intervention. The fact that the 
militants were regarded by the police as criminal actors rather than an armed ‘enemies’, provided 
for a more nuanced and flexible approach to what was essentially a problem of lawlessness. An 
interesting observation is that the UN changed to ‘integrated missions’ around this time and 
perhaps there were some lessons from RAMSI which translated to the UN. 
Implications of RAMSI for Pacific Region 
RAMSI helped consolidate Australia as a trusted partner in the Pacific, even in places where 
Australia traditionally had little or no interest, such as Micronesia, which had a traditional 
partnership with the United States, and Polynesia, whose traditional partner was, and remains, 
New Zealand. This was by virtue of the diverse Pacific membership of the PPF, which reflected 
the PIF membership more broadly. The appropriate levels of political support and resourcing were 
also extremely important. 
Many positives arose from RAMSI, including; a safer region; the provision of a successful 
formula upon which similar interventions could be based; an enhanced understanding of regional 
dynamics; increased understanding and appreciation of individual agency’s methods of operation, 
including constraints, restraints and requirements; and the development of strong police to- police 
peer networks, As will be discussed in another section, such relationships have become 
increasingly important. It is instructive to mention short-term versus long-term time perspectives 
in relation to such interventions as: 
McDevitt explains that the military representative said in securing the strategic 
military points would take 32 days, and then the military would be ready to withdraw. 
Mr McDevitt then explained that the community had lost trust in the RSIP and the 
police component of the mission could take up to 10 years. He says a representative 
from another agency then talked at length about endemic corruption in the country. 
Further there was a need for significant programs in infrastructure, finance and all 
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other departments. The assessment was it would take a generation to make the 
necessary changes.279 
RAMSI adopted and applied a comprehensive approach, which combined peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peace building. Seen through Australian eyes, particularly those of the police, 
RAMSI was in short, the beneficiary of a rare combination of political will and a regional 
imperative, and in that sense was a diplomatic success. In terms of the legacies left behind, 
however, there may be less grounds for optimism. 
It is worthwhile re-stating that the RAMSI intervention was intended as a circuit breaker to create 
a secure environment for recovery, not a panacea for all the problems facing Solomon Islands. 
These underlying problems remain and can only be addressed by the Solomon Islanders 
themselves, as they negotiate the terms of their own social contract. 
Legacy for the Solomon Islands 
Urban drift, youth unemployment, ‘wantokism’, nepotism, political corruption, foreign-based 
resource exploitation, and a fragile path to economic self-sufficiency, remain as concerns for the 
future peace, order and good governance of the Solomon Islands. RAMSI has provided some 
basis for development along these lines, but has not addressed the underlying causes, because it 
was never designed or intended to. RAMSI was intended to provide breathing space to allow the 
Government of the Solomon Islands to re-establish itself. In that, RAMSI has succeeded. It is 
now up to the Solomon Islanders themselves. As RAMSI Special Coordinator Nick Coppel stated: 
RAMSI[was] a unique initiative, never before attempted by the countries of our region 
or elsewhere for that matter. The mission’s commitment to assist Solomon Islands 
[went] well beyond simply creating a stable environment and strengthening the 
capacity of the security sector, to a much broader commitment to assist Solomon 
Islanders in their efforts to strengthen the functions of the state in areas such as 
economic management and good governance. This was an ambitious but very 
deliberate decision, reflecting the unanimous views of the Pacific Island Forum 
Leaders that the mission should assist Solomon Islanders to address the fundamental 
causes of their nation’s near collapse and not just be a ‘quick-fix’ focused on 
security.280 
The AFP within RAMSI was very much to the forefront of this pioneering effort, and as such 
consolidated a growing and impressive list of achievements, both in terms of operational 
outcomes, and effective diplomacy. In the case of RAMSI, both Australia’s national interest and 
regional good citizenship were consistently demonstrated. 
279 Australian Federal Police (2013) It all Hinged on Harold, AFP Platypus Magazine October 2013. 
280 Coppel, N (2011) Building the Capacity to Protect:  The work of the Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands Special Coordinator Nicholas Coppel, 22 June 2011. 
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The rapid withdrawal of extant governance control, and the resultant power vacuums, have been 
partially to blame for some of the problems in Australia’s region. It is important to note that the 
closure of RAMSI has not meant the end of AFP involvement in the Solomon Islands. When the 
UN withdrew from Timor Leste in 2012, the AFP maintained a police capacity development 
mission there, known as the Timor Leste Police Development Program (TLTDP). In a similar 
fashion, the AFP will continue its police capacity development in the Solomon Islands with the 
Solomon Islands Police Development Program (SIPDP) with 45 members. This sort of phased 
withdrawal is one of the salient lessons learned from the AFP experience in both Timor Leste and 
the Solomon Islands. Pro-active engagement was another. 
Section 3: The Pacific and the establishment of the International Deployment 
Group 
The year 2004 was a highly significant one for the way in which the AFP engaged at an 
international level. As discussed in a previous section, the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement 
Cooperation was established, as a joint AFP Indonesian National Police initiative, in response to 
the Bali bombing in October 2002. Another initiative in 2004 was in response to the demands 
placed on police administration, logistics and training by contemporaneous police activities, in 
Timor Leste and the Solomon Islands, where RAMSI had been established the previous year. The 
extant arrangements were somewhat ad hoc, and not designed for long-term sustainment of large 
missions so the International Deployment Group (IDG) was formed at Majura, on the north 
eastern outskirts of Canberra in the ACT. 
The establishment of the AFP International Deployment Group (IDG) 
Following the East Timor deployments, particularly the UNAMET and UNTAET deployments 
between 1999 and 2002, and the impact they had upon deployed members, the AFP reviewed its 
pre-deployment training. The original model adopted closely resembled the pre-deployment 
training conducted by the ADF, for AFP members deploying to Bougainville. This period also 
coincided with the Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations.281  
This Report made a number of observations and recommendations based on the changing nature 
of United Nation interventions, in which police were playing an increasingly significant role. This 
included civilian police involvement in East Timor, in which the AFP was playing a continuing 
role, in tandem with, and following on from INTERFET. An important observation in the Report, 
in a domestic donor nation sense, means there can often be less opposition to deploying civilian 
police in lieu of military forces, but that the availability of such police is often impractical, as they 
281 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) A/55/305–S/2000/809. 
http://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml 
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are structured to meet domestic needs alone, and there is therefore little or no excess capacity to 
provide police for international missions. The Report further acknowledged that police from a 
range of backgrounds and cultures, could experience difficulties working together in a cohesive 
manner, if forced to work together in the field for the first time. 
The Report noted that in its global operations, deployed civilian police personnel were only 
second in numerical terms to deployed military personnel, and that the demand for police in UN 
missions was high and likely to remain high. The Report highlighted the fact that unique features 
of policing in such environments, included fairness and impartiality, and further mentioned the 
disruption to political and economic progress in fragile states, caused by crime. This is 
compounded by associated intimidation, violence and other criminal activity, and police reform 
in such states, was recognised as important as training, advising and monitoring. 
The Report made a number of recommendations which included the establishment of: (1) a 
national pool of civilian police ‘… administratively and medically ready for deployment to United 
Nation peace operations, within the context of the United Nations Standby Arrangements System. 
(UNSAS); (2) regional training partnerships for civilian police; and (3) a single point of contact 
for the provision of civilian police to United Nations peace operations.’  
As a result, the AFP established the International Deployment Group IDG), to service the existing 
and evolving UN mission in East Timor, and the growing multi-lateral RAMSI deployment to the 
Solomon Islands. The IDG was an appropriate mechanism by which to provide a national pool of 
deployable police; the development of a regional training regime which trained all Participating 
Police Force (PPF) members from the Pacific nations deploying to RAMSI, and acted as a single 
point of contact for international police deployments for Australia. Finally the panel 
recommended that ‘… parallel arrangements to these recommendations be established for 
judicial, penal, human rights and other relevant specialists, who with specialist civilian police 
will make up collegial “rule of law” teams’. This was in part, addressed by the Australian Civilian 
Corps (ACC), established by Prime Minister Rudd in 2011 under DFAT. 
The Pacific, the arc of instability and the Howard doctrine 
The formation of the IDG also accorded with prevailing Australian Government foreign policy 
doctrine, which became known as the Howard Doctrine. This featured a more robust regional 
posture involving police support as an alternative, or as a supplement to, other means of 
intervention. Australian Prime Minister John Howard stated in early 2004: 
the purpose of this group [Deployment Group] will be for deployment in the region. 
Nobody should construe from the formation of this group that we have in mind 
deployment further afield. The whole purpose is to consolidate and put on a proper 
dedicated basis the evident need for this country in the years ahead to provide police, 
professional police support, to many of our neighbours in the Pacific. Many of these 
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countries need trained police, as much [as] if not more than they need military 
personnel[,] and one of the best things that Australia can do, on an ongoing dedicated 
professional basis [,] is to provide and effective police presence and police advice in 
these countries.282 
The regional focus was to become stretched slightly with UN deployments to Sudan and South 
Sudan and also bi-lateral deployments to Jordan and Afghanistan. A discussed earlier, Prime 
Minister Howard had made his decision to deploy AFP to East Timor in 1999, as a result of a 
crisis created by an unexpected reaction by Indonesian President Habibie to his letter of December 
1998, and the need for a ‘third force’ to act as a buffer between the Indonesian authorities and the 
voters of East Timor. He made the decision to deploy AFP to the Solomon Islands following a 
failed approach by the Solomon Islands Prime Minster to the UN for assistance and following 
advice from U.S. President George Bush, where Prime Minister Howard was reminded about 
Australia’s responsibilities in the South West Pacific region. The Howard Doctrine was coined in 
an expression, whereby Australia became known colloquially in the media as the ‘Deputy Sheriff’ 
in the region, which created some raised regional eye-brows. 
As Breen recorded, the new ‘peace-building approach’ was built upon the successes of East Timor 
dating from 1999, where a national police force had been established following independence, 
and by the early successes of the RAMSI mission in the Solomon Islands. 283 Despite the fondness 
for journalists and cartoonists to use the term ‘Deputy Sheriff’ title, the Howard Government’s 
contrary intentions were made clear years earlier on 27 September 1999, after the deployment of 
INTERFET, when Prime Minister Howard addressed the House of Representatives:  
We do not seek ever to impose our views on other countries; we do not seek any kind 
of regional police role. We seek rather to act in concert with friendly nations within 
our region to achieve mutually shared objectives. 284 
This was reinforced the following day when Mr Nugent Liberal Member for Aston who addressed 
the House of Representatives on 28 September in response to a question by the Leader of the 
Opposition concerning the Bulletin article on the Howard Doctrine: 
Let me reiterate what the Prime Minister has already said very specifically: the 
government does not see Australia as playing the role of deputy for the United States 
or, indeed, any other country in the region. Neither does the government see the United 
States playing a role as regional policeman.285 
282 Breen (2016), p. 411. 
283 Breen (2016), p. 454. 
284  Howard 27 September 1999, p.10517  Parliament of Australia 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=CHAMBER;id=chamber%2Fhansardr
%2F1999-09-27%2F0034;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F1999-09-27%2F0000%22 
285Nugent 28 September 1999, p. 10759 Parliament of Australia. 
http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;db=CHAMBER;id=chamber%2Fhansardr
%2F1999-09-28%2F0028;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F1999-09-28%2F0000%22 
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The Howard Doctrine focussed on the ‘Arc of Instability’ as it applied to the island nations in the 
South West Pacific. The Pacific is the largest ocean in the world. It stretches from the Arctic to 
the Antarctic circles, and is surrounded by the archipelagic region of South East Asia, continents 
of East Asia, North and South America and Australia, and its vast interior contains several island 
groups inhabited by racial and ethnic grouping broadly categorised as Melanesian, Polynesian 
and Micronesian. At 165 million square kilometres, it is larger than all of the earth’s land areas 
combined. It has been a contested area for the past century, as littoral states have waged actual 
and strategic conflict for control or influence. Australia’s recent history saw Imperial Japanese 
military forces very close to Australian territory, and since 1942, Australian policy has been one 
of strategic denial to powers whose aspirations and intentions were inimical to Australia’s.286 
Early claims 
There have been some ambitious claims on ownership and possession on this vast and sparsely 
populated expanse of water. This first European claim actually came from the eastern side of the 
Pacific by early Spanish explorers. 
Columbus reached Central America in the Santa Maria in 1492; he never saw the 
Pacific, but by 1513 the Spaniards reached the Pacific coast and learned that Columbus 
had not been crazy after all. There lay the mightiest ocean of all! Keats has told us of 
that breathless moment when the Spaniards ‘stared at the Pacific, silent upon a peak 
in Darien.’  Balboa, the leader of this expedition, waded into the ocean, clad in full 
armour and sword in hand, and took possession of the Pacific in the name of the 
sovereign of Spain.287 
Like many who have tried to deal with the Pacific as a single entity, Balboa was perhaps more 
than a little ambitious. Of the nations on the Pacific Rim three are global behemoths: China, 
Russia and the United States. Other major industrial powers such as Japan and South Korea also 
have significant interests in the Pacific, as does one of the most populous nations in ASEAN, the 
Philippines. There is, therefore, no unique Pacific culture, religion, ideology, political system or 
approach, nor is there a shared history, colonial or otherwise. 
Colonisation and the principle of effective occupation 
There are many nations, particularly amongst the islands, which are former colonies of European 
powers, primarily Britain and France, but also Germany which had a brief foray into global 
colonialism in the late 19th Century. Of note is a principle related to colonial possession 
developed in relation to the ‘Scramble for Africa’. The Principle of Effectivity, or Effective 
Occupation, was developed at the Berlin Conference in 1884-85. Also known as the ‘Congo 
286 It was German influence in the Pacific region in the late 19th Century, particularly New Guinea, which 
was one of the driving influences which provided the impetus for the federation of the Australian colonies 
in 1901. 
287 Crawford, R. (1943) Ourselves and the Pacific. Melbourne University Press, p. 39. 
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Conference’ (German: Kongokonferenz) or Berlin West Africa Conference (German: Westafrika-
Konferenz) the principle was developed to prevent European powers from setting up colonies in 
Africa in name only. 
The Principle of Effective Occupation stated that powers could acquire rights over 
colonial lands only if they actually possessed them: in other words if they had treaties 
with local leaders, if they flew their flag there, and if they established an administration 
in the territory to govern it with a police force to keep order.288  
This principle would have been recognised in the 19th Century German colonies in the Pacific, 
which were based primarily in Samoa, but which included north eastern New Guinea, the 
Bismarck Archipelago, the northern Solomon Islands, including Bougainville, the Marshall 
Islands as well as Carolines, Palau and the Marianas. 
Pacific governance 
Although it was written with colonial administration in mind, from a governance perspective, the 
Principle of Effectivity or Effective Occupation, is a good benchmark from which to measure the 
basic provision of administration by all governments. Rather than ‘treaties with local leaders’, the 
‘social contract’ with the community, is a more relevant term for contemporary observation 
related to police and policing. Noteworthy is the mention of the ability to administer the territory 
and the requirement for police to keep order. 
This has not always been a strong feature of governance and policing in a number of nations in 
the South West Pacific, the Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea in particular, each of which 
has a section of its own in the thesis. From aspirational possession by Balboa, and effective 
administration by European colonisers, to contemporary dialogue and aspirational partnerships in 
the post-colonial environment, the nations of the South West Pacific have traditionally sought 
assistance for governance from liberal-democracies such as Australian and New Zealand. 
Building on experience in East Timor and the Solomon Islands, police capacity development was 
seen as a way forward in other parts of the Pacific. The combination of the Australian national 
interest and international good citizenship as it applies to the region, are highly prominent features 
of the AFP approach to the Pacific. 
Until the Howard Doctrine, the AFP had a loosely coherent approach to the Pacific starting with 
the South Pacific International Liaison Officer (SPILO), which was part of the International 
Liaison Officer Network. As discussed, following significant AFP involvement in East Timor and 
the Solomon Islands, there was an increasing recognition that the AFP was in a position to play 
an important role in stability and rule of law interventions in the South West Pacific. 
288 The Berlin Conference of 1884-85 (The General Act of the Berlin Conference). 
http://originalpeople.org/berlin-conference-1884-85/ 
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Figure 8. Map of the Pacific Ocean 
Source: Australian National University CartoGIS 10-059 
From the Pacific Regional Policing Initiative to the Pacific Police Development 
Program 
The years 2004–2008: The Pacific Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI) 
The year 2004 saw the effective implementation of the Howard Doctrine, with the establishment 
of the JCLEC, to respond to Islamic violent extremism in South East Asia, and the IDG to support 
ongoing operations in Timor-Leste and the newly formed RAMSI. The year 2006 was one in 
which the dynamics of the Pacific created the catalyst for a renewed focus on peace, order and 
good governance in the Pacific, as the Arc of Instability lived up to its name. The reaction by the 
Australian Government under Prime Minister John Howard, involved the AFP in a multifaceted 
and ongoing engagement. 
At the Pacific Islands Forum in August 2003, the Prime Ministers of Australia, New Zealand and 
Fiji announced the creation of Australian-led Pacific Regional Policing Initiative (PRPI). This 
was to be based in Fiji and was intended to enhance capacity to address crime and corruption, 
coordinate and deliver standardised training for regional police, and foster police networking 
across the Pacific. Significantly this initiative included Fiji, however events in late 2006 had a 
follow on impact for the PRPI, and the transfer of regional policing for the Pacific from Fiji to 
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Australia, specifically the IDG. This manifested itself in a renewed sense of Melanesian identity 
in the form of the Melanesian Spearhead Group, based in Fiji. 
The Year 2006 – The Howard Doctrine faces challenges in the Pacific 
Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) 
The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) has its genesis in a renewed sense of unity among the 
members of Melanesian nations, Fiji, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and the 
French territories in the form of the Front de Liberation Nationale Kanak et Socialiste (FLNKS), 
a group of pro-independent parties in the French Territory of New Caledonia. The first MSG 
member to flex its muscles against Australian-led intervention aimed at better governance, 
including an attempt to tackle political corruption was Papua New Guinea.   
Enhanced Cooperation Project (ECP) – Papua New Guinea 2005 
In 2005, the AFP deployed 115 AFP members to Papua New Guinea (PNG), under the Enhanced 
Cooperation Program (ECP). This saw AFP members working alongside their Royal Papua New 
Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) counterparts in an armed executive policing role. This involved 
the legal indemnity from prosecution under PNG law, and also provided legal immunity from 
civil prosecution in what is a highly litigious population. This aspect of the program was 
successfully appealed by Luther Wenge, Governor of Morobe Province to the PNG Supreme 
Court, and on the basis that it was unconstitutional the ECP wound up, and AFP members returned 
to Australia in May 2005. The ECP will be discussed in more detail in a later section. 
Solomon Islands – Prime Minister Sogavare and Julian Moti 2006 
The next MSG member to flex its political muscle was the Government of the Solomon Islands 
under Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare. The appointment of Snyder Rini as Solomon Islands 
Prime Minister, after the 2006 general election, sparked rioting in Honiara, amid allegations that 
the election and subsequent appointment of Rini were ’fixed’. As tensions escalated, parts of 
Honiara were razed and looted, with Chinese-owned property targeted. He was replaced by 
Manasseh Sogavare, who had previously served a term as Prime Minister in 2000-2001, at the 
very time much of the government predation was occurring. 
Sogavare was known to be opposed to the presence of RAMSI, perhaps due to the fact that 
RAMSI had commenced addressing some of the corruption, fraud and theft, which had caused 
the ‘tensions’. He sought to install a Fijian born QC who was a dual Solomon Islands and 
Australian citizen, Julian Moti QC as his Attorney-General. The appointment was opposed by the 
Australian Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, based on advice from the Australian High 
Commissioner to the Solomon Islands, who had indicated that Moti was unfit to take this office, 
due to outstanding criminal charges from a court in Vanuatu, which were also contrary to 
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Australian criminal legislation, under the Child Sex Tourism Act. The allegations involved 
multiple charges of rape of a teenage girl in Vanuatu and New Caledonia in 1997. 
Attempts to have Moti extradited from the Solomon Islands had failed. On 29 September 2006, 
Moti was returning to Honiara from India via Singapore and Port Moresby. He was returning to 
support Prime Minister Sogavare, who was facing a no-confidence motion. He was arrested in 
October 2006 in Port Moresby, while in transit to the capital Honiara, where he was to be sworn 
in as Attorney-General by his close friend and then Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare. 
Moti was held in PNG unwillingly and illegally by virtue of the express authority of the PNG 
Deputy Prime Minister Don Poyle, who was acting for Prime Minister Sir Michael Somare who 
was away in the Provinces at the time. An attempt to have him extradited to Australia from PNG 
to face criminal charges, saw him take refuge, under diplomatic protection, in the Solomon Islands 
High Commission in Port Moresby. Whilst there he was contacted by the Chief of the Intelligence 
Branch at the Office of the then Prime Minister, Joseph Assaigo, who informed him that the PNG 
Government could no longer guarantee his safety, and that a secret operation had been planned. 
On 10 October 2006 Moti was conveyed on a clandestine PNG Defence Force flight from Port 
Moresby to Munda in the Western provinces of the Solomon Islands. According to Dr Susan 
Merrell in the PNG Echo ‘He had been dumped in the middle of Papua New Guinea police armed 
with machine guns who were confronted by a RAMSI Land cruiser obstructing the runway. The 
Australians were waving revolvers and shouting threats.’ 289 He was conveyed to Honiara. 
In the meantime the Australian High Commissioner Patrick Cole, was declared persona non grata 
in September 2006 by the Sogavare Government. This was to be followed in December 2006 by 
RSIP Commissioner Shane Castles, who had been seconded from the AFP to take up this position 
in 2005. The existing tensions between the Governments of the Solomon Islands and Australia 
were aggravated by actions taken by the RSIP under Commissioner Castles, with assistance from 
the RAMSI PPF, including some Australians. They had obtained search warrants and searched 
the office of the Solomon Islands Prime Minister seeking to obtain evidence for the prosecution 
of Moti. 
Commissioner Castles declared an ‘undesirable immigrant’ December 2006 
Mr Castles was declared an undesirable immigrant in late December 2006, when he was on leave 
in Australia. He never returned to the Solomon Islands. The Foreign Affairs Minister for the 
Solomon Islands, Mr Patterson Oti, indicated that the return of Mr Castles ‘… would be 
289 Merrell, S (2016) The PNG Judiciary – The power and the glory – Part two. Dr Susan Merrell PNG 
Echo 30 March 2016 http://www.pngecho.com/category/uncategorized/page/2 
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prejudicial to peace, defence, public safety, public order, public morality, security and good 
governance in the Solomon Islands.290 
This created some consternation in Canberra. National Manager of IDG Assistant Commissioner 
Paul Jevtovic stated in a Media Release on 12 January 2007: 
In relation to the search warrant on offices associated with the Prime Minister, a 
search warrant was sought through the Director of Public Prosecutions and issued by 
an independent Magistrate, who authorised the police action. The process to issue the 
search warrant and the subsequent search of the Prime Minister’s Office complied with 
the laws of the Solomon Islands in all respects.291 
Prime Minister Sogavare replaced by Prime Minister Sikua December 2007 
In December 2007, Prime Minister Sogavare was replaced in a parliamentary no-confidence 
motion by Prime Minister Derek Sikua, who was well disposed to the presence of RAMSI and 
the Australian Government generally. The incoming Australian Government of Prime Minister 
Kevin Rudd, elected in November 2007 supported the extradition of Moti to Australia to face 
criminal charges in the Supreme Court of Queensland. In a media interview on 13 December 
2007, Prime Minister Rudd stated: 
on the question of the Moti matter, the position of the Australian Government is 
absolutely clear cut. This individual is the subject of criminal charges and because of 
the application of Australian domestic law; we have activated our extradition 
arrangements with the Government of the Solomon Islands. Nothing has changed on 
that score. We therefore intend to prosecute that to the full. The reason being is that 
the normal operation of the criminal law of the Commonwealth of Australia, and 
through its properly constituted agencies, including the Australian Federal Police, 
international extradition arrangements should proceed unimpeded and that will 
remain our position.292 
Extradition of Julian Moti 
In December 2007, Mr Moti was extradited to Australia, and was bailed, to face criminal charges 
in the Supreme Court of Queensland, where his case was heard by Supreme Court Judge Debra 
Mullins in December 2009. Justice Mullins ruled against Mr Moti's claims that the investigation 
and prosecution, under the Child Sex Tourism Act, was politically motivated by the then Howard 
government's fears of the lawyer's growing backroom influence in the region. Justice Mullins 
acknowledged that the investigation had commenced after concerns raised by Australian High 
Commissioner to the Solomon Islands, Mr Patrick Cole. She stated: ‘There is no evidence of any 
290 http://www.abc.net.au/news/2006-12-27/solomons-shuts-out-police-chief/2162076 
291 AFP refutes claims made about Solomon Islands police commissioner, AFP Media release, 12 January 
2007. 
292 Media interview, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd,  Bali,13 December 2007. 
pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/release/transcript-15706 
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impropriety associated with the AFP's approach to the investigation of the conduct of (Mr Moti) 
that is the subject of the charges...’ 293  
However, she also raised some concerns about the way in which the AFP provided funding to 
support the family of the victim of the original crimes and the prime witness. She further stated:  
[i]t raises questions about the integrity of the administration of the Australian justice 
system, when witnesses who live in a foreign country, where it is alleged an Australian 
citizen committed acts of child sex abuse, expect to be fully supported by the Australian 
government, until they give evidence at the trial in Australia of the Australian citizen 
… The conduct of the AFP in taking over the financial support of these witnesses who 
live in Vanuatu is an affront to the public conscience.294 
This led to a series of legal cases that culminated in a permanent stay of prosecution by the High 
Court of Australia in 2011.295 The PNG Echo stated that ‘It was ‘abuse of process’ that the High 
Court of Australia found when it granted a permanent stay of prosecution to Moti at the end of 
2011, on the regurgitated Australian charges of sex with a minor that the Vanuatu courts had 
thrown out over a decade previously. In December 2014, Manasseh Sogavare was again elected 
Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands, and remains in office at the time of writing in mid- 2017, 
which is when RAMSI wound up after 14 years. 
Timor Leste–Dili riots July 2006 
As all of these events were taking place in the Solomon Islands, another incident to test the 
resource base of the IDG, was not in the Pacific but in Timor Leste in July 2006. This saw 
approximately 50 AFP IDG members deploy in a Public Order Management (POM) capacity to 
assist the ADF, who had deployed under Operation Serene. Rioting broke out following the 
dismissal of 600 soldiers from the Timor Leste Defence Force.296 
Operation Tokoni – Tonga November 2006 
This outbreak was followed by riots in the Tongan capital Nuku’alofa. On 16 November 2006, 
approximately 750 to 1000 people rioted in the Tongan capital of Nuku’alofa, following a period 
293 Moti case thrown out as judge slams AFP over witness payments. Michael McKenna, Sarah Elks. The 
Australian. 16 December 2009 
294 http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/moti-case-thrown-out-as-judge-slams-afp-over-witness-
payments/news-story/52ec288e974a08572d883e147bfb9607 
295 Mullins, J. in Moti v The Queen (2012) 283 ALR 393 
296 A petition by soldiers from Timor’s army F-FDTL in January 2006 resulted in protests in March 2006 
when 594 petitioners were dismissed from the army. A rebel group of soldiers led by Lieutenant Gastao 
Salsinha later joined by Major Alfredo Reinado led a rebellion. The crisis erupted into armed violence in 
April-May. Initial joint operations by the F-FDTL and police (PNTL) soon descended into armed clashes 
between the police, army, rebel soldiers and urban youth, with over 100 people being killed in 2006. This 
escalated beyond the capacity of the security forces and resulted in the fall of the Alkatiri Government. 
The impact continued in Timor Leste politics and in February 2008 there were armed attacks on President 
Ramos Horta and Prime Minister Gusmao, and the death of Major Reinado. 
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of pro-democracy protests.  As a result, a large area of the capital’s central business district was 
destroyed by fire, scores of buildings were looted and seven people died as a result of a 
deliberately lit fire.  Properties owned by the King of Tonga, the Prime Minister and Chinese 
businessmen were specifically targeted.  A State of Emergency was declared and the Tongan 
Government sought assistance from the Australian and New Zealand Governments during the 
evening of 16 November 2006. 
Early on 18 November 2006, an initial AFP commitment of 34 personnel deployed to Tonga to 
re-establish law and order and to support the Tonga Police Force investigation into the criminal 
activity of 16 November 2006.  The deployment was named Operation Tokoni, after the Tongan 
word for ‘friendship’. A total of 65 AFP personnel deployed to Tonga between 18 November 
2006 and 19 December 2006.  The Contingent consisted of personnel from IDG, the Operations 
Response Team (ORT), AFP Forensics, The Victorian Institute of Forensic Medicine, AFP 
Information and Communications Technology, and AFP Protection, portfolios. This deployment 
formed the basis of what was to become the Tonga Police Development Program, (TPDP). 
The three public order events in East Timor, the Solomon Islands, and Tonga, formed the catalyst 
for the formation of the Operations response Group (ORG), which performed a specialist response 
capability within the IDG. This was to later amalgamate with ACT Policing Special Operations 
Team (SOT) to become the Specialist Response Group (SRG) which became an AFP-wide asset 
in 2015, as the IDG was dissolved and its duties absorbed by the AFP International Operations 
portfolio. As the public order issues throughout 2006 attracted the attention of the AFP IDG, the 
situation in relation to Mr Castles as Commissioner of the Royal Solomon Islands Police was 
replicated by the situation of another AFP nominated Commissioner, Mr Andrew Hughes in Fiji. 
Withdrawal of Fiji Police Commissioner Andrew Hughes – November 2006 
The final incident in 2006 involving the AFP, which had implications for the IDG, occurred in 
Fiji in November and December 2006. This involved another seconded senior AFP officer, as 
Commissioner of the Fiji Police Force, AFP Assistant Commissioner Andrew Hughes, who 
assumed his position in 2003. As Commissioner of the Fiji Police Force, Mr Hughes had made 
sincere attempts to reconcile some of the ethnically-based differences between the indigenous 
Fijian population and the Indian population. He had also sought to address corruption and had 
been a major instigator of the Pacific Region Police Initiative (PRPI), as discussed earlier. 
Mr Hughes had been nominated by the AFP following a request by the Fijian Constitutional 
Officers Committee. Fiji had experienced political instability and a coup in 2000 in which the 
Fijian military had deposed the elected government of Prime Minister Mahendra Chaudhry. This 
had resulted in a number of pending prosecutions and it was felt that a non-Fijian citizen would 
better project an image of fairness and impartiality with coup-related cases. 
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Mr Hughes vigorously pursued investigations impartially against high-profile citizens in relation 
to the coup events of 2000. His targets included chiefs and politicians, including some government 
Ministers. This occasionally strained his relationship with the Government of Fiji. His main area 
of disagreement with the government concerned the Reconciliation, Tolerance, and Unity Bill, 
which proposed to establish a Commission empowered to compensate victims and pardon 
perpetrators of the coup. Mr Hughes expressed serious reservations about the amnesty provisions, 
and also opposed government attempts to cap expenditure by the police and the Military. 
Relations between Mr Hughes and the Military Commander, Commodore Frank Bainimarama, 
deteriorated during 2006, to the point where Commodore Bainimarama demanded his resignation 
in November. 
Mr Hughes was critical of the Fijian military throughout the later part of 2006. The military 
consequently demanded that he be sacked by the Government. Mr Hughes had endured intense 
political pressure while maintaining the rule of law in Fiji, in the lead up to an eventual military 
coup in December. Apart from personal threats, threats were also made against the well-being 
of his family.297 His family left in November 2006, and he followed shortly afterwards. 
Fiji – Military coup December 2006 
A military coup deposed the government on 5 December 2006, and on 6 December, according to 
the Fiji Live news service, the military junta announced that it had dismissed Mr Hughes from 
office, citing ‘dereliction of duty.’ However, as AFP Commissioner Keelty stated in 2007 
For a long time now the AFP has been committed to assisting the development of police 
forces not only in the Solomons and Fiji but also Vanuatu, Tonga, Timor-Leste, 
Cambodia and Asian countries. It is important to stand up for the apolitical nature of 
policing-it has to serve the community as well as the Government.298 
Unfortunately there are some political influencers in the region, in both South East Asia and the 
South West Pacific, to which this degree of impartiality, based on the application of an apolitical 
posture, remains inimical. Regional isolation of Fiji intensified in 2009, after Bainimarama failed 
to hold the elections he had promised or, indeed, to open any discussion about the return to 
democracy. In response, the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) and the Commonwealth suspended Fiji. 
Fiji expelled Australia’s High Commissioner in November 2009, and New Zealand’s High 
Commissioner in 2010, cutting diplomatic communications to the bare minimum. This effectively 
spelt the end of the Pacific Region Police Initiative. The Final Report of the PRPI in October 2006 
stated: 
There are very mixed messages being delivered across the Pacific about policing 
priorities.  Most Forum Island Countries (FICs) will never be in a position to have the 
sophistication of policing to address regional and global transnational crime 
297 Australian Federal Police (2007) AFP Platypus Magazine No 94, p. 16. 
298 Australian Federal Police (2007) AFP Platypus Magazine No 94, p. 16. 
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problems.  The primary focus of support for capacity development is at the basic 
functions of community policing: Pacific government budgets are unlikely to afford 
anything more.  Other arrangements are necessary to ensure FIC access to other 
specialist police services when they are required.299 
The key Stakeholders’ Group (KSG), comprising representatives of AusAID, NZAID, Fiji 
Government, PIFS, PICP, AFP, New Zealand Police (NZP) and PRPI. Five years after its 
inception, as the Pacific Regional Police Initiative (PRPI) at the Pacific Islands Forum in 2003, 
the AFP IDG established the Pacific Police Development Program (PPDP) in 2008, which 
adopted many of the same objectives as the PRPI, and much of the same membership, with the 
notable exception of Fiji. 
The Year 2008 – The IDG establishes the Pacific Police Development Program (PPDP) 
As the PRPI could no longer be based in Fiji, due to the ongoing political instability, and Fiji’s 
exclusion from the Pacific Islands Forum, the AFP IDG established the Pacific Police 
Development Program (PPDP). This was a joint initiative between the AFP and the Attorney-
General’s Department in close cooperation with Australia’s development agency, AusAID. It was 
designed to provide a more coherent Australian response to police development needs in the 
Pacific with the intention of providing police to police assistance to improve the rule of law in the 
region. 
PPDP has two broad components which incorporate country-specific programs in Nauru, Papua 
New Guinea, Samoa, Tonga and Vanuatu, as well as a regional component, the Pacific Police 
Development Program-Regional (PPDP-R). The latter provides country-specific support on a fly-
in-fly-out basis to the remaining members of the Pacific Islands Forum countries: Kiribati, Niue, 
Tuvalu, The Republic of the Islands (RMI), Palau, Cook Islands and the Federated States of 
Micronesia (FSM). 
PPDP-R is designed to meet the specific needs of the seven host nations and incorporates an 
ability for joint planning and resource sharing. It has two primary outcomes: (1) the 
encouragement of legitimacy and accountability within the host country police, and (2) increased 
capacity for law and justice agencies to operate within legal frameworks which are just, effective 
and support the rule of law. 
PPDP-R has provided funding and technical advisory support to PICP established working groups 
including the Forensic Working Group, Cyber Safety Pasifika,  the Pacific Policing Training 
Advisory Group (PPTAG), the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP), the Women’s Advisory 
Network and the Pacific Prevention of Domestic Violence Program (PPDVP), which is managed 
299 https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/Aid-Prog-docs/Evaluations/backup_from_uat/Mid-term-Review-
Pacific-Regional-Policing-Initiative.pdf 
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by the New Zealand Police and start-up funding for the Pacific Police Information Technology 
Program Working Group. 
Training supported by PPDP-R includes police leadership courses specifically delivered to future 
and current female police leaders, management of investigations, basic intelligence, sexual 
offences first response and community engagement. PPDP-R also provides assistance in the 
reform and development of corporate policy, planning and legislation and has worked 
collaboratively with AGD’s International Legal Assistance Branch in relation to the review, 
reform and implementation of police enabling legislation.300 
Samoa-Australian Police Partnership (SAPP) 2009 
The AFP took responsibility for the management of the Samoa-Australia Police Partnership 
(SAPP) from AusAID on 1 January 2009. On 1 August 2009, the AFP deployed the first Project 
Manager to Samoa who in consultation with the Commissioner of the Samoa Police and Prison 
Service (SPS) and other key stakeholders, initiated the development and implementation of the 
Samoa – Australia Police Partnership, Strategic Framework 1st January 2010 to June 2012. The 
SAPP is staffed by three members of the AFP. 
This Framework focussed on three key objectives: (1) improved public safety by strengthening 
general policing and investigative capacity; (2) improved police responsiveness to community 
perceptions; (3) improved corporate and administrative support capacity to underpin Samoan 
Police Service operations. Much of this administrative support was captured by the introduction 
of a crime reporting system and case management system within the Criminal Investigations 
Department and the Professional Standards Unit. Police responsiveness was encouraged by 
members of the SPS attending training course such as Emergency Management and Executive 
Development Program, with the support of the Australian Institute of Police Management 
(AIPM), to strengthen police management, encourage change and to improve police performance. 
Media Skills Workshops were conducted to positively shape community perceptions of the police 
through improved media management and response. 
Qualifying courses at the Constable and Sergeant levels were also introduced. Name plates were 
introduced for police to enhance accountability, and a law reference book was compiled and 
distributed to members so they can better informed of their powers and important legislation. An 
enhanced Police Code of Conduct, both in English and Samoan was also promoted throughout 
300 With large Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), and a minimal capacity to patrol and enforce them, 
these nations are subject to illegal exploitation of fishing mainly by vessels based in Asia. The AFP in 
tandem with the ADF Pacific Patrol Boat Program, provides tuition on how to prosecute offenders and 
seize their vessels under the rule of law, and helps to protect their resources. 
185 
                                                 
the SPS. In September 2011 the PPDP funded a Forensic Laboratory and a Pacific Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System. 
The SAPP continues to focus on more advanced police capability development in areas such as 
investigative capacity, brief preparation and case management, police responsiveness, police 
visibility, customer service, training, information management, intelligence, inter-agency 
communication and coordination (including disaster management), performance management, 
executive development, media management, traffic management and radio communications. 
Noteworthy is the fact that the Pacific Transnational Crime Network (PTCN), formed in 2004, 
and discussed below, has its headquarters in Samoa. 
Vanuatu Australia Police Project (VAPP) 2011 
The Vanuatu Australia Police Project (VAPP), is a ‘whole of government’ project aimed at 
providing support to the Vanuatu Police Force (VPF). The project commenced in February 2011, 
following the conclusion of the Vanuatu Police Force Capacity Building Project. This was a 
partnership between the AFP, AusAID (DFAT), the Government of Vanuatu and the Vanuatu 
Police Force (VPF). 
The aim of the project is to provide support to VPF and build and develop capacity of the VPF to 
assist and provide members with the tools and resources to effectively carry out their duties. This 
has included the provision of training and development courses, including Middle Management 
Courses at the Australian Institute of Police Management (AIPM) in Sydney, the modernisation 
of VPF communications system, the construction of police buildings, the provision of a 12 metre 
police vessel as well as several police vehicles. The support has also included improved 
governance procedures and processes relating to finance, budgeting, workforce planning, and 
police accountability as well as improved firearms control. 
Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) 
The Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police, of which the AFP Commissioner is a member, has 
responsibility for various police programs in the Pacific with certain nations assuming lead 
responsibilities. These include the Pacific Forensic Working Group (Federated States of 
Micronesia), the Pacific Transnational Crime Network (Samoa), the Pacific Police Training 
Advisory Network (Palau), Cyber Safety Pasifika (Australia), Women’s Advisory Network 
(French Polynesia), Pacific Police Domestic Violence Program (Niue), Pacific Police Crime 
Prevention Program (Cook Islands), Pacific Police Information and Technology Program 
(Solomon Islands). 
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Pacific Transnational Crime Network (PTCN) 2004 
In addition to the formation of JCLEC and the IDG, the year 2004 also saw the establishment of 
the Pacific Transnational Crime Network (PTCN), in which the AFP plays a significant role. 
Based in Samoa the PCTN and its coordination centre, the Pacific Transnational Crime 
Coordination Centre (PTCCC) links Transnational Crime Units (TCU) in each member country 
and collects, analyses, and disseminates criminal intelligence. It thus provides a proactive 
intelligence network for Pacific police agencies, including the AFP. This sort of operational 
cooperation in the South West Pacific region is important in a constantly changing global criminal 
environment, which poses an increased threat to Pacific island nations as well as Australia. The 
sort of criminal activity targeted by the PCTN includes narcotics trafficking through the region, 
fraud, money laundering, illegal resource exploitation, and irregular people movements. 
The membership of the PCTN consists of Vanuatu, PNG, Fiji, Samoa, Tonga, FSM, Palau, 
Marshall Islands, Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands, Solomon Islands, Kiribati, Cook 
Islands, Niue, Australia, New Zealand and the United States. It  links Transnational Crime Units 
in each country with the broader global law enforcement network via its links with the AFP, NZ 
Police and significantly with the U.S. Joint Inter Agency Task Force West (JIATF-W) based in 
Hawaii. JIATF-W links directly into the extensive U.S. global law enforcement network. It has 
links to the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat (PIFS), Oceania Customs Organisation (OCO), 
Pacific Immigration Directors Conference (PIDC), and the ADF-funded Pacific Patrol Boat 
Program (PPBP). The AFP also provides PTCN advisors to the PTCCC in Samoa, PNG, Fiji and 
the Pacific Island Chiefs of Police (PICP) Secretariat. This provides a vital regional Pacific 
linkage into the AFP’s criminal intelligence network. This is an example of the new diplomatic 
networks advocated by Slaughter. 
Pacific Police Training Advisory Group (PPTAG) 2011 
In 2011, the AFP formed the Pacific Police Training Advisory Group (PPTAG), which seeks to 
address holistic training needs for the region, and works in conjunction with the PPDP-R. One of 
the major programs involves ‘Cybersafety Pasifika’ which is ‘a youth project aimed at developing 
knowledge around cyber-crime and safety matters with an emphasis on internet and technological 
devices. The mission of CSP is to ensure that the children of the Pacific will be safe and secure 
by providing them with the skills and knowledge to navigate the digital landscape safely and 
responsibly.301 
301 Cybersafety Pasifika pamphlet-AFP 2017. This program is based on another AFP cyber safety 
program called ThinkUKnow, targeted at school-aged children and their parents in the ACT. 
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Is this diplomacy by default? 
The diplomatic qualities enunciated by Copeland and Meyer were amply demonstrated during the 
period between the bombings in Bali in 2002, and the closure of the RAMSI mission in the 
Solomon Islands in 2017. Diplomatic activities of communication, including negotiation and 
reporting featured heavily in both of these international engagements. The response and joint 
investigations between the AFP and INP, with other international police, in response to the Bali 
bombings, involved a great deal of negotiation and reporting, and served to cement personal and 
professional relationships between police members. This is a very good example of the different 
way in which police relationships work outside of the political, military or even traditional 
diplomatic frameworks. They way in which police can cooperate and collaborate on a common 
task, to the betterment of their respective communities, despite cultural and language differences, 
is demonstrative of Slaughter’s ‘new diplomacy’. The response to the Bali bombings in October 
2002 was aptly called Operation Alliance. 
Commander PPF Ben McDevitt’s letter to Harold Keke, upon the arrival of RAMSI in 2003, 
although old fashioned, ended with a peaceful end to the militancy, and paved the way for an 
eventual return to sovereignty in the Solomon Islands, from the brink of state collapse. The AFP 
was not only a participant in this mission, it was the lead security agency, and approached the 
armed militants as ‘criminals’ rather than as ‘enemies’, and the resolution was achieved through 
a voluntary and peaceful submission to justice. The follow on investigation saw ‘justice being 
done and being seen to be done’, which served to re-instate community trust in its institutions. 
The RAMSI intervention was given the operational name Operation ‘Helpem Fren’, because that 
is exactly what the mission was intended to do-help a friend. The involvement of the Pacific 
Islands Forum, and the PPF nations, at the insistence of Prime Minister Howard, was an inspired 
piece of regional diplomacy. The creation of the International Deployment Group, to service the 
RAMSI mission and the East Timor missions, provided the basis for greater police engagement 
in the Pacific. 
The primary mission objectives of Operation Alliance were immediate response and the eventual 
bringing of the offenders to justice. This was achieved through networking and collaboration 
between police professionals, and is very much in accordance with Slaughter’s concept of vertical 
and horizontal networking, as advanced by Slaughter as ‘new diplomacy’. The return to full state 
sovereignty in the Solomon Islands is very much in accordance with the ‘replication on 
international society’ as advance by Jonsson and Hall as a feature of diplomacy. 
The instrumental role played by the AFP and its members in both Operation Alliance and 
Operation Helpem Fren, are demonstrative of all of the individual qualities as listed by Copeland 
and Meyer, and of the diplomatic activities as outlined by Jonsson and Hall, and reflect the ‘new 
diplomacy’ as advanced by Slaughter. It is this period, and these engagements, which form the 
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firm foundations upon which the claim that the AFP performs ‘diplomacy by default’ can be 
based. 
Summary and conclusion 
The AFP has made a significant contribution into stabilising what was once referred to as 
Australia’s ‘Arc of Instability’. This success is based on myriad reasons including implicit over-
arching direction from successive U.S. administrations, an acknowledgement that some of the 
issues facing sovereign governments in the region were beyond the capacity of existing resources, 
and a resultant willingness to reach out to a neighbour and seek assistance, and the confidence of 
Australian Governments in the AFP to deliver. This involved the AFP adopting culturally 
appropriate approaches and strategies which, in the case of RAMSI, involved a ‘Pacific face’ with 
Australian training. This is a force multiplier, as Pacific police members gained training, 
experience and contacts which they returned to their own nations with. The IDG concept was 
‘platinum standard’, but was expensive and poorly understood by more operationally focussed 
AFP executives. Combined with the opprobrium attached to successive deployment to PNG and 
Afghanistan, discussed in the next chapter, for which it was neither designed nor intended, the 
IDG concept fell afoul of restricted funding and political inertia. 
Australia has had, and continues to have, direct and indirect interests in the South West Pacific 
region, related to a vested interest in ongoing stability, security, good governance and economic 
prosperity. In some counties in the region, cultural, social, economic, gender, security and 
governance issues, continue to hamper sustainable development. If not addressed, these could 
undermine stability in the region, and have the potential to create conditions which could be 
exploited by malicious state and non-state actors, including criminal elements, requiring future 
interventions. 
The 2013 Australian Defence White Paper stated that the: 
region’s big strategic challenges will last for decades and their mismanagement could 
have significant consequences. Regional forums and multilateralism have proven well 
worth nurturing, even if they remain a modest supplement to long-practised bilateral 
statecraft.302 
Police capacity development programs run by the AFP, and participation in a wide range of 
police-related for a, have played a significant role in this form of multilateral and bilateral 
statecraft. With a change in government in Canberra, from Prime Minister Howard to Rudd, came 
a change in foreign policy strategy and the deployment of AFP IDG members to missions where 
302 Defence White Paper 2013, Commonwealth of Australia, 2013. 
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expectations were high and difficult to meet, with the resultant adverse impact on political 
support. 
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Chapter 5: Police in Challenging Environments – Closer to 
Home and Further Afield 
Overview 
This chapter explains the way the AFP is well positioned within government law, intelligence, 
and security circles in the Australian and international contexts. It will be demonstrated how the 
AFP has shown itself as capable and ready to respond effectively, to extant and emerging conflicts 
and challenges, and as such has earned a place in foreign policy discussions and considerations, 
at the highest diplomatic levels, including the United Nations. This assertion is supported by case 
examples of international deployments in Papua New Guinea, in Afghanistan and in response to 
the downing of Malaysian Airlines MH17. 
Section 1: Papua New Guinea – Early colonialism 
Bismarck’s principle of effective government 
The Berlin Conference which resulted in the Scramble for Africa, was called for by Portugal and 
organised by Otto von Bismarck, the German Chancellor. One of the principles to emerge from 
this conference was the Principle of Effective Occupation for European powers, which as 
previously discussed could acquire rights over colonial lands, only if they actually possessed 
them, namely if they had treaties with local leaders, if they flew their flag there, and if they 
established an administration in the territory to govern it with a police force to keep order.  
Although it applied to the European colonisation of Africa, the metaphorical and practical 
application of this principle in relation to law, justice and policing, and their relationships with 
peace, order, good government and prosperity, should not be overlooked in the post-colonial 
setting in the South West Pacific. This is of particular relevance to Papua New Guinea, as the 
north eastern quadrant of the island of New Guinea was actually colonised by Germany in 
the1880s, and the Principle of Effective Occupation would have been directly relevant to that 
territory. The German administered territory was policed by the New Guinea Police Force. The 
south eastern quadrant, known as Papua, was administered by the British until 1905, when it 
changed from British to Australian administration. It was policed by The Royal Papuan 
Constabulary. 
The German Territory, then known as New Guinea, was ceded to Australia following the Treaty 
of Versailles in 1919, under a League of Nations mandate in 1920, and joined the south eastern 
quadrant, Papua, which had been reluctantly colonised under the British Crown. This followed 
precipitous action by the colonial Government of Queensland in the 1880s, due to alarm at 
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German activities in the region. Once amalgamated, they became the Australian Territory of 
Papua and New Guinea (TPNG), and eventually the new nation of Papua New Guinea upon 
gaining independence in 1975. 
The Australian Territory of Papua and New Guinea (TPNG) and the ‘kiaps’ 
Policing during the period between 1945 and 1975, was done via Australian Patrol Officers, 
known as ‘Kiaps’, a pidgin term derived from the German word for captain, (kapitän).  In all, 
about 2000 young Australian males performed duties as Patrol Officers in the Australian Territory 
of Papua and New Guinea. Prior to taking up their posts, they were trained at the Australian 
School of Pacific Administration (ASOPA) in Sydney. 
In the field, kiaps juggled the multiple roles of ambassador, policeman, judge, 
administrator, explorer, farmer, engineer and anthropologist. Away for weeks at a 
time, kiaps patrolled vast areas on foot with the help of an indigenous police force.303 
A recruitment advertisement from 1959, provides a snapshot of an era offering positions for 
‘Cadet Patrol Officer; Cadet Agricultural Officer; Cadet Veterinary Officer; Cadet Education 
Officer; Cadet Forest Officer; Cadet Valuer; Co-operative Officer-in-Training, and Clerk’, to 
male British Subjects aged between 18 and 24. ‘…they were administrators, census takers, 
policemen, magistrates and gaolers. Some were required to go on arduous patrols into unexplored 
territory. At times it was dangerous work…’ 304. The kiaps were assisted by the amalgamated 
native police forces, the New Guinea Police Force, in the north, and the Royal Papuan 
Constabulary in the south. These were later amalgamated to form the Royal Papuan and New 
Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) upon independence in 1975. 
Independence 1975 
The kiaps ceased duties in 1975, with independence and the RPNGC assumed primacy. It could 
be argued that since independence in 1975, Papua New Guinea has not demonstrated ‘effective 
occupation’, and in terms of governance, has seen a gradual, but consistent decline in internal 
security and stability, an eroded standard of living, and chronic neglect of basic services such as 
health and education, as well as law and order. This has occurred despite sincere and costly efforts 
on the part of international aid donors (including the Australian Government and its taxpayer 
base), to assist the human development of the people of PNG, the economic and social 
development of PNG as a nation, and its placement in the global community of nations. 
303 http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/snapshots/find-of-the-month/september-2010.aspx 
304 Recruitment advertisement: Australian Department of Territories in 1959. (NAA: A452, 1959/4654) 
http://www.naa.gov.au/collection/snapshots/find-of-the-month/september-2010.aspx 
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Figure 9. Map of Papua New Guinea 
Source: Nations Online Project 
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Urbanisation 
In concert with other parts of the Pacific, particularly in Melanesia, rapid urbanisation and 
increased crime rates have exacerbated an already extant disparity situation between rich and 
poor. This urban drift started in the immediate post-independence era, when large groups of males 
from rural areas moved to urban centres seeking employment. In a familiar pattern, a lack of work 
and pressure on general facilities, unable to handle this influx, resulted in the development of 
squatter camps. As the squatter camps continued to grow, due to the high rate of unemployment, 
low education levels and boredom, they provided a steady stream of recruits to criminal gangs 
which became known as ‘raskol’ gangs. 
This provided disenfranchised youth with a sense of worth and belonging within the existing and 
culturally accepted ‘wantok’ hierarchy. This extended into various government organisations 
including the police and military, as well as into mainstream politics providing a pool of thugs 
for hire for use in extortion, robbery, bribery and other violent and predatory crimes. These 
include vandalism, theft, physical violence, racial attacks targeting foreigners, violent sexual 
attacks and mutilation, drug taking, murder, extortion and armed robbery. 
Crime 
Law and order in PNG remains a serious issue, and PNG is seemingly at a constant risk of 
breaking down completely into a state of anarchy. Corruption is endemic, often masked by the 
‘wantok’ culture, which is widely accepted as a part of the PNG tribal-based culture. This has an 
impact not just upon the long-suffering law abiding members of the community, but also to the 
risk-based decisions relating to foreign investment. A Special Report by ASPI in 2014 lists five 
broad areas of crime: (1) violence against women; (2) corruption; (3) public order; (4) crimes 
against the person and property; and (5) transnational crime and money laundering.305. 
Many of the drivers underpinning this combination of criminal activity include, culturally 
accepted or ingrained behaviours, particularly in relation to violence against women, corruption 
and public order. PNG is a male-dominated culture, and as a consequence, the RPNGC is a male-
dominated culture. This is highly problematic, and difficult to address by cultural outsiders, 
without risking exposure to accusations of cultural imperialism. This is not to say that 
international police should not or cannot attempt to address these issues, quite the contrary, but 
strategies designed to do so, need to factor in the cultural aspects of a male-dominated, ‘warrior’ 
culture, and work towards changing male behaviours, as well as championing the cause of 
inclusiveness of women’s participation in community activities including policing. Such changes 
305 Connery, D. and Claxton, K. (2014) Shared interests, enduring cooperation: The future of Australia-
PNG police engagement. ASPI Special Report. October 2014. 
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are unlikely to take place in the short-term, and are likely to be resisted by an entrenched 
patriarchy. 
Corruption is endemic and pervasive, and can often be masked by the ‘wontok’ culture. Inaction 
by the authorities, such as the police, to seriously address such issues, has led to a culture of 
impunity and the inevitable culture of violence. This has a negative impact on investor confidence, 
and therefore upon the prospects of enhanced peace and prosperity. Transparency International, 
rates PNG as ‘highly corrupt’ and ranks it among the bottom third of nations surveyed.306 
Similarly, the Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering used a standard comparative assessment 
to report in 2011, that PNG faces very serious risks from money laundering (ASPI, 2010). The 
World Bank rated Port Moresby and Lae, two of the unsafest cities in the world in 2010, on the 
basis of their 33 and 66 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively. Regular surveys of 
community, business and investor confidence, as well as academic studies, support widespread 
perceptions that the country is badly affected by violence and crime.307 
Tribal violence is a serious issue, but appears to be in a different category from the urban thuggery 
perpetrated by the ‘raskol’ gangs in Port Moresby and Lae, but the lines appear to be blurred, 
particularly in the urban fringes. Connery and Claxton point out  
Large fights, mainly over land issues that may go back decades, involve hundreds of 
warriors using military, high-powered and homemade guns. Intergroup clashes on the 
outskirts of cities and towns stem from friction as newer settlers from ‘outside’ groups 
are blamed for taking work and causing crime.308 
One result of this combination of widespread corruption, and semi-officially sanctioned crime is 
that there is widespread cannabis cultivation, particularly in the Highlands. The AFP, with the 
RPNGC, has intercepted, investigated and prosecuted numerous attempts at importation of 
narcotics, and other contraband from PNG to Far North Queensland, by light aircraft and vessel. 
This area is remote, and as such police resourcing is very thin on the ground. The AFP has offices 
in Cairns, and two officers posted on Thursday Island in the Torres Strait, the narrow waterway 
between the tip of Cape York Peninsula in Far North Queensland, and the Southern Province of 
Papua New Guinea, which is only about 100 kilometres wide and is populated by a number of 
islands, known as the Torres Strait Islands. The ability for Australian authorities to detect and 
respond to criminal activity in this remote region, is extremely challenging. In part, effective 
306 https://www.transparency.org/country/PNG 
307 Connery and Claxton (2014), p. 3. 
308 Connery and Claxton (2014), p. 6. 
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Australian border control relies on timely and accurate reporting between the AFP and RPNGC, 
which is fostered through peer-to-peer relationships. 
Cape York Peninsula and the Torres Strait 
The Department of Immigration and Border Protection is also active in the area. The Queensland 
Police Service also has members posted to police stations on Thursday Island in the Torres Strait 
and throughout Cape York Peninsula. Their primary role is community-based policing, rather 
than border protection. Therefore, a deterioration of circumstances in PNG has direct implications 
for Australia, due to its proximity and the regional vulnerability to covert border penetration. It 
need not necessarily be narcotics which are being imported. It may be items, such as bio-hazards 
or people, such as terrorists, with the potential to cause serious harm to the Australian community, 
particularly through threats to the agricultural economy by bio-hazards. A state of lawlessness, or 
a state where malign non-state actors, such as organised crime groups, hold influence over affairs 
in PNG, increases the risk of such activities impacting upon Australia. 
This is compounded by the possibility, which has influenced Australian strategic thinking on PNG 
since the Germans in the 1880s, that a state power whose interests are inimical to Australia’s, 
having influence in PNG, poses a direct threat to Australian sovereignty. This nearly came to pass 
in the 1940s with the expansion of Imperial Japanese forces in the region. As ASPI strategist 
Joanne Wallis, recalled that: 
renowned strategic thinker T.B. Millar once reflected, Papua New Guinea is an ‘an 
exposed and vulnerable front door’, as if it was in ‘hostile hands’ it would ‘make 
attacks on our east coast much easier – Port Moresby, after all, is closer to Sydney 
than Darwin is.309 
There are therefore vulnerabilities for Australia from an unstable PNG, and clearly this is a 
situation which Australia cannot ignore. There are global, regional and domestic considerations 
in the relationship between PNG and Australia, and very real incentives for Australia to invest 
heavily in social stability and economic progress in PNG. However, if one were to apply a 
PESTEL (Political, Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental, Legal) analysis to the 
relationship, it is the political and the legal, which have been most influential in the manner in 
which the policing aspect of the relationship has developed, and this has been detrimental to actual 
progress, and as a bi-product, harmful to the reputation of the AFP.  The recent involvement of 
the AFP in PNG can be seen in two stages: (1) the PNG Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) 
in 2005 and (2) the PNG-Australia Police Partnership (PNG-APP), which ran in phases from 2008 
to the present. 
309 Wallis, J (2014). Is Australia’s influence over Papua New Guinea declining? The Strategist, 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 20 October 2014. 
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Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) – 2004–2005 
For many years the forerunner to AusAID, the Australian International Development Aid Bureau 
(AIDAB), provided police advisers to the RPNGC under contract. However in the mid-2000s 
under the Howard Doctrine, which had witnessed relative successes in East Timor and the 
Solomon Islands, in 2005 the AFP deployed serving members to work alongside their RPNGC 
counterparts, in an executive policing role. This met with mixed success, due to a range of factors, 
not the least of which was the successful constitutional challenge to the immunities under which 
Australian police deployed to PNG in 2005 which will be discussed below. 
The governance underpinning this deployment commenced with the ‘Enhanced Cooperation 
Program: RPNGC-AFP ECP Policing Assistance Component: Implementing Agreement’ signed 
in August 2004, also referred to as the ‘Madang Agreement’ or the ‘ECP Treaty’ which was 
enacted into PNG law in the ‘Enhanced Cooperation between Australia and Papua New Guinea 
Act 2004 (ECP Act)’. This included the deployment of both Assisting Australian Police Personnel 
(AAPP) as well as other Australian government personnel deployed to work with their 
counterparts in PNG Government departments and agencies. The objective of the ECP was to 
work in partnership with the Government of PNG, to address core issues in law and order and 
justice, as well as capacity in the RPNGC.  
Enhanced Cooperation Treaty – 2004 
A number of administrative and legal arrangements were included in the ECP Act of 2004. These 
included the granting of ‘functions, powers, authorities and privileges exercised by members of 
the RPNGC’ under Article 3 (7). Crucially AAPP members were not ‘members’ of the RPNGC 
for the purposes of carrying out their duties. Furthermore they were subject to command and 
control by the head of the AAPP, a deployed AFP senior officer, who was required to report 
administratively to the Commissioner of the RPNGC, but who also was operationally responsible 
to the Commissioner of the AFP. There was thus a conflict of sovereignty. 
In acknowledgment of the highly litigious nature of PNG society, and due to the exposure AAP 
members would have to vexatious and malicious prosecutions, AAPP members were granted 
immunity from the civil jurisdiction of the PNG courts, with respect to acts or omissions done in 
the course of, or incidental to their official duties. It was these aspects of ‘privilege’ and 
‘immunity’,310 and the dual nature of reporting to two Commissioners, which formed the basis of 
310 In the case of the ECP the purpose of applying ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ was to ensure that 
members of the deployment could perform their assigned functions effectively, efficiently and 
independently. ‘Privileges’ generally refer to exemptions from the host state’s laws and regulations, for 
example immigration and customs requirements and the application of duties and taxation. ‘Immunities’ 
generally refer to protection from the application of legal process, including criminal and civil 
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the successful constitutional challenge by the Governor of Morobe Province Mr Luther Wenge. 
In its judgement, the PNG Supreme Court made a number of determinations including: 
a) The command structure, whereby AAPP were subject to the direction of the 
head of the AAPP, was held to be invalid because it undermined the 
constitutional requirement that the Commissioner of the RPNGC have 
superintendence and control of the PNG Police Force (s.198 of the PNG 
Constitution). 
b) The arrangements for dealing with criminal jurisdiction were held to be invalid 
because they were inconsistent with the unfettered prosecutorial discretion 
given to the PNG Public Prosecutor and members of the RPNGC under the 
PNG Constitution (ss.176 and 197(2) respectively). 
c) The immunity from civil jurisdiction with respect to acts or omissions done in 
the course of or incidental to their official duties was held to be invalid to the 
extent that it affected the rights of persons to enforce rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the PNG Constitution.311 
This was deemed to be an unacceptable risk by the AFP, and the Australian Government withdrew 
the police component of the ECP in May 2005. This marked the end of the first serious attempt 
at addressing some of PNG’s law and order issues by a large Australian ‘boots on the ground’ 
police intervention. There is no way of accurately assessing whether this approach would have 
been successful, but one lesson learned includes the fact that not everyone welcomes such 
interventions. Despite strong political support at the national level, the existence of such missions 
can be successfully challenged through an active judicial system, which embodies the rule of law, 
and proves the existence of the separation of powers in PNG. It also raised the risk profile 
associated with such deployments by including exposure to legal risks as legitimate 
considerations for incorporation into mission planning, alongside the security, physical and health 
risks. The influence of the Melanesian Spearhead Group should also not be discounted in this 
regard. 
Papua New Guinea Policing Partnership (PNG-APP) 
The period between the end of the ECP in 2005, and the commencement of the PNG-APP in 
2008, featured two major events of significance to the AFP IDG and its reputation. The first was 
the election of the Rudd Government in 2007, and its changed posture in relation to the region, 
and the second was the deployment of AFP members to Afghanistan, which will be discussed in 
detail in a later section. The PNG-APP will be discussed below. 
procedures. In the Wenge decision, any such ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ were deemed to be 
inconsistent with the PNG Constitution. 
311 AFP Legal Risk Report 2012 Papua New Guinea-Australia Police Partnership, pp. 14-15. 
198 
                                                 
2008 to present: Operation ‘Wok Wantaim’ 
Following the withdrawal of the ECP in 2005, due to its conflict with the PNG Constitution, the 
AFP, under the Rudd Government negotiated an agreement with the PNG Government of Prime 
Minister Peter O’Neill, for the deployment of a relatively small number of AFP advisors to the 
RPNGC. This was known as Phase I. These 17 members were deployed to the Bomana Police 
College and the Internal Affairs Directorate, and carried out a range of support roles. In October 
2011,  Parliamentary Secretary for Pacific Island Affairs in the Rudd Government, Richard 
Marles stated: 
The sense of the need to have more police on the ground, more federal police, is 
certainly an issue that was raised on the PNG side, and it's certainly one we take very 
seriously and we're keen to assist…312 
In 2012, Phases II and III of the PNG-APP were implemented, increasing the number of members 
deployed by 11 sworn and 5 unsworn, who focused on  training, logistics, professional standards, 
governance and accountability management frameworks, fraud and anti-corruption. All of the 
AFP’s international deployments, including those to PNG were impacted by changing political 
circumstances in Canberra. The ECP under the Howard Doctrine, had failed due to circumstances 
beyond the control of the AFP, both at the strategic level and the operational level. The Howard 
Government was replaced by the Rudd Government in a landslide victory for the ALP. This 
started a cycle of political instability in Australia, which distracted from issues such as police 
development in places such as PNG. This was exacerbated by a single issue involving border 
control, which sucked the life out of most other government programs. 
After 11 years in office the conservative Howard Government was voted out in 2007, with Prime 
Minister Howard losing his own seat of Bennelong in Sydney. The Howard Government was 
replaced by the energetic government of Kevin Rudd, a progressive multi-lateralist with a strong 
belief in the United Nations, and of Australia’s role on the Asia-Pacific region. Rudd himself was 
replaced by Julia Gillard after a leadership contest in June 2010. Rudd again took the Prime 
Ministership after another internal leadership contest in June 2013, shortly before the government 
was to face the electorate.  
Regional resettlement program with Papua New Guinea 
Between 2007 and 2013 the Rudd-Gillard-Rudd Governments had seen a significant influx of 
irregular maritime arrivals, with people from as far afield as Africa, the Middle East and Pakistan, 
seeking asylum in Australia, after transiting through Malaysia and Indonesia. This was electorally 
312 Australian police may return to PNG - Government says. October 21, 2011. 
http://www.news.com.au/breaking-news/australian-police-may-return-to-png-government-says/news-
story/0902d7abc5b16e0601ef7e5334768abb 
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unpopular, and was considered at the political level that a loss of control of borders would result 
in a loss of government. Shortly after Prime Minister Rudd replaced Prime Minister Gillard in 
2013, he announced a Regional Resettlement Program with Papua New Guinea, whereby those 
seeking asylum by arriving by boat from Indonesia, would not be settled in Australia.  In the lead 
up to the 2013 federal election The Guardian: reported on 19 July 2013: 
All asylum seekers who arrive in Australia by boat will be sent to Papua New Guinea 
for processing and resettlement and none will be allowed to stay in the country, the 
prime minister has announced, as he sent out a draconian pre-election message that 
Australia’s borders are closed to refugees. 
In what he said was “a clear and undiluted message to every people smuggler in the 
world that your business model is basically undermined”, Kevin Rudd said the new 
rules would apply initially for one year and there was no limit on the numbers of asylum 
seekers PNG would take. 
In return, the government announced new aid to PNG for hospitals and universities 
and said it would pay unspecified “resettlement costs” for the refugees as well as 
bearing the costs of the expansion and upgrade of the Manus Island processing centre. 
Rudd said only that the package would “not be inexpensive” but no cost details were 
immediately available.313, 314 
The relationship between perceived national interests and international good 
citizenship personified 
Although not overtly stated, the connection with an expanded police program in PNG was 
assumed, and in 2013, the AFP expanded the PNG-APP mission by 50 frontline police officers, 
known as Phase IV, following the agreement between Prime Ministers Rudd and O’Neill.  That 
agreement included a small group of AFP officers deployed to Lae. 
In September 2013, the Rudd ALP Government was replaced by a Liberal Government, led by 
Prime Minister Tony Abbott, who continued both the Regional Resettlement Plan and the PNG-
APP. Prime Minister Abbott was himself replaced as Prime Minister by Malcolm Turnbull in 
September 2015 as a result of a leadership vote in the Liberal Party. Prime Minister Turnbull has 
continued both programs, although the Regional Resettlement Program is in its final stages, as 
313 Rudd announces deal to send all asylum boat arrivals to Papua New Guinea, The Guardian 19 July 
2013. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/19/kevin-rudd-asylum-boats-png 
314 The Regional resettlement arrangement between Australia and PNG was signed in Brisbane 19 July 
2013. It had as its intention: 
‘…encouraging sub-regional and bilateral arrangements to create disincentives for irregular travel, in-
cluding through possible transfer and readmission arrangements. …Existing cooperation between Aus-
tralia and Papua New Guinea, in particular through the Manus Island Regional Processing Centre, rep-
resents a significant element of the regional response to people smuggling. Australia warmly welcomes 
Papua New Guinea’s offer to adopt additional measures which build on the Manus Island Regional Pro-
cessing Centre. These measures will make a significant further contribution to encouraging potential un-
authorized arrivals to avail themselves of lawful channels to seek asylum and to abandon the practice of 
perilous sea journeys which has led to the deaths of so many.’  [Regional Resettlement Arrangement 19 
July 2013. 
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the PNG Supreme Court deemed the detention centre illegal in May 2017, and ordered its closure 
by the end of 2017. 
Despite the political and legal challenges, the PNG-APP mission now stands at 73 members with 
60 members in Port Moresby and 13 in Lae. These members are ostensibly involved in ‘publicly 
visible policing activities’, but lack executive police powers and have no authority. They are 
involved in training, prosecutions, station management, custody management, specialised crime 
squads and corporate management. Members also undertake joint foot patrols in community areas 
including markets and shopping centres. 
Throughout 2017, a significant number of these members have been involved in duties related to 
the upcoming Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting to be hosted by Papua New 
Guinea in 2018. Much of this has involved training and advising RPNGC members in duties 
specifically related to APEC. They include: traffic control, including motorcycle escorts, police 
intelligence, airport policing including Counter Terrorist First Response, Bomb Search, canine 
operations, Water Police, Close Personal Protection (CPP), hostage negotiations, investigations, 
custody management, gender issues, family and sexual violence and internal investigations, as 
well as Public Order Management (POM). It should be noted that the RPNGC remains the 
sovereign authority in PNG and that the AFP activity is confined to advising and training. It 
should be noted that these are all areas in which the AFP has a particularly comprehensive skills 
and experience base. These tasks are important for the RPNGC to deliver the secure conduct of 
the APEC meetings, and have some follow on value for post-APEC policing in PNG. 
Future trends 
One of the most serious challenges facing international police participating in an intervention 
involving police capacity development, is the issue of community trust. As discussed, the nature 
and the level of crime is PNG is difficult to address via a liberal-democratic policing approach, 
particularly when the international police, in this case the AFP, lacks authority and adequate 
capacity to make a meaningful contribution to addressing the underlying causes of crime. In the 
case of PNG, this appears to be a combination of cultural factors, such as tribal disputes and social 
factors created by trends such as rapid urbanisation, high youth unemployment and an 
environment in which organised thuggery and corruption seem to thrive with impunity. 
Addressing these issues in any meaningful way in PNG, through better policing, involves acting 
on two assumptions identified by ASPI in a Special Report by Connery and Claxton in October 
2014. 
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The PNG police force 
The first assumption is that the PNG Government wants an effective police force. This involves 
effective policing in all of its aspects, including an objective and impartial anti-corruption 
capability with the authority and the capacity for it to deliver. It also involves developing a 
stronger relationship with the PNG community. One significant lesson to come from the RAMSI 
mission in the Solomon Islands, it is that re-establishing community trust in the police, once it 
has been lost, can take many years. The situation in PNG is manifestly more complex than the 
Solomon Islands, and as ASPI points out: ‘creating an effective RPNGC that can promote the 
rule of law, prevent crime, use resources to their maximum effect and contribute to a positive 
human rights situation in PNG is a generational undertaking.’ 315 
The second assumption is that Australia will support an ongoing commitment to PNG’s police. 
There are other Australian-led programs in PNG aimed at enhanced justice. They include: the 
PNG–Australia Law and Justice Program (PALJP); the Strongim Gavam Program (SGP) and the 
Combating Corruption Project (CCP), all of which are funded by DFAT. The PNG-APP is the 
only program in this sector which is not funded by DFAT, and as such is exposed to occasional 
unfavourable commentary from DFAT. 
Whether the Australian Government decides to continue with the PNG-APP post-APEC, and if 
so, in what format, will not be known until 2018. The impetus behind the decision to boost the 
PNG-APP in 2013, combined with the Regional Resettlement Program no longer exists, as 
facilities on Manus Island close down and the pre-APEC incentive for enhanced training will 
dissipate post-APEC. The underlying causes of crime will, in all likelihood, remain unaddressed, 
thus creating an environment favourable for more organised criminal activity on Australia’s 
vulnerable northern approaches and the potential risks attached. 
The Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) 
The third assumption, not stated by the ASPI paper, is that PNG will prefer international 
assistance to come from Australia in the south, rather from Asia in the north. The Melanesian 
Spearhead Group (MSG) has a ‘Look North’ policy, whereby it is seeking greater connectivity 
with Asia, particularly China, in terms of investment and cultural exchange. The dynamics with 
the MSG are interesting in this regard, as they also have an impact on the Pacific Islands Forum 
(PIF), which has been the pre-eminent supra-national body in the South West Pacific, and was 
the authority which underwrote the RAMSI intervention in the Solomon Islands. Notably the PIF 
has a membership which includes Australia and New Zealand. An alternative grouping, with 
connections with the MSG is the Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), which excludes 
315 Wallis, J. (2014) 
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Australia and New Zealand. Wallis states that this is ‘an alternative caucus grouping at the United 
Nations, the ‘Pacific Small Island Developing States’ (PSIDS) group, which has effectively 
relaced the PIF in this role.’ 316 
Australia PNG relationships 
The MSG ‘Look North’ posturing, has obvious implications for regional dynamics particularly 
as they relate to the Australia-PNG relationship. There are already a number of other interested 
parties engaging with PNG, and more broadly in the region. Carter and Firth (2015) identified 
some of these parties: 
China is a rising power in the region, the United States is responding to that rise, and 
Indonesia is claiming a Melanesian identity for its easternmost provinces as part of a 
concerted effort to forge closer links with the island countries of the western Pacific. 
Japan, China, the United States, Korea, India, Indonesia, Israel and the European 
Union are all counted among the external states that have deepened their long-term 
connection with Melanesia in recent years, while the United Arab Emirates, Russia and 
Georgia are recent minor players on the scene. France is a Pacific Islands power with 
three Pacific territories.317 
The implications of this sort of regional engagement for Australia are unknown, and are not really 
an issue upon which police could or should comment, other than to attempt to determine what it 
may mean for criminal activity which may impact on Australia or Australian interests. In this 
capacity the AFP maintains a strong liaison presence in Port Moresby, independent of the PNG-
APP mission. The duties of this post include participation in the PNG intelligence group 
responsible for monitoring activities in the Torres Strait, assisting the RPNGC with its conduit 
with INTERPOL, and the provision of support to the RPNGC Transnational Crime Unit (TCU) 
within the Pacific Transnational Crime Network (PTCN). 
Australia has a unique relationship with Papua New Guinea, particularly since it is a former 
Australian administered territory. Since independence in 1975, the relationship has been seen 
primarily through the prism of PNG acting as a sentinel state for potential hostilities in the region, 
or as a recipient of considerable amounts of foreign aid funding, and very little attention has been 
paid to its internal governance or its implications for Australia, which as has been discussed, has 
the potential to impact on Australian sovereignty and its peace and prosperity. The way in which 
Australia responds to the challenges posed by internal governance issues in PNG remains unclear. 
It is reasonable to assume that the AFP will have some sort of involvement, both in terms of 
316 Wallis, J. (2014) 
317 Carter, G and Firth, S (2015) The Mood in Melanesia after the Regional Assistance Mission to 
Solomon Islands, Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1002/(ISSN)2050-2680 
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protecting the safety and security of the Australian community, and the promotion of 
humanitarian values within a culturally appropriate social contract in PNG. 
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Section 2: Afghanistan 
Afghanistan 2007–2013 
As discussed previously in the thesis, the International Deployment Group (IDG) was established 
under the Howard Government in 2004, for police capacity development and stability missions 
in the Pacific. However, between 2007 and 2014, the AFP was deployed at political direction, to 
another theatre entirely: Afghanistan. The AFP engagement in Afghanistan was well intentioned, 
particularly by those who actually deployed, but due to fast-changing, and often ambiguous 
strategic directions, there was little prospect that the AFP would be able to make any meaningful 
progress, and its members were exposed to high risk for very low return. There was a general 
perception held by many AFP members deployed to Afghanistan, that much of the strategic 
direction appeared to be based more on political optics than operational effectiveness. 
The AFP was subject to many diversions. The mission was characterised by a failure of the AFP, 
and the Australian polity generally, to appreciate and understand the human factors involved in 
Afghanistan, whose history, culture, social structures, political, legal and economic frameworks, 
ideology and religious intricacies, have very complex origins. Furthermore, this ‘failure to 
understand’, influenced those whose policy approaches underwrote the strategic direction, and 
set over ambitious expectations. If ever there was a case of being ‘thrown off course by a thousand 
diversions’, it is the various directions international interventions took in Afghanistan and its 
region following the attacks on September 11, 2001. When Clausewitz wrote the following, he 
was writing about conventional warfare between organised forces, with clear objectives in mind. 
Everything in strategy is very simple…once it is determined from the political 
conditions what a war is meant to achieve and what it can achieve, it is easy to chart 
the course. But great strength of character, as well as great lucidity and firmness of 
mind, is required in order to follow through steadily to carry out the plan and not be 
thrown off course by a thousand diversions.318 
Policing in any environment, is an endeavour whose success is dependent upon several factors, 
which fall into two broad categories: (1) physical, such as climate, terrain, existing infrastructure; 
and (2) human, which includes, history, culture, social structures, political, legal and economic 
frameworks, ideology and religion. To a certain extent, the physical factors can be mitigated 
technically, and will not be dealt with further in this section of the thesis. International police 
development in any society, however, must account for the human factors, and attempt to 
incorporate them into programs and service delivery. 
318 Clausewitz, C. von. On War (1993).  Everyman’s Library Series. Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 
p. 209. 
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Three criteria for the success of any endeavour including international police deployments are, 
first, political will which underpins a coherent strategy based on sound policy; second, adequate 
resourcing and funding; and third, realistically achievable objectives. Much of the thinking 
behind this can be condensed into the word ‘understanding’, which appears to have been 
overlooked in the deployments to Papua New Guinea and Afghanistan. In both missions, high 
expectations, based more on political optics than operationally achievable objectives, set the AFP 
up for potential failure. 
 
 
Figure 10. Map of Afghanistan 
Source: nationsonline.org 
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Counter terrorism to counter insurgency 
The period 2007–2013, was a period in which governments changed in both Australia, and the 
United States, from so-called ‘conservatives’ to so-called ‘progressives’, with the inevitable 
changes in political posturing and strategic direction. This was particularly evident in approaches 
to Afghanistan, where, with the election of the Obama Administration, the strategic approach 
changed from a predominantly ‘Counter-Terrorism’ (CT) posture, to a predominantly ‘Counter 
Insurgency’ (COIN) approach. 319  The slightly confusing aspect of this from a policing 
perspective, is that both terrorists and insurgents do the same things; they use violence to attempt 
to achieve political ends. The NATO definitions do not leave much room for distinction between 
the two as far as their actual activities are concerned. The NATO definitions are as follows: 
Terrorism: 
[t]he unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or 
property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve 
political, religious or ideological objectives. 
 Insurgency: 
[a]ctions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks 
to effect or prevent political change or to overthrow a governing authority within a 
country or a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use 
of violence and subversion. 
 Counter Terrorism: 
[a] offensive measures taken to neutralize terrorism before and after hostile acts are 
carried out. Note: Such measures include those counterforce activities justified for the 
defence of individuals as well as containment measures implemented by military forces 
or civilian organizations. 
319 Kilcullen (2009) states: ‘Counter-terrorism, a discipline dating from the early 1970s, focuses on the 
enemy: the individual terrorist and the network of terrorist operatives. It seeks to destroy this network, 
proceeding from the assumption that removing the network removes the problem. In this sense, like most 
conventional warfare, it is ‘enemy-centric.’ On the other hand, classical counter-insurgency, a discipline 
that emerged in the late 1950s but has much older roots in imperial policing and colonial small wars, is 
‘population-centric.’ It focuses on the population, seeking to protect it from harm by-or interaction with-
the insurgent, competing with the insurgent for influence and control at the grassroots level. Its basic 
assumption is that insurgency is a mass social phenomenon, that the enemy rides and manipulates a 
social wave consisting of genuine popular grievances, and that dealing with this broader social and 
political dynamite, while gaining time for targeted reforms to work by applying a series of tailored, full-
spectrum security measures, is the most promising path to ultimately resolve the problem.’ Kilcullen, D 
(2009). The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Scribe Publications 
Melbourne. (xv). This is the precise approach adopted by the British in the Malayan Emergency 1947-
1960, as discussed at the end of Chapter 1 of this thesis, which as discussed involves police using 
extraordinary powers of  force and intrusion  inimical to a liberal-democratic Peelian approach to 
policing. 
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Counter insurgency: 
Comprehensive civilian and military efforts made to defeat an insurgency and to 
address any core grievances.320 
Both terrorism and insurgency involve the threat, or actual use of force or violence, to influence 
political outcomes, based on a political, religious or ideological basis. From a policing 
perspective, these activities are considered to be crimes, and they are addressed in the same way, 
namely all efforts are made to detect, deter, prevent or disrupt them, or if offences are actually 
committed, all efforts are made to identify the offenders and have them brought to justice. Herein 
lies the difference between the way police perceive and address such things, and the way the 
military counters them. In the case of the US military under the Presidency of George W. Bush, 
offensive measures, counter terrorism measures meant using military force. In Afghanistan this 
was known as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), which included aerial bombardment and 
missile attacks, launched from U.S. Navy ships at sea, combined with aggressive action by special 
forces, and CIA operatives on the ground.  
A failure to understand 
Addressing core community grievances is the key element in COIN strategy. When U.S. strategic 
policy changed due to a change in government in 2008, Australian policy correspondingly 
changed. The role of policing, especially liberal-democratic policing, in a counter-terrorism 
operation such as Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), is nil as they are purely military operations 
in which law and justice are disregarded for good reason. The primary focus was to avenge the 
911 attacks by targeting Osama bin Laden who had taken refuge in the Tora Bora caves on the 
remote border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, hence the bombing and missile strikes. This 
was ‘counter terrorism’ via military offensive action, in which the police play no role at all. 
In a ‘counter insurgency’ however, the role of police is extremely important, because  one means 
of addressing community grievances involves restoring and maintaining justice mechanisms 
through which such grievances can be addressed. Effective policing plays an extremely important 
role in this process. Building trust between the community and its government, via visible and 
effective policing within a viable justice system, is key to underwriting the move towards 
sustainable peace and prosperity. However, a number of conditions need to be established before 
international police intervention can be effective. The first and foremost, is there needs to be a 
‘peace to keep’, and until such time as there is a peace to keep, any civilian police input into the 
320 NATO’s Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Experience in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned 
Workshop Report, NATO Centre of Excellence-Defence Against Terrorism, Ankara 18-20 November 
2014. https://www.exop-
group.com/src/Frontend/Files/userfiles/files/DE/MediaCentre/News/150929_NATO_AfghanistanLessons
LearnedBooklet.pdf 
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environment is futile. ‘Making the peace’ is therefore the role of the military. Once the ‘peace’ 
has been ‘made’, it is the role of the police to ‘keep’ it.321 
This was not understood by those who sent the AFP to Afghanistan, under a flawed set of 
expectations, which changed mid-stream. This is primarily because those advising at the political 
level, were themselves poorly informed and lacked understanding, of both the situation on the 
ground, and the limitations on the ability of a liberal-democratic policing approach in such a non-
permissive environment. 
A complex environment: History and cultural complexity 
To fully appreciate why this was the case, some explanation of the challenging physical, and 
complex human terrain in Afghanistan is necessary. Afghanistan’s proximity and location at the  
crossroads between Iran and India, Central Asia and South Asia, and Central Asia and 
the Middle East…’ [made it] ‘…an important part of the old Silk Route, used by 
pilgrims and traders, who along its length and breadth carried new religions, 
inventions, and ideas…’ including ‘…all the world’s ancient religions… including 
Zoroastrianism, Manichaeanism, and Buddhism, with Islam the last arrival, in AD654, 
when Arab armies invaded India and Afghanistan after the death of the Prophet 
Mohammed. 322 
Afghanistan itself is a geographic entity, whose borders were established in the age of 
imperialism, and was actually created in the nineteenth century, as a ‘buffer state’, between what 
was once the southern extent of Tsarist Russia, and the North West Frontier of British India, in 
what was known as the ‘Great Game’. The southern borders were established in 1893, by Sir 
Mortimer Durand, which divided Afghanistan from the North West Frontier of British India 
which was later to become Pakistan. In doing so, the Durand Line cut through tribal areas of the 
Pashtuns, and as such has been heavily disputed since. The Pashtun tribes on either side of the 
border, are kinsmen, and as such, pay scant regard, to the artificial national border dividing their 
tribal homelands. To them, it truly is a line in the sand. It is also remote and porous and therefore 
unenforceable by either Pakistan or Afghanistan. 
The northern border is shared with the Russia-influenced Central Asian countries of Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, whose people, the Tajiks, the Turkmen and the Uzbeks, have also 
crossed into Afghanistan from the north. The western border of Afghanistan is shared with Iran, 
321 Casual observations indicate that the military seeks to divest itself of what it regards as constabulary or 
policing duties. In a contested environment such as Afghanistan, the distinction between ‘peace-maker’ 
and ‘peace-keeper’ are simultaneously academically clear, but operationally opaque. It has sometimes 
been asked, ‘when do the police take over?’ The answer from a police perspective at least, is ‘when the 
military has created a peace to keep.’ As the AFP experience in Afghanistan shows, this is often difficult 
to achieve. 
322 Rashid, A. (2009). Descent into Chaos: The U.S. and the Disaster in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and 
Central Asia. Penguin. London, p. 7. 
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formerly Persia, the home of the Shi’a Islamic tradition. The religious overlay is Islamic, 
predominantly following the Sunni tradition, with the exception of the Hazaras, the descendants 
of Genghis Khan, who follow the Shi’a tradition, and are more closely aligned with Iran to the 
west. There are therefore societal fissures running through Afghan society and culture, based on 
ethnicity and religion, which makes a cohesive, trust-based society, a difficult proposition.  
Cold War dynamics – The Soviet Occupation 1979–1989 
The modern troubles in Afghanistan began with the invasion by the Soviet Union on Christmas 
Eve 1979 as a result of a civil war in Afghanistan, which broke out following a coup in 1978, led 
by Marxist military officers. This thrust Afghanistan into the middle of the Cold War, as the U.S. 
reacted under the Presidency of Ronald Reagan, by supporting an Islamic resistance to fight the 
Soviet occupation. The disparate tribal and ethnic groups within Afghanistan, coalesced to resist 
the Soviet occupation. They called themselves the Mujahadin. 
The Mujahadin 
The U.S. supported the Afghan Mujahadin, who also recruited Islamic fighters from far afield, 
among whose number, was an Arab from Saudi Arabia called Osama bin Laden. The U.S. 
provided money and weapons and, after a decade of occupation, and several thousand casualties, 
the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. This triggered a commensurate U.S. 
withdrawal from the region leaving a power vacuum, which was filled by contesting parties based 
largely along ethnic lines. This, in part, was also fueled by a silent proxy war for influence in 
Kabul between Pakistan and India.  
The Taliban and al Qaeda 
In the early 1990s, a number of Pashtun former Mujahadin left Afghanistan, and attended 
madrassas in Pakistan to take up religious studies. They called themselves ‘talibs’, meaning 
religious students, who seek knowledge and justice. They united as the Taliban, to return to 
Afghanistan to restore peace, disarm the population, enforce Sharia, or Islamic law, and defend 
Islam in Afghanistan.323 
They re-entered Afghanistan from the south and took Kandahar, Afghanistan’s second city in 
1994, followed by Herat in the west in 1996, and the capital Kabul in 1996, and finally Mazar-e-
Sharif in the north, in 1998, massacring more than four thousand Hazaras, Tajiks, and Uzbeks.  
They were financed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, through the Pakistani Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), which had direct connection with the Taliban through its tribal 
affiliations. The Taliban then formed a government called The Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan 
323 Rashid, A. (2006), p. 13. 
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(IEA). Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader formed a relationship with Osama bin Laden and they 
lived together in Kandahar in 1996.  
The CIA already considered bin Laden a threat, but he was left alone to ingratiate 
himself with Mullah Omar by providing money, fighters, and ideological advice to the 
Taliban. Bin laden gathered the Arabs left behind in Afghanistan and Pakistan from 
the war with the Soviets, enlisted more militants from Arab countries, and established 
a new global terrorist infrastructure called al Qaeda.324   
Motives of al Qaeda 
Bin Laden was motivated by his repugnance at the existence of U.S. and allied troops in Saudi 
Arabia, as part of the U.S. offensive against Iraq in the early 1990s. This was made clear in a 
statement made by bin Laden on October 7, 2001, following the 911 attacks, which was broadcast 
by Al Jazeera Television, in which he promised more attacks on the U.S. and its interests and 
allies: ‘Neither America nor the people who live in it will dream of security before we live it in 
Palestine and not before all the infidel armies leave the land of Mohammed’.325 
The significance of the relationship with Mullah Omar, was that bin Laden now had an entire 
country at his disposal to train global Islamic jihadists. There had been a number of training camps 
operating in Afghanistan, financed by the Pakistani ISI, to train insurgents for use in the disputed 
province of Kashmir on the Indian-Pakistan border. Bin Laden used these camps to train 
thousands of extremists to extend al Qaeda operations globally. It was during this period that bin 
Laden planned the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, on August 7, 1998, 
which killed 224 people and wounded nearly 5000, and made bin Laden a man wanted by the 
U.S. authorities. 
The UN and al Qaeda 
As a result of these attacks, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1267 in October 1999, 
which demanded that the Taliban surrender bin Laden, and cease providing sanctuaries to 
terrorists. This was followed by UN Security Council Resolution 1333, in December 2000, which 
imposed an arms ban on the Taliban government, the seizure of the Taliban’s assets outside 
Afghanistan, and demanded the closure of the training camps. These were ignored by the Taliban 
government and its Pakistani ISI backers. Finally, on July 30, 2001, the UN Security Council 
passed Resolution 1363, which authorised monitors on Afghanistan’s borders to ensure that the 
UN arms embargo was enforced. This angered the Taliban government in Afghanistan and their 
Pakistani supporters who threatened to kill UN monitors. 
324 Rashid, A. (2006), p. 15 
325 Osama bin Laden quoted in Rashid, A. (2006), p. 80 
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While the U.S. authorities were closely monitoring the situation, they appear to have 
underestimated the immediacy and the magnitude of the threat. Rashid states that between January 
and September 2001, 216 internal threat warnings were issued by the FBI, and 33 National 
Security Agency intercepts relating to the possibility of an al Qaeda attack, were reported. In July 
a briefing paper by the CIA to President Bush stated: 
We believe that [bin Laden] will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S and/or 
Israeli interests in the coming weeks...attack preparations have been made...and will 
occur with little or no warning… 326  
911 attacks-connection with bin Laden 
On September 11, 2001, 19 militants associated with al-Qaeda, hijacked four airliners in the north 
east of the United States, and carried out suicide attacks against iconic targets in the United States. 
Two planes were flown into the towers of the World Trade Centre in New York City, a third plane 
hit the Pentagon just outside Washington, D.C., and the fourth crashed in a field in Pennsylvania. 
The attacks resulted in extensive death and destruction, with over 3000 fatalities, including over 
400 police officers and firefighters, as first responders. The reaction by the U.S. was calculated 
and deliberate. In addition to the warning given to nations who may be harbouring terrorists or 
their associates, there was specific mention of Afghanistan. The rationale was the connection 
between bin Laden, Mullah Omar and the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan: the Taliban. 
In furtherance of the plan to attack the World Trade Centre, the Pentagon and other targets in the 
United States, bin Laden provided two potential Saudi suicide pilots and two Yemeni volunteers 
who ultimately were unable to obtain U.S. visas. The Saudis had no problem obtaining visas to 
enter the U.S. They practiced with flight simulators on personal computers, and were 
supplemented by four volunteers from the German city of Hamburg, who travelled separately to 
and from Kandahar on a regular basis to meet with bin Laden. 
According to Woodward al Qaeda was deliberately recruiting from 35 countries whose citizens 
did not require visas to enter the U.S. and was bringing them into the ungoverned regions in large 
numbers to train them in all aspects of asymmetric warfare, including the use of explosives and 
chemical agents, and was trying to have them acquire biological weapons.327 
The CIA was aware of Islamic extremists generally in Germany, and sought assistance from 
German police, but were largely unsuccessful, as German courts placed strict limitations on police 
intrusion, and some German politicians and intellectuals dismissed American concerns over 
global Islamic terrorism as overblown, even naïve: an unfortunate legacy of the reaction to 
Germany’s Nazi past in which policing was both highly intrusive and forceful. The plot by these 
326 CIA Briefing to U.S. President Bush quoted in Rashid, A. (2006), p. 59. 
327 Woodward, B. (2010). Obama's Wars. New York: Simon & Schuster, p. 5. 
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specific individuals was missed by the Americans, which is not surprising, as once they had 
entered the U.S. they lived as normal members of the community for a period of time, during 
which they had amassed 364 false names between them in order to avoid detection, as they 
planned and eventually carried out the attacks on September 11, 2001.328 
The United States reaction: Operation Enduring Freedom 
On the 20 September, President Bush addressed a Joint Session of Congress, which was broadcast 
worldwide. In this address President Bush made specific reference to Afghanistan. He stated:  
Al Qaeda is to terror what the mafia is to crime.  But its goal is not making money; its 
goal is remaking the world…and imposing its radical beliefs on people everywhere. 
This group and its leader…a person named Osama bin Laden…are linked to many 
other organizations in different countries… The leadership of al Qaeda has great 
influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban regime in controlling most of that 
country. 
And tonight, the United States of America makes the following demands on the Taliban:  
Deliver to United States authorities all the leaders of al Qaeda who hide in your land. 
…Close immediately and permanently every terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, 
and hand over every terrorist, and every person in their support structure, to 
appropriate authorities.  Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps, 
so we can make sure they are no longer operating. 
These demands are not open to negotiation or discussion.  The Taliban must act, and 
act immediately. They will hand over the terrorists, or they will share in their fate. 
(Bush, G. 2001).329 
Northern Alliance 
The 911 attacks engendered significant international support for the U.S. and international 
pressure mounted against the Taliban government in Afghanistan. A number of exiled Afghan 
leaders joined forces to take up an armed offensive against the Taliban administration. Their 
coalition was known as The Northern Alliance, but was officially known as The United Islamic 
Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan. Iran, Russia, and India, which had traditionally funded 
and armed the Northern Alliance, stepped up their military support. (Rashid, 2006, pp. 19-20) 
The Northern Alliance fought a two month campaign against the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan, and took Kabul in December 2001. 
The involvement of Iran and India broadened the dimensions of the strategic environment, as 
Shi’a Iran, was fighting a proxy war against its Sunni Islamic rival, Saudi Arabia, which was, in 
part, funding the Taliban-led Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, through Pakistan. India was 
328 Australian Federal Police (2014) Identity Unknown; Identity Crime: AFP Platypus Magazine No 115 
Jan-Jun 2014. 
329 Bush, G. Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush 2001–2008. https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_W_Bush.pdf 
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similarly fighting a proxy war with its regional rival Pakistan, whose connections with the Pashtun 
Taliban has been previously discussed. The involvement of India and Pakistan raised the stakes 
considerably, as both countries are nuclear powers.  The involvement of Russia naturally attracted 
the attention of the U.S. The potential involvement of nuclear weaponry was not confined to the 
nuclear powers mentioned, but extended to al Qaeda itself. According to Rashid: 
In the first months after 9/11, the CIA was deeply fearful of a follow-up nuclear or 
biological weapons attack on the American mainland by al Qaeda. In 1998, bin Laden 
had said that obtaining nuclear weapons was a ‘religious duty’ and he spoke frequently 
about creating an American Hiroshima. The discovery at al Qaeda safe houses in 
Afghanistan of computer disks, laboratories, and even a crude diagram of a nuclear 
bomb, showing that al Qaeda was experimenting with biological and nuclear warfare, 
only confirmed the worst about al Qaeda’s intentions.330 
With this in mind, it was clear that the primary way to prevent al Qaeda obtaining nuclear material, 
was through the relationship with Pakistan. Bin Laden had fled to the remote Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan in December 2001, following the U.S. reprisals 
for the 911 attacks, in the form of OEF which complemented the military offensive by the 
Northern Alliance. The FATA became the new base for al Qaeda.331 
Bonn Agreement and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 
While OEF and the Northern Alliance were having an impact on the ground in Afghanistan, the 
international community was seeking a long term, sustainable solution to stability in Afghanistan 
once the ‘peace’ was ‘made’ by military force. This was arranged by Germany, which had acted 
as a broker during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s, by hosting unofficial dialogue between the 
UN, the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. Germany was regarded as an honest broker by these 
parties, and the German Government hosted discussions in the former capital, Bonn in December 
2001. An agreement, known as the Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan 
Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions 332 was promulgated from 
the Bonn discussions. The declaration specifically mentioned a new Afghan security force, but 
no specific mention was made of a new Afghan police force. 
The Bonn Agreement also created a second international intervention force, known as the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), under UN Security Council Resolution 1386 of 
20 December 2001. ISAF was given an enforcement mandate under Chapter VII of the Charter 
of the United Nations. ISAF was not initially under the command of NATO, but under British, 
330 Rashid, A, (2006), p. 120. 
331  Rashid, A. (2006), p. 265. 
332 Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Reestablishment of Permanent 
Government Institutions. 
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Turkish, German and Dutch command, before coming under the command of NATO in August 
2003. 
ISAF was initially tasked with providing security in the capital Kabul, but in August 2003, once 
NATO assumed command, a UN Security Council Resolution authorised ISAF to expand beyond 
Kabul. This took the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), in each province to be led 
by a NATO member. At the same time, four cross-cutting, nation-wide lines of effort were 
devised, with Britain assuming leadership for counter-narcotics, Germany assuming leadership 
for policing, Italy assuming leadership for justice and the United States assuming leadership for 
training the Afghan military. 
As a result, there were now two separate command structures for foreign forces in Afghanistan-
the NATO-ISAF command responsible for peacekeeping in Kabul and the provinces; while the 
hunt for terrorists would continue to be carried out by the U.S.-led Coalition under Operation 
Enduring freedom. 333 The UN also had a presence in Afghanistan, in the form of the United 
Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), however, due to the non-permissive 
security environment throughout the country, particularly in the south, its influence was 
negligible. 
AFP Deployment to Afghanistan 2007 
Australia’s role in Afghanistan spanned four phases: 2001 to 2005, 2005 to 2008, 2008 to 2013, 
and 2014 onwards. The AFP primarily involved in the period 2008-2013, with a year extra either 
side of this period. The legal basis for Australian involvement in operations in Afghanistan was 
twofold: authorisation under United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1883, and at 
the invitation of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). Australia’s 
military commitment to Afghanistan operated as part of the NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), as a peace-enforcement mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. 
In early 2006, a request was received by the Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer from 
the then British Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, for an Australian police contribution to assist with 
mentoring for the newly created Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA). Due to 
administrative difficulties relating to visas to enter Afghanistan, and some negotiations between 
Canberra and Kabul, concerning duties and immunities, the deployment was delayed until the 
second half of 2007. 
In addition, ISAF had established a U.S.-led Combined Security Transition Command (CSTC-
A), which had assumed the role of reforming the Afghan National Police (ANP) from the 
Germans, to collectively deliver a professional police force to enhance the security of the Afghan 
people. One AFP member was seconded to CSTC-A, to advise an exclusively military, and a 
333 Rashid (2006), pp. 350–351. 
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predominantly U.S. command structure, on elements of police reform. Among the contributions 
made by this member was the adoption of an amended police recruit training package from the 
AFP College in Barton, Canberra. There was also a need for advice on criminal investigations to 
the Ministry of the Interior, within the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan 
(GIRoA), so one member, the mission commander, was tasked with these duties. 
In the meantime, in February 2007, the Afghan Ambassador to Australia, Mr Mohammed Anwar 
Anwarzai highlighted the narcotics problem in Afghanistan, and its connection with the Taliban 
insurgency, and the risk this posed of creating a ‘narco-state.’ As Mark Todd of The Australian 
wrote: 
Afghanistan has warned it could unravel into a terrorist-backed narco-state unless 
Australia and the rest of the international community send specialist police to combat 
the heroin trafficking which is funding the Taliban insurgency. 
The war-battered nation’s ambassador to Canberra, Mohammed Anwar Anwarzai, 
said yesterday Australia’s military deployment had helped build local trust, but a 
dangerous vacuum existed in the wake of their withdrawal last year. ‘Unfortunately, 
we are now on the verge of becoming a narco-state. I can confess to that,’ Mr Anwarzai 
told The Australian. 
In its first acknowledgement of the extent of the problem, Canberra is planning to send 
four AFP agents to Afghanistan to help with police training and monitoring of illicit 
opium exports. Two armed AFP agents will be based in the opium heartland of 
Jalalabad to gather intelligence on opium smuggling.334 
On 16 October 2007, four AFP officers were deployed to Afghanistan. Two members were 
located in Kabul, working under the auspices of the United States-led CSTC-A, and the Afghan 
Ministry of the Interior respectively and two members were located in Jalalabad, and worked 
under the auspices of the British Embassy Drug Team (BEDT) with the CNPA. Significantly, 
their life support was provided by a private British security firm, known as ArmourGroup, which 
later became G4S. The expense this incurred was to influence the way the AFP was postured in 
Afghanistan, with the incoming Rudd Government in 2007. 
From Howard to Rudd: Political optics 
The Howard Government was voted out of office by the Rudd Government in 2007, and there 
was an immediate change of posture in relation to the AFP in Afghanistan. When in Opposition, 
Prime Minister Rudd had been highly critical of the Howard Government for its involvement of 
Australian military in the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. He had been less vocal in relation 
to Afghanistan, and in fact had supported Australia’s military involvement, primarily because it 
was a reaction to the 911 attacks, and secondly the international involvement in Afghanistan, both 
OEF and ISAF, had the authority of the UN. Significantly, the four original AFP members had 
334 Todd, M. (2007) Australian help sought for drug fight, Mark Dodd, The Australian, 20 February 2007. 
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only been in Afghanistan for a short time when the Rudd Government was elected and he was 
taking advice from many quarters in relation to Afghanistan, but crucially it seems, not the AFP. 
In May 2008, Raspal Khosa from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), wrote a paper 
in which he highlighted the importance of security sector reform in Afghanistan, and urged the 
use of the AFP International Deployment Group, based on its record for capacity-building, 
mentoring and peacekeeping operations. Khosa specifically mentioned the use of AFP to mentor 
ANP via a police OMLT to be based in Uruzgan Province, whereby the Australian Government 
would realise the synergies with any proposed ADF training activity, particularly the instruction 
of police in small arms and other tactical activity. 335 
Police Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (POMLT) 
The OMLT concept, (Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team), was used by the ISAF military 
whereby military trainers, mentors and liaison officers accompanied their Afghan National Army 
(ANA) counterparts in the field. From a policing perspective this concept, dubbed ‘POMLT’ 
(Police Operations Mentoring and Liaison Team), was highly problematic. This has its basis in 
the profound differences in field operations and daily duties, between the respective roles, 
composition and structure of the military, and the police in such endeavours. These differences 
are exacerbated in a non-permissive environment such as southern Afghanistan in 2008. 
The military is generally well-armed, moves in groups, and is well-supported by force protection. 
Its duties in conflict, including in insurgencies such as Afghanistan are dirty, dangerous and 
difficult, but relatively straightforward: to train in the use of weapons and tactics, to oversee 
leadership decisions and to ensure effective communications are maintained, and when in direct 
contact with their adversaries, to employ as much force as required, with the expectation of 
immediate fire support and medical evacuation if needed. The military is well suited and equipped 
for this role, it is after all its raison d’etré. 
Policing, on the other hand, is generally done on an individual basis or in small groups, and if 
being done correctly, involves maximum community engagement and interaction, and often 
unseen investigations to detect, deter, disrupt or prevent crime, including violent crime, and other 
criminal activity, such as corruption and narcotics dealing. While there is an active insurgency, 
policing can be equally dirty, difficult and arguably more complex and dangerous, due to exposure 
and vulnerability to those hostile to police activities, including violent extremists, those involved 
in the narcotics trade and those whose actions are corrupt. The latter may include some of the host 
police themselves, particularly at a leadership level, where the incentives for corruption are the 
highest, thus exposing international police mentors to danger from the very people they are tasked 
335 Khosa, R. (2008). Making it Count: Australia’s involvement in Afghanistan. Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute May 2008, p. 12. 
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to assist, and with whom they would be intimately dealing, with a view to their arrest prosecution. 
A dangerous endeavour in Australia: a death warrant in southern Afghanistan. 
No peace to keep; a low base; corruption and a lucrative cash crop 
The role of the police is to engage with the local population, to prevent crime, identify offences, 
bring offenders to justice, and basically keep the peace. The existence of the latter underpins all 
three other functions, namely in order to administer justice and ‘keep the peace’, there must be a 
‘peace to keep’. There is no prospect of justice, very little chance of detection of offences and 
almost zero chance of benign crime prevention, in a liberal-democratic sense, until there is such 
a peace. In the case of Afghanistan, particularly in Regional Command (South) including Uruzgan 
Province, such a peace was, and remains highly elusive. 
An additional complication for policing, as opposed to military mentoring, in southern 
Afghanistan, is that the Afghan National Army (ANA) was predominantly composed of soldiers 
from the ethnic groups from the north of Afghanistan, the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmen, whose 
predecessors had formed the Northern Alliance, which had ousted the Pashtun dominated Taliban 
Government, with U.S. support, in the immediate aftermath of 911. The Afghan National Police 
(ANP) however, were locally recruited, from the predominantly Pashtun population in the south 
of the country, thus the prospect of a ‘blue on blue’ incident, was a very real prospect, based on 
this aspect alone, to say nothing of the vulnerabilities create by exposure to the criminal activities 
mentioned above. 
Among the shortcomings of the ANP, in addition to illiteracy and inadequate training, was the 
fact that corruption was widespread, and there was an ambiguous relationship between the police 
and the public as a result. This cannot be addressed by training or mentoring in the field, without 
intimate supervision and highly intrusive protocols. A further complication involved the 
connection between police corruption and the burgeoning trade in opiates. Opium poppies are a 
cash crop in many parts of Afghanistan. The United Nations had a ‘line of control’, below which, 
they recommended that enforcement action not take place. This was to protect the livelihoods of 
local poppy farmers and their employees, thus the only part of the supply chain which could be 
addressed by policing at a local level, was the actual heroin production and its distribution by 
road to its worldwide market. The execution of search warrants and the interception of such road 
transport was a highly dangerous activity.  
The AFP members deployed to Afghanistan were armed with Glock 9mm Self Loading Pistols 
for self -protection, not law enforcement, and in any circumstance in Afghanistan, were 
outgunned. Any involvement in the POMLT concept, which involved mentoring the ANP in 
enforcing dubious laws ‘outside the wire’, dealing with well-armed and well-connected criminals, 
in a highly lucrative trade in illicit narcotics, was a risk AFP was not prepared to take. Such 
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activities in Australia, where the AFP legitimately enforces the criminal law, would be subject to 
detailed risk assessments and judicial oversight, with every precaution taken to ensure member 
safety. For the AFP to engage in such POMLT activities ‘outside the wire’, in an environment 
like Uruzgan Province, was suicidal and ultimately futile; a fact recognised by those on the 
ground, but not their political masters. 
Prime Minister Rudd, December 2008 
When Prime Minister Rudd, and his security advisor Duncan Lewis, travelled to Tarin Kot (TK) 
in Uruzgan Province just before Christmas 2008, the latter made a direct approach to the senior 
AFP member present, who had just assumed the role of AFP narcotics intelligence coordinator in 
TK. The exchange as related to the author was: ‘If money and security weren’t a problem, could 
you do POMLTs?’ The response was, ‘If money and security aren’t the problem then we can 
basically do anything asked of us.’ This exchange was reported to AFP Canberra and alarm bells 
rang immediately at the IDG at Majura. 
There is no evidence of prior consultation with the AFP in Canberra, so the first time this concept 
was made known to the AFP, was when a high ranking official in the Prime Minister’s party, a 
former military officer, made an approach directly to a relatively junior officer in the field. This 
was repeated at a later date during another visit by Mr Rudd, as Foreign Minister, in TK in March 
2011. This is indicative of the ad hoc approach to policy involving police deployments, under this 
particular government, which appeared to have been based on concepts advanced by the Canberra 
‘Good Ideas Club’, without consultation with the people who would actually have to perform 
these duties, namely the police themselves, or their agency heads, who had a duty of care and 
were thus ultimately responsible for their safety and welfare. 
The reason this member was in TK was due to a direction from government, pending the rotation 
of the first four members, for the AFP to increase its numbers to eight and to go to Regional 
Command (South) (RC(S)) and leverage as much as possible off the ADF. The rationale for this 
was based on the cost of life support by G4S for the Kabul based members. The two Jalalabad 
based members had spent six months in that location working with the CNPA. Their means of 
transport between Kabul and Jalalabad was via a United Nations aircraft which was withdrawn 
by the UN for passage by the AFP members for unspecified reasons. 
Re-focus AFP efforts to regional command (south) and leverage as much as possible from 
the ADF 
The AFP members involved were in Kabul when this decision was made, and returned to 
Jalalabad via a local bus service which took them approximately six hours, due to delays created 
by roadworks. This exposed them to an unacceptable risk of death, serious injury or kidnap, and 
as a result the Jalalabad post was closed forthwith by the AFP in Canberra, and these members 
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were re-located to Kabul. When the direction came from government to re-focus AFP efforts to 
RC(S), it was these members who conducted the initial scoping in Kandahar Airfield (KAF), the 
Headquarters of RC(S). 
The broad direction to AFP for the second deployment of AFP to Afghanistan, was to increase 
the number of eight, to move the bulk of the mission to Regional Command (South), and to 
leverage as much as possible from the Australian Defence Force. This was interpreted by AFP 
members, at the operational level, as being more related to the political optics of comparison 
between the new, fresh and progressive Rudd Government with the old, tired and conservative 
Howard Government. Such a perspective is given added credence when the instructions from 
government also contained a direction to increase the number of AFP deployed to Afghanistan to 
twelve the following year. 
The most confusing part of this direction, was the fact that no further guidance was provided as 
to what the AFP members deployed to an active conflict zone, were expected to actually do, other 
than a broad reference to ‘counter-narcotics intelligence’ and ‘criminal intelligence’. In an effort 
to maximise the value of this increased commitment, an AFP delegation engaged interlocutors 
from the major law enforcement contributors to Afghanistan, the U.S., Britain, Canada and the 
Netherlands to identify strategic opportunities to complement existing efforts. 
Counter-narcotics intelligence 2008 
The intention was to enhance support for international stabilisation operations in Afghanistan, 
through the deployment of civil policing expertise to Australian whole of Government activities 
in Southern Afghanistan, and other international efforts based in Kabul. The focus was on 
counter-narcotics and criminal intelligence, by providing strategic, analytical and intelligence 
advice on counter-narcotics activities, as part of the international stabilisation activities in 
cooperation with GIRoA, in order to shape counter-narcotics activities to address illicit narcotics 
activities in Afghanistan.336 
The configuration of the mission was therefore in three separate locations, engaged in entirely 
different duties. Two members were located in Kabul, where the Mission Commander continued 
duties with CSTC-A, and the Ministry of the Interior, and an embedded member with the 
Interagency Operations Coordination Centre (IOCC) dealing with the U.S. Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA) and the British Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA). Three members were 
336 Kilcullen (2009) states that [a]ccording to officers of the National Directorate of Security (NDS)-the 
Afghan intelligence service...the Taliban adopted a five-line information strategy, in the form of series of 
slogans, in early 2006. These were ‘Our party, the Taliban’; ‘Our people and nation, the Pashtun’; ‘Our 
economy, the poppy’; ‘Our constitution, the Shari’a’; and ‘Our form of government, the emirate.’’ 
Kilcullen, D (2009). The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One. Scribe 
Publications Melbourne p. 58. 
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located at Kandahar Airfield (KAF), where the intention was to locate two members as liaison 
officers and analysts in secure compartmentalised intelligence cells: the Kandahar Intelligence 
Fusion Centre (KIFC) and the Kandahar Fusion Centre (KFC), and a third member and supervisor 
of all members in RC(S), to act in the capacity of a law enforcement liaison officer with the British 
Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) at Kandahar Airfield, dealing primarily with the 
counter-narcotics effort.  
The third location was in Tarin Kot, Uruzgan Province.  Three members were located at Tarin 
Kot, with one member working as a Security Sector Reform (SSR) Adviser to the Dutch 
Commander responsible for police and SSR in the province. One acted as an intelligence officer 
within the Tarin Kot Secure Compartmentalised Intelligence Fusion Team (SCIF), with a focus 
on force protection. And the third member worked within the Tarin Kot Fused Intelligence Team 
which acted as a clearing house for raw intelligence. 
Regional command (south) 2008 
The problem from an AFP perspective was, aside from the Kabul-based positions, the members 
arrived ‘cold’ to establish their own roles within this heavily militarised environment, dominated 
by the U.S. military, in an active conflict zone. Two of the positions in KAF required an extremely 
high level security clearance, a fact not relayed to Canberra, which resulted in two members not 
being able to enter the secure intelligence cells for a number of weeks, until arrangements could 
be made for them to enter the KFC. The KIFC was a military targeting cell, so AFP presence in 
this area was ill-advised. Some effective negotiations on the ground in KAF by the senior AFP 
members there also negotiated placement within a newly-formed outpost of the IOCC in Kabul, 
known as the Combined Joint Inter Agency Task Force-Nexus (CJIATF-N) which was a U.S.-led 
targeting cell.  
The role of the AFP members in this cell was to look for connections between the insurgency and 
the narcotics trade, and attempt to engender an ability for the Afghan authorities to deal with this, 
via judicial and police action, rather than kinetic military responses. There was however, a 
disconnect between the AFP and the ANP in KAF, as the AFP were not permitted off the base 
and the ANP were not permitted on the base. The counter-narcotics mission was known as 
Operation Contego. The counter-narcotics mission, however was relatively short-lived as the 
strategic direction changed in 2009. 
Transfer and transition 2009 
When the Obama administration took office from the Bush administration in 2009, there was a 
changed strategy towards the situation in Afghanistan. Bob Woodward (2011) in his book 
Obama’s Wars, makes it clear that President Obama was seeking an exit strategy.  In 2009 for the 
first time the words ‘transfer’ and ‘transition’ appeared. The model had become clear, hold, hold, 
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hold, hold and hold. Hold for years. There was no build, no transfer. 337 The question was transfer 
or transition from what to what?  
The answer was, from an international guarantee of safety and security, to a host government 
guarantee of safety and security, preferably with host state police primacy. The solution, after a 
number of reports, was a full counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy, which involved one member 
of the security forces (international or domestic) for every 40 or 50 members of the Afghan 
community, nation-wide. This was later amended to consider the north relatively benign, as the 
main insurgency was in the south among the Pashtun Taliban, who considered themselves to be 
the legitimate government, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, in exile. 
Australian whole-of-government strategic objectives 2009 
In April 2009, Prime Minister Rudd identified the Whole-of-Government (WoG) strategic 
objectives, and focus for Australia’s contribution to Afghanistan. These included, stabilisation of 
the Afghan state through a combination of military, police and civilian efforts to consolidate the 
gains made by Afghan and international military forces; support for counter-narcotics efforts in 
Afghanistan; the re-establishment of security and rule of law in Afghanistan as an essential 
requirement for broader development aspirations; the promotion of the capabilities of the Afghan 
National Police (ANP) and policing agencies. 
The AFP expertise in building the capacity of community police overseas was well suited to the 
training and mentoring of the ANP at the Provincial Training Centre Tarin Kot. The AFP 
delivered tailored programs on values, ethics, general police duties and human rights. This was 
an attempt to apply internationally accepted processes and policies regarding the role of a police 
force within a democratic society in order to generate public confidence. As Kilcullen points out 
Counterinsurgency policing is substantially different from policing in a peacetime 
environment. The three key components required for effective police work in a 
counterinsurgency environment are community police officers, who act to secure and 
protect population centres and delivers basic public order and rule of law; field police 
(paramilitary organisations sometimes called constabulary or gendarmerie units), who 
conduct normal police duties but in a higher threat environment and typically are better 
armed and more mobile than community police; and a police intelligence or police 
special operations capability (sometimes called a ‘special branch’) that specifically 
targets and arrests insurgent underground cells.338 
The AFP was ill-fitted for all of the roles, as a 2016 Lessons Learned Report on Afghanistan 
commissioned by the Australian Civil Military Centre stated: 
For all their professionalism and experience, however, the AFP is not set up, trained 
or equipped as the sort of paramilitary force that would have been required to 
337 Woodward, B. (2011), p. 349. 
338 Kilcullen (2009), p. 61. 
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undertake joint counter-insurgency training patrols with the ANP and some of what 
was expected of the AFP went beyond what it is trained, prepared and equipped for, 
which led to some frustration.339 
These are all well-intentioned aspirations and theoretically achievable from the safety and 
certainty of a policy office in Canberra, but concepts such as stabilisation, security and the rule 
of law, and the application of internationally accepted processes and policies regarding the role 
of a police force within a democratic society in order to generate public confidence, were not 
easily achieved in a place such as southern Afghanistan in 2009. Nonetheless, increased pressure 
was placed upon the AFP to deploy ‘outside the wire’, along the lines of the POMLTs discussed 
above. It was patently clear to the AFP members on the ground, and to a number of support staff 
in Canberra, that this was highly risky, both physically on the ground in Afghanistan, and 
politically in Canberra. 
The Provincial Training Centre Tarin Kot 
As good fortune would have it, the Dutch were destined to leave Uruzgan Province, as their 
involvement in Afghanistan became very unpopular, and the Dutch Government had almost fallen 
as a result. As a legacy project, the Dutch financed and constructed a Provincial Training Centre 
(PTC) for police in Uruzgan. The reason was that police recruits locally recruited from Uruzgan 
Province, were fearful of travelling to the adjoining province of Kandahar to undertake training, 
for fear of the safety and security of their families in their absence. Negotiations occurred on the 
ground with the Dutch authorities, for AFP trainers to take up positions at the PTC, which was 
quickly endorsed by AFP Canberra. On 29 April 2009, the Prime Minister announced an 
additional AFP commitment of up to 10 personnel to act as advisors to Afghan National Police 
Training staff at the Provincial Training Centre at Camp Holland, Tarin Kot, Uruzgan Province, 
Afghanistan. These personnel and roles were known as Operation Synergy. 
The curriculum for the ANP basic patrolman’s course, was a basic eight week training programme 
which was developed under the Focussed District Development (FDD) initiative. A member of 
the initial AFP deployment, had a significant input into the development of this program in his 
role as advisor to the CSTC-A. The FDD Basic police curriculum was continuously reviewed and 
enhanced to best meet the needs of the ANP. This is fortunate because the U.S. Commander ISAF, 
Gen. David Petraeus reviewed the FDD police training course in 2009, and as Woodward states: 
Petraeus had immersed himself in the details. He studied the police training schedule 
for an eight-week course. He kept looking at it. Something was missing. He soon 
realised there was no time on the shooting range.340 
339 Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from Australia’s Whole of Government Mission, Australian Civil 
Military Centre, (2016), pp. 24–25 https://www.acmc.gov.au/afghanistan/ 
340 Woodward, B. (2011), p. 17. 
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A reality check 
An event described by Australian diplomat Ian (Fred) Smith, involving ANP members in Tarin 
Kot township provides an explanation as to the efficacy of this in a non-permissive security 
environment such as southern Afghanistan during this period. Mr Smith, a DFAT representative 
in Uruzgan Province, was due to meet some Afghan representatives from Provincial Governor’s 
office, who were held up by an incident involving a suicide bomber, who was waiting in ambush 
for them. The bomber was shot in the face by the ANP members present, and is a good example 
of why a liberal-democratic policing approach to generate public confidence was a flawed 
approach. Smith recorded how: 
The governor said the bomber had been waiting outside the compound for him but 
when he did not emerge had moved towards the adjacent bank building, where Afghan 
National Police officers were drawing their salaries as they usually did on Sunday 
mornings. An ANP officer spotted the bomber and quietly alerted two colleagues; one 
grabbed the bomber’s left arm, the other grabbed his right arm (thereby preventing 
him from touching together the two detonation wires hidden up his sleeves). The third 
shot the bomber in the face. Not a bad effort; the governor was pleased.341 
A deteriorating situation 
In Australia, this would be regarded as police murder, and the police concerned would be 
prosecuted to the full extent of the law. In Afghanistan it was applauded by the governor. The 
difference lies, in large part, in the permissiveness of the environment and the commensurate 
tolerance for forceful policing. 
There are indications that Mr Rudd was aware of the deteriorating situation on the ground in 
southern Afghanistan, both as Prime Minister and as Foreign Minister, and that the increasing 
casualties of Australian soldiers was taking its toll politically. In March 2009, SBS News reported 
that a recent poll indicated that 65 per cent of those polled were against increased troop 
deployments to Afghanistan. In the same article it was reported that ‘the situation in Afghanistan 
was becoming even more challenging and would require a continued commitment’ and ‘that 
progress in Afghanistan would require a better integrated strategy, involving military, police and 
development assistance.’  The following month on 29 April, on the ABC 7.30 Report, Michael 
Brissenden interviewed Prime Minister Rudd who stated: 
Australia concurs with the United States that the current civilian and military strategy 
is not working. If anything, security in Afghanistan is deteriorating…I think this is 
going to become progressively an unpopular war. I accept that for the reality that it is. 
I am also seized of the fact that we have a responsibility to prevent Afghanistan from 
becoming a training base again for terrorists to go out and kill more Australians, and 
341 Smith, F. (2016) The Dust of Uruzgan, Allen & Unwin, Sydney, p. 300. 
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that we have a responsibility to our American ally consistent with our treaty 
obligations.342 
This was known to Mr Rudd as early as 2008, as a Sydney Morning Herald report from 2010 
indicates, with reference to the mass leaking of diplomatic cables by Wikileaks. The article titled 
‘Rudd: ‘Scared as Hell’ by Philip Dorling and Nick McKenzie on 10 December, stated that the 
government was deeply pessimistic about Australia’s engagement in Afghanistan, and that some 
officials had described the task of training police in Afghanistan as hopeless. The article further 
stated: 
Referring to Australia's plan to increase funds for training Afghan police - a task 
undertaken by more than two dozen federal police officers - Mr Smith warned it might 
involve ''putting good money into a bad situation''. 
Another cable, from December last year, says that ''Smith questioned what the AFP 
would be able to accomplish given the 'train wreck' that they had to be given to work 
with in the Afghan National Police''. 
A cable from October 2008, which records what Mr Rudd told a group of visiting US 
congressmen, says he ''concluded by noting that the national security establishment in 
Australia was very pessimistic about the long-term prognosis for Afghanistan'' 
The US cables also reveal that the head of the AFP's International Deployment Group, 
Assistant Commissioner Frank Prendergast, had also raised concerns about what 
federal police officers could achieve in Afghanistan.343 
Nonetheless, Mr Rudd was prepared to place AFP members in harm’s way. 
President Obama’s Exit Strategy 2009-2011 
Although the COIN strategy was implemented in April, the situation was further complicated in 
December 2009, when President Obama promulgated his Final Orders for the Afghanistan-
Pakistan Strategy, which included an intention to deny safe haven to al Qaeda, and to deny the 
Taliban the ability to overthrow the Afghan Government. This was based on a strategic concept 
of degrading the Taliban insurgency, while rebuilding sufficient Afghan capacity, to secure and 
govern Afghanistan, thereby creating conditions for the U.S. to commence a reduction of forces 
by July 2011.344 
Once a timeframe had been made known, the Taliban government in exile, was able to work on 
the population and regularly used direct threats against them via ‘night letters’, which threatened 
retribution for those who cooperated with the international forces. This announcement allowed 
342 Rudd, K. (2009) Rudd commits more troops to Afghanistan Michael Brissenden 7.30 Report ABC, 
2009. 
343 Dorling, P and McKenzie, N (2010) Rudd: 'Scared as hell' and Afghanistan: our secret fears, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 10 December 2010). 
344 Woodward 2011, pp. 385–386. 
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the Taliban to adopt a posture, where the internationals had ‘all the watches’, but the Taliban had 
‘all the time’. In terms of justice and governance, as David Kilcullen has stated: ‘a government 
that is losing to an insurgency is not being outfought, it is being out-governed’. 345 The Taliban, 
as an alternative government, was administering its own form of ‘justice’ and dispute resolution. 
Those who advocated the application of internationally accepted processes and policies regarding 
the role of a police force within a democratic society in order to generate public confidence in 
Afghanistan, were oblivious to the fact that the internationals might have ‘all the law’, but the 
Taliban had ‘all the justice’. 
Operations Synergy and Contego were combined in 2010, to form Operation Illuminate, which 
continued in all three locations, Kabul, Kandahar and Tarin Kot. The AFP closed its mission in 
Afghanistan in 2014. 
In summary, the AFP also deployed personnel to several Kabul based roles between 2007 and 
2014, including a SES level representative from June 2011 until September 2013. The initial role 
of this member was both as Senior Advisor to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-
A), Deputy Commander-Police and Executive Police Advisor to the Afghan Government’s 
Deputy Minister for Security. In 2012, this member occupied a lead role on the International 
Police Coordination Board (IPCB), the main coordination body for police reform in Afghanistan. 
Other experienced AFP officers undertook advisory roles with either NATO or Afghan 
authorities, or assisted the European Union Police training mission in Kabul. A number of others 
performed duties with the Major Crime Task Force, in conjunction with the U.S. Federal Bureau 
of Investigation. 
The most salient lesson learned from an AFP perspective, was the inappropriateness of attempting 
to apply liberal-democratic policing approaches in a non-permissive environment. As stated by 
the ACMC Report: 
The international military intervention, which began as a counterterrorism campaign 
increasingly, took on the characteristics of a counter-insurgency campaign and, in 
significant parts of the country, stabilisation operations of the kind usually seen in post-
conflict situations were not possible. Perhaps the best that can be said is that 
stabilisation-type activities were undertaken in parallel with continuing conflict.346 
If this was a challenge for the ADF, whose role is to engage in both counter-terrorism and counter-
insurgency, these challenges were amplified for the AFP IDG, which was established for capacity 
development in benign environments such as the South West Pacific, rather than active conflict 
zones such as southern Afghanistan. 
345 Kilcullen, D. (2009), p. 60 
346 Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from Australia’s Whole of Government Mission, Australian Civil 
Military Centre, (2016), p.4  https://www.acmc.gov.au/afghanistan/ 
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Opium 
Another context, and the primary reason the AFP was initially deployed to Afghanistan in 2007, 
was narcotics. According to Rashid (2006) the opium problem in the region began in Pakistan in 
the 1980s, where the Mujahadin were encouraged to grow and sell opium and heroin to fund their 
anti-Soviet activities, while the Pakistani ISI and the CIA turned a blind eye. In addition, as the 
Taliban expanded though Afghanistan, they also assumed control of the opium trade and its export 
through Pakistan, Iran, Central Asia, and the Arabian Gulf through al Qaeda contacts.347 
Crop eradication was seen as problematic because so many low-level farmers and micro-
economies were dependent upon the cash crop nature of poppy harvests. Drug money and its 
associated corruption permeated all levels of society so that nothing could be done without the 
permission of the drug lords. Nothing could compete with the profits, including substitute crops. 
No ordinary jobs paid as much as the lucrative drug industry. Drug money funded the Taliban 
and compensated the families of suicide bombers. According to Rashid: 
one of the major reasons for the failure of nation building in Afghanistan and Pakistan 
was the failure to deal with the issue of drugs.  In 2006 the State Department belatedly 
conceded that ‘Afghanistan’s huge drug trade severely impacts efforts to rebuild the 
economy, develop a strong democratic government based on the rule of law, and 
threatens regional stability.348 
There were also very strong links between the drug trade and senior members of the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and their families. The corruption and political and 
economic distortion this created will never be fully assessed, but the detrimental impact as 
observed by Rashid is profound. Along the lines of Clausewitz, however, due to the reasons 
discussed, the AFP was subject to distractions from this important effort.349 
Section 3: The Australian Federal Police, the United Nations and the International 
Police Organisation 
The AFP and the United Nations 
In 2004, under the Howard Doctrine, the AFP IDG focussed its primary attention on the Pacific, 
indirectly in response to the 911 attacks and Australia’s perceived ‘Arc of Instability’. Almost ten 
years to the day of the attacks on the United States of America, on September 8, 2011, the United 
Nations Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon visited the International Deployment Group training 
facility at Majura, on the outskirts of Canberra. He toured the facility, including the training 
347 Rashid, A. (2006), pp. 319–320. 
348 Rashid, A. (2006), p. 330. 
349 The AFP did not cease its interest in the opium trade from Afghanistan. A brief explanation of the 
extent of the trade and recent AFP involvement in the Regional Narcotics Intelligence Fusion Centre in 
Bahrain is provided at Appendix D. 
227 
                                                 
village constructed following the East Timor intervention in 1999, and adapted to resemble a 
small village in the Pacific or East Timor, and had a discussion with several senior AFP officers, 
including Commissioner Negus and Assistant Commissioner Newton, the National manager of 
the IDG. 
Platinum standard 
Assistant Commissioner Newton later appeared before the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Trade where she stated: 
when I go and speak at the United Nations; throughout all of the international 
masterclasses with primary countries like the UK, US, Canada; and throughout the 
European countries, they all come to us as being the best model in the world for 
capacity development, and we have the greatest experience. Ban Ki Moon, when he 
came out to Majura where the International Deployment Group is and our training 
village is located, views our training as the platinum United Nations training in the 
world.350 
Credible history 
This thesis has explored the evolution of this aspect of AFP ‘boots on the ground’ deployments 
since 1964, when the British Government requested Australian military assistance for the inter-
communal violence in Cyprus, but received a contingent of Australian Commonwealth police 
instead, which established a precedent for the Australian Federal Police. The AFP subsequently 
deployed members to Cambodia, (UNTAC) in 1992, Mozambique (ONUMOZ), in 1994, East 
Timor, (UNAMET, UNTAET, UNMIT, UNMISET), from 1999 to 2012, Sudan (UNMIS), 2005 
and South Sudan, (UNMISS) 2011. The AFP also deployed members to Haiti, Bougainville 1997 
and the Solomon Islands (RAMSI), 2003-2017, Papua New Guinea (ECP) 2005 and (PNG APP) 
2008-present, Jordan (IPTC)2004 and Afghanistan (Operations Synergy, Contego and Illuminate) 
2007-2013. This history was to play a part in Australia’s successful bid for a non-permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council in 2013–2014. 
The AFP Police Adviser UN New York (PAUNNY) and the UN Security Council 
bid 
In 2004, the AFP also deployed a member to the United Nations in New York as a police adviser, 
known as the Police Adviser United Nations New York (PAUNNY). In 2008, shortly after being 
elected in a landslide federal election, Prime Minister Rudd launched a bid for one of two non-
permanent seats on the UN Security Council (UNSC). He was replaced by Julia Gillard as Prime 
350 Newton, M. (2014). Role of the private sector in promoting economic growth and reducing poverty in 
the Indo-Pacific region.  Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade. 
22/09/2014http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22committees
%2Fcommjnt%2F0e712173-ec81-47ca-907b-138dd027f315%2F0001%22 
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Minister and ALP leader two years later in 2010. Australia’s bid was announced as successful on 
October 19, 2012, under the Prime Ministership of Julia Gillard, who was replaced by Kevin 
Rudd again in 2013, shortly before the federal election in which the Liberal Government of Tony 
Abbott was elected. 
UN Security Council bid: 2013–2014 
Although neither the AFP nor the IDG were not specifically mentioned, during the bid for the UN 
Security Council seat, Anthony Bergin and Peter Jennings from the Australian Strategic Policy 
Institute (ASPI), published an article in which it highlighted Australia’s 
reputation based on the work we have done in East Timor, the Solomon Islands and 
elsewhere in coordinating and assisting international missions to stabilise countries 
which have faced significant internal violence… and a strong record of demonstrating 
that we know how to do this in a way that is sympathetic to regional concerns.351 
The Australian Government in part relied on this sort of advice to support its bid. PAUNNY was 
the AFP conduit for the passage of advice and information, relying on a support network in 
Canberra, including an AFP member acting as a liaison officer to the UN Security Council Task 
Force at the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Australia assumed the non-permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council for a two year term throughout 2013 and 2014. Aside from making 
a contribution to the successful bid for the seat, the AFP, through PAUNNY, made three 
significant contributions over this two year period, in the UN Security Council. 
UN Security Council Resolution 2151: Security sector reform – 2014 
The first was the provision of experience-based advice to a UN Security Council Resolution, 
proposed by Nigeria, another non-permanent member, on Security Sector Reform (SSR). This 
resolution was passed unanimously in April 2014 and was based on professionalisation and better 
integration and accountability of police, military, border management and maritime agencies. The 
foundation was that a strengthened security sector is an effective approach to building community 
trust and confidence, which underpins sustainable stability, peacebuilding and development. The 
AFP was able to demonstrate that this was achievable, based primarily on experiences in East 
Timor and the Solomon Islands.352 
351 Jennings, P. and Bergin, A. ( 2010) An Australian agenda for the UN Security Council. 10 Oct 2010. 
The Strategist ASPI. Peter Jennings and Anthony Bergin. https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/an-australian-
agenda-for-the-un-security-council/ 
352 S/RES/2151 (2014). 
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UN Security Council Resolution 2185: Policing an essential part of peacekeeping – 
2014 
The second was a proposal advanced by Australia, as president of the UN Security Council in 
November 2014, which sought to resolve to make policing an essential part of peacekeeping 
mandates and that they be adequately funded. The resolution was unanimously passed on 20 
November, and stressed that UN Peacekeeping mandates including police, should be clear, 
credible and achievable. It also stressed that the effectiveness of United Nations police be 
supported through proper training, equipment, standards, leadership and gender expertise. 
Although not specifically mentioned, the impression made upon the UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki Moon, as related by Assistant Commissioner Newton to the Joint Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, is of direct relevance.353 
UN Security Council Resolution 2166: Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17 – 2014 
The third significant contribution made by Australia, and the AFP, related to the shooting down 
of a civilian aircraft in broad daylight, killing all on board including a significant number of 
Australians, in a region in which Australia has no strategic interests: Malaysian Airlines Flight 
MH 17 en route from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur. This forms the next section of this thesis.354 
  
353 S/RES/2185 (2014). 
354 S/RES/2166 (2014). 
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Section 4: Malaysian Airlines Flight MH 17 
In July 2014, many of the operational activities of the AFP as an agency of diplomacy, referred 
to in previous sections of the thesis, were called upon for an incident of mass homicide, involving 
almost 300 people, including several Australians. This was an incident, of which the victims had 
no knowledge and no warning, in an area of the globe involved in a conflict, in which Australia 
had no direct interest. The response by the AFP was immediate and effective, as members with 
the required skills, worked alongside their international counterparts, in a hostile environment, 
over a crime scene covering a large area, tasked with the massive task of retrieving the remains 
of the victims for identification and repatriation, in accordance with the wishes of their surviving 
kin. The AFP response to this incident was to be known as Operation Arew. It remains an ongoing 
operation. The perpetrators of what journalist Paul Toohey at the one year anniversary called one 
of the greatest crimes of this century 355 remain un-prosecuted. 
 
 
Figure 11. Map of Ukraine 
Source: nationsonline.org 
  
355 Toohey, P. (2015). Former Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston believes those responsible for the MH17 
disaster will face justice. Paul Toohey. New Corp, Australia Network, July 14, 2015. 
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The Incident: 17 July 2014 
Shortly after midnight (AEST) on July 17, 2014 Malaysian flight MH17, a Boeing 777 en route 
from Amsterdam, the Netherlands, to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia failed to respond to calls from 
Rostov-on-Don air traffic control, and vanished from its intended flight path. The morning media 
in Australia reported almost three hundred bodies lying in a burnt out fields, near the city of 
Donetsk in the eastern Ukraine. This area had been contested between the Ukraine Government 
and pro-Russian, and Russian-backed rebels, who sought unification with Russia. This was not a 
small scale fight involving small arms: it was a heavily contested war zone in full-scale conflict 
involving weaponry such as: 
tanks, very heavy calibre artillery, mortars, air defence weapons and people wandering 
around with high power long arms, Kalashnikovs… 
The aircraft was shot down … likely by a separatist-fired, Russian-supplied SA11 
(BUK) surface-to-air missile, in what was probably a case of rebels-who are fighting 
to break from the Ukraine-mistaking it for a Ukrainian military plane near Hrabove 
village, Donetsk Oblast. Neither side claimed responsibility. The culprits were either 
the Ukrainian or the Russian-backed separatists-or one of them trying to make it look 
like the other.356 
Why the police? 
The decision to deploy the AFP into this heavily contested zone was made by Prime Minister 
Abbott following a meeting of the National Security Committee of Cabinet. According to some 
accounts, the Prime Minister was convinced of the efficacy of this strategy, by the ability of the 
AFP to deploy rapidly. Some accounts indicate that when asked how long it would take the ADF 
to assemble and respond to this crime scene, the Chief of the Defence Force, responded that it 
would take approximately two weeks. Apparently when asked the same question, the AFP 
Commissioner, responded that he could deploy a full team immediately. 
One senior AFP member who was involved in Operation Arew, indicated that prior to this NSC 
meeting taking place, the ADF had made an offer of a C17 heavy lift aircraft, to transport AFP to 
Europe in response. This offer was apparently withdrawn following the NSC meeting for 
unexplained reasons, but was suspected by this AFP member to be churlishness on the part of the 
ADF at not being allocated as the lead agency. Regardless of the politics behind this, the fact was 
that there were several hundred bodies lying in a large field of debris, which was difficult enough 
on its own. As a crime scene, natural decomposition and animal predation called for a timely 
response, and AFP was able to fulfil the requirements by utilising civilian air carriers. James 
356 Brown, J. (2016) Firing Line. Quarterly Essay. 
(2016).  https://www.quarterlyessay.com.au/essay/2016/06/firing-line, p. 50. 
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Brown, Research Director and an Adjunct Associate Professor at the U.S. Studies Centre, 
University of Sydney, stated: 
After considering the sensitivities of operating in a war zone and within the shadow of 
the border of a faded superpower with one of the world’s largest conventional 
militaries, I concluded that the presence of the military would be counter-productive. 
This mission would be best left to federal police and diplomats, preferably unarmed to 
emphasise the non-military forensic nature of their work. If the situation was unstable 
enough to require means of immediate self-defence, the AFP should carry side-arms. 
As an afterthought, I forwarded my blog post to a friend working in the national 
security field. He replied almost straightaway to let me know he was thinking along the 
same lines.357 
About 180 AFP officers were deployed to Operation Arew, including disaster victim 
identification (DVI), investigation and other specialists, some of whom were seconded from the 
State Police. 
International diplomacy 
Diplomatic negotiations were complex and were conducted by DFAT officers. These negotiations 
involved the carriage of firearms by foreign police (AFP) in other jurisdictions, and involved the 
Governments of The Netherlands and Ukraine as well as the Organisation for the Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Ukraine government agreed to cede sovereignty in this case, 
and allow international police to conduct the investigations. The governments of Ukraine and 
Australia agreed to a Dutch-led response, with search scene response to be co-ordinated by 
Australia. This was to be a two-faceted, but combined Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) and 
Counter-Terrorism (CT) investigation response. The AFP’s experience with the Boxing Day 
Tsunami and various bombings in Indonesia underpinned this decision. 
Access was arranged by members of the OSCE, but it was quite restrictive as Australian Special 
Envoy Sir Angus Houston stated:  
[t]he conditions of access were, you can’t stay overnight and you can’t carry arms. We 
never took arms out-they were never needed out there…and had we needed them, we 
would have been in a heap of trouble. This is high-end conventional type warfare. We 
didn’t want to get anywhere near that and it worked for us.358 
A challenging crime scene 
On July 22, 2015, a presentation on Operation Arew was given by AFP Commanders Buchhorn 
and Harrison, and Dr Simon Walsh, to the United Services Institute in Canberra. 359 The following 
357 Brown, J. (2016) Firing Line. Quarterly Essay. (2016).  https://www.quarterlyessay.com.au/es-
say/2016/06/firing-line, pp. 50-51 
358 Toohey, P. (2015). Former Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston believes those responsible for the MH17 
disaster will face justice. Paul Toohey. New Corp, Australia Network, July 14, 2015. 
359 Presentation to the Royal United Services Institute, ADF HQ Russell, Canberra, 22 July 2015. 
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is a precis of that presentation. A number of challenging issues were evident on the ground 
including: (1) access to the scene (2) geographic isolation (3) long supply lines (4) sub-standard 
convoy transport (5) security (6) technological limitations (7) co-ordination with partners-
Ukraine/Netherlands/Malaysia (8) few searchers had trained with previous experience in an active 
conflict zone. 
Priority taskings 
The priorities for the police teams were in order: (1) recover remains: due to the altitude and 
manner in which the aircraft was destroyed, there was severe ‘disarticulation’ of body parts, 
strewn over a wide area. The debris field was approximately 23 kilometres in dispersal length, 
and covered an area of approximately 15 square kilometres; (2) recover personal effects-these 
had already been searched or interfered with by local Ukrainian authorities prior to arrival; and 
(3) recover wreckage. While the international police teams had ‘permission to do certain things, 
it should be noted that ‘permission’ in this case was ‘permission at the end of an AK47’ and as 
such, evidentiary material was the last of three priorities, and on occasion was actively 
discouraged by the local people on the ground. 
There were also issues with identification from ground level, due to the crops of sunflowers and 
wheat obscuring the view. Thus an aerial perspective was required. This was provided via the 
‘Five-Eyes’ intelligence community, of which Australia was the only member among the nations 
represented. This allowed a process known as ‘geo-tagging’ to be utilised for the first time in such 
an operation. The potential search areas were ‘sectorised’ and ‘clusters’ identified for ‘highest 
yield of human remains’. 
The search on the ground was a mixture of AFP, Dutch, and Malaysian police, and was led by an 
AFP Sergeant, Sergeant Rod Anderson, from Gungahlin Police Station in the ACT, who doubled 
as the Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) Commander for ACT Policing. There were Cadaver 
K9 dogs, Explosive Ordinance Device (EOD), Chemical Biological Radiation (CBR) and military 
medics in support. All were unarmed with limited and optional ballistic protection available. Time 
on task was determined by the prevailing security environment, which was fluid. There were five 
search teams of five police, each utilising a pre-loaded GPS from the sectoring and clustering 
process mentioned already. 
Safety and security at the end of an AK 47 
From a safety perspective the following risks were identified: (1) landmines; (2) gunfire/cross-
fire; (3) Indirect Fire (Mortars); (4) risk of hostage-taking; (5) aircraft carbon filaments similar to 
asbestos; (6) poison oak which can cause severe allergic reactions including rashes if direct 
contact is made with the skin; (7) TB-which was epidemic in this region; (8) polluted drinking 
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water; (9) dehydration-which was a problem, particularly for the Dutch police who were unused 
to working in hot conditions; and (10) chemical safety. This was an issue especially during the 
Post Mortem Phase due to the use of formaldehyde by the Ukrainian authorities, to preserve the 
bodies, when they first responded to the incident. 
Disaster victim identification (DVI) 
DVI is conducted in Four Phases in accordance with INTERPOL Guidelines and the ANZPAA 
DVI Committee (ADVIC). These are Phase 1-Recovery of remains at the scene; Phase 2 Post 
Mortem-to establish cause of death; Phase 3-Ante Mortem-information obtained from family to 
assist with identification; Phase 4 Reconciliation.360 
International justice 
At the diplomatic level, the Australian Government, through the Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, 
was pursuing justice in conjunction with the governments of all other nations who lost citizens 
when MH17 was shot out of the sky. By sheer coincidence, Australia was a non-permanent 
member of the United Nations Security Council for a two year term 2013-2014. Australia, through 
Foreign Minister Bishop, proposed a Resolution condemning the downing of the flight, and 
demanding immediate access to the site, the dignified repatriation of the remains of the victims, 
and an independent international investigation. UN Security Council 2166 was passed 
unanimously by the Security Council. Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop had previously 
consulted the Australian Ambassador to the United States, Kim Beazley and CIA Director, John 
Brennan and the U.S. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper. The content of this 
meeting is not available, however, it can be safely assumed confidential information relating to 
suspected culpability was passed to Ms Bishop. 
Australia urged the Council to pass Resolution 2166 which: 
…underlined the need for a full, thorough and independent investigation into the crash 
and demanded all military activities in the area cease to enable access to the 
site….[and was a]… vital point of pressure on those who controlled the crash site to 
allow access for investigators from Australia and other countries and enabled the 
victims of flight MH17 to be repatriated and returned to their loved ones.361 
360 Please see Appendix E for further detail on how this was implemented during Operation Arew. 
361 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2166 (United Nations S/RES/2166 (2014)) states inter 
alia:  
1. Reaffirming the rules of  international  law  that  prohibit  acts  of  violence  that pose  a  threat  to  the  
safety  of  international  civil aviation  and  emphasising  the importance of holding those responsible for 
violations of these rules to account, 
2. Stressing the   need   for   a   full,  thorough   and   independent   international investigation   into   the   
incident   in   accordance   with   international   civil   aviation guidelines… 
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On the twelve month anniversary of the passing of Resolution 2166, Foreign Minister Bishop 
published a media release in which she stated: 
Australia, Belgium, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Ukraine, the countries undertaking 
the independent criminal investigation into the downing of MH17, are consulting 
closely with all members of the Security Council to seek their support to establish an 
independent tribunal to hold to account those responsible for the downing of MH17. 
The independent air safety investigation has been conducted in full compliance with all 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) guidelines and Annex 13 of the 
Chicago Convention. It is an independent investigation with broad international 
participation. 
The UN has expressed confidence that the investigation is being carried out in line with 
international standards. 
The objective of the air safety investigation is to determine the cause of the MH17 
incident – it is not intended to identify whether any crimes have been committed or to 
identify those responsible. 
Alongside the air safety investigation, the law enforcement authorities of Australia, 
Belgium, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Ukraine have been cooperating in a Joint 
Investigation Team to conduct a criminal investigation. This investigation has been 
equally comprehensive and independent, carried out in accordance with the highest 
international standards. 
Consistent with standard practice, and to ensure that future prosecutions are not 
jeopardised, the criminal investigation is confidential: it will not result in the 
publication of a report that will be available to anyone other than the prosecuting 
authority.362 
The AFP is the Australian police representative in the Joint Investigation Team, and as such will 
contribute to the evidence presented in the Dutch prosecution of any offenders identified and 
charged. This is not only serving justice, but has potentially global diplomatic consequences. 
Russian obstruction 
On 21 July 2014, Resolution 2166 was passed unanimously by the Security Council, including 
Russia, which later created an obstacle to its implementation. One year later, the Government of 
Malaysia, supported by Australia, the Netherlands and Ukraine, proposed a resolution to the UN 
3. Supports efforts    to    establish    a    full,    thorough    and    independent  international  investigation  
into  the  incident  in  accordance  with  international  civil aviation guidelines; 4… States  who  have  
lost  nationals  on  MH17,  to  institute  an international  investigation  of  the  incident,  and calls  on all  
States  to  provide  any requested assistance to civil and criminal investigations related to this incident; 
9. Calls on all  States  and  actors  in  the  region  to  cooperate  fully  in  relation to   the   international   
investigation   of   the   incident; 
11. Demands that those responsible  for  this  incident  be  held  to  account  and that all States cooperate 
fully with efforts to establish accountability. (UNSCR 2166, 2014] 
362 DFAT (2015) An MH17 tribunal: why it is necessary and timely: Media release Foreign Minister The 
Hon. Julie Bishop :21 July 2015. 
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Security Council, to establish a tribunal to investigate this event. This proposal was vetoed by the 
Russian Federation, as a Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. The Protection of 
Civilians was highlighted by most speakers during the debate on Resolution 2166. Ironically, as 
the Resolution was being debated, the Russian representative stressed that such protection was a 
national responsibility and that national sovereignty should be respected. On the subject of the 
protection of the civilians aboard the aircraft, Russia remained silent. 
Actually eleven countries of the 15-member council voted in favour of the proposal by Malaysia, 
Australia, the Netherlands and Ukraine, while three countries abstained: China, Angola and 
Venezuela. A number of excerpts from various statements provides some background to the 
positions adopted by some of these nations. 363 Russian representative Vitaly Churkin said: 
the Russian Federation did not support the creation of an international tribunal under 
Chapter VII, as resolution 2166 (2014) had not considered the downing of the aircraft 
a threat to international peace and security. 
This was vehemently disputed by the majority of other nations which made statements. The 
Angolan representative, Joao Iambeno Gimoleica, ‘… emphasized the need to hold the 
perpetrators accountable, bring justice to the victims and their families and ensure the safety of 
civil aviation…’ but further stated that… ‘…the establishment of an international tribunal was 
premature, given that the investigations were ongoing.’ 
While the Venezuelan representative, Rafael Dario Ramirez Carreno, stated that ‘Justice must 
prevail’ and added that… ‘We must not prejudge or reach conclusions that are unfounded.’ 
Tellingly, no suggestion was made as to how well-founded conclusions can be drawn without 
such a tribunal. The Chinese representative, Liu Jieyi justified abstention on the basis that there 
was no consensus indicating that the 364  ‘… focus should be on seeking justice and ending 
impunity… Consensus on the draft would have sent a positive message, whereas a divided 
Council would impede the cause espoused.’365 
There were an overwhelming number of voices supporting the Malaysian proposal. Most 
objections related to the fact that attacking civilian passenger aircraft was a threat to international 
peace and security, in direct contradiction of Russia’s rationale for the veto. This extended to the 
actual and perceived impunity afforded to the perpetrators by the Russian veto, and the message 
of impotence its sends to those malign actors, including ideologically based terrorists, who would 
363 UN.org. (2017). Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution on Tribunal for Malaysia Airlines Crash 
in Ukraine, Amid Calls for Accountability, Justice for Victims | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. 
[online] Available at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11990.doc.htm [Accessed 9 Sep. 2017]. 
364 UN.org. (2017). Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution on Tribunal for Malaysia Airlines Crash 
in Ukraine, Amid Calls for Accountability, Justice for Victims | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. 
[online] Available at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11990.doc.htm [Accessed 9 Sep. 2017] 
365 This of course, is consistent with justifying China’s own veto power when it is required over issues 
such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. 
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seek to target civilian passenger aircraft.  This diverse group of voices included those of Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Vietnam, Chad, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, France, Germany, Israel, 
Lithuania, Chad, Spain, Chile, Britain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Canada, Ireland, the Philippines 
and Ukraine. The Ukraine representative Pavlo Klimkin, the Ukraine Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
summed up the unspoken sentiments of many when he stated: 
There is no reason to oppose such a move unless you are one of the perpetrators…The 
Russian Federation’s role in the conflict in Ukraine was clear and well known…and 
its veto needed to be seen in that context.  The hope for justice remained alive.  The 
Russian Federation’s use of the veto may have killed the draft resolution today; it 
would not be able to kill the hopes of people around the world to see justice prevail.366 
Evidence for prosecution 
If and when an international tribunal is established to investigate this crime and bring the 
perpetrators to justice, much of the evidence obtained and submitted, will have been collected by 
AFP members. The Joint Investigations Team continued in its duties. One member, Detective 
Superintendent Andrew Donoghoe, observed:  
An overwhelming amount of information has already been collected. This includes 
video files, photographs, interviews, witness statements, telephone intercepts, and lots 
of intelligence. A vast amount of forensic examination work has been completed. ‘It’s 
a very big repository of evidentiary information that takes time to meticulously scour-
and access to the AFP’s electronic resources for our members in the Ukraine can also 
be challenging. But we continue to look for the clues that re going to lead us to the 
right solution to the problem we have.367 
Prosecution in the Netherlands 
On 5 July 2017, the Government of The Netherlands announced that the members of the JIT, 
Australia, Belgium, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Ukraine, had decided that the suspects should 
be prosecuted in the Netherlands and that the Dutch Public Prosecution Service will take 
appropriate decisions regarding criminal prosecution at the appropriate time. All JIT countries 
have expressed their full confidence in the Dutch legal system and the ongoing criminal 
investigation continues to enjoy virtually unanimous support from the international community. 
This will see members of the AFP giving evidence in a Dutch court against those who will 
eventually stand accused of this crime. 
This could potentially involve the charging and conviction, in absentia, of senior members of the 
Russian military, and possibly also senior political figures. The London-based freelance 
366 UN.org. (2017). Security Council Fails to Adopt Resolution on Tribunal for Malaysia Airlines Crash 
in Ukraine, Amid Calls for Accountability, Justice for Victims | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. 
[online] Available at: http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11990.doc.htm [Accessed 9 Sep. 2017]. 
367 Pursuing the Truth, AFP Platypus Magazine, ed. 120 (2016), p. 18. 
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investigative body Bellingcat, has provided information to the JIT based in The Netherlands in 
which it identifies Russian Major General Sergey Nikolaevich Dubinsky, born August 9, 1962… 
‘as a key–or perhaps even the key–figure in organizing the transport of Buk 332 from Donetsk to 
a field south of Snizhne on the day of the tragedy’ and links him to the incident via a series of 
photographs and telephone intercepts.368 
This information is highly circumstantial, and Major General Dubinsky is as entitled as anyone, 
to the presumption of innocence. Should the criminal prosecution in The Netherlands find him 
and his associates guilty of this crime, even in absentia, the implications for them are significant. 
Such a conviction could result in an INTERPOL Red Notice, which would result in immediate 
arrest should he or his associates cross an international border upon leaving Russia. It is 
noteworthy that not even a Russian veto in the UN Security Council can prevent that from 
occurring. This is testimony to the underlying principle of the separation of powers, even on a 
global scale, between the executive, in this case the UN Security Council and the justice system, 
in this case the combination of the Dutch judicial system and INTERPOL. 
The AFP and INTERPOL 
The relationship the AFP has with the UN dates from 1964, when one of its predecessor 
organisations, the Commonwealth Police, deployed to Cyprus. Since then a credible history has 
evolved, which resulted in a platinum standard training capability and contributed to Australia 
securing a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. During its term on the 
Council, Australia influenced global affairs in relation to international policing, in part relying on 
the AFP’s involvement. The AFP’s experience, was therefore able to provide a demonstrable link 
between the theoretical and the practical, by two unanimously adopted Resolutions relating to 
police. The involvement of the Australian Foreign Minister in the unanimous adoption, and 
subsequent pursuit of the offenders in relation to the mass-murder of passengers aboard MH17, 
and Australia’s response on the ground, which involved the AFP deploying large numbers of 
members to an active war zone, way out of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, is a direct link between 
Australian foreign policy and its implementation at the highest global level. This is practical 
diplomacy in uncharted waters. 
The fact that the UN has been unable to follow through on Resolution 2166, due to a veto by the 
Russian Federation, is an unfortunate result of the highly flawed construct of the UN generally, 
and the Security Council specifically, since its inception in the late 1940s. The fact that there is a 
separate international policing organisation, independent of the UN, known as INTERPOL, is 
368 Bellingcat, (2017). Pre-MH17 Photograph of Buk 332 Discovered, June 5, 2017. Bellingcat 
Investigation Team. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/06/05/pre-mh17-photograph-
buk-332-discovered/ 
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testimony to the utility of that independence. The UN focusses its international policing efforts 
on the provision of uniformed police responding to long-term crises and capacity development, 
and the AFP has played its part in this, as discussed. 
The AFP is also the Australian representative for INTERPOL, the organisation which may well 
prove successful in bringing the MH17 offenders to justice, via a prosecution by the Dutch 
Government, and the subsequent issue of INTERPOL Red Notices (for arrest) should the 
prosecutions result in convictions.369 This epitomises the horizontal and vertical relationships and 
networking advocated by Slaughter as ‘new diplomacy’. 
The new security dilemma: Expect the unexpected 
AFP Operation Arew thrust the AFP into the global spotlight, once again in the wake of a tragic 
event which involved the loss of life of a significant number of Australians, and victims from 
other countries. The AFP response was rapid and the way in which members meshed seamlessly 
with their international colleagues, stands as testimony to their versatility and professionalism. 
They served their nation with pride, courage and skill. This event was unexpected, but like the 
other tragic mass casualty events discussed throughout the thesis, they are now on the threat 
horizon as a reality. It may not be a surface to air missile next time, but there are enough 
ideologically driven extremists, with the intent to target civilian airline traffic indiscriminately, 
that the next mass casualty event, involving airlines somewhere in the world is only a matter time. 
The AFP performance in Operation Arew in 2014 is evidence of the preparedness to respond in 
a similar way if required. As AFP Commissioner Colvin stated at a Lowy Institute address in 
March 2015:   
Had you asked me 12 months ago if could I see a situation where the AFP would deploy 
teams of unarmed men and women to the heart of an active conflict zone in eastern 
Ukraine – with no notice, no area familiarity, no established links or local partnerships 
– to identify and bring home the remains of Australian victims, and to investigate the 
shooting down of a passenger plane, I would probably have told you that even as a 
hypothetical exercise, it was a bridge too far. But we did it, and we did it very well.370 
Is this diplomacy by default? 
The period 2007 to 2014 was one in which the versatility of the AFP was called upon by a new 
government in areas in which expectations were unrealistically high, and were tinged with the 
optics of politics. The challenging situations faced by the AFP in both Papua New Guinea and 
Afghanistan, had some similarities, including difficult geographic and human terrains, and a 
politically-driven attempt to fit a liberal-democratic policing template in culturally inappropriate 
369 Please see Appendix F: INTERPOL. 
370 Colvin, A. (2015) Lowy Institute Address, 5 March 2015. https://www.afp.gov.au/news-
media/national-speeches/lowy-institute-address 
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contexts. The inability of the AFP to meet unrealistic, politically-driven expectations resulted in 
frustration and the eventual financial stifling of the IDG concept. Nonetheless, the achievements 
of the AFP, particularly the IDG, formed part of the successful pitch by the Australian 
Government for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Ironically, it was 
during Australia’s term on the UNSC that three resolutions in which the AFP had a direct stake 
were passed. Two related to UN policing and security sector reform, and the third related to the 
downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight MH17, in an incident to which the AFP deployed rapidly 
and effectively. 
The MH17 response was called Operation Arew, which is an obsolete word for ‘in a row’. The 
immediate, medium and long-term engagement of AFP in relation to this atrocity could result in 
offenders being tried in absentia in a court in the Netherlands, and could result in travel restrictions 
being placed upon military officials and possibly others, from a resurgent superpower. The 
response, the evidence, the prosecution in the Netherlands and potential international action 
through INTERPOL, all have the potential to line up in a row to serve justice, in an unprecedented 
circumstance. 
The four case studies in this chapter are demonstrative of the versatility and willingness of the 
AFP and its members to engage in a diverse range of activities. Deployments to Papua New 
Guinea, Afghanistan and Ukraine, have all involved the application of diplomatic qualities listed 
by both Copeland and Meyer. They have all involved communication, negotiation and reporting 
as outlined by Jonsson and Hall. The networking involved in Operation Arew and the likelihood 
of the judicial outcome are reflective of Jonsson and Hall’s replication of international society 
and Slaughter’s ‘new diplomacy’. These practical examples, in three diverse geographic and 
cultural contexts, coupled with the theoretical input by the AFP into the UN Security Council 
Resolutions with global significance for UN police, provide a solid foundation upon which the 
AFP and its members can rightfully claim to be ‘diplomats by default’. 
Summary and conclusion 
The major global influences in the post 1945 world were new internationalism, UN-inspired post 
colonialism and self-determination and Cold War dynamics, including proxy wars in South East 
Asia and Indo-China, and South West Asia, particularly Afghanistan. The AFP was deployed to 
Papua New Guinea to address some of the poor governance outcomes which ironically had arisen 
from the haste with which it was granted independence in 1975. This has encountered some 
obstacles which are difficult to overcome. These include some of the political, legal and cultural 
influences over which the AFP has no control. The influence of the MSG and its ‘look north’ 
policy has not been helpful. This has resulted in a perception by some, particularly DFAT of the 
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AFP being ineffective. There are alternative motives for DFAT to hold such a position, primarily 
a desire to take control of the funding attached to the PNG-APP program. 
The AFP was also deployed to Afghanistan, in part, to address the narcotics industry and its 
impact on legitimate governance in that country. This activity fell afoul of ODA funding 
guidelines and as a result the AFP was re-tasked to engage in training at the PTC. When the AFP 
reneged on an opportunity to engage in the proposed POMLT model, based on its own risk 
assessment, it incurred further opprobrium by the government of the day. The AFP became 
embroiled in a change in strategy, from a military-centric counter-terrorism approach, to a 
population-centric, counter-insurgency approach. The AFP was not well suited to either and its 
activities in Afghanistan were largely related to political optics rather than operational effect. 
The opprobrium arising from perceived AFP deficiencies in PNG and Afghanistan under the 
Rudd Government were somewhat restored under the Abbott Government when it responded to 
the MH17 disaster. This response was immediate and meticulous, and is likely to result in AFP 
members giving evidence in a Dutch criminal court, which could result in international travel 
restrictions being imposed on those found guilty. In all probability this involves senior members 
of the Russian military. 
The downing of MH 17 demonstrated how there is no other organisation in Australia, or in its 
region, that had the combined attributes of flexibility to respond rapidly to such an unexpected 
event, and the versatility, within its own ranks, to ensure that the response was as comprehensive 
as possible. This ranged from the DVI, forensic, search and rescue, investigation, intelligence, 
Special Response Group, Family Investigative Liaison Officers and the Ceremonial and Protocol 
Officers. The fact that these elements exist under the one command, is evidence that the AFP in 
such circumstances is capable of effectively linking a response to a tragic event of mass murder 
with the families of those victims. This is demonstrative of the new diplomacy as advocated by 
Slaughter. 
The fact that they may play a significant part in a criminal trial potentially involving senior 
Russian military and possibly political figures, places them in as high a profile as any ordinary 
police officer can be placed. If their evidence forms part of a successful prosecution, and restricts 
the ability to travel of those convicted, it is not just a partial closure for the victim’s relatives, but 
a significant advancement in global justice and the dismantling of impunity, which has served to 
undermine confidence in the international rules-based order. 
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Chapter 6: The AFP and Interconnectedness: Domestic, Re-
gional and Global Networking for a Safer Australia 
Overview 
A general discussion of international policing and the operational role the AFP plays in global 
policing is appropriate for this thesis at this point. Greener (2012) wrote how Lord Davies first 
raised the concept of an international police force in the 1930s. As mentioned earlier in this thesis, 
United Nations Secretary General U Thant, claimed that he had no doubt that the world should 
eventually have an international police force which will be accepted as an integral and essential 
part of life in the same way as national police forces are accepted. 371  
This has not materialised in any structured sense, perhaps due to Slaughter’s globalisation 
paradox, of both needing and fearing global government simultaneously. However, the AFP has 
demonstrated it is sufficiently versatile and flexible, to provide ‘boots on the ground’ policing 
when required, as well as a world class forensic and investigative veracity to respond at short 
notice, in extremely challenging circumstances. It also has the capacity to provide evidence in a 
court, with implications at the highest international level, both directly and through its 
membership of INTERPOL. In all of these endeavours, the AFP has made a positive contribution 
to maintaining an international order based on the rule of law. This in itself is demonstrative of 
its own form of international diplomacy. 
As discussed in previous chapters, the AFP is a distinctive organisation. It has a relatively brief, 
but compact history, in which a diversity of duties and a versatility of approaches, have featured 
prominently, both nationally and internationally. It is Australia’s international face of policing 
and has served the interests of successive governments, as well as the people of Australia, with 
distinction. This has been achieved in part, by service in an ever evolving international 
environment, and in this regard, has developed a high level of credibility, both in terms of 
peacekeeping, training, advising and police development missions, as well as specialist responses 
to incidents such as the Bali bombings in 2002, the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 and the 
downing of Malaysian Airlines flight MH 17 in 2014. 
The AFP has an extensive international liaison officer network. The Federal Agents who deploy 
internationally, carry with them the values, principles and approaches to policing, which they 
apply domestically, and adapt them to suit a multitude of unfamiliar, challenging and occasionally 
hostile environments. This includes adherence to common law principles, Peelian notions of 
371 Bowling and Sheptycki 2012, p. 4. 
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preventative, community-based policing, and the AFP values of, fairness, accountability, 
excellence, integrity, commitment, trust and respect.  
Section 1: The Australian Federal Police centrally located and widely dispersed 
The AFP is the chief source of policing advice to the Australian Government, and is mandated to 
perform its duties with strict impartiality and objectivity. It operates in a constantly evolving 
environment, which requires both capability and capacity, in response to rapidly changing 
priorities, in fluid international criminal and ambiguous political and legal environments.  It must 
adhere to the common law principles, the community-based preventative approach and the AFP 
principles, which underpin its credibility, with both the government of the day, and with the 
broader community. The ability to make sound decisions, and be accountable for those decisions 
is vested in the lowest levels of the policing hierarchy, namely at the level of Constable. This is a 
unique feature of British-based Peelian policing, which in the case of the AFP, has been applied 
at a national level. The AFP has an empowered workforce. Its’ integrity as a trusted organisation, 
is reflected in a poll of nationally recognised organisations in January 2017. Essential Research  
conducted a poll of more than 1000 respondents, which revealed that the AFP had 69 per cent 
‘total trust’ from those polled, closely followed by state police on 67 per cent. Others such as the 
High Court (62%), the ABC (53%) and the Reserve Bank (51%) rounded out the top five. The 
bottom five for ‘total trust’ were Federal Parliament (30%) , Religious Institutions  (28%), Trade 
Unions (27%), Business (27%) and Political Parties (17%).372 
As an Australian Government agency, the staffing of the AFP is responsive to government 
priorities, including budgetary concerns. As at the end of 2016, the AFP listed a staff of 6580, 
35% of whom are female, and include 3436 sworn police officers, and 661 protective service 
officers, with 282 staff serving overseas. The AFP has a relatively low attrition rate of 2.4%, 
which is testimony to the working environment, and the value members place upon their work. It 
is also demonstrative of a highly experienced workforce, with its own well established internal 
networks, working in accordance within a mutually understood set of values and principles, as 
outlined. 
The AFP polices at three levels: local, national and international. At the local or community level 
the AFP provides general, community policing in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), 
including Jervis Bay on the New South Wales south coast and Australia’s External Territories, 
Norfolk Island in the Pacific Ocean, and Christmas Island and Cocos (Keeling) Islands in the 
372 Essential Research Poll January 2017: http://www.essentialvision.com.au/wp-
content/uploads/2017/01/Essential-Report_170124.pdf 
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Indian Ocean. The AFP also provides uniformed police at eight designated Australian airports, in 
all the mainland state and territory capital cities, as well as Cairns and Gold Coast airports.  
At the national level, the AFP has a broad remit of responsibilities which include, fraud and 
corruption offences against the Commonwealth, Victim Based Crime, such as the kidnapping for 
ransom of Australian citizens travelling internationally, child sexual and servitude exploitation 
offences and cyber-crime investigations. The AFP also provides close personal protection for 
Australian High Office Holders, such as the Prime Minister and the Governor General, as well as 
foreign dignitaries in Australia, such as Ambassadors and High Commissioners, as well as visiting 
international dignitaries. 
Counter terrorism 
The AFP was established in the wake of an act of violent extremism in Sydney in 1978, and 
continues its involvement in counter-terrorism investigations, particularly those with an offshore 
element, including Australians who have travelled overseas as ‘foreign fighters’ in places such as 
Syria and Iraq. The return of these people to Australia, and to the South East Asian region, is of 
concern to all police agencies in the region, as events in Mindanao in the southern Philippines in 
2017 demonstrate.  In conjunction with State and Territory police, the AFP coordinates Joint 
Counter Terrorist Teams (JCTT), formed after the Bali bombing in 2002, in all Australian capital 
cities. This provides a direct link for information and intelligence exchange with international 
partner agencies in the South East Asian region through ASEANAPOL, the South West Pacific, 
through PICP, and further afield through EUROPOL and INTERPOL. In addition, like its military 
counterpart, the AFP is a member of the ‘Five-Eyes’ law enforcement community, which 
includes, Australia, Britain, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, the most trusted of law 
enforcement partners. 
Narcotics 
Much of the AFP’s international engagement has it historical roots in the long association with 
the international trade in illicit narcotics. This commenced with a strong presence in South East 
Asia from its inception in the 1970s, as the trade in opiates such as heroin, began to impact on the 
Australian criminal environment at the end of the Vietnam War, sourced primarily from the 
‘Golden Triangle’ in northern Thailand, Laos and Myanmar. More recently, the AFP has worked 
cooperatively with police agencies in this region, including those with which Australia has had 
less than cordial diplomatic relations.  
Joint task forces 
Currently the AFP has Joint Task Forces with China (Taskforce Blaze), Vietnam (Taskforce 
Storm), and Thailand (Taskforce Dragon), in relation to Border Controlled Drugs (BCD), most 
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of which at present appears to be Chrystal meth amphetamine or ‘ice’, sourced from southern 
China. The AFP is also connected throughout the Pacific in relation to the transit of cocaine from 
the Americas, through the Pacific Transnational Crime Network (PTCN), based in Samoa. These 
are important aspects of the long-term AFP strategy to tackle international crime at its source.373 
Joined-up government 
In the new millennium, while many of the regional police deployments were taking place, there 
was a growing realisation that Australia was also vulnerable to the threat posed by global 
jihadism. A sizeable diaspora from many Islamic countries and proximity to the world’s largest 
Islamic nation, made it prudent to position the Commonwealths law enforcement body closer to 
the government security architecture. Thus the AFP expanded its relationships both domestically 
and internationally. 
In an article on ‘joined-up government’, Dr Alan Ryan, Executive Director of the Australian Civil 
Military Centre argued for a… higher level of multiagency interconnectedness than ever before… 
because [c]ontemporary crises arise suddenly, and require greater levels of readiness from a 
more diverse ‘team of teams’ than in the past. 374 . As discussed, the AFP has been highly 
responsive to short notice crises, such as the UNAMET mission in East Timor in 1999, the Bali 
bombing in 2002 and most recently the downing of MH17 in 2014. The following discussion will 
demonstrate that the AFP is well positioned both within the machinery of government and is 
strategically located globally to address routine, and reasonably foreseeable criminal activity 
likely to impact on Australia. The AFP is structurally linked-in to a global network of trusted 
contemporaries in the law enforcement community, to enable the rapid transmission of 
information, in an era when such transmission has never been so important to preserve public 
safety and community cohesion. In this capacity, the AFP is able to provide, independent insight 
and influence directly to where it is needed. This is practical diplomacy and is an example of the 
sort of communication aspects of diplomacy outlined by Jonsson and Hall. 
Section 2: The Australian Federal Police in ‘whole-of-government’ 
This section will demonstrate how the contemporary AFP epitomises Dr Ryan’s ‘higher level of 
multiagency interconnectedness.’ The discussion will commence by outlining how the AFP is 
linked into domestic law enforcement and intelligence communities, followed by a discussion on 
373 Taskforce Blaze is a joint taskforce between the AFP, and other Australian law enforcement agencies, 
and the Chinese Narcotic Control Bureau, focussed on opiates and methamphetamine, commenced in 
November 2015. This has resulted in the seizure of over 13 tonnes of illicit drugs and precursor chemicals 
and 215 arrests, 117 in China and 98 in Australia. 
374 Ryan A (2016) Delivering ‘joined-up’ government: achieving the integrated approach to offshore 
crisis management. The Strategist. ASPI 29 Nov 2016. 
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the AFP’s regional engagement in South East Asia and the South West Pacific, and finally on the 
AFP’s engagement further afield in the global environment. The ACMC also lists a progressive 
list of broad ways in which entities interrelate including co-existence, communication, 
cooperation and collaboration. It has been argued throughout this thesis that the AFP is at its most 
effective when cooperating and collaborating with partners, and not competing with them. 
National Police Agency 
With an increased realisation in the new millennium, that the domestic security challenges facing 
Australia, required some ‘whole-of-government’ approaches, the AFP, as the national police 
agency and primary law enforcement representative, and adviser to the Federal Government, 
moved closer to a position of trust within the national security architecture in the post 911 
environment. This meant strengthening existing relationships with long-standing partners, such 
as the State and Territory police agencies. In addition, it resulted in establishing strategic and 
operational relationships with agencies departments, and organisations, which had heretofore 
been primarily transactional, including the Defence Department, the Australian Defence Force 
(ADF), and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). Links with other government 
agencies including the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD) (of which the Department of 
Justice is a sub-set), and newly formed agencies such as the Department of Immigration and 
Border Protection (DIBP), and its enforcement arm the Australian Border Force (ABF) have 
proven invaluable in assisting the AFP to achieve its mandate, as have links with the Australian 
Intelligence Community (AIC). 
Under different constitutional, structural, and socio-legal circumstances, this sort of centralised 
activity by one organisation, particularly a policing organisation, might be cause for concern, as 
it may result in a potential ‘big brother’-like collection of information with an attendant potential 
for abuse of the power, such mass information holdings could provide. As discussed, however, 
the combination of a liberal-democratic community-focussed policing posture within a strong 
federated structure provides sufficient accountability and responsibility to largely mitigate any 
such concerns. This in part, addresses Slaughter’s globalisation paradox. 
Operational areas 
The way in which the AFP is structured internally, provides an overview of the breadth and depth 
of coverage, within the Australian policing environment, provided by the AFP, and also 
demonstrates the direct linkages with the Australian community, a feature not shared by either 
the military or the foreign service. The AFP has six operational areas, each headed by a SES Band 
2 (2 Star), with the rank of Assistant Commissioner. They are: (1) ACT Policing; (2) Aviation 
and Protection; (3) Counter Terrorism; (4) Organised Crime and Cyber; (5) Crime Operations; 
and (6) International Operations. Each represent discrete portfolios, but in many cases have 
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overlapping responsibilities, including some with international partner agencies. The AFP 
International Operations portfolio will be discussed in the regional and global setting as distinct 
from the domestic responsibilities of the AFP.  
Section 3: The Australian Federal Police International Operations portfolio 
Since its foundation in 1979, the AFP has an extensive international liaison officer network with 
a fluid number of about 100 officers, located in approximately 30 countries. The locations vary 
in accordance with emerging crime types, national priorities and the over-arching strategy of 
fighting crime at its source. Traditionally this has been largely narcotics related and thus 
concentrated in South East Asia. As opposed to the ‘Boots on the ground’ aspect of AFP 
international policing, this network is more operationally focused, dealing with normal police 
enquiries and criminal intelligence, as well as developing relationships with representatives from 
the host state police and relevant departments and agencies. It was a combination of this 
positioning within the Whole-of-Government architecture in the domestic security and 
intelligence space, and in regions far afield from Australia which allowed the AFP to have an 
officer deploy immediately from Belgrade to Kiev in 2014, to commence dealing with the 
Ukrainian police upon learning of the downing of MH17. 
The rise of organised crime, often ethnically-based, such as the Chinese triads, Italian mafia, 
Mexican and South American cartels and others, combined with a contemporaneous rise in 
politically-motivated groups such as the Irish Republican Army and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation, meant that the AFP liaison officer network expanded into other regions including 
Europe, North America and the Middle East. Australia’s membership of the ‘Five Eyes’ law-
enforcement community means that information concerning criminal enterprise or trends can be 
exchanged between trusted partners very rapidly. 
The AFP’s largest overseas liaison post is in Jakarta, the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, as 
both the AFP and the Indonesian National Police (INP) address issues of common import to their 
respective governments and communities. This includes terrorism, fraud, people smuggling, child 
sex exploitation and other serious crimes. This co-operative relationship is replicated with varying 
degrees of success in other countries, and demonstrates that despite what can sometimes be a 
fractious political or diplomatic relationship, such as the immediate aftermath of the 
UNAMET/INTERFET era in East Timor in 1999-2000, the police to police relationship can 
endure and prosper, due to a combination of a common interest in the welfare of each respective 
community, and a professional relationships built on trust and understanding. 
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International operations 
The International Operations portfolio, based in Canberra, with managers dispersed globally,375 
was created in 2015, from an amalgamation of the International Liaison Officer Network, 
responsible for the management of AFP liaison officers worldwide, and the International 
Deployment Group (IDG), responsible for ‘boots on the ground’ deployments of AFP members. 
The duties of the latter involve traditional peacekeeping, regional police capacity development 
and an assortment of other duties, including advisory and training, many of which have been 
discussed in previous sections. The international aspect of crime impacting on Australia was 
raised in May 2017 when AFP Commissioner Colvin addressed the National Press Club of 
Australia and stated: 
Crime in Australia is increasingly emanating from, being directed by, or having a 
significant overseas element. We estimate that about 70 percent of Australia’s serious 
criminal threats have an international dimension…nearly three quarters of serious 
crime impacting Australia has overseas aspects. The AFP has built an extensive 
international liaison network and it is a cornerstone of our organisation, and put 
simply, our efforts to cripple organised crime would be futile without it. Our work with 
partner agencies in these locations is crucial in disrupting crime before it can even 
reach our shores.376 
375 There are five Managers at the Commander, or three-star level within the International Operations 
portfolio with line responsibilities on a regional and global basis: 
Regional 
Manager Pacific, based in Canberra, responsible for police regional capacity development programs 
under the Pacific Police Development Program-Regional (PPDP-R) in Republic of Marshall Islands, 
Federated States of Micronesia, Palau , Kiribati., Nauru, Niue, Cook Islands and Tuvalu, and for more 
involved police capacity development programs in Papua New Guinea (PNG-APP), the Solomon Islands 
(Solomon Islands Police Development Program), Tonga (Tonga Police Development Program (TPDP)), 
Samoa (Samoa-Australia Police Program (SAPP)) and Vanuatu (Vanuatu Australia Police Program 
(VAPP)), as well as the Timor Leste Police Development Program (TLTDP). In addition the Manager 
Pacific has responsibility for oversight of the AFP’s community policing obligations in Australia’s 
external territories on Norfolk Island in the Pacific Ocean, Jervis Bay Territory on the New South Wales 
Coast, Christmas Island and Cocos (Keeling Islands) in the Indian Ocean. The Manager Pacific is 
supplemented by two additional Canberra-based SES Band 1 Commanders: the Manager International 
Engagement and the Manager International Strategy. 
The Manager South East Asia, based in Singapore, responsible for liaison posts in: Manila, Kuala 
Lumpur, Singapore, Jakarta and Semarang (JCLEC) and Bali. The Manager South East Asia is based in 
Singapore, responsible for liaison posts in: Manila, Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Jakarta and Semarang 
(JCLEC) and Bali. The Manager Asia is based in Beijing, responsible for liaison posts in: Islamabad, 
New Delhi, Beijing, Guangzhou, Hong Kong, Hanoi, Yangon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh and Ho Chi Minh 
City. The Manager Europe, Africa, Middle East is based in London, responsible for liaison posts in: 
Belgrade, The Hague, London, Lyon. Ankara, Beirut, Amman, Dubai and Pretoria. The Manager 
Americas is based in Washington, responsible for liaison posts in: New York (the Police Advisor UN 
New York-PAUNNY), Washington, Los Angeles and Bogota, Colombia. 
376 Colvin, A. (2017) AFP Commissioner, Address to the National Press Club May 2017.  
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The AFP and Regional Police Fora 
The AFP has well established links with partner policing and law enforcement agencies in the 
South East Asia and South West Pacific regions. Through membership or affiliations with supra-
national peak police representative bodies, such as that representing the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEANAPOL), of which the AFP has been a dialogue partner since 2008, and 
that representing the Pacific Island Forum (PIF), the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP), of 
which the AFP is a founding member. 
South East Asia 
 ASEANAPOL 
Australia’s interests in South East Asia lie in long-standing, and well-established relationships 
with the governments in that region, dating from colonial times, and forged through the turmoil 
of hostile Japanese occupation in the 1940s. The Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) was formed in the 1960s, as a pro-western body of the five original likeminded nations, 
Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. Brunei jointed in 1984, after 
gaining independence. ASEAN formed a bulwark against southward communist expansion, from 
China and Indo-China. In a policing sense, this schism has largely been healed with the 
incorporation of the Indo-Chinese states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, as well as Myanmar 
into ASEAN, thus growing its membership to ten. ASEANAPOL represents police from each of 
those ten nations. 
ASEANAPOL has a number of dialogue partners including Australia, China, Japan, Republic of 
Korea, New Zealand, Russia, Turkey, and INTERPOL as well as a number of observers including 
representatives from Fiji, Timor Leste, UK National Crime Agency, EUROPOL, International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), International Committee Regional of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) and the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network (WEN). The stated objectives of 
ASEANAPOL include the enhancement of police professionalism and stronger regional 
cooperation among police via enhanced communication and coordination and facilitation of 
mutual assistance aimed at combatting transnational criminal activity. These objectives are 
closely aligned with those of the AFP. 
The AFP also makes a significant contribution to the South East Asia Bomb Data Working Group 
(SEABDWG) which was established in 2005. It has five regional members from South East Asian 
Bomb Data Centres in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. The information 
and intelligence exchange in relation to methodologies of returning foreign fighters from Syria 
and Iraq to South East Asia, is a vital link in defeating this threat, which exists both in South East 
Asia and in Australia. 
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The South West Pacific 
Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) 
The Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police (PICP) represents 21 Pacific island nations 377 , with a 
combined police constituency in excess of 75,000 serving police officers. Among other things, 
the PICP strives to improve policing in the South West Pacific, by providing a common approach 
based on shared ideas and information exchanges on crime and the police responses to it. This 
includes the coordination of training and development, which is aligned very closely with the 
Pacific Police Development Program. The stated aims of the PICP are: (1) to develop current and 
future police leaders; (2) to uphold high standards of integrity in policing; (3) to create influence 
and add value to crime prevention strategies; and (4) to strengthen cross-jurisdictional 
relationships and regional cooperation to fight crime and respond to emergencies. 
Pacific Trans National Crime Network (PTCN) 
Since its inception in 2002, the PTCN has been working collaboratively to address transnational 
crime in the South West Pacific region, by providing a mechanism for proactive criminal 
intelligence exchange, and the enhancement of investigative capabilities in regional police 
agencies. The Pacific Trans National Crime Coordination Centre (PTCCC) is based in Apia, 
Samoa and links 18 Transnational Crime Units (TCUs), in 13 Pacific Island nations and supports 
their operational activities. The PCTN makes a positive contribution to the identification of 
current and emerging criminal trends and risks in the region via the annual PTCN Transnational 
Crime Assessment and the annual Illicit Drug Seizures assessment which deals specifically with 
trends related to illicit drug trafficking in the Pacific Region. It should be noted that the Pacific 
Islands have long been used as transit points for the transport of illicit drugs across the Pacific 
from the Americas. Recent trends, however, indicate that organised crime groups such as Outlaw 
Motorcycle Gangs are recruiting from among the local unemployed youth in some Pacific Island 
states for membership, with links to the Pacific Island diaspora communities in Australia. 
The PCTN engages with a number of non-police Pacific-based stakeholder organisations, 
including a number of Financial Intelligence Units, the Pacific Islands Forum Regional Security 
Committee; the Oceania Customs Organisation; the Pacific Immigration Directors Conference; 
the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency; the Australian-led Pacific Patrol Boat Program and 
377 The members of the PICP are American Samoa, Australia, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands, Cook Islands, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Fiji, Guam, Federated States of Micronesia, 
Kiribati, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, 
Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu. The PICP has a number of specialist groups including: (1) the 
Forensic Working Group; (2) the Training Advisory Group; (3) Cyber Safety Pasifika; (4) the Prevention 
of Domestic Violence; (5) the Women’s Advisory Network; (6) the Pacific Transnational Crime Network 
(PTCN). 
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crucially is linked with the United States-led Joint Inter Agency Task Force-West (JIATF-W), 
based in Honolulu Hawaii.  
Thus it can be seen that on a regional basis, the AFP is interlinked with the ten regional police 
agencies in the South East Asian region via its affiliation with ASEANAPOL, and with 21 police 
agencies in the South West Pacific, via its membership of the PICP and its operational arm, the 
PTCN. The AFP international liaison officer network has long-standing relationships in the 
region, dating from the 1970s when the heroin trade from the Golden Triangle in Laos, Thailand 
and Myanmar was the major criminal threat to Australia in the immediate post-Vietnam War era. 
These threats have now developed into a multitude of crimes, including fraud, financial, cyber-
crime, people smuggling and terrorism, as well as narcotics, including heroin and increasingly 
methamphetamines (ice), which is being exported in large quantities from southern China and 
Myanmar. 
In a similar way in which the police to police relationship between the AFP and the Indonesian 
National Police developed independently of the occasionally tumultuous political relationship, 
the relationship with the Chinese authorities, combined with the relationship with the United 
States directly, provides an effective Australian police back-channel for communications between 
nations whose relationship may not always be as cordial as is ideal.  
Global 
The third and final environment in addition to the domestic and the regional, in which the AFP 
engages is the global, where relationships exist on a bi-lateral basis via the AFP liaison officer 
network in Europe, the Middle East and the America, and also with international police for a such 
as EUROPOL and INTERPOL. 
The AFP maintains relationships with both EUROPOL and INTERPOL by posting members of 
the international liaison officer network into those organisations in Lyon and The Hague 
respectively. 
EUROPOL 
EUROPOL is the agency for inter-government law enforcement cooperation within the European 
Union (EU), with the stated objective of preventing and addressing serious international organised 
crime, including cyber-crime and terrorism, within the EU.378  
378 The membership of EUROPOL is: Ireland, Britain, France, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Greece, 
Austria, Germany, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Portugal, 
Netherlands, Belgium, Malta, Cyprus, Luxemburg, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, who 
exchange information and intelligence via the Secure Information Exchange Network Application 
(SIENA). https://www.europol.europa.eu/about-europol/our-thinking. 
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EUROJUST: EUROPOL has a very close connection with a pan-European judicial operation 
entity known as EUROJUST. Judicial cooperation in the EU was under consideration in 1999 and 
an embryonic provisional justice unit was established in December 2000. Following the attacks 
in the United States in September 2001, the focus on combatting terrorism moved from domestic 
or regional to global, and as a result EUROJUST was formed in 2002. It is composed of national 
prosecutors, magistrates, or police officers detached from each Member State, and aims to 
increase the exchange of information between the member states, facilitate and strengthen 
cooperation between national authorities, and enhance relationships with partners and third states, 
such as non-EU members, including Norway and the United States. 
INTERPOL 
The AFP is the National Central Bureau and the Australian interlocutor with INTERPOL. The 
official name of INTERPOL is the International Criminal Police Organisation-ICPO. The stated 
aim of INTERPOL is to enable police around the world to work together to make the world a 
safer place. As stated by INTERPOL Secretary General Jürgen Stock in March 2017: 
By collaborating and exchanging information with the wider police community through 
INTERPOL, we must recognize that we do not only protect our own country but also 
that of our neighbour. And in today’s ultra-connected world, this neighbour is more 
likely to be thousands of miles away.379 
Project Watchmaker: Among the many contemporary criminal activities pursued by INTERPOL, 
is a project related to the manufacture of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) which are being 
increasingly encountered in conflict zones around the world. This is known as Project 
Watchmaker. It is a collaborative effort between the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade Australia and Global Affairs Canada. Project Watchmaker provides operational and 
specialised support to member countries through the sharing of INTERPOL Notices and warning 
messages on individuals manufacturing or using chemical improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 
These notices serve as a platform from which technical information on chemical IEDs may be 
shared, updated and modified by member countries. 
This project maintains a database on the ‘forensic signatures’ of known and wanted persons 
involved with the manufacture or use of IEDs with a view to alerting police and border control 
agencies globally on the movement of bomb-makers and their associates to enable appropriate 
action to be taken at border control points under the INTERPOL notice system. The INTERPOL 
Integrated Border Management Task Force (IBMTF) is the central point of contact and 
coordination for international border-security activities at INTERPOL.  
379 INTERPOL National Central Bureaus essential in enhancing global security Secretary General Jürgen 
Stock 08 March 2017. https://www.interpol.int/ 
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This is of particular significance in the fight against global Islamic jihadism, particularly in South 
East Asia, where returning foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq pose a serious security problem 
for the governments of ASEAN, particularly Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines, 
which all have significant Muslim populations. 
Noteworthy is that between 2011 and 2015 the AFP responded to over 207,547 requests for 
information from INTERPOL and EUROPOL through AFP Operations Coordination Centre 
(AOCC) at AFP National Headquarters in Canberra. The AFP is also a member of the -Strategic 
Alliance Group (SAG), whose membership consists of the Five-Eyes nations: Australia, Britain, 
Canada, New Zealand and the United States (represented by the FBI and the DEA).380 
Section 4: The AFP in the third millennium 
The role the AFP has played, and continues to play, in international policing and diplomacy, in 
the past, the present, and its potential roles in the future, has been the focus of this thesis. The 
research findings indicate that, in cadence with globalised crime trends, effective international 
policing has never been more important in linking the international with the domestic. The way 
the AFP operates in a landscape where traditional policing paradigms are rapidly changing, due 
to ever-changing political, diplomatic, and transnational issues, has been discussed. The way the 
organisation has evolved from its origins, based on western liberal-democratic policing values, 
approaches and skills, to an organisation involved in international policing and diplomacy at the 
highest levels is outlined in detail.  
  
380 https://www.afp.gov.au/what-we-do/our-work-overseas/afp-across-world 
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Figure 12. AFP International operations locations 
Source: AFP (correct as at April 2018) 
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Future trends 
In a straitened fiscal environment, no organisation can afford to rest on its laurels. Like its 
predecessor the Commonwealth Police, the AFP has had several iterations, as it has re-prioritised 
in accordance with emerging criminal trends, and extant political circumstances. Despite a highly 
credible history of international engagement in peacekeeping and police capacity development, 
these are not current priorities for the AFP or the Australian Government. There has been a 
discernible move away from UN deployments, with the closure of the UNMIT mission in Timor 
Leste in 2012, the withdrawal from the UNMISS mission in South Sudan in 2011 and the 
UNIFICYP mission in Cyprus in 2017. The RAMSI mission in the Solomon Islands closed in 
2017, leaving 45 members in a follow on mission. There are still capacity-development missions 
in the Pacific, in Tonga, Samoa and Vanuatu, as well as the PPDP-R in Micronesia. There is still 
a significant mission in Papua New Guinea with the approach of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) meeting scheduled in 2018. 
Funding 
Part of this drawdown from international ‘boots on the ground’ peacekeeping and capacity 
development missions has been financial. In situations where the AFP is committed to respond to 
new deployments offshore,  New Policy Proposals (NPP) are generally the means by which the 
AFP seeks funding. If this funding is not forthcoming due to fiscal restraint, the AFP is expected 
to fund these activities from within budgets allocated for its domestic operations. Competing 
priorities therefore will continue to be a challenge for police decision makers, and will impact on 
how such interventions are structured and resourced. A more predictable and sustainable funding 
model would improve this situation. Many of these missions have been funded by Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), which has some very strict guidelines attached to it in 
accordance with foreign aid principles. There needs to be an acknowledgement that there will be 
some operational outcomes from these police activities, and this needs to be factored into funding 
considerations. If there is an expectation for the AFP to provide members for deployments of this 
kind, greater certainty of such deployments and longer funding timeframes are required. This can 
only come from political bipartisanship and would enable more effective planning and resource 
allocation. On present trends, the skills, experience and relationships developed by the AFP over 
a considerable period are withering on the vine. The diplomatic capital developed by the AFP, 
past, present and potentially future, are at real risk of being lost, due to atrophy and political 
apathy. 
Regional focus 
The Indo-Asia-Pacific region will continue to be a priority for the Australian Government, and 
for the AFP in its international engagement. There are increasing criminal threats in both Asia 
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and the Pacific as both as transit areas, and as areas in which crime originates. State fragility in 
the Pacific will continue to be a challenge for regional stability, and the AFP will maintain its 
commitment to the region, particularly through the good offices of the PICP, PTCN and PPDP-
R. The relationships with all the police forces in ASEAN, both bi-laterally and through 
ASEANAPOL, are vital for the AFP to carry out its duties. There are also highly productive 
relationships with both Chinese and American law enforcement agencies, which endure despite 
the political sabre rattling and trade competition which features in daily news reports. 
The AFP International Engagement Strategy: 2020 and beyond 
In July 2017 the AFP released its AFP International Engagement Strategy:  2020 and Beyond381 
which highlights the growth in criminal and terrorist threats, globalised markets and services, as 
well as technology, and the combined challenges they pose for police tasked with community 
safety and security, as the overriding driving influences behind policy for the foreseeable future. 
The solution rests in part, with greater cooperation and collaboration, which as discussed, has 
been very much integral to the way it has done business in all aspects of its duties. 
Ideologically based crime 
The combination of globalised demographic and technological influences has been joined by 
another influence which has proven quite challenging for traditional law enforcement approaches. 
That influence is ideology. The flows of people, including through people smuggling, and of 
goods, ideas and information are increasing. As the AFP International Engagement strategy 
highlights: 
[t]errorism has a global reach through the use of the internet and social media to 
recruit, radicalise and train people in attack methodologies and in some cases execute 
attacks. Increasing global reliance on the internet for commerce and communication 
exposes countries and organisations to cyber-attack.382 
The cost of crime 
In an environment in which poly-criminal networks engage in borderless crime, blurring the lines 
between traditional and non-traditional crime as well as the lines between crime and national 
security threats, new approaches are required. The AFP estimates that up to 70 per cent of 
Australia’s serious crime has links overseas. The global cost of crime is estimated at $3 trillion. 
Fraud is estimated at in excess of $6 billion per year. The cost of cyber-crime is estimated at more 
than $2 billion per year. There has been in excess of a 60 per cent increase in people crossing 
Australia’s international border in recent years. Terrorism incidents globally have increased by 
381 AFP International Engagement Strategy:  2020 and Beyond Commonwealth of Australia AFP 2017. 
382 AFP International Engagement Strategy 2020 and Beyond p. 6. 
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120 percent since 2010, and there has been an exponential increase in trade, aircraft movements, 
and shipping tonnages worldwide, including in Australia. 383The implications for police and 
policing are starkly clear. 
The purpose of the AFP’s international engagement is to tackle crime offshore as close as possible 
to its source. The intention is to protect Australians and Australia’s national interests by working 
in partnership with state, territory, and foreign law enforcement agencies to detect, deter, prevent 
and disrupt crime at its point of origin or transit. 384  
Crime sans frontières 
The reason is that these crimes are taking place, with little regard for sovereign jurisdictions, and 
the legal and geographic restrictions which hamper the manner in which government agencies 
including the AFP, are able to address them. One simple example should serve to illustrate the 
significance of this. The ability of a malign group of actors to create a mass casualty event is quite 
easy to achieve. The only things required are a plan, a device such as a simple homemade 
explosive device, or a device containing poison chemicals, or a biological agent, someone to plant 
it amongst a group of people and a means of initiation, such as a mobile phone. It is now possible 
for someone anywhere in the world, including in a poorly governed country, to conspire with a 
likeminded radicalised individual in any western city, to make and plant a device anywhere, 
including airports, shopping centres, sporting venues or public transport and simply make a phone 
call to cause a mass casualty event. The prospect of such an individual being brought to justice is 
minimal, without a policing agency with capacity and a global reach. Hence the importance of 
peer to peer police relationships. The trend with the AFP is moving towards greater 
interoperability for information sharing, increasing joint operations, offshore taskforces, 
regional approaches and capability leverage.385 
Legal and ethical considerations 
There are, however, some legal and ethical concerns arising from Australia’s principled stance 
on humanitarian issues such as the death penalty and human rights abuses. The AFP continues to 
engage with these partners cognisant of potential death penalty and human rights implications, 
while balancing the need for effective cooperation on transnational crime and the commitment to 
protect individuals from the death penalty. The AFP also claims to positively influence these 
agencies in areas such as human rights and victim advocacy.386 
383 AFP International Engagement Strategy 2020 and Beyond pp. 6–7. 
384 AFP International Engagement Strategy 2020 and Beyond, p. 10. 
385 AFP International Engagement Strategy 2020 and Beyond p. 7. 
386 AFP International Engagement Strategy 2020 and Beyond, p. 18. 
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Lessons have been learned from the Indonesian execution of some of the convicted narcotics 
traffickers, known colloquially as the ‘Bali Nine’, whose conviction in part rested upon 
information exchanged between the AFP and the Indonesian police in Bali. Death penalty 
considerations are included in planning and communications and mitigation strategies are 
factored into international dealings and operations. 
Home Affairs Department 
Despite its withdrawal from UN missions and its drawdown from regional capacity development 
activities, the AFP has not withdrawn from international engagements or responsibilities, but it 
has changed its priorities in accordance with prevailing and anticipated circumstances, including 
the changing political landscape and ever increasing funding pressures. 
In July 2017 the Australian Government led by Prime Minister Turnbull announced the proposed 
formation of a Home Affairs Department, combining the AFP, the Australian Security 
Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), and the Department of Immigration and Border Protection, 
itself an amalgamation of the Australian Customs Service and the Department of Immigration. 
This is the type of ‘joined-up-government’ envisaged by Dr Ryan of the ACMC. However, it 
comes with certain risks as policing and enforcement, of necessity, becomes more forceful and 
intrusive. There will always be a balance between the protection of individual rights and 
freedoms, and community expectations of safety and security.  Where the balancing point resides 
is moveable, and ultimately is up to the community to decide. What remains unchangeable, from 
a policing perspective, are the common law principles, the Peelian approach of preventative 
policing, and the AFP values. In fact, it could be argued that adherence to these principles, values, 
and approaches by the AFP within this new departmental structure, will tend to preserve and 
protect individual freedoms rather than abuse them. The year 2029 marks the 200th anniversary 
of the Peelian policing tradition and the 50th anniversary of the AFP. Although there are some 
pressures on the common law principles, the Peelian approach to preventative policing and the 
AFP values, there is every reason to believe that adherence to these values, principles and 
approaches will continue. Based on its highly credible history of service to the community, both 
domestically and internationally, the balance of probabilities tends to lean this way. In order to 
do so, however, the AFP requires the rules and the tools to surgically target criminal malevolence 
whilst contemporaneously maintaining its preventative and responsive posture for the law-
abiding community. It also requires a better funding model, because the present model is 
unsustainable. 
United Nations: Boutique rather than boots 
As has been discussed, there is an increasing demand for policing input into global affairs, 
including those of the UN,  though the AFP is unlikely to deploy large numbers of police to 
259 
international ‘boots on the ground’ missions including those with the UN. There is, however, a 
very likely prospect of the AFP providing members for niche capability roles, including training, 
advisory, forensics and leadership roles within the UN environment. This builds upon existing 
capabilities and continues the international engagement in the service of peace. It is submitted 
that this is diplomacy by default. 
Global humanitarian aspirations and practices 
The thesis demonstrates how the AFP values, principles and approaches evolved in a uniquely 
Australian context through its colonial era until the present day. The AFP continues to aspire to 
reflect global best practice, and adhere to humanitarian values, principles and approaches, in its 
engagements and interactions with partner agencies, domestically, regionally and globally, in an 
increasingly globalised criminal environment. It has also been demonstrated, how the values, 
principles and approaches, which are its foundation, are facing increasing challenges and the way 
they are applied must constantly adjust, in light of community expectations within emergent 
globalised terrorist, cyber, and criminal challenges.  Such a focus will need to balance community 
expectations about the provision of public safety and security, while adhering to entrenched rights 
to individual privacy and freedom of action. 
Effective diplomacy 
The thesis has also demonstrated that while diplomacy has traditionally been restricted to inter-
government dealings, global dynamics are changing and so too should the notion of what 
diplomacy is intended to achieve. Rather than being strictly concerned with formal relations 
between states, international relations now increasingly involve community to community, and 
organisation to organisation interactions across national boundaries. The world is becoming 
increasingly inter-linked as a result of a combination of unprecedented developments in 
technology and people movements. In addition, rapidly growing populations and poor governance 
combined with rapid technological advances are creating unprecedented threats to peace order 
and good governance on global, regional and domestic levels. Many of these threats are criminal 
in nature. The once distinct line between criminal behaviour and traditional, state-based military 
threats, is becoming increasingly blurred, with malign non-state actors, such as criminal groups 
posing as much threat to safety, security and social cohesion. This requires a re-thinking of 
resourcing and policy priorities. The intention of this thesis is to advance this through a credible 
international policing perspective. 
International relations 
Effective police to police relations work to the betterment of the respective communities they 
serve, by being well positioned to identify and mitigate criminal threats, before they can make an 
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impact. This is as applicable and relevant at the international level as it is at the local or 
community level. Unlike their traditional counterparts in the diplomatic or military spheres, police 
do not seek leverage or advantage over other police. On the contrary, police work much more 
effectively and efficiently when they cooperate rather than compete with each other. This is the 
essence of police diplomacy. 
International relations still involve dealings between sovereign governments, each of which must 
balance their own considerations at the global, regional and domestic levels. Police, working 
collaboratively at the international level addressing phenomenon such as transnational crime and 
violent extremism, have the potential to combine all three. This has been the case with the AFP 
since its establishment in 1979. 
Summary and conclusion 
This thesis has discussed the position of the AFP within the machinery of government, and its 
wide dispersal internationally, via its extensive international liaison officer network. Much of this 
has arisen from the confidence of previous governments, based on a highly credible history of 
international engagement in several varied deployments, crisis responses, and effective 
international liaison activities. The significance of this in the globalised criminal environment, in 
serving both the Australian national interest and international good citizenship, is that it provides 
part of a values-based infrastructure which makes the ‘thin blue line’ becoming a ‘wide blue net’, 
more of a reality. The way in which the AFP is structured and postured and the way in which it 
conducts itself may provide an example by which international policing can be conducted. In part, 
this addresses Slaughter’s globalisation paradox. 
Is this diplomacy by default? 
The objective of diplomacy is aimed broadly at peace and prosperity, within an international 
rules-based global order. The AFP has been involved in the promotion of international peace in 
many ways. This includes a credible history of traditional UN peacekeeping in Cyprus, assistance 
with electoral missions in Mozambique, Cambodia and East Timor, capacity development 
missions in Australia’s ‘Arc of Instability’, and immediate responses to unexpected mass-casualty 
events involving Australians, regionally and further afield. The salient feature of all of these 
endeavours, is that they are not the AFP’s core business, which is actually domestic crime. Despite 
this, in accordance with Australia’s long and proud history of volunteerism, AFP members have 
continued to put themselves forward for international service. The AFP has only deployed in an 
armed capacity performing executive policing roles on three occasions, and transitioned to an 
unarmed posture as soon as the situation was sufficiently permissive. Over a period in excess of 
fifty years, in some very challenging and hostile environments, the AFP has not fired one shot in 
261 
anger. There have been four fatalities over this period: three in Cyprus and one in the Solomon 
Islands.  
The AFP has also maintained an extensive international liaison officer network which is linked 
into host nation police, in furtherance of the early detection, disruption and prevention of criminal 
activity offshore before it can have an impact on its victims both offshore, and in Australia. The 
ultimate objective is to link up with trusted global partners to the betterment of all communities 
concerned, by addressing common criminal challenges. This emphasises shared values, focusing 
on the things police have in common across national boundaries, rather than focussing on areas 
in which they differ.  In a unique sense, police do not seek to compete with their international 
peers, but strive to perform better through cooperation and collaboration. There are, of course, 
dangers in such cooperation and collaboration, if left without oversight, so none of this should 
occur without a legislative basis subject to judicial review. 
The blurring of the lines between what have been considered as traditional crime and security 
threats has been discussed, as has the response options available to western governments such as 
Australia’s. This now involves closer cooperation between ‘soft’, ‘firm’ and ‘hard’ elements of 
state diplomacy. The role of the AFP in this context, is to utilise its extensive links internationally 
and domestically, to serve the safety and security interests of the Australian community, as a 
primary responsibility, and those of other citizens as a secondary role. 
Australia’s primary sphere of strategic interest involves South East Asia and the South West 
Pacific. Security and stability in both of these regions is vital to Australia’s own peace and 
prosperity. The AFP has made, and continues to make, a significant contribution to the global 
rules-based order, by fostering police to police peer relationships with their international 
contemporaries. Collectively, the international activities of the AFP serve to enhance the rule of 
law, and promote socio-economic development, and stability throughout the region, which in turn 
reduces potential criminal and security threats to Australia. In turn, this assists in re-enforcing the 
global rules-based order, by addressing serious crime, which is one of the underlying causes of 
conflict, in partnership with its international policing peers. 
In relation to Dr Ryan’s call for inter-agency interconnectedness, it can be positively argued that 
the international activities of the AFP, combined with its positioning within whole-of-government 
circles domestically, is a demonstration of such par excellence. Furthermore these activities 
provide a clear demonstration of effective diplomacy by the AFP serving both Australia’s national 
interests by addressing crime at its source, but also international good citizenship, by contributing 
to both a rules-based global order and to regional peace and prosperity. The strategic implications 
of these activities, in terms of conflict prevention, are impossible to quantify, but by any 
estimation the combined effect of good global policing as a form of preventative defence must be 
significant. 
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The AFP has made a significant contribution to stabilising what was once referred to as 
Australia’s ‘Arc of Instability’. This involved the AFP adopting culturally-appropriate approaches 
and strategies, which in the case of RAMSI involved a ‘Pacific face’ with Australian training in 
accordance with liberal-democratic values, principles and approaches to community-based 
policing. Police and policing, however, are only one part of the mosaic which is effective 
governance. 
The AFP was deployed to Papua New Guinea, to address some of the poor governance outcomes 
which had arisen from the haste with which it was granted independence in 1975. This has 
encountered some obstacles which are difficult to overcome, including some of the political, legal 
and cultural influences over which the AFP has no control. Regional political dynamics have 
played a significant role in limiting some of the potential influence of AFP programs. This has 
resulted in a perception by some observers of being ineffective. In Afghanistan the AFP became 
embroiled in a change in strategy from a military-centric counter-terrorism approach to a 
population-centric counter-insurgency approach. The AFP was not well suited to either and its 
activities were largely related to political optics rather than operational effect, however when the 
politics and the politicians move on, the optics and impressions remain.  
The confidence of government 
This thesis has discussed the position of the AFP within the machinery of government, and its 
wide dispersal internationally, via its extensive international liaison officer network. Much of this 
has arisen from the confidence of previous governments, based on a highly credible history of 
international engagement in deployments, crisis response, and effective international liaison 
activities. The confidence of government is extremely important. The significance of this, in the 
globalised criminal environment, in serving both the Australian national interest and international 
good citizenship, is that it provides part of a values-based infrastructure which makes the ‘thin 
blue line’ becoming a ‘wide blue net’ to the benefit of all, more achievable. The way in which the 
AFP is structured and postured, and the way in which it conducts itself may provide an example 
by which broader international policing could be conducted, in accordance with Slaughter’s New 
World Order. This has involved fielding deployed police peacekeepers, advisers and trainers as 
well as general investigators and specialists. However, as the AFP International Engagement 
Strategy 2020 and Beyond outlines, large AFP deployments are unlikely in the foreseeable future, 
as straightened fiscal circumstances take their toll. 
The thesis concludes that the structure and values-based approach of the AFP provides a useful 
template for enhanced global policing efforts in the face of emerging global challenges. The 
research affirms the AFP is a transnational agency, well placed to link the international with the 
domestic, the contextual with the aspirational, and the theoretical with the practical. At the dawn 
of the third millennium the sort of connectivity and response capacity has never been so important. 
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As the AFP sets it course for the next fifty years, it should do so in accordance with Meyer’s 
mutually-shared police and diplomatic traits of ‘a quick mind, a hard head, a strong stomach, a 
warm smile and a cold eye.’ In 2012, Bowling and Sheptycki indicated that ‘…policing 
organisations require members who can play the diplomat role because not everything can be 
orchestrated by issuing commands. Often they will be required to provide ‘leadership beyond 
authority.’ This applies to the institutional level as well as at the individual level. This thesis has 
demonstrated that the AFP has been able to provide this sort of leadership beyond authority in a 
wide variety of environment and circumstances, due in large part to the calibre of its individual 
members and the contexts in which they operate. 
Final statement 
Bowling and Sheptycki highlighted the absence of scholarly attention paid to police as diplomatic 
actors. This thesis seeks to consider this from an Australian policing perspective by addressing a 
broad audience, both Australian and international; police, military, civilian; strategic, academic 
and operational; political and community level. The primary objective is to inform and introduce 
a new perspective on diplomacy. This interpretation is that the two traditional instruments of 
international state projection, the foreign service and the military, can be supplemented by a third 
international actor: the police. Australia has a national police agency, the AFP which has 
developed a highly credible experience-base, upon which future international police engagement 
can draw some guidance. Military planners and civilian policy makers in particular, would benefit 
from a greater understanding of the specific nature of policing in the Peelian tradition, and need 
to be made aware of the significant potential of international police capabilities in offshore 
missions and operations. This knowledge cannot be assumed, particularly in defence and foreign 
policy circles, as well as at the political level. In an era of globalisation, and strategic ambiguity, 
Australia needs to acknowledge the value of ‘firm’ diplomacy as provided by the AFP, and to 
continue to invest in developing capability for a significant offshore police presence. To be 
effective in sustainably resolving contemporary and future international security dilemmas, 
Australia can only succeed as a team which draws on the strength of the combined efforts, skills 
and experience of the police, the military and the foreign service. If service in the pursuit of peace 
order and good governance on a domestic, regional and global scale is a worthy objective of 
foreign policy, the AFP, as discussed in this thesis, has made a significant contribution in its brief 
but compact history. This is police diplomacy. 
This thesis has discussed the notion of the social contract in an Australian sense, with its roots 
deep in Australia’s history. In all of its endeavours, the AFP, and its individual members, have 
acted in accordance with Blainey’s ‘pale empire of ideas’ concerning freedom, rights, 
responsibilities and the rule of law. These arrived with the First Fleet in 1788, and were refined 
over two centuries of European settlement. These include the common law and associated rights, 
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the Peelian tradition of preventative, community-based policing tradition, and the AFP’s own 
values. The thesis has outlined how the strategic global environment has changed, from one in 
which state-centric, inter-state conflict has been largely replaced by people-centric, intra-state 
conflict This has several implications for police, including detecting, deterring and preventing the 
activities of malign non-state actors, often operating in ungoverned, or poorly governed spaces.  
The thesis has discussed the international role the AFP has played over a period in excess of fifty 
years, through the lens of ‘diplomacy’, in the context of diplomatic qualities, behaviours and 
activities. It has incorporated eight separate and distinct missions, operations and responses, from 
a traditional peacekeeping mission in Cyprus, commencing in 1964, to an immediate response to 
a mass-casualty event in eastern Ukraine in 2014. This has included missions to East Timor in 
1999, which set the course for the eventual independence of Timor Leste in 2002, as well as the 
resultant inclusion of Australia and Australians as ‘crusaders’ in the eyes of global extremists 
such as bin Laden and al Qaeda, with the tragic loss of life in Bali in 2002, caused by bombs, set 
by bombers inspired by al Qaeda’s catastrophic ideology. The latter event in itself, served to repair 
and restore an enduring relationship with Indonesia, through effective police peer-to-peer 
relationships, which resulted in deeper AFP engagement in the South East Asian region through 
ASEANAPOL, as well as a number of bi-lateral Joint Task Forces. This period has also seen an 
Australian-led regional intervention in the Solomon Islands, led by a succession of diplomats, 
working with police, rather than military, as the security sector leader, to restore security and 
eventual state sovereignty to a regional neighbour. There have been circumstances where the 
perceived success of such police endeavours, has led to the deployment of AFP members to 
environments, such as Afghanistan, where, due to factors out of the control of the AFP, 
expectations could not be met, and where the AFP, and its former International Deployment 
Group, suffered a degree of reputational harm. 
In all of its international endeavours, AFP members have demonstrated to various degrees, the 
three enduring elements of diplomacy, communication, representation and replication of 
international societal norm, as outlined by Jonsson and Hall. They have communicated and 
negotiated effectively in some very challenging circumstances; they are representatives of the 
Australian Government, a fact demonstrated by the wearing of the Australian National Flag on 
their uniforms when deployed with the United Nations, specific badges such as the ‘Helpem Fren’ 
or ‘Wok Wantaim’ shoulder patches when working in RAMSI and PNG, respectively, or, the AFP 
badge when working operationally. All are highly symbolic, and serve to illustrate the history, 
governance, versatility, willingness and goodwill which underpin Australian policing. They thus 
represent and visibly communicate the ideas, concepts or notions of the rule of law, justice, 
authority and accountability, associated with first order policing. In many of the circumstances 
and environments the AFP has deployed, the social contract has been seriously breached or has 
broken down completely. The AFP, as part of broader efforts, with supra-national institutions 
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such as the UN and INTERPOL, have not so much sought a replication of international society, 
as mentioned by Jonsson and Hall, but have provided a supplement to traditional diplomacy, often 
by assisting the people in host nations to develop their own notion of culturally-appropriate and 
sustainable social contracts between themselves and their governments.  It is not so much 
homogeneity which is sought by such endeavours, as a balance between it, and the heterogeneity 
which is inevitably associated with cultures transitioning from custom and tradition to 21st 
century expectations of nationhood, and which are sometimes resistant to international influences 
of globalisation or ‘westernisation’. 
In relation to Copeland’s qualities of his ‘guerrilla diplomats’, namely: 
autonomy, agility, acuity, and resilience; the ability to generate and use intelligence; 
personal and situational sensitivity; local knowledge, cultural awareness and linguistic 
and communication skills; irregular representational capabilities and characteristics; 
an affinity for collaboration and teamwork; functionality in conflict situations; 
connectedness to the global political economy of knowledge; the capacity, enhanced 
by science & technology act with suppleness and a catalytic and transformational 
orientation.387 
This thesis has outlined eight environments in which the AFP and its members, have been called 
upon each and every one of these qualities. The same could be said in relation to the diplomatic 
traits as outlined by Meyer, namely ‘a quick mind, a hard head, a strong stomach, a warm smile 
and a cold eye’. 
Under the behavioural criteria set down by Jonsson and Hall, and the diplomatic attributes 
mentioned by Copeland and Meyer, it is submitted that the AFP as an organisation, and its 
individual members, have demonstrated their diplomatic credentials over a sustained period, and 
in a range of circumstances, and that in doing so, they have addressed, in part at least, the 
globalisation paradox as raised by Slaughter. The AFP, in the eight contextual case studies 
provided in this thesis, has not only fulfilled all of the criteria to be considered as ‘diplomats by 
default’, they have demonstrated that the policing aspect of global governance is not something 
to be feared, rather is something in need of greater appreciation, enhanced support and better 
utilisation in accordance with Slaughter’s ‘new diplomats’, by expanding the ‘thin blue line’ into 
a wider ‘blue network’. In this thesis, the discussion has illuminated a number of ways in which 
the diplomatic aspect of policing, as raised by Bowling and Sheptycki, can be considered 
alongside the technical, legal, entrepreneurial and public relations aspects of policing. All of these 
AFP efforts combined, have served, and will continue to serve the interest of peace, prosperity 
and justice at the domestic, regional and global levels. These activities in themselves are worthy 
of the title diplomacy and those who conduct them as ‘diplomats by default’.   
387 Copeland, p. 209. 
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Post-script: Policing in the service of peace 
Often overshadowed by larger and more visible peacekeeping and warlike efforts performed by 
their military colleagues, Australian police have a long and credible history of international 
intervention, regionally and more broadly. This has gone largely unrecognised. In a domestic 
sense, Australian police, with a well-established adherence to humanitarian principles, are the 
barometers of the liberal-democratic social contract between the community and their 
government. They are among the first to implement policy as it becomes law, and the first to feel 
the public disapproval, should this prove unpopular. They are tasked with making difficult 
decisions and sound judgements, which affect people’s lives, often with incomplete information, 
and in contested circumstances. They are trained to show restraint and courtesy; to obtain and 
transmit information; to make quick assessments, and above all, to be personally accountable for 
their own actions. Individually and collectively, Australian police and policing, reflect all the 
hallmarks of diplomats and diplomacy. 
In an international environment, Australian policing, acting in the service of peace, aims to create 
secure and stable environments, by strengthening the rule of law, and confidence in the 
institutions of justice and governance, globally and regionally. It is only when these basic 
foundations are in place, that social and economic recovery and development can occur, and 
sustainable peace and prosperity can be encouraged, thereby supporting the global rules-based 
order. 
To do this, Australian police peace-builders and peacekeepers, have deployed, and will continue 
to be deployed, to difficult and dangerous environments, where they engage and cooperate with 
representatives from other nations and regions, and with the host nation community, and police. 
They may be required to protect innocent civilians from danger, provide humanitarian assistance, 
and establish and enforce fundamental human rights and freedoms, as the host nation society 
emerges from conflict, and begins to rebuild its physical infrastructure, and its own social 
contract. They are for the most part unarmed, and their primary tools are reason, persuasion and 
negotiation, in short, they favour prestige over power to achieve their objectives. 
For more than half a century, Australian police have deployed to diverse environments, working 
collaboratively in the service of peace. The operational names, in Pidgin, of the two major 
missions in Melanesia, ‘Helpem Fren’, in the Solomon Islands and ‘Wok Wantaim’ in Papua New 
Guinea, sum these efforts up. Australian police, work together with their international 
counterparts, to help friends.  In challenging circumstances, Australian police peacekeepers and 
capacity-builders, have demonstrated the professionalism of police impartiality, objectivity, the 
values of openness, commitment, fairness, compassion and respect, and on occasion have shown 
initiative, valour and courage beyond leadership, and service beyond self. Their service and 
267 
sacrifice has given Australian foreign policy efforts an added, and distinctively Australian, 
legitimacy and experience-based credibility. 
If the purpose of diplomacy is the peaceful resolution of disputes, and if peace is not merely the 
absence of conflict, but the presence of justice, then policing in furtherance of this, is diplomacy 
writ large, and those who perform these duties, are ‘diplomats by default’. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Diplomatic representation: Visible symbols 
Visible symbols worn by AFP members when deployed internationally, reflecting the values they 
represent, including authority, accountability, as well as humanitarian ideas and ideals, under the 
rule of law, and a global rules-based order. 
Australian National Flag 
 
 
 
The Australian National Flag, is a direct descendant of the British Red Ensign. It can be seen as 
consisting of two parts. This left half contains the British Union Flag in the canton, which itself 
is an overlaid combination of the three crosses of the three Patron Saints of the British Isles, St 
George, representing England, St Andrew representing Scotland and St Patrick, representing 
Ireland. Below the Union Flag is the Federation or Commonwealth Star, consisting of seven 
points, one for each of the original colonies at Federation and one for the other governments, 
including the Federal or Commonwealth Government. This represents unity and federation. The 
right half depicts the Southern Cross, a constellation visible in the southern skies, representing 
the geographic location of Australia in the Southern Hemisphere. 
United Nations 
 
The symbol of the United Nations is a stylised, flattened, globe as seen from the North Pole, 
surrounded by a wreath of olive leaves, symbolising peace. It depicts all continents and oceans. 
Australia is depicted in the top right quadrant. 
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Australian Federal Police 
 
The Australian Federal Police badge consists of a number of components which reflect its history, 
role and authority. It consists of an Australian Coat of Arms, itself a depiction of the symbols of 
the original six colonies. This is surrounded by the words Australian Federal Police, overlaid on 
a Federation or Commonwealth Star, on a laurel wreath representing both peace and victory. It is 
surmounted by a St Edwards Crown, a symbol of authority, demonstrating its constitutional and 
historical links with Britain. It is shared with other Australian police jurisdictions, the armed 
forces of Australia, other Commonwealth police agencies including the Royal Papua New Guinea 
Constabulary, the Royal Solomon Islands Police, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the 
New Zealand Police, as well as all British police services, and the majority of the armed forces 
from each of those countries. 
The AFP Values are: Fairness, Accountability, Commitment, Excellence, Integrity, Trust and 
Respect. 
The Vision of the AFP is ‘Policing for a Safer Australia’ 
 
Sillitoe Tartan 
Based on the diced bands seen on the Glengarries worn by several Scottish regiments of the 
British Army, Sillitoe Tartan is the nickname given to the distinctive black and white chequered 
pattern which was originally associated with the police in Scotland. This form of identification 
for police spread to Australia, New Zealand, and the rest of the United Kingdom in the 1970s, as 
well as to some other places such as Chicago and Pittsburgh in the United States and in parts of 
Canada. The pattern was first adopted for police use in 1932 by Sir Percy Sillitoe, Chief Constable 
of the City of Glasgow Police.  
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The AFP adopted the Sillitoe Tartan upon formation in 1979 as its chequered headband for police 
caps and hats and it is worn only be serving sworn police members. It also forms the basis for the 
ribbon associated with the Police Overseas Service Medal (POSM) depicted below. 
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RAMSI Participating Police Force: Operation Helpem Fren
 
The Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands (RAMSI) commenced in 2003, after 
endorsement by the Pacific Islands Forum, the Pacific Islands Chiefs of Police, the United Nations 
and the Commonwealth. The policing component of the mission consisted of fourteen 
Participating Police Force (PPF) nations from the Pacific and was led by the Australian Federal 
Police. The AFP operation name was Operation ‘Helpem Fren’, which is Solomon Islands pidgin 
for ‘helping a friend.’ RAMSI was able to re-arm elements of the Royal Solomon Islands Police 
Force (RSIPF), in a major step towards full state sovereignty. RAMSI finished on 30 June 2017, 
and was replaced by a continuing police development program, run by the AFP, known as the 
Solomon Islands Police Development Program (SIPDP). This program falls under the AFP 
umbrella Pacific Police Development Program (PPDP). 
PNG-APP: ‘Wok Wantaim’ 
 
 
The Papua New Guinea-Australia Policing Partnership (PNG-APP) commenced in four phases in 
2008, as part of the AFP’s Pacific Police Development Program. It was boosted in 2011. Members 
work alongside their Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) counterparts in various 
capacities, including training and mentoring for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
Forum in Port Moresby in 2018.  
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Appendix B: Police capacity development 
Police development and the rule of law 
The AFP IDG definition of Police development is ‘the support provided to police in post-conflict 
and developing nations, to build their capacity to provide sustainable and quality policing to their 
citizens. This support develops the operational capacity, enabling services and leadership that 
police services require to be accountable to their citizens, and to build and maintain the legitimacy 
required to support the delivery of the rule of law.’ 
(AFP International Deployment Group) 
The diagram below depicts a stylised theoretical and idealised transition from state conflict and 
disruption, where human rights are prone to abuse, to a state of consent based stability and 
security, where human rights are likely to be respected and protected. This transition involves an 
imposition of security by foreign actors, primarily military, to a situation where host nation police 
primacy is the respecter and protector of rights. For ease of depiction, this is represented in phases, 
where a gradual handover from international military to international police and eventually to 
host-nation police takes place as the security situation eases and a more justice-oriented police 
posture is permissible. The objective from an AFP perspective is to encourage competent and 
accountable host-nation police in such interventions to permit normal police peer-to-peer 
relationships. The AFP has been involved in such successful interventions and transitions in the 
South West Pacific and Timor Leste, since 1999-2000.  
 
[http://www.peacekeepers.asn.au/mag/2015/Spring15.pdf] 
[ABCA Publication 369. Edition 2] 
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There is a direct relationship between police development, the observance of the rule of law and 
human rights. Police, however, are only one part of the institutional framework which underpins 
a well-functioning criminal justice system, as the following United Nations definition of the Rule 
of Law illustrates. 
‘For the United Nations, the rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which 
all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the state itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights norms and 
standards. It requires as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of the 
supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the 
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal 
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.’ 
(United Nations Rule of Law (S/2004/616) Report to the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies.  [http://www.in.org/en/ruleoflaw/]) 
Military interventions are expensive and rarely result in a sustainable peace to keep. Early in this 
thesis, the distinction was made between the military as peace-makers and the police as peace-
keepers. This is deliberately simplistic, however, in a preventative sense, to not consider these 
policing activities, in tandem when making the peace, runs the risk of increasing continued 
breakdowns of social contracts, when the peace is actually made, to the extent that international 
military interventions may be prolonged. It does not take very long for a liberating military, to be 
regarded as an occupier. By advocating transition, to best-practice, humanitarian approaches to 
policing, especially regionally, not only is the national interest served, so too is the prospect of a 
sustainable peace to keep, by virtue of improved social contracts between the community and its 
government. Furthermore, this serves the Australian community’s interests, by enhanced 
connectivity between police agencies, working to mitigate the influence of crime. 
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Appendix C: Group Bravery Citation: 1st East Timor Contingent-UNAMET 
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Appendix D: Narcotics 
Regional Narcotics Intelligence Fusion Centre Bahrain 
Opiates-Afghanistan 
Afghanistan: Total area under opium poppy cultivation expanding, threatening sustainable 
development in the country 
Year Hectares under opium poppy 
cultivation 
Year Hectares under opium 
poppy cultivation 
1994 71000 2006 165000 
1995 54000 2007 193000 
1996 57000 2008 157000 
1997 58000 2009 123000 
1998 64000 2010 123000 
1999 91000 2011 131000 
2000 82000 2012 154000 
2001 8000 2013 209000 
2002 74000 2014 224000 
2003 80000 2015 183000 
2004 131000 2016 201000 
2005 104000   
 
UNODC/MCN Opium Surveys 1994-2016 [http://media.breitbart.com/media/2016/10/Insert2.png 
The AFP has a member embedded in the Regional Narcotics Intelligence Fusion Centre (RNIFC), 
based in Bahrain and focusses on the trafficking of opiates originating from Afghanistan. The 
global heroin trade is estimated at between 430 and 450 tonnes, and to generate between $US 400 
and $US 500 billion dollars annually. It is estimated that approximately 80 per cent of this trade 
originates in Afghanistan, with the remainder originating in the Golden Triangle area of northern 
Thailand, Myanmar and Laos. 
The area under poppy cultivation in Afghanistan has grown from 82000 hectares in 2000 to 
201000 hectares in 2016. It is grown primarily in the south and distorts the legitimate economy 
by discouraging investment and fuelling violence and insecurity through the Taliban insurgency. 
Local consumption also creates costs associated with addiction. The cultivation provides full-time 
employment for low paid workers (estimated at 235,100 in 2016). There are two primary 
trafficking routes from Afghanistan. North and west through Iran, Turkey, the Balkans, or 
Tajikistan and Russia and eventually into Europe; South, through the Makram Coast, to east and 
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southern Africa, including Tanzania, South Africa, Mozambique, and Kenya, as well as Egypt 
and Nigeria. The syndicates which run this trade are based in West Africa, Pakistan, China and 
South East Asia. There are a number of connections with Australia, in which the AFP takes an 
interest. 
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Appendix E: Disaster victim identification: Operation Arew (MH17 Ukraine July 
2014) 
Phase 1 Scene-Recovery of remains 
Phase 2 Post Mortem-to establish cause of death 
The Post Mortem Phase, was conducted to establish the cause of death and was conducted by a 
combined international team comprised of police from The Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, 
Britain, Australia, Malaysia and Indonesia. Australian experience training and working with 
Malaysian and Indonesia counterparts was instrumental in their inclusion is this European-
oriented team. All DVI Teams worked in accordance with international protocols and procedures 
which provide a level of commonality and standardisation. The Australian contribution to the 
DVI effort comprised 63, including 20 Forensics officers, 22 members from ACT Policing, 6 
members from National policing and a combination of State and Territory police members. The 
DVI process involved over 3000 specialist examinations which were undertaken to ensure the 
victims were identified in accordance with the INTERPOL standards mentioned previously. The 
Primary Identifiers used in the PM process are biological: (1) fingerprints; (2) dental; (3) 
DNA/pathology. These are supplemented by Secondary Identifiers such as effects linked to the 
recovered body such as: (1) jewellery; (2) tattoos; (3) clothing. 
Phase 3 Ante Mortem-information obtained from family to assist with identification 
State and Territory police, who maintained primacy in relation to contacting Next of Kin, liaised 
with AFP Family Investigative Liaison Officers (FILO) throughout Australia to collect Ante 
Mortem material for further identification. The Family Investigative Liaison Officer (FILO) 
program was raised in response to the Bali bombings in 2002. Their role is to act as a conduit 
between the families impacted by a critical incident and the AFP investigation team, to provide a 
single point of contact for the family to ensure ongoing messaging. Operation Arew highlighted 
the vital nature of the role in support of the whole-of-government response. Within 24 hours of 
the Incident Coordination Centre (ICC) being established, 26 FILOs (from a deployment 
capability of 30) were deployed to 23 different family groups, with an additional four deployed 
offshore to streamline the identification process. The Victorian Coroner was nominated as the 
central point of contact. All human remains were processed through the Victorian Institute of 
Forensic Medicine (VIFM) in Melbourne. The AFP FILO’s provided liaison between DFAT, the 
Victorian Coroner and associated officers and with the families in conjunction with State and 
Territory police. State and Territory DVI representatives were notified of all repatriations or 
cremations in The Netherlands. 
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Phase 4 Reconciliation 
This Phase involves case management, data mining, and comparison reports from PM and AM 
processes, to positively identify remains, supported by a stringent quality assurance process. 
Recovered remains were conveyed by Dutch and Australian military aircraft to The Netherlands 
and secured at a Dutch Air Force Base. This was a secure site and had large undercover areas 
available for the task at hand. This allowed co-location of both Phases 2 and 3. It also allowed 
on-site accommodation and messing for DVI staff and served to restrict access by the general 
public, including the media. Upon return to Australia, the remains were provided with a 
ceremonial guard of honour provided by the AFP Ceremonial and Protocol Officer (CAPO) 
network before the remains were handed over to the Coroner and eventually to the families in all 
parts of Australia. 
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Appendix F:388 INTERPOL 
 
The badge of the International Criminal Police Organisation (ICPO or OIPC: French Organisation 
Internationale de Police Criminelle) depicts a globe with Europe and Africa centred, surrounded 
by a wreath of olive leaves, symbolising peace, a vertical sword representing police action and 
scales, the universal symbol of justice. It contains the motto ‘INTERPOL’, and the acronyms 
ICPO/OIPC, as above. Australia is depicted in the bottom right. 
The vision of INTERPOL is ‘Connecting Police for a Safer World’ 
The four official languages of INTERPOL are: Arabic, English, French and Spanish. 
INTERPOL is the world’s oldest and largest international criminal intelligence organisation with 
a history dating from 1914, when the concept was first raised at the International Criminal Police 
Congress, held in Monaco. It was officially established as the International Criminal Police 
Commission (ICPC) in 1923. In 1926 the General Assembly, held in Berlin, proposed that each 
country establish a central point of contact within its police structure: the forerunner of the 
National Central Bureau (NCB), a structure which was adopted in 1927. The ICPC dealt primarily 
with currency counterfeiting, criminal records and passport forgery. In 1935 the ICPC launched 
an international radio network which provided independent telecommunications system solely for 
the use of the criminal police authorities at national levels. 
The following year in 1936 the German National Socialist Government took control of the ICPC 
after deposing its President, and moved the headquarters to Berlin in 1942. During this period the 
ICPC effectively ceased to function as most countries withdrew their participation. In 1946 
Belgium led the rebuilding of the ICPC and the headquarters was moved to Paris. Democratic 
processes were established for the election of the President and the Executive Committee. 
‘INTERPOL’ was chosen as the organisation’s telegraphic address. The organisation itself 
became known as INTERPOL in 1956. There are currently 190 member nations. In 1949 the 
United Nations granted consultative status as a non-government organisation and was granted 
recognition as an intergovernmental organisation in 1971. The General Secretariat of INTERPOL 
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moved to Lyon, France in 1989 and in 2003 established a Command and Control Centre at Lyon 
which enabled INTERPOL to operate on a 24 hour, seven day a week basis. INTERPOL 
maintains a Criminal Information System (ICIS) database which was established in 1998. It 
allows instant, direct access to a number of criminal databases which contain millions of records, 
contributed by countries across the world. The latest innovation for INTERPOL is the 
establishment of the INTERPOL Global Complex for Innovation in Singapore in 2015, which 
aims to combat cybercrime and assist police around the world address emerging threats through 
innovation and training. INTERPOL currently has 190 members, which provides global coverage 
for international criminal activities including international INTERPOL Red Notice arrest 
warrants under the INTERPOL Colour-Coded Notice System.  
The INTERPOL colour-coded notice system 
INTERPOL’s system of Notices is used to issue international alerts for fugitives, suspected 
criminals, persons linked to or of interest in an ongoing criminal investigation, persons and 
entities subject to UN Security Council Sanctions, potential threats, missing persons and dead 
bodies. Details are stored in a database known as the INTERPOL Criminal Information System, 
which also contains personal data and the criminal history of people subject to request for 
international police cooperation.  
The INTERPOL colour-coded notice system was established in 1946 as follows: (1) Red Notice 
- To seek the location and arrest of wanted persons with a view to extradition or similar lawful 
action; (2) Blue Notice -To collect additional information about a person’s identity, location or 
activities in relation to a crime; (3) Green Notice -To provide warnings and intelligence about 
persons who have committed criminal offences and are likely to repeat these crimes in other 
countries; (4) Yellow Notice -To help locate missing persons, often minors, or to help identify 
persons who are unable to identify themselves; (5) Black Notice -To seek information on 
unidentified bodies; (6) Orange Notice -To warn of an event, a person, an object or a process 
representing a serious and imminent threat to public safety; and (7) Purple Notice -To seek or 
provide information on modus operandi, objects, devices and concealment methods used by 
criminals. INTERPOL–United Nations Security Council Special Notice-Issued for groups and 
individuals who are the targets of UN Security Council Sanctions Committees.  
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INTERPOL: Types of notice 
 
Red Notice 
To seek the location and 
arrest of wanted persons 
with a view to extradition 
or similar lawful action.  
 
Yellow Notice 
To help locate 
missing persons, 
often minors, or to 
help identify persons 
who are unable to 
identify themselves.  
 
Blue Notice 
To collect additional 
information about a 
person’s identity, location 
or activities in relation to 
a crime.  
 
Black Notice 
To seek information 
on unidentified 
bodies.  
 
Green Notice 
To provide warnings and 
intelligence about persons 
who have committed 
criminal offences and are 
likely to repeat these 
crimes in other countries.  
 
Orange Notice 
To warn of an event, 
a person, an object or 
a process representing 
a serious and 
imminent threat to 
public safety.  
 
INTERPOL–United 
Nations Security Council 
Special Notice  
Issued for groups and 
individuals who are the 
targets of UN Security 
Council Sanctions 
Committees.   
Purple Notice 
To seek or provide 
information on modus 
operandi, objects, 
devices and 
concealment methods 
used by criminals.  
 
 
 
[https://www.interpol.int/] 
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INTERPOL areas of interest 
INTERPOL’s activities aren’t confined to terrorism. INTERPOL maintains a number of 
databases which are useful for criminal investigations. They include the following: 
(1) Fingerprints and DNA 
The International Child Sexual Exploitation Image Database; the Automatic Fingerprint 
Identification System (AFIS), the DNA profiles which contains DNA profiles from offenders, 
crime scenes, missing persons and unidentified bodies but does not store any nominal data linking 
a DNA profile to any individual. 
(2) Stolen and Lost Documents 
Stolen documents can be used by criminals to facilitate criminal activity, so INTERPOL 
maintains a Stolen and Lost Travel Documents (SLTD) and a Stolen Administrative Documents 
(SAD). INTERPOL also provides the EDISON (Electronic Documentation and Information 
System on Investigation Networks) which provides examples of genuine travel documents, in 
order to help identify fakes, which is extremely useful for border control agencies. 
(3) Stolen Property 
Stolen property, particularly motor vehicles, vessels and works of art are trafficked internationally 
and INTERPOL maintains a database for each. Noteworthy is the fact that the Works of Art 
database contains descriptions and pictures of cultural objects reported as stolen by INTERPOL 
member countries and international partners such as the International Council of Museums and 
UNESCO. It includes items looted during crisis periods in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. Items 
such as works of art are regularly trafficked by organised crime groups. 
(4) Firearms and Ballistics 
The INTERPOL Firearms Reference Table provides a standardised methodology to identify and 
describe firearms, and enables an investigator to obtain or verify the details of a firearm. The 
INTERPOL Ballistic Information Network provides a global platform for the centralised 
collection, storage and cross-comparison of ballistics imaging. The INTERPOL Illicit Arms 
Records and tracing Management System (iARMS) facilitates information exchange and 
cooperation between law enforcement agencies on firearm-related crime, and allows them to trace 
a firearm from the point of manufacture or of legal importation into a country, through the lines 
of supply to the last known point of possession. 
(5) Radiological and nuclear materials 
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The Project Geiger database is used to collate and analyse information on illicit trafficking and 
other unauthorised activities involving radiological and nuclear materials. It combines data from 
the International Atomic Energy Agency, open-source reports and law enforcement channels. 
(6) Maritime piracy 
The maritime piracy database stores intelligence related to cases of piracy and armed robbery at 
sea, including data on individuals, telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, piracy incidents, 
locations, businesses and financial information.  
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